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Showing 21 to 40 of 49 Records
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1959 (5) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gs, without giving away particulars which would prejudice them and this suggestion has been accepted and carried out by filing an affidavit of D.G. Prodhan affirmed on the 23rd March, 1959. The deponent in this affidavit is the Income-tax Officer who recorded his reasons and issued the notice. An extract from his affidavit has been set out above. In my opinion, this is a sufficient disclosure to the assessee, and no further disclosure should be permitted at this stage. In my opinion, the Income- tax Officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the income, profits and gains chargeable to income had escaped assessment during the relevant years and that the notice issued by him under section 34(IA) of the Income-tax Act was valid and proper and that the petitioner is not entitled to any further disclosure at this stage. The application is, therefore, dismissed. The rule is discharged. Interim orders, if any, are vacated. There will be order as to costs. Application dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 42 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ose who are responsible for the levy and collection of the tax. This is calculated to ensure impartial decision of the questions raised at the assessment. The provisions relating to a reference to the High Court and then an appeal to the Supreme court further ensure that the law will be correctly interpreted and applied. As observed by my Brother Bhargava, J., the facts in Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh state Road Transport Corporation 1959 Supp1. (1) S.C.R. 319 were quite different and the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in that case does not apply to the present application. Before parting with this judgment, I must acknowledge the help received from the illuminating and learned arguments addressed by Mr. R.S. Pathak for the applicants and Mr. Gopal Behari for the Department. For the reasons given above, I am of opinion that section 34(1A) offends article 14 of the Constitution and is invalid. I would, therefore, allow the applications with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eighbouring house. The tenant is not bound by the contract to give any preferential treatment to the lodger. He may take his turn along with others, and when he is served, he is served not in his capacity as a lodger but as one of the general customers. What is more, under the document the tenant is not even bound to carry on the business of a hair-dresser. His only liability is to pay the stipulated amount to the landlord. The room, therefore, for the purpose of the Act, ceases to be a part of the hotel and becomes a place of business of the respondent. As the rooms in question were not let out as part of a hotel or for hotel purposes, I must hold that they are' not rooms in a hotel within the meaning of s. 2 of the Act. In this view, the appellants are not exempted from the operation of the Act. The judgment of the High Court is correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.
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1959 (5) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ere properly ruled out, even, though all the reasons given by the Court may not stand scrutiny. The matter was not followed up with proper questions, and it seems that similar questions on these and other points were not put to the witness out of deference (as it is now suggested) to the ruling of the Court. The accused can only blame themselves, if they did not. The learned Judges of the High Court ruled out from their consideration that these two circumstances made it possible for the witnesses to recognise the accused, but hold that there was ample opportunity even otherwise for the witnesses to do so. The High Court was justified in so doing, and there being ample evidence on which they could come to the conclusion that the witnesses had, in fact, recognised the accused, it must inevitably be regarded as one of fact in regard to which this Court does not interfere. Since no other point was argued, the appeal must fail, and we agree that it be dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rovided there is no express provision to the contrary in the Banking Act. If, as we hold, unamended s. 10. of the Banking Act expressly prohibits the employment of any person by a bank whose remuneration takes the form of a share in the profits of the company, then s. 2 of the Banking Act is of no help and cannot permit something which is expressly prohibited by s. 10. For the reasons given above, we allow these seven appeals to the extent already indicated, namely, (1) the reference of 1952 is not now pending for determining the question of bonus for the relevant years in respect of particular banks and (2) section 10 of the Banking Act prior to the amendment of 1956 prohibits the grant of industrial bonus to bank employees when such bonus is remuneration which takes the form of a share in the profits of the banking company. In the circumstances of these cases and in view of the long drawn out nature of the dispute, we make no direction as to costs. Appeals allowed in part.
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1959 (5) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mpted to obtain from any person any gratification by way of bribe within the meaning of s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code. That charge failed because the evidence of P.W. 9 was not accepted by’ the High Court or the trial court. The charge under s. 5(1)(d) does not require any such proof. If there is evidence forthcoming to satisfy the requirements of the earlier part of sub-s. (3) of s. 5, conviction for criminal misconduct can be had -on the basis of the presumption which is a legal presumption to be drawn from the proof of facts in the earlier part of the sub-s. (3) aforesaid. That is what has been found by the courts below against the accused person. Hence, the failure of the charge under cl. (a) of sub-s. (1) of s. 5, does not necessarily mean the failure of the charge under s. 5(1)(d). In our opinion, the judgment of the High Court is correct, and the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. If the accused is on bail, he must surrender to his bail bond. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
Arbitration award
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The settlement did not amount to an accord and satisfaction. Till the terms of it had been carried out, the appellant retained all its rights under the contract. It was said that the case had been made in paragraphs 34 and 35 of the respondent's petition to the High Court. I do not think it was there made. These paragraphs refer to the arbitrator's decision that he had jurisdiction to arbitrate as the settlement had not destroyed the arbitration clause and the contention there made was that this decision was erroneous on the face of it. This has nothing to do with the question that the award was wrong on the face of it as it awarded a sum in excess of the amount fixed by the settlement. Whether the arbitrator was right or not in his decision that the arbitration clause had not been superseded is irrelevant for that is the question that the Court was called upon to decide in the application. Thus order of the High Court set aside
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1959 (5) TMI 36 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Soyar Cookery 450 where a dish of vegetables are required for second course. 1875 Jowett Plate (Ed. 2) III. 243 Cabbages or any other vegetables which are fit for boiling. Having regard to the context of the expression in the notification of the 28th August, 1947, and having also regard to the dictionary meaning of vegetable , we are of opinion that sugar-cane cannot be held to be a green vegetable within the meaning of the Government notification and, therefore, cannot be treated as exempt from taxation under the provisions of the Bihar Sales Tax Act. For these reasons we hold that sugar-cane is not a green vegetable within the meaning of item 6 of notification No. 9894-F.T., dated the 28th August, 1947, and, therefore, not exempt from taxation. Accordingly we answer the question of law referred by the Board of Revenue in favour of the State of Bihar and against the assessee. We do not propose to make any order as to costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (5) TMI 35 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up - Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... Funds Act, 1952. Such liability, I think, should fairly begin from the date when the official liquidator started running the mill and it being a few days after the order, it will begin from the 1st April, 1955, for facility of calculation, leaving out the few odd days. The official liquidator is given leave to pay the said amount of contribution from the funds of the estate in his hands as prayed in clause (b) of the summons. In clause (c) of the summons the official liquidator has asked for direction whether he is liable to pay the employer s contribution to the fund in respect of employees who are not covered by the Act, and the obvious answer is that he is certainly not liable for the same. The official liquidator will retain the costs of and incidental to this application to be taxed by the Taxing Officer of this court as between attorney and client out of the funds of the company in his hands. The respondent Regional Provident Fund Commissioner would bear his own costs.
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1959 (5) TMI 34 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up – Debts of all descriptions to be admitted to proof ... ... ... ... ..... to direct the liquidator to admit the claim would not therefore be barred even under article 181 of the Limitation Act. Following these principles which I have discussed I shall, therefore, direct and order the liquidator to admit the claim of the applicant Lloyds Bank as an ordinary creditor for the amount which the Lloyds Bank should satisfactorily prove before the liquidator. To this extent the list of creditors settled by this court already will be modified by including the claim of the Lloyds Bank herein for the amount to be proved satisfactorily before the liquidator. This order, however, will not disturb any dividend paid or declared or any commitment made by the liquidator in respect of the list of creditors already settled by the court. The applicant will pay the costs of and incidental to this application to the liquidator as between attorney and client. In this case I grant a certificate under rule 251 to the liquidator s attorney who appeared on this application.
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1959 (5) TMI 19 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the cognizance taken by the Magistrate on 16-9-1952, was without jurisdiction?
Held that:- In the present case, as the requisite authority had been granted by the Reserve Bank on 27-1-1953 to file a complaint, the complaint filed on February 2, was one which complied with the provisions of Section 23 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and the Additional District Magistrate could take cognizance of the offence which, indeed, he did on that date.
Thus the proceedings before the Additional District Magistrate and the trying Magistrate were with jurisdiction and the trial of the appellant was legal. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 18 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the notice issued under section 34 of the Act by the Income-tax Officer on February 27, 1950, after the assessee had filed a voluntary return was valid in law ?
Whether the assessment made on February 26, 1951, is valid in law ?
Held that:- If the Income-tax Officer had acted on that return and assessed the assessee before March 31, 1950, the assessment would have been valid. He chose to ignore the return, and served on the assessee a notice under section 34(1). This notice was improper, because with the return already filed, there was neither an omission nor a failure on the part of the assessee, nor was there any question of assessment "escaping". The notice under section 34(1) was, therefore, invalid and the consequent assessment, equally so. We accordingly agree with the judgment under appeal. Appeal dimssied
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1959 (5) TMI 17 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the trust property is held wholly for religious or charitable purposes within the meaning of section 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act ?
Whether the trust property is held in part only for religious or charitable purposes ?
Held that:- In our opinion the income from the trust properties comes within the scope of section 4(3)(i) and is, therefore, entitled to exemption. Therefore, the negative answer given by the High Court to question No. 1 cannot be supported and that question should be answered in the affirmative. In this view of the matter, question No. 2 does not arise and needs no answer. The result is that this appeal must be allowed and the question No. 1 must be answered in the affirmative
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1959 (5) TMI 16 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the amounts of commission paid by cheques, drawn respectively on banks at Madras and Bombay and respectively posted from Madura and Bombay, can in the circumstances of this case be held to have been received in what was British India or at Secunderabad?
Held that:- Whatever may be the position when there is an express or implied request for the cheque for the amount being sent by post or when it can be inferred from the course of conduct of the parties, the appellant in this case expressly required the amount of the commission to be paid at Secunderabad and the rule of Ogale Glass Works' case [1954 (4) TMI 3 - SUPREME Court] would be inapplicable. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 15 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessee is entitled to relief granted by the Notification No. 878-F dated March 21, 1922, as amended by Notification No. 8 dated March 24, 1928?
Held that:- Having regard to the purpose of the notification and the context and the sequence in which the words "assessed" and "charged" have been used, it is clear that the word "charged" does not, in the notification, mean the mere statutory liability to pay tax but goes further and includes the actual charge or levy. Apart from the fact that in view of the claim for relief under section 25(4) the Income-tax Officer need not have taken the trouble of going through the process of assessment of the firm's income at all, it is not disputed that in fact the firm's income has not been assessed to tax and no tax has been charged in the sense of being levied. In this view of the matter the third condition has not been fulfilled and the assessee cannot, therefore, claim any relief under the notification. The referred question should, in our opinion, be answered in the negative. The appeal is, therefore, allowed.
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1959 (5) TMI 14 - SUPREME COURT
What question of law arose for determination out of the Tribunal's order under section 33(4) of the Act?
Held that:- The result of our going into these appeals before us on the merits would be either to confirm the judgment which has been pronounced by the High Court or to differ from it. If we did the former the appellants would be out of court, if, however, perchance we came to the contrary conclusion and accepted the latter view, namely, that the High Court was wrong in not granting the applications of the appellants under section 66(2) of the Act there would be two contrary decisions, one by the High Court and the other by us and we would be in effect, though not by the proper procedure to be adopted by the appellants in that behalf, setting aside the judgment of the High Court. This is an eventuality which we cannot view with equanimity. It is contrary to all notions of comity of courts and even though we are a court which could in certain events set aside and overrule the decisions of the High Court concerned, we cannot by-pass the normal procedure which is to be adopted for this purpose and achieve the result indirectly in the manner suggested by the appellants. We, therefore, think that in the circumstances here it would be inappropriate on our part to enter upon an adjudication of these appeals on merits. We would, therefore, dismiss these appeals without anything more. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 13 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in view of the circumstances of the case, and particularly the manner in which, after due consideration, the learned Agricultural Income-tax Officer in his first judgment dated the 5th January, 1946, had held that the assessee was not liable to be assessed for the receipt on account of the zarpeshgi lease, the learned Agricultural Income-tax Officer has jurisdiction to revise his own order under section 26 of the Act?
Whether if he had the jurisdiction to revise his own order, under section 26 of the Act, the income from the zarpeshgi lease of the assessee was taxable under the Act?
Held that:- The Agricultural Income-tax Officer was competent under section 26 of the Act to assess an item of income which he had omitted to tax earlier, even though in the return that income was included and the Agricultural Income-tax Officer then thought that it was exempt. The answer given by the High Court was therefore correct.
The case of the assessee rests upon the claim that this was a money-lending transaction and the receipts represented a capital return. If, however, the payment to the lessor was premium and not a loan, the income, being agricultural, from these leasehold properties was assessable under the Act. We are of opinion that it was so, and that the Agricultural Income-tax Officer was right when he assessed it to agricultural income-tax. The income was not the income of money-lending, and this does not depend upon the character of the recipient. The Thika profits were clearly agricultural income being actually derived from land. The answer to the question by the High Court was thus correct. Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (5) TMI 12 - SUPREME COURT
whether there was any material to support the finding of the Tribunal that the sum of ₹ 1,41,000 represented the secreted profits of the appellant's business and as such liable to be taxed in the hands of the appellant under the Indian Income-tax Act and the Excess Profits Tax Act ?
Held that:- The Tribunal in arriving at the conclusion it did in the present case indulged in suspicions, conjectures and surmises and acted without any evidence or upon a view of the facts which could not reasonably be entertained or the facts found were such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have found, or the finding was, in other words, perverse and this court is entitled to interfere.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the High Court was clearly in error in answering the referred question in the affirmative. The proper answer should have been in the negative having regard to all the circumstances of the case which we have adverted to above.
The appeals will accordingly be allowed, the judgment and order passed by the High Court will be set aside and the referred question will be answered in the negative. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (5) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT
Declining to register the appellant firm under section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act
Held that:- The order of the Appellate Tribunal is reversed. The firm shall be registered under section 26A of the Act for the assessment year 1948-49. The appeal against the order of the High Court need not be considered, since it is not necessary to pass any orders thereon. Appeal allowed.
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1959 (5) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the solitary transaction in respect of about three-quarters of an acre of land in the suburbs of Calcutta, was an adventure in the nature of trade and, therefore, liable to income-tax?
Held that:- In all the circumstances of this case, the total impression created on our mind is that it has not been made out by the Department that the dominant intention of the appellant was to embark on a venture in the nature of trade, when he entered into the agreement which resulted in the profits sought to be taxed.
For the aforesaid reasons, we would allow this appeal, and set aside the orders of the Tribunal below with costs. Appeal allowed.
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