|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 91 Records
-
1961 (3) TMI 130 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rmation was given up but that would be immaterial because even in the previous proceedings the want of definite information was not the reason for setting aside the assessment. In these circumstances, it would appear that the amendment of section 34 in no way brought about any change in the nature or validity of the proceedings under section 34 in respect of this interest income and consequently the mere fact that there was an amendment would give no right to the department to take a fresh proceedings. Consequently, our view earlier that the final order passed by the Tribunal on April 25, 1949, was a bar to the proceedings subsequently taken under the notice dated January 19, 1950, remains unaltered. As a result of the question referred to us is answered in the negative. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference which we fix at ₹ 400. The same amount shall be treated as the fee of learned counsel for the department. Question answered in the negative.
-
1961 (3) TMI 129 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nd the Government. To judge such an action with the same rigour with which a judicial enquiry or trial is judged is to convert the enquiry into a civil suit. The appellant was fully heard by the Claims Officer, and the only question was whether the claim was within time. Even there, the Member, Board of Revenue, asked the appellant to submit all documents and arguments in support of his contention that the claim was within limitation, and to that extent, the appellant had his say. Whether the Member, Board of Revenue should have gone further and given a viva voce hearing was a matter entirely for that Officer to choose, and there was nothing under the law to compel him. Though we think that such an opportunity might have been afforded to the appellant, we cannot say that this was a matter which entitled him to a writ. In this view of the matter, the appeals fail, and are dismissed. But, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
-
1961 (3) TMI 128 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... de." The reference regarding this last sentence is to the decision in Lagunas Nitrate Co.'s case (supra). Two points emerge from this passage, namely, that there appears to be no significance attached to the use of the word "pay" or "declare" regarding directors' power with respect to interim dividends and that the learned editors, the latest of whom is Lord Simonds, former Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, have interpreted the decision in Lagunas Nitrate Co.'s case (supra) as meaning that a resolution of the directors for payment of interim dividend may be rescinded before payment has been made, there being no reference to the fixing of any date for payment. In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the decision of the authorities and the Tribunal was correct in this case and that the question propounded for our consideration is to be answered in the affirmative. The Commissioner will have his costs from assessee. Capoor J.-I agree.
-
1961 (3) TMI 127 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Income-tax 1952 22 ITR 484 (SC). The money received from an insurance company under a "consequential loss policy" was held to be a receipt inseparably connected with the ownership and conduct of the business and arising from it. This again in our opinion is not a case which affords guidance to us in the present case. As observed by their Lordships in this case "income" must be read with reference to the particular facts of each case. In the present case the agreement was not incidental to the carrying on of the assessee's business but was one which determined initially the structure in or conditions under which the assessee's business could be carried on. In the light of the above observations we are of opinion that the question referred to this court should be answered in the negative. We would like to express our thankfulness to Mr. R.S. Pathak and Mr. Gopal Behari for the elaborate and lucid arguments they have advanced in this difficult case.
-
1961 (3) TMI 126 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... December, 1944, to 30th November, 1945. The business profits tax reference for the chargeable accounting period from 1st December, 1947, to 30th November, 1948, will be covered by the decision of the Supreme Court for the period from 1st December, 1947, to 31st March, 1948, but not for the chargeable accounting period from 1st April, 1948, to 30th November, 1948, and 1st December, 1948, to 31st March, 1949. We, therefore, answer the question under reference as under "On the facts and circumstances of the case the collections by the assessee company described in its accounts as 'empty bottle return security deposits' were not income assessable under section 10 of the Income-tax Act in so far as the collections have been made after 1st April, 1948, and to the extent allowable under rule 40, sub-rule (14), clause (f) of the Punjab Liquor Licence Rules as amended." In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs of this reference.
-
1961 (3) TMI 125 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... depart from the finding given by the earlier Tribunal. Now, in the instant case, it was incumbent on the Income-tax Officer to duly scrutinise the partnership deed and see whether the requirements of section 26A, sub-section (1), had been satisfied before granting registration of the firm. As we have already stated, on the scrutiny of the deed, the requirements do not appear- to have been fulfilled. It, therefore, cannot be said that the registration of the firm made by the Income-tax Officer in the years 1951-53 and 1952-53 was made by them after due scrutiny of the material on record. In these circumstances, in our view, there was no bar in the way of the income-tax authorities to refuse to renew the registration of the firm in the year 1953-54. For the reasons stated above, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the Department. No order on the notice of motion. No order as to costs therein as they are not pressed.
-
1961 (3) TMI 124 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... r the disposal of the appeal or one which is incidental to it. Therefore, the proviso would apply to cases where the appellate or revisional authority finds that the income was received in any particular year. As we held earlier, it will also apply to a case where it is held that the income was not received during the year with which the authority was concerned. In such a case it would be for the Income-tax Officer to investigate afresh as to in which year the income was received. In either case, the action taken by the Income-tax Officer under section 34 would be the result of or the logical consequence of the finding arrived at for the purpose of the disposal of the appeal by the appellate authority. We are, therefore, of opinion that the Income-tax Officer acted within his jurisdiction in initiating proceedings under section 34 in the instant cases. The writ petitions fail and are dismissed. The rule nisi is discharged. The petitioner will pay the costs of the department.
-
1961 (3) TMI 123 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t it seems to us that apart from the employment of Dr. Ganguli there are other good reasons for the company's progress, for instance the increase in turnover, and the profits of the business, in the instant case, took place because the appellant-company had gradually increased its capital from 5.87 lakhs in 1950 to 8.6 lakhs in 1955. It is common knowledge that very often the increase of capital enables a company to raise its production and to earn higher profits. Moreover there is another special reason why such improvement took place. At the relevant time there were restrictions on import of enamelware. As a result there was greater demand of the enamel goods in the market and consequential increase of profit. Considering all these circumstances we find no reason to disturb the order of the Tribunal. For the reasons stated above, the answer to the question should be in the affirmative and against the assessee who will pay the costs of this reference. Mitter J.-I agree.
-
1961 (3) TMI 122 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... es an answer to his argument. Lord's Dairy Farm Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1955 27 ITR 700 (Bom.) has also no parallel here. It seems to be of the same category as Badridas Daga v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1958 34 ITR 10 (SC). It was also a case of a cashier of the assessee withdrawing monies from the bank and bringing them to the office and defalcating various sums of money between May, 1946, and April, 1947. Chagla C.J. and Tendolkar J. ruled that it was necessary for the assessee to employ a cashier and to depute to him the duty of withdrawing monies from the bank and the loss arose directly from his business. Therefore this case does not give any assistance to the assessee. For these reasons, we hold that the opinion of the Tribunal that the amount in question was a loss in trade is unsustainable and that the view of the department is correct. In the result, we answer the reference in favour of the Revenue. The assessee will pay the costs of the department.
-
1961 (3) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... a different footing, but it is conceded that no cause of action against him survived, because the appeal has abated against him. Mohabat Singh, who is the third defendant, cannot be described as an agent of the ex-Ruler, because his connection with the orders placed was merely to sign the letters purporting to emanate from the Military Secretary. Those letters he signed "for the Military Secretary". He was not acting as the agent of the ex-Ruler but was performing the ministerial act of signing the letters on behalf of the Military Secretary. This cannot be said to have constituted him an agent. The suit against him was, therefore, misconceived, whatever might have been said of the Military Secretary. In our opinion, the dismissal of the suit was justified in the circumstances of the case. The appeal fails, and is dismissed with costs. The appellant will pay court-fee on the memorandum of appeal, as he was allowed to file this appeal as a pauper. Appeal dismissed.
-
1961 (3) TMI 120 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that if the impugned tax could not be imposed by the Union Legislature under the cover of entry 86 it would be intra vires the same by virtue of the provision of article 248 read with entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. I have, however, already said above that it is entry 86 and not 97 read with article 248 which empowered the Union Legislature to enact the impugned provision. For the reasons already mentioned and on the basis of the conclusions given above it must be held that section 3 of the Act is intra vires the Union Legislature by virtue of entry 86 of List I of the Seventh schedule of the Constitution. I would, therefore, dismiss all these petitions with costs. The case was ably argued both by Mr. B.L. Gupta and Mr. Gopal Behari from whom we received considerable assistance. BY THE COURT.--We accordingly dismiss all these nine writ petitions with costs. We assess the fee of the standing counsel for the department at ₹ 200 per case. Petitions dismissed.
-
1961 (3) TMI 119 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rjee on the other hand has contended that the Liquidator acts as representative of the Court and not of the Company and has referred to (1885) 10 AC 210, Metropolitan Bank v. Pooley, as an authority for that proposition. 12. Even if in certain respects the Liquidator acts as representative of the Court, there is no conflict to his acting as representative of the Company as well in other respects. So I do not find any difficulty in accepting Mr. Matter's contention and as a result I hold that the proceeding now pending before the learned Presidency Magistrate is a proceeding in effect and for all intents and purposes a proceeding by the banking company, and that the prosecution is in the course of winding up proceeding within, the meaning of Section 45F of the Banking Companies Act. 13. The result is that the decision of the learned Presidency Magistrate passed order dated the 20th August, 1959 must be held to be a correct decision and the present Rule must be discharged.
-
1961 (3) TMI 118 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the partnership business no doubt continues for the purpose of winding up. One of such purpose is to realise the partnership assets. This authority may include the right to institute suit for the purpose of recovering the partnership assets. But what would be the form of the suit? What is the nature of the relief to be claimed? If there is already a suit for dissolution as is alleged being suit No. 2339 of 1953 in which a Receiver has been appointed, is the form of the present suit correct? These questions might have arisen and would have required an answer. These questions, however, were not seriously debated and having regard to my main decision in this suit, they need not be considered further. 20. For the reasons given above the suit fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case I direct the parties other than the guardian of the minor defendant to bear and pay their own costs. The costs of the guardian will be paid by the plaintiff assessed at ₹ 730/-.
-
1961 (3) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... is in our opinion is not correct as a fact, for, as pointed out by the High Court, there are documents on the record which show that S. N. Dutt gave himself out as a partner of Messrs. S. N. Dutt and Co., thus suggesting that S. N. Dutt and Co. was a firm. That was the reason why a plea was raised on behalf of the Union of India that the suit was barred under s. 69 of the Partnership Act as the firm was not a registered firm. 14. In this connection learned counsel for the appellant referred us to certain cases in which in similar circumstances the notice was considered to be valid under s. 80. These cases are Kamta Prasad v. Union of India (1957) 55 A.L.J. 299. and Secretary of State v. Sagarmal Marwari AIR1941Pat517 . . In view of what we have said above, we cannot agree with the view taken in these cases and must hold that they were wrongly decided. 15. In this view of the matter, there is no force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed with costs. 16. Appeal dismissed.
-
1961 (3) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... from such breach. That means that the respondent had to prove the market rate at Kanpur on the date of breach for similar goods and that would fix the amount of damages, in case that rate had gone above the contract rate on the (late of breach. We are therefore of opinion that this is not a case of the special type to which the words "which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it" appearing in s. 73 of the Contract Act apply. This is ,in ordinary case of contract between traders which is covered by the words "which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach" appearing in s. 73. As the respondent had failed to prove the rate for similar canvas in Kanpur on the date of breach it is not entitled to any damages in the circumstances. The appeal is therefore allowed, the decree of the High Court set aside and of the trial court restored with costs to the appellant throughout. Appeal allowed
-
1961 (3) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... a pleader is per se guarantee of the truth of the facts stated therein and also of the fact that it was actually sent by the person whose name it bears. In order to assure the Court about these matters an affidavit from the party would be necessary. Upon the materials before us we are satisfied that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was entitled to ignore the telegram as well as the application. We, therefore, hold that his refusal to act on the telegram did not amount to contempt of court. We may add that the fact that on receiving a copy of the High Court's order through the Additional District Magistrate not only were further proceedings stayed but a writ to redeliver possession was not permitted to issue. This would show clearly that there was no intention on the part either of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the second officer to disobey the order of the High Court. The conviction as also the fine of the appellant is erroneous and accordingly set aside. Appeal allowed.
-
1961 (3) TMI 114 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... action such as is alleged by the defendant, cannot be deemed to be a mortgage unless the condition of retransfer is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale. Under these circumstances, the Courts below were right in having rejected the defendant's contention. (7) Sri Dayanand in the course of his arguments pointed out that the plaintiff had admitted in the course of his evidence that the defendant was a tenant and Sri Dayanand sought to contend that by virtue of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, the possession of the defendant was not liable to be disturbed in execution of a decree of a civil court. No plea has been taken by the defendant in his written statement that he was a tenant; that being so , he cannot now be permitted to raise the contention for the first time, in Second Appeal, that he is a tenant. (8) This Second Appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs. (9) JE/M/K.S.B. (10) Appeal dismissed.
-
1961 (3) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rom the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal below that this letter amounts to an acknowledgment. The tenor of the letter shows that it is addressed by respondent 2 as mortgagor to respondent 1 as puisne mortgagee, it reminds him of his interest as such mortgagee in the property which would be put up for sale by the first mortgagee, and appeals to him to assist the avoidance of sale, and thus acquire the whole of the mortgagee's interest. It is common ground that no other relationship existed between the parties at the date of this letter, and the only subsisting relationship was that of mortgagee and mortgagor. This letter acknowledges the existence of the said jural relationship and amounts to a clear acknowledgment under s. 19 of the Limitation Act. It is conceded that if this letter is held to be an acknowledgment there can be no other challenge against the decree under appeal. 16. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 17. Appeal dismissed.
-
1961 (3) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d be considering the question of bona fides in respect of the numerous statements about the settlement of accounts in connection with the dissolution of business made in the deed of dissolution. We are satisfied, therefore., that the appellant Fazal Bhai had reasonable opportunity of being heard as regards the bona fides of the transactions mentioned in the deed of dissolution. As we have already mentioned in connection with the other appeal, the fact that the firm stood dissolved with effect from the date on which the deed of dissolution was executed can no longer be disputed. The effect of the Custodian's order in regard to the deed of dissolution merely is that the transactions mentioned in that deed on the purported basis of an earlier dissolution has been declared to be not bona fide and confirmation was refused of whatever transfers of properties were purported to have been effected by that deed. This appeal, is, therefore,, dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
-
1961 (3) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Cattle Trespass Act. In the case referred to in the endorsement of the appellant, the Orissa High Court had taken the view following the decision in Raghu Singh v. Abdul Wahab (1) that authorisation is necessary. The decision in Raghu Singh v. Abdul Wahab (1) was dissented from in Budhan Mahto v. Issur Singh (1) and it does not appear that this fact was brought to the notice of the Orissa High Court. The Legal Remembrancer to whom the matter was referred submitted a note which, according to the High Court, was "something ambiguous and did not deal with all questions--consequential and ancillary". In spite of that the appellant, in his endorsement, gave a direction to the Magistrates to ignore the decision of the High Court even though that was binding on them. We have not the least doubt that such a direction is a flagrant interference with the administration of justice by courts and a clear contempt of court. Upon this view we dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
|
