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2007 (12) TMI 551 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... n the letter dated 24.08.2000 did not confer any legal right, Mr. Ram Prakash, would submit that an administrative order may also confer a legal right. No doubt, it was so stated in Union of India v. K.P. Joseph and Ors. 1973 2SCR752 but then it was a case where an executive order was passed which was within the jurisdiction of the State in terms of the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The Bench, it is interesting to note, hastened to add 11. We should not be understood as laying down any general proposition on this question. But we think that the Order in question conferred upon the first respondent the right to have his pay fixed in the manner specified in the Order and that was part of the conditions of his service. We see no reason why the Court should not enforce that right. 31. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of this case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2007 (12) TMI 550 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e remitted the matter back to the High Court for consideration thereof on merit of the appeal, but as we have ourselves looked to the records of the case, we are of the opinion that interest of justice would be subserved if we set aside the ex-parte decree dated 19.4.1990. We direct accordingly. 13. This order shall, however, be subject to the condition that the appellants shall deposit a further sum of Rs.1 lakh before the Executing Court which shall be subject to the outcome of the suit. Appellants shall further pay a sum of Rs. 25,000/- to the respondent towards costs. The respondent shall be entitled to withdraw the sum deposited by the appellants, upon furnishing security. 14. Appellants may file written statements before the Trial Court within six weeks and the learned Trial Judge may consider the desirability of disposing of the suit within three months from the date of receipt of this order. The appeal is disposed of with the aforementioned observations and direction.
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2007 (12) TMI 549 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... re by applying the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in JANAKI RAM BAHADUR RAM's case , it cannot be held that it is a business transaction. in JANAKI RAM BAHADUR RAM's case, the property was purchased and was sold immediately in order to gain profit. Under such circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it amounts to business income. But on facts, in the case when the assessee was running the hotel for several years and after closing down the hotel if the assessee has sold the property to different persons for sale consideration, it cannot be said to be business income, since the partnership deed does not permit the assessee to venture into such transaction. Because, the main business of the Firm was to run a hotel and not to purchase the property and develop the same and thereafter sold the property for profit. In the circumstances, we are answering the questions of law against the revenue. 7. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
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2007 (12) TMI 548 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ected by the learned Trial Judge by order dated 13.5.1995. A revision petition was filed there against and the High Court also rejected the said contention. It is not a case where stricto sensu the provisions of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could have been invoked. The very fact that such an application was got filed by PW-1 nine months after his deposition is itself pointer to the fact that he had been won over. It is absurd to contend that he, after a period of four years and that too after his examination-in-chief and cross-examination was complete, would file an application on his own will and volition. The said application was, therefore, rightly dismissed. 39. We, therefore, dismiss Criminal appeal Nos. 382-386 of 2004 Umar Mohammad and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and allow Criminal Appeal No. 387 of 2004 Jamallu son of Asheen v. State of Rajasthan . If Jamallu is in custody, he shall be released forthwith unless wanted in connection with any other case.
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2007 (12) TMI 547 - CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
... ... ... ... ..... ring hearing that the Tribunal has passed an order rejecting the request of the appellant for inspection of the document, but supporting documents have not been submitted before the Commission. Under these circumstances, the matter is, therefore, remanded back to the first Appellate Authority with the following directions - a. He will determine whether there is any judicial order of the Tribunal pronounced under the Income Tax Act as regards disclosure of the information sought by the appellant and if it is so, the remedy available to the appellant shall be under the Income Tax law and not under the RTI Act. b. If there is no such judicial order from the Tribunal, in that case, the first Appellate Authority will consider the appeal under the provisions of the Income Tax Act read with the Right to Information Act and will pass a speaking order within a fortnight from the date of the receipt of this order. 52. The appeal is accordingly remanded to the First Appellate Authority.
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2007 (12) TMI 546 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... hicle being used for such purpose that the State of Gujarat which owned the vehicle also caused or allowed any driver of the Municipality who was engaged in the work of distribution of water to the citizens, to use motor vehicle for the purpose. Therefore, when the vehicle was driven by the driver of the Municipality and the accident resulted due to his negligence, the insurer of the vehicle became liable to pay the compensation under the provisions of the Act. It is, therefore, held that the State, as the owner of the vehicle and the respondent Insurance Company as its insurer were also liable to pay the compensation awarded by the Tribunal 18. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the State shall be liable to pay the amount of compensation to the claimants and not the registered owner of the vehicle and consequently the appellant herein. 19. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be upheld. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
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2007 (12) TMI 545 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... anging times. The RDB Act does not provide the creation of any interest like security interest as is created by the SARFAESI Act. 23. The legislative competence as regards SARFAESI Act falls easily within Entries 6 and 7 of List III and thereby within the competence of the Union, even as regards the co-operative banks. The impugned notification, issued by the Central Government, therefore, stands. 24. For the aforesaid reasons, the issues regarding the applicability of SARFAESI Act to the Kerala State Co-operative Bank, the District Co-operative Banks and the Urban Co-operative Banks and the validity of notification dated 28-1-2003 issued by the Central Government, in exercise of power under Section 2(1)(c)(v) of the SARFAESI Act, are answered against the petitioners and these writ petitions are dismissed, preserving the right of the petitioners for appropriate statutory remedies in terms of the provisions in the SARFAESI Act. No costs. A reproduction from ILR (Kerala Series)
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2007 (12) TMI 544 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it. 16. As noted above, the accepted concept of an industry cannot be applied to the Law department of the Government. 17. That being so, the view expressed by the Labour Court and the High Court is indefensible. However, it appears that the respondent has been reinstated to the post he was holding at the time of termination. In view of this fact, even though we have held that the orders passed are clearly unsustainable. We leave it to the appellant to consider whether the respondent can be continued, in view of the fact that he worked for some years. 18. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent without any order as to costs.
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2007 (12) TMI 543 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... order regarding sentence. However, it is an admitted position that the statement of affairs is filed late by 384 days. Considering the explanation tendered before the Official Liquidator as well as submissions made before this Court, the Court is of the view that this is not a case where harsh view is required to be taken. Looking to the age of the accused and circumstances in which they were put, some delay is bound to be there for which they should not be penalized. 8. Considering the overall view of the matter and looking to the provisions contained in the Act, interest of justice would better be served if the accused are penalized by way of fine of Rs.2,500/- each. Accordingly, the accused are penalized by way of fine of Rs. 2,500/- each and they are directed to pay the said amount to the Official Liquidator within four weeks from today. 9. Subject to the aforesaid directions, the accused are absolved from their liability and this criminal case is accordingly disposed of.
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2007 (12) TMI 542 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... s stipulated under Section 200 Cr.P.C are complied with, the learned Magistrate cannot proceed further on the basis of the complaint made. In the absence of dismissal of a complaint on merits, there is no bar for filing even a second complaint on the same set of facts and allegations. 11. Under such circumstances, I am of the considered view that no prejudice has been caused to the accused/petitioner and the contentions that the endorsement dated 10.04.2003 must be taken as final order and that the respondent/complainant has only appeal remedy against such endorsement are not well founded. It follows that the action of the learned Magistrate in taking the complaint on file is well within his jurisdiction and is in consonance with the procedure prescribed under the Code and therefore, the present petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the proceedings is not well founded. The petition stands dismissed as devoid of merits. Consequently, the connected Crl.M.P is closed.
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2007 (12) TMI 541 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... issued by the proprietorship firm, is a valid prosecution. 9. Counsel for the appellant contended that the punishment awarded to the appellant was too harsh. The appellant was having an invalid son under some disability and he was a sole bread-earner of the family and the sentence of the appellant may be reduced looking in that fact in mind. 10. Considering the age of the appellant and the burden of the family on the appellant, the sentence awarded by the trial Court is modified. The appellant is sentenced to penalty of Rs.1,50,000, out of which 1,40,000 be paid to the complainant and Rs.10,000 be deposited in the State fund. The appellant has already paid the penalty awarded by the trial Court. Let the same be released in favour of the respondent. The balance of penalty amount be deposited by the appellant within one month from today, failing which appellant shall undergo sentence of 3 months imprisonment. With these modifications in the sentence, the appeal is disposed of.
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2007 (12) TMI 540 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... learned senior counsel for the complainant that the accused has not probabilised his evidence either by leading evidence of his own or the cross examination of the complainant must be rejected. The trial Court has considered the evidence of the complainant and of the accused in proper perspective and has rightly held that the accused has rebutted the presumption by bringing the facts on record in the cross-examination of the complainant which made his case improbable. The findings recorded by the trial Court in any case cannot be termed as perverse nor could the complainant point out any manifest error of law in the judgment and, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. None of the judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the complainant are of any avail to the complainant for seeking reversal of the order of acquittal into an order of conviction. In the result the appeals are dismissed. The judgments and orders passed in both the cases stand confirmed.
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2007 (12) TMI 539 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... sions arrived at by the State Commission that there was a legal deficiency in the matter of payment of the amounts in cash instead of in cheque. 12. It is well-settled law that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 has a wide reach and the Commission has jurisdiction even in cases of service tendered by the statutory authorities and such authorities become liable to compensate for misfeasance in public office, that is an act which is oppressive or capricious or arbitrary or negligent provided, loss or injury is suffered by a citizen, In the instant case, having regard to the facts and circumstances, the State Commission was fully justified in recording a finding that on account of the petitioners' action being capricious and oppressive has occasioned grave injustice to the respondent The State Forum being statutorily obliged to award circumstances, is justified in directing payment of ₹ 50,000/- as compensation to the complainant. Writ petition is accordingly, rejected.
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2007 (12) TMI 538 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... s. (2007) 3 SCC 538 . 23. The expression 'just' must also be given its logical meaning. Whereas it cannot be a bonanza or a source of profit but in considering as to what would be just and equitable, all facts and circumstances must be taken into consideration. 24. In view of our finding abovementioned, the appeal is to be allowed in part in so far as the High Court had directed deduction of medical reimbursement and tax elements on the entire sum which according to the statute constitute income. But we decline to do so for two reasons. Firstly, the accident had taken place as far back as on 1st September, 1997 and secondly the Tribunal as also the High Court failed to take into consideration rise in income of the deceased by way of promotion or otherwise. 27. For the aforementioned reasons, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2007 (12) TMI 537 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... with the following conclusions of the First Appellate Court as affirmed by the High Court in Second Appeal (a) that the activities of threatening to kill the plaintiff, beating the son of the plaintiff and abusing him with filthy language would amount to nuisance and annoyance, furnishing a ground of eviction under Clause (e) of Section 13 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956; (b) that causing damage to the collapsible gate of the tenanted portion and putting up a concrete elevation of the floor, would amount to doing acts contrary to the provisions of Clauses (m), (o) and (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, thereby furnishing a ground of eviction under Clause (b) of Section 13(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. 14. Consequently, we find no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed accordingly. However, the appellant is granted two months' time to deliver vacant possession of the suit premises to the respondents. No costs.
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2007 (12) TMI 536 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... estigate into the case is patently invalid and unsustainable in law. In view of this finding of ours we need not go into the questions, whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act applies to the consent given under Section 6 of the Act and whether consent given for investigating into Crime No. 246 of 1994 was redundant in view of the general consent earlier given by the State of Kerala. We do not see any application of the said ratio herein. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. 14. Mr. Rai submitted that the High Court did not go into the other contentions raised by the respondent in quashing the application. We have examined the application filed by the respondent under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and are satisfied that the respondent herein only raised the contention of validity of the chargesheet filed upon completion of the second investigation. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is allowed.
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2007 (12) TMI 535 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... 8377; 2,25,000/- advanced by the plaintiff, but also promised to pay the said amount within six months i.e., on or before 10.6.2001. It is true that Ex. A1 agreement did not refer to the fact that the debt was already barred by limitation by that date. However, the recitals in the said document contained an express promise to pay the debt due to the plaintiff. 15. Hence, the finding of fact recorded by the Courts below that Ex. A1 agreement is an acknowledgment of the liability of the 1st defendant in respect of the debt availed by him in the year 1997 does not suffer from any infirmity. Consequently the suit cannot be held to be barred by limitation. Though no specific issue was framed, the trial Court as well as the lower Appellate Court for different reasons held that the suit was not barred by limitation. The said conclusion being in accordance with the settled principles of law warrants no interference by this Court. Accordingly, the second appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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2007 (12) TMI 534 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... and any proceedings adopted thereunder will also be without jurisdiction. 12. In view of the discussion made above there cannot be any escape from the conclusion that the Designated Court had no jurisdiction to try and convict the appellant under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 in view of the fact that it could not have taken cognizance of the offence under TADA for lack of sanction by the competent authority under Section 20A(2) of TADA. In view of the fact that the Designated Court could not try the offence under TADA being debarred from taking cognizance thereof on account of want of sanction by the competent authority under the mandatory provisions of Section 20A(2), it could not try any offence under any other Act as well. 13. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the conviction of the appellant under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and the sentence imposed thereunder are set aside. The appellant shall be released forthwith unless wanted in some other case.
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2007 (12) TMI 533 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... mmitted by it in not rejecting plaint, nor returning it for presentation to proper Court. 'Applicability of Hong Kong Law', 'entering into an agreement in Hong Kong' or 'defendant residing in Ghaziabad (Uttar Pradesh)' or any of them does not take away the jurisdiction of Delhi Court since a 'cause of action' at least in part, can be said to have arisen in Delhi. We, therefore, see no substance in the contention of the defendant- appellant. 32. So far as imposition of costs is concerned, normally it is in the discretion of the Court. When the Court, in the light of the facts before it, satisfied that the defendant wanted to delay the proceedings and ordered him to pay costs of ₹ 4,000/-, it would not be appropriate to interfere with that part of the order. 33. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstance of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2007 (12) TMI 532 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... olition or it was obtained under coercion. It is also seen that within a short time the respondent had been transferred by the complainant from Bangalore to Mumbai and mat the respondent has returned back from Mumbai expressing his genuine difficulties. Hence, it is purely a matter of civil transaction which the Civil Court has to adjudicate and ascertain as to whether there is a breach of contract or there is any violation of conditions of the agreement and whether the very conduct of the complainant is without any blemish, in a separate enquiry to be held if need be. When the cheque is dishonoured for non-payment and the respondent has come out with a probable defense, then the presumption is rebutted and the respondent cannot be held responsible and the appellant cannot proceed against the respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. For the foregoing reasons, the application filed seeking leave is rejected and consequently, the appeal is also dismissed.
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