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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 91 Records
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1961 (3) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e possible in the case of a permanent lease granted -by a manager of a temple which is the owner of the property to prescribe for a limited permanent interest by adverse possession it would be impossible to do so in the case of a jagir, for the limitation in such a case would start to run against the heir from the date when his title accrues on the death of the previous heir and no advantage can be taken of any running of time against the previous holder of the jagir. Besides, in the case of such temple grants, long lapse of time may sometimes give rise to the inference that the alienation was in such circumstances as would justify a permanent lease. No such inference is however possible in the case of permanent leases granted by jagirdars. In this view therefore the case of the appellants that they have prescribed for the limited interest of a permanent lessee against the respondent must fail. The appeal therefore. fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (3) TMI 109 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o re-open the assessment and serve a notice on the assessee and thereafter to make a fresh assessment and add the respective sums of ₹ 16,875 as income of Parvatibai and another sum of ₹ 16,875 as income of Yeshwantrao to the income of the assessee as these sums represent the shares of Parvatibai and Yeshwantrao in the undisclosed income of ₹ 1,35,000. There are, however, difficulties in the way of Mr. Joshi. The question in this form was not raised before the Tribunal. Further, the other difficulty in the way of Mr. Joshi is that we are not dealing with the case arising out of the order of the Income-tax Officer of February 29, 1956, but of date July 31, 1956, consequent on the second notice issued on March 21, 1956, by the Income-tax Officer. For reasons stated above, in our opinion, the question referred to us will have be answered in the negative. Costs of the assessee of this reference shall be paid by the Department. Question answered in the negative.
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1961 (3) TMI 108 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the termination of his services and which the company ought to have paid to him on the said date. The amount, therefore, though granted by way of damages, was still an item of taxable income in the hands of the assessee. Even with regard to the amount of ₹ 625, therefore, the same was properly brought to tax by the income-tax authorities. In our opinion, therefore, none of the contentions raised by Mr. Thakkar is sustainable and the assessee's appeal as been rightly dismissed by the Tribunal. On the questions, which have been referred to us by the Tribunal in the present case, our answers accordingly will be as follows As to the first question our answer is that the sum of ₹ 42,000 could not be held as a payment solely as compensation for loss of employment within the meaning of Explanation 2 to section 7(1) of the Act. Our answer to the second question is in the affirmative. The assessee will pay the costs to the Department. Reference answered accordingly.
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1961 (3) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng to do. The learned Subordinate Judge accepted the case of the plaintiffs and held that the coal that was left in the encroached area was entirely lost to them by being rendered unworkable. The High Court accepted the finding. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that under the Rules the respondents could request the mining authorities to exempt them from the operation of rule 76 of the Indian Coal Mines Regulation, 1946, and if exemption was granted, they could remove the coal left by the appellant in the encroached area. This possibility of the respondents getting an exemption from the operation of the rule was not raised either before the learned Subordinate Judge or before the High Court. Nor can we hold in favour of the appellant on the basis of such a possibility. We, therefore, accept the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the courts below in respect to this issue. No other point was raised. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (3) TMI 106 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the admission fee for the particular entertainment cannot alter the nature of what is collected on behalf of the Government or of the obligation on the part of the person so collecting to transfer the entirety of the amount so collected from the public. The amount thus collected not being the income of the person providing the entertainment would not form his property so that he can in case there is any payment by mistake recover it back. What was paid to the Government was what was collected on its behalf; if there was an excess collection made, the person aggrieved is the person who paid. The appellant could have no cause of action in respect of such excess collection which was made and paid over to the Government. 8. Agreeing with the lower court, we are of opinion that the excess amount of tax paid to the Government by the appellant was not his property so as to entitle him to recover such excess payment from the Government. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1961 (3) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... itself struck down on the ground of excessive delegation, though it was further held that the executive order contained no finding and no statement of the grounds of the President's action in enacting the prohibition. This case in our opinion is not in point so far as the matter before us is concerned, for there the section itself was struck down and in consequence the executive order passed thereunder was bound to fall. We are therefore of opinion that s. 3 of the Act is constitutional so far as els. (c), (d) and (g) are concerned and orders Nos. 615 and 671 passed on March 15, 1951 are legal and valid. In the circumstances it is not necessary to consider whether the High Court was right in holding that the orders of references in these cases were special orders under s. 3 and the references under those orders were therefore valid. In this view of the matter, the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1961 (3) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he party in whose favour he gave a decision; nor can another subordinate officer of the Custodian, who made the decision and who has no statutory duty to appear before the Custodian to put forward the case of the department or lead evidence in support thereof, be equated to a party in a lis. We, therefore, bold, having regard to the scheme of the Act, that the Assistant Custodian, Headquarters, Patna, is not a person aggrieved within the meaning of s. 24 of the Act. The appeal to the Custodian, therefore, was not competent. In this view, the second question does not fall to be considered. In the result, the order of the High Court is set aside and we direct the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Custodian of Evacuee Property Bihar, dated April 26, 1954 setting aside the order of the Assistant Custodian, Giridih, releasing the holdings Nos. 326, 774 and 654 in Giridih belonging to the appellant. The appeal is allowed with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (3) TMI 103 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng as regards assessment from a registered firm. The learned judges in that case were at pains to point out at more than one place that it was not necessary for them in that case to consider the legal position of a registered firm as it was admitted that the firm in that case was not registered before the relevant period. In express terms at page 284 the learned judges have observed that it was not necessary in that case to express their view on the legal status of a registered firm. This decision is not of much help to the respondent in this case. In our view, the assessee is entitled to claim the benefit of the loss which he had incurred during Samvat year 2009 and is entitled to set off such loss as against the income earned by the assessee as a partner in the firm in question during Samvat years 2010 and 2011. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative. The respondent will pay to the assessee the costs of the reference. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1961 (3) TMI 102 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hich can served to support the argument of the learned counsel. Lastly, it was claimed by the department that this amount of 14,237 dollars is made up of items which cannot properly come within the scope of revenue expenditure. It seems to us that this contention is not open to the department. All the departmental officers and the Tribunal have proceeded on the footing that these items of expenditure were in fact incurred for purposes of superintendence, wedding, etc., that is to say, which would normally be regarded as revenue expenditure. It is not open to the department to ask us to investigate at this stage the nature of the various items going to make up this total. We must proceed on the footing that no part of this sum represented any expenditure on a capital head of account. We answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Councils fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1961 (3) TMI 101 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ave been necessary for the Tribunal to take evidence and it would have been only thereafter that the Tribunal could have correctly formed an opinion whether this replacement was or was not in the nature of a repair. While such facts still required investigation, the Tribunal could very justifiably hold that it was not an appropriate case where a new ground should be allowed to be raised before it, when it was not raised before the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who could have more properly investigated those facts. In the circumstances, even the question as reframed by us in the form in which it actually arises out of the appellate order of the Tribunal must be answered against the assessee. We accordingly answer the questions as indicated above. In the circumstances of this case we direct that parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. We fix the fee of learned counsel for the department at ₹ 250. Questions answered accordingly.
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1961 (3) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... idence in the case would be legal evidence on the basis of which the custodian-General held that the presumption raised under s. 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was rebutted. The Custodian-General stated in his order as follows "It cannot be denied that prima facie a negotiable instrument which had been endorsed shall be taken to have been drawn for consideration. But if there is evidence to prove that there was no consideration for the endorsement then there can be no presumption to that effect. As I have set out above the evidence and the circumstances of the case negative the fact that the promissory note was endorsed for consideration." The proposition of law enunciated by the Custodian-General is correct and on the basis of the relevant legal evidence he held that the presumption was rebutted. The order of the Custodian-General is, therefore, correct both in law and in fact. 4. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (3) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ision was given are entirely different from the circumstances of the present case. In that case the contents of notice were changed; while formerly what was required was a notice without any particular period, the amendment required a notice of one year. There was no provision in the Amending Act making notices which were in accordance with the previous law ineffective. In these circumstances the Calcutta High Court was right in holding that the amendment did not affect notices already given. No such question however arises in the present case. The period of notice is the same before and after the amendment in the present case, and what we have to see is whether the crucial date for the application of the new sub-section (2-A) is the date of the notice or the date of the termination of the tenancy. We have already held that that date must be the date of the termination of the tenancy. In the circumstances the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (3) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pend on whether there has been actual inconsistency. I have found that there has been adoption in the present case and the prosecution of the appeal will result in the conduct of the appellant becoming inconsistent. That is, all that I decide. Before leaving the case, I think I ought to observe that the fact that the appellant had withdrawn the money after he had obtained leave from this Court makes no difference to the applicability of the principle. It was by such withdrawal that he adopted the decree and thereafter he is precluded from proceeding with the appeal. There is as much inconsistency in the present case as there would have been, if the appellant had withdrawn the money before he had obtained the leave. For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal with costs. By COURT In accordance with the majority judgment, the preliminary objection is overruled. The appeal will now be set down for hearing on merits. Preliminary objection overruled. Appeal set down for hearing.
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1961 (3) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... said to have been arbitrarily made. The formation of a different class of those who retired after September 8, 1948, from those who had retired before that date on which the decision was taken is a reasonable classification and does not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. This contention is therefore also rejected. The High Court was therefore right in our opinion in holding that there was a reasonable classification of the ministerial servants who had been retired under Rule 2046 (2) (a) on attaining the age of 55 into two classes one class consisting of those who had been retired after September 8, 1948, and the other consisting of those who retired up to September 8, 1948. There is, therefore, no denial of equal protection of laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs, as the appellant is a pauper. We make no order under Order XIV, rule 9 of the Supreme Court Rules. Appeal dismissed.
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1961 (3) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
main objection- is that the tax has not been laid upon "passengers and goods" as authorised by Entry No. 56 but upon "fares and freights", which are different entities.
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1961 (3) TMI 95 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of section 12(2). Mr. Mitra also relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court Ormerods (India) Private Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax(6) and a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Chhail Behari Lal v. Commissioner of Income-tax(7), which simply follows the Bombay case, in support of his contention. These cases have been dealt with at length by my learned brother and so I do not propose to deal with them over again. In my view the decision of the Patna High Court in Kameshwar Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax(8) is based on a correct reading of the scope and implication of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Eastern Investments Co.'s case and is more in accord with the textual interpretation that should reasonably be put upon sub-section (2) of section 12. In my view, the finding of the Tribunal is correct and the question should be answered in the negative as proposed by my learned brother. Question answered in the negative. Question answered in the negative.
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1961 (3) TMI 94 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erefore referred to a third Judge. Now in accordance with the opinion of the third judge who has agreed with one of us, which thus constitutes the majority opinion, we answer the question referred to us in the negative. We have also heard learned counsel for the parties further on the question as to what should be our order for costs in view of the circumstances in which this question is being answered in favour of the department. After hearing learned counsel, we are inclined to the view that in the circumstances of this case it would be fair to let parties bear their own costs of the reference and we direct accordingly. The fee of learned counsel for the department is fixed at ₹ 300, in view of the fact that the learned counsel had to appear before a third Judge to whom the question of law had been referred in addition to the hearing which were had before us when we were of the view that the amount of fee should only be ₹ 200. Question answered in the negative.
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1961 (3) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hirty days after the making of the order" used in the said sections means within thirty days after the date on which the communication of the order reached the parties affected by it. These decisions show that where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned. Therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court of Allahabad was in error in coming to the conclusion that the application made by the appellant in the present proceedings was barred under the proviso to s. 18 of the Act. In the result we allow the appeal, set aside the orders passed by Mootham, C. J. and Chaturvedi, J., and restore those of Mehrotra, J. In the circumstances of this case there would be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1961 (3) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s of the said impugned statute. Mr. Ayyangar 'for the petitioner realised the difficulties in his way, and so he attempted to argue that the contentions which he wanted to raise in his present petition are put in a different form, and in support of this argument he has invited am attention to grounds 8 and 10 framed by him in paragraph X of the petition. We are satisfied that a change in the form of attack against the impugned statute would make no difference to the true legal position that the writ petition in the High Court and the present writ petition are directed against the same statute and the grounds raised by the petitioner in that behalf are substantially the same. Therefore the decision of the High Court pronounced by it on the merits of the petitioner's writ petition under Art. 226 is a bar to the making of the present petition, under Art. 32. In the result this writ petition fails and is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1961 (3) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
Whether respondents 1 and 2 have cancelled the licences in circumstances which amounted to a denial of its right to be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard, as provided by cl. 10 of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, before the impugned 'orders were passed and thus arbitrarily and without authority of law deprived the petitioner of its fundamental right to carry on its business under Art. 19 of the constitution?
Held that:- It is not necessary to enter into details of that correspondence, because the proposed action under cl. 8 is not the subject-matter of the present proceeding. It is enough to state that from what happened after the receipt of the letter dated July 2, 1960, it is abundantly clear that the petitioner has bad no real opportunity of being heard with regard to the ground alleged in the letter, before the cancellation orders were made on August 3, 1960. There was, in our opinion, a clear violation of the requirement of cl. 10, which embodies the principles of natural justice. The cancellation orders are, therefore, bad and must be quashed. We allow the writ petitions .
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