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Showing 141 to 160 of 213 Records
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1982 (7) TMI 73 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e time of computing the tax payable at source. Further, as the statement of case shows, the regular assessment of the employees had been completed and the amount of tax was fully paid by them. The ITO, Salaries Circle (TDS), could not, therefore, demand farther tax from the employer in respect of the income of the employees, which was the salary of the employees chargeable to tax, when the same had been fully paid. In view of our aforesaid decision, it must be held that the Tribunal was right in law in holding that where a regular assessment of an employee had been completed and the amount of tax fully paid by him, the ITO, Salary Circle (TDS), had no jurisdiction under s. 201 of the Act to demand further tax from the employer in respect of the tax short deducted relating to such employee. In our opinion, therefore, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative and against the Department. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs.
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1982 (7) TMI 72 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... lly reframed the opening words of s. 33(1) to read as follows No estate duty shall be payable in respect of property, which includes any interest in property belonging to the deceased which passed on his death. Whether such a reading of s. 33(1) would be permissible having regard to the specific use of the words property of any of the following kinds belonging to the deceased is matter which is open to debate but in which, having regard to the view which we have taken, it is not necessary to go in the present case. In the view which we have taken, it is not possible to find any fault with the conclusion reached by the Tribunal that the accountable person is not entitled to claim exemption under s. 33(1)(n) of the E.D. Act. Question No. 1 is, therefore, answered in the negative and against the accountable person. Consequently question No. 2 is also answered in the negative and against the accountable person. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (7) TMI 71 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... Ltd. v. CIT 1976 102 ITR 25 (Guj), do not lay down any principle contrary to the distinction that has been drawn by the Tribunal. Therefore, it is not necessary to deal with these cases in detail. The case that is now sought to be made out before us by the Revenue was not made out before the Tribunal. This was also not the case of the ITO this argument was also not considered by the AAC. The question whether the expenditure was incurred even prior to the setting up of business was not gone into at any stage. The argument that is now being canvassed before us raises a question of fact which was neither argued nor considered nor investigated by the Tribunal. In that view of the matter we are unable to hold that there was no material before the Tribunal to come to the conclusion that it did. In view of the aforesaid, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Parties will pay and bear their own costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1982 (7) TMI 70 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
House Property ... ... ... ... ..... nditure should be taken as the extra amount of B.A.V. and should be added to the amount of the municipal valuation in each year on the basis of the expenditure incurred in that particular year. The percentage of 1/16th has been fixed by us following the various orders of the Tribunal in wealth-tax cases where a multiplying factor of 16 is taken to fix the valuation of the properties with reference to the net rental income. The Income-tax Officer is directed to recompute the B.A.V. of the three properties in all the years on the basis of the above findings given by us. In view of the provisions of s. 22 read with s. 23 and s. 56, sub-s. (2) of the I.T. Act, 1961, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal, in the facts and circumstances of this case and in respect of the three items, arrived at the correct conclusion. The question, therefore, is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1982 (7) TMI 69 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Partnership ... ... ... ... ..... olution of a firm, but also with cases of transfer by a body of individuals and other association of persons. That apart, s. 2, cl. (47) has to be interpreted with reference to the language employed therein. Merely because s. 47(ii) excludes the application of s. 45 in case of dissolution of firms on the ground that no transfer is involved, it cannot be implied that a transfer is involved in the case of retirement. The converse or the opposite does not follow. For the reasons given above, we agree with the view expressed by the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Mohanbhai Pamabhai 1973 91 ITR 393, which is based on the observations of the Supreme Court in Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa, AIR 1966 SC 1300. The Tribunal was perfectly right in upholding the contention of the assessee that the sum of Rs. 46,500 received by him on his retirement is not assessable to capital gains. We answer the reference in the negative and in favour of the assessee with costs. Advocates fee Rs. 250.
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1982 (7) TMI 68 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d either under sub-s. (1), (2) or (4) of s. 139 of the I.T. Act. It appears that although the Commissioner has recorded a finding that the returns filed by the assessee in respect of the years in question were voluntary, he did not apply his mind to other relevant factors for exercising discretion under s. 273A. The reason for which the Commissioner refused to exercise discretion is not one which is contemplated by s. 273A of the I.T. Act. In this view we are fortified by a Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Jakhodia Brothers v. CIT 1978 115 ITR 61 (All). In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The part of the order of the Commissioner dated 15th March, 1978 (annex. 5 to the writ petition), in so far as it relates to the assessment years 1965-66 to 1967-68 is quashed and the Commissioner is directed to re-consider the matter afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. In the circumstances, costs are made easy.
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1982 (7) TMI 67 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Firm, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... -firm had filed before the ITO copies of accounts of these ladies as also copy of the interest account, and, therefore, it could not be said that there was any escapement of the petitioner s income by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the petitioner-firm to disclose fully and truly all the material facts necessary for its assessment for the years under consideration. There is also nothing to show that it was in consequence of any information in the possession of the ITO that he had reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax for the years under consideration had escaped assessment. It will appear, therefore, that it was as a result of a change of opinion only that the impugned notices were issued. That being so, the notices are bad in law and cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and is allowed with costs and the impugned notices issued under s. 148 by the ITO in respect of the assessment years 1972-73, 1973-74 and 1974-75 are quashed.
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1982 (7) TMI 66 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... . Before the Tribunal this point was specifically argued by the assessee. In the application for reference before the Tribunal the assessee raised two questions. The Tribunal, however, referred the question set out hereinabove to this court and stated that the question was wide enough to cover all the aspects of the case. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us by saying that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the sale proceeds of the equity shares in this case were liable to be assessed to income-tax as short-term capital gains. But the Tribunal was in error in holding that the cost of acquisition of the shares in this case was the cost the assessee had incurred for the debenture bonds. The Tribunal will have to recompute the cost of the equity shares in the light of the principles indicated above. We, therefore, answer the question accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1982 (7) TMI 65 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Cash Credits, Estate Duty, Income Tax Proceedings, Undisclosed Income ... ... ... ... ..... t the undisclosed income which has been assessed as a result of the settlement arrived at under S. 271(4A) continued to exist in the form of cash or other asset till the date of the death of the deceased, and unless the existence of such an asset is established by the Revenue, which is its duty, the onus does not shift to the accountable persons to explain as to what had happened to the assets. If the assets have continued to exist on the death of the deceased, then, of course, the onus will shift to the accountable persons to explain as to what had happened to the assets and how they had been dealt with. On the facts of this case, we are not able to say that the existence of the assets at the time of the death of the deceased has been duly established. Hence, we have to agree with the view taken by the Tribunal in this case. The reference is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. The Revenue will pay the costs of the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1982 (7) TMI 64 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Perquisite, Salary ... ... ... ... ..... upon the amounts paid to the employee by the said employer by way of salaries and that the salary income that may be received by the employee from other sources of employment need not be and should not be taken into account. We have already pointed out that there is no scope for restricting the interpretation of s. 17(2)(iii)(c) in the manner suggested by the learned counsel. The object of the section is to bring to tax the value of such amenities or benefits in the case of employees who have certain amount of income that standard is set out in very wide language which there is no reason to restrict. That apart, we may point out that the interpretation sought to be placed by the learned counsel can also lend itself to abuse and manipulation. For the reasons discussed above we agree with the view taken by the Tribunal and answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs.
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1982 (7) TMI 63 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... he law requires a degree of formality in regard to transfers of immovable property. A partition may not technically be a fullfledged transfer of ownership, because those who receive their shares under the partition may be rightly regarded as co-owners and the partition in any case does not confer a new title on them. Still there is a transformation or metamorphosis of the co-owner s title and possession involved in the partition. This would include the mutual release of the respective interests of the co-owners. This is why partition has always been regarded as involving some degree of alteration in the title and possession of the immovable property. Partition, apart from what the Hindu law permits, is always a synallagmatic transaction and it cannot fructify by mere book entries. For these reasons as well as grounds on which my learned brother has decided the questions of law, I would respectfully agree with this conclusion. I would agree with the direction as to costs also.
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1982 (7) TMI 62 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Interest On Failure To Pay Tax On Time ... ... ... ... ..... slature to impose an accompanying liability upon a party upon whom a legal right is conferred or to prescribe conditions for the exercise of the right. In the instant case also even if the law had prescribed that no application for rectification would be entertained unless the tax is paid, that would be a condition for availing of the right to have the order rectified and would clearly be within the ambit of art. 14 of the Constitution. In the instant case the law requires that after the notice of demand is received, the tax must be paid within the stipulated period. If not paid, the assessee is liable to pay interest thereon under sub-s. (2) of s. 220 of the Act. The law does not contemplate that, in cases where an application for rectification is made, the assessee can return the notice of demand and refuse to pay the tax till the rectification is done. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no merit in the petition. The petition is, therefore, summarily dismissed.
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1982 (7) TMI 61 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... deed of partnership dated 31st December, 1965, whereby the partners had agreed to revise sharing of profits or losses amongst them on Sri B. M. Choudhuri s attaining majority and electing to be a partner of the firm. Accordingly, we would direct the Income-tax Officer to grant registration to the assessee for the two years under appeal. In view of the facts of this case and the terms of the deed, in our opinion, the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion as it did. Incidentally, we may mention that in some other context, more or less the same view was taken by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Badri Narain Kashi Prasad v. Addl. CIT 1978 115 ITR 858. It is, however, not necessary for us to express any opinion on the reasons expressed by the learned judges of the Allahabad High Court. In the premises the question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1982 (7) TMI 60 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Educational Institutions, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... meaning of institution . This, as already pointed out above, is not correct. Institution is a word of wide import. If the view canvassed by Mr. Shelat were to be accepted, it is likely to create complications in application of clauses (22A), (23) and (23B) of s. 10 and s. 80G of the Act. We do not think that the point needs any elaborate discussion. We reject Mr. Shelat s contention that since trust is not specifically referred to in s. 10(22), that provision does not apply to a trust. In the light of what is discussed above, we hold that the assessee trust is an educational trust which comes within the expression other educational institution in s. 10(22) of the Act. The assessee-trust is, therefore, entitled to claim exemption in respect of its income under that provision. We, therefore, agree with the view taken by the Tribunal and answer both the questions referred to us in the affirmative and against the Revenue. Reference answered accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1982 (7) TMI 59 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Interest On Borrowed Capital ... ... ... ... ..... that the conditions required to be satisfied under s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act were not fulfilled. The only ground, for disallowing a part of the interest, given by the Tribunal was that the assessee had not chosen to charge interest on advances made to the three concerns. The contention urged on behalf of the Department, in the instant case, that a part of the capital borrowed by the assessee was not for the purpose of the business, cannot be considered because that is not the finding of the Tribunal. All that the Tribunal has found is that the assessee was not entitled to claim deduction in respect of a part of the interest, as the assessee had not charged interest to the three sister concerns, to whom advances were made. This ground cannot justify disallowance of interest. For all these reasons, our answer to the question referred to this court is in the negative and against the Revenue. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1982 (7) TMI 58 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Capital Reserve, Company, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... in a reference, it is not possible to accede to the request of Mr. Mehta. We do, however, think that when the matter goes back to the Tribunal, in view of our decision on the question referred, it should be open to the assessee to take up the contention that such part of the said amount of Rs. 1,57,967, as exceeded the liability for gratuity calculated on an actuarial basis as on 1st January, 1963, should be included in the capital of the assessee-company for the purposes of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act. We have no doubt that the Tribunal and the taxing authorities will follow the procedure directed by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, which we have set out earlier. In the result, the question referred is answered in the negative and against the assessee. The matter will now go to the Tribunal, which will dispose of the case in accordance with what we have observed above. Looking to all the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (7) TMI 57 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Entertainment Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... . 3,524 as business expenditure under s. 37(1) of the I.T. Act and that no portion of the same can be added back to the assessee s income. From out of total expenditure of Rs. 17,118 spent by the assessee on jalpan, etc., on its customers and Rs. 38 spent for purchasing glasses, etc., for providing drinking water to customers (total Rs. 17,156) the assessee is entitled to claim a deduction of Rs. 5,000 as entertainment expenses. From out of this amount, only a sum of Rs. 12,156 could be added back to the assessee s income. In the result, we answer the question referred to us as follows On the fact and circumstances of this case, disallowance of Rs. 15,680 was not justified under s. 37(2A) of the I.T. Act, 1961. In this regard only a sum of Rs. 12,156 could have been disallowed. Further, the expenses on Ganeshji ki Puja amounting to Rs. 958 could not be disallowed under s. 37(1) of the Act. In view of partial success of both the parties, we direct them to bear their own costs.
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1982 (7) TMI 56 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... el for the Department. The Tribunal, in the facts and circumstances of the case and on the material available on record, have clearly arrived at the conclusion that Smt. Kamala Kumari had come into possession of the property in question in 1939. Thereafter, the property was being shown in her ownership even in the Municipal records and the assessee had never challenged the ownership of Smt. Kamala Kumari at any time. In these circumstances, it was found that the assessee had not committed any error in not mentioning the income of this property in his own return and no proceedings for escaped assessment could have been taken under s. 147(a)/148 of the I.T. Act, 1961. In view of the above finding of fact, found proved in favour of the assessee by the Tribunal that the house property belonged to Smt. Kamala Kumari long before the assessment in question, in our opinion, no question of law arises for determination by this court. The application for reference as such is dismissed.
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1982 (7) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e sale of import entitlements which we have pointed out were earned or acquired by the assessee directly in the course of its business. It has not been seriously urged before us that these receipts could be regarded as casual receipts. In view of what we have stated earlier, it must be held that the aforesaid receipts were revenue receipts and were not of a casual or non-recurring nature and that the same were rightly assessed as the assessee s income from business. As far as question No. 3 is concerned, it is common ground that this question is concluded against the assessee by the decision of a Division Bench of this court in Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. CIT 1980 121 ITR 951. In the result, the questions referred to us are answered as follows Question No. 1 In the affirmative. Question No. 2 In the affirmative. Question No. 3 In the negative. It is clarified that all the questions are answered against the assessee. The assessee to pay costs of this reference to the Commissioner.
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1982 (7) TMI 54 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Gift ... ... ... ... ..... said Act. The Tribunal held that the sum was not liable to be included in the estate of Malchand. On reference, it was held by a Division Bench of this court that what the deceased continued to enjoy, after the gift was given, was his own 6 per cent. share in the firm, which had not been gifted at all, and his rights as a partner by virtue of his having such a share. It could not be said that the deceased took any benefit or share in the subject-matter of the gift or that the benefit or share enjoyed by the deceased after the gift was relatable to the property gifted. It is clear to us that in view of these decisions, both the questions referred must be answered against the Controller and in favour of the accountable person. In the result, the questions referred are answered as follows s Question No. 1 In the negative and against the Controller. Question No. 2 In the negative and against the Controller. The Controller to pay costs of this reference to the accountable person.
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