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2004 (7) TMI 706 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... se appeals, various interim orders were passed by this Court on 27.8.2001, 11.1.2002 and 17.2.2003. In pursuance of those orders, rental income derived from the property has been collected and paid to the subsequent vendee, subject to the result of these appeals. Learned counsel appearing for the subsequent vendee, at the conclusion of the arguments, has handed over to this Court a chart mentioning the figures of total rent received up to February 2004 and separately shown the amount deposited in the Court. The figures submitted in the chart by the subsequent vendees are open to verification by the prior vendee. With dismissal of these appeals, we confirm the judgment of Division Bench of the High Court including the directions made to adjust equities with regard to the construction cost and the rental income derived from the suit property. 112. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in these appeals.
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2004 (7) TMI 705 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... adhikari, JJ. ORDER Appeal admitted.
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2004 (7) TMI 704 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... tock of the entire material and failed to take a cumulative view from the material evidence on record. 10. Thus, the judgment of the appellate Court cannot be sustained and has to be set aside. Since, a finding on various Issues which are based on facts are required to be given, there is no alternative but to remand the matter back to the first appellate Court with certain directions. Accordingly, the second appeal is allowed. The judgment of the first appellate Court dated 7-5-1976 is set aside and the, matter is remanded back to the first appellate Court to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure and to decide the same in accordance with law within a period of three months from the date a certified copy of the judgment is produced before it. Till the disposal of the appeal, the injunction granted by this Court shall continue to operate. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to cost.
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2004 (7) TMI 703 - SC ORDER
... ... ... ... ..... Adv. And Mr. B.V. Balaram Das,Adv. For Respondent None ORDER We see no reason to interfere. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
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2004 (7) TMI 702 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... egations in a complaint make out a case of cheating, certainly, the Court is required to look into it and take cognizance and issue process for that offence. But, in the case on hand, the requirements of Section 420 are not at all forthcoming and that is why, in the complaint, the Respondent/Complainant himself had not requested the Court to take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC. The request was to take cognizance for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Further, there is no allegation whatsoever in the complaint to attract Section 420 of IPC and as such, the decisions relied on for the Respondent/Complainant do not held him in the matter. No other point was urged for the Respondent/Complainant. 10. In the result, the petition is allowed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., and quashed the proceedings in C.C.No. 321/02 on the file of JMFC II Court at Hubli, including the process issued against the petitioner/accused.
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2004 (7) TMI 701 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... p Singh 1974CriLJ337 (supra) and Dharamdeo Singh 1976CriLJ638 (supra), we are of the opinion that the High Court was in error in reversing the findings of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 12. The facts of the instant case are almost similar to the one in the above case. Therefore, it cannot be said that the trial Court was wrong in rejecting the plea of the complainant and acquitting the accused. The initial burden does not mean that it is a burden on the part of the complainant to prove that there was a legally enforceable debt or liability by leading evidence. The mere basic facts of the case should inspire the invocation of the legal presumption under Section 139 of the Act. In the absence of such factual basis, the lower Court cannot be said to have erred in holding that the initial burden was not discharged by the complainant, which is absent in this case, as seen above. 13. For all the above reasons, the Criminal Appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.
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2004 (7) TMI 700 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title. The order of the High Court is cryptic and the same is without assigning any reason. 4. For the aforesaid reasons, we accept this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and remit the matter back to the High Court to decide it afresh keeping in view the observations made by this Court in Madhukar v. Sangram 2001 4 SCC 756 while dealing with the first appeal. 5. The Registry is directed to remit the record to the High Court forthwith. Since this first appeal pertains to the year 1990, we would request the High Court to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible. 6. Interim stay granted by the High Court during the pendency of the first appeal shall continue till the disposal of the appeal subject to its variation on an application being made by either of the parties. 7. Both the IAs are dismissed as infructuous.
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2004 (7) TMI 699 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ravel Co. (Inc.) and others vs . Vimla Panna Lal, AIR1986Delhi439 in which the Full Bench decision in Smt. Sheila Devi Versus Kishan Lal Kalra (1974) 2 Delhi 491 was discussed and followed. An understanding of these decisions lead to the conclusion that the Defendant is not liable, at this stage of the proceedings, to pay ad-valorem Court Fee on the sum of ₹ 18,54,500/- or ₹ 3,05,750/- since the correctness of both these sums is yet to be arrived at. In cases of this nature the interests of the Exchequer are adequately safeguarded in that an undertaking is given for the payment of ad-valorem Court Fee as and when it is found due. 7. The application is without merit and is dismissed. CS(OS) No. 568/2001 8. Reply to the Counter Claim be filed within four weeks. Final opportunity to file document within four weeks is granted. 9. Renotify for admission/denial of documents before the Joint Registrar on 8.10.2004 and before the Court for framing of Issues on 25.10.2004.
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2004 (7) TMI 698 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Seeking grant of bail application u/s 439 of CrPC - cruelty and murder - Offence punishable u/s 498-A, 307, 302 u/s 34 of IPC - whether or not filing of the chargesheet is a substantive change necessitating Courts to decide the application seeking bail, filed after the chargesheet - HELD THAT:- Under Section 207 of Cr.P.C., an accused gets documents relied upon by the prosecution as of right. He is thus better equipped to address the Court and invite the Court to examine the evidence after filing of the chargesheet from his point of view and to point out lacunas, if any, in the investigation, which could be fatal to the prosecution or sufficient enough to convince the Court that there exists reasonable grounds for, prima facie, believing that the applicant has not been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Until filing of the chargesheet one of the important fact that weigh on the mind of a Judge is the continuity of investigation and whether the investigation will be hampered if the accused is set at large. However, after filing of the chargesheet, this approach changes and the Court, apart from merits of the case, requires to consider whether the accused should be continued in custody even after the investigation is over. This change, in the approach of the Court after filing of the chargesheet towards evaluating the need of keeping the accused in custody, should be termed as substantial change.
It is open for the Court to take similar view which was taken while rejecting earlier application for bail made before filing of the chargesheet. However, in my opinion, it is not open for the Court to hold that filing of the chargesheet is not a substantive change of circumstance and refuse to enter into merits of the case. The Court is obliged to consider merits of the case afresh by allowing the applicant or his advocate to argue an application for bail on the basis of documents supplied to the accused with the chargesheet as required u/s 207 of CrPC.
Ultimately, the Court directed the Addl. Sessions Judge to reconsider the bail application, allowing the applicant's advocate to argue based on the chargesheet and documents supplied, emphasizing the need for a fresh consideration of the case on its merits post-chargesheet filing. The previous order rejecting bail after chargesheet filing was rendered ineffective, highlighting the importance of evaluating the need for continued custody post-investigation completion.
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2004 (7) TMI 697 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... of Sub-Court, Arani; transferred to District Court, Thiruvannamalai renumbered as O.S. No. 66 of 2004. The above suit is said to have been decreed on 30-6-2004. If that be so, any amount payable by the accused could be realised through appropriate forum. When no amount is payable by the Accused, nothing survives for consideration in this Appeal. 11. In an appeal against order of acquittal, the High Court would be very slow to interfere in the order. Unless the appreciation of evidence and the findings suffer from patent erroneous approach and the findings are perverse, the High Court would not reverse an Order of Acquittal. The reasonings and findings of the Additional Sessions Judge, Thiruvannamalai for acquitting the accused cannot be said to be suffering from serious infirmity warranting interference in this appeal against the Order of acquittal. This appeal has no merits and is bound to fail. 12. C.A. No. 791 of 1997 For the reasons stated above, this Appeal is dismissed.
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2004 (7) TMI 696 - SUPREME COURT
Challenged the Quashing of FIR by the High Court - Exercise of power u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - transportation or storing of black jaggery/molasses for manufacturing illicit distilled liquor - HELD THAT:- If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint/F.I.R. has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant or disclosed in the F.I.R. that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint/F.I.R. is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance.
In all these cases there was either statements of witnesses or seizure of illicit distilled liquor which factors cannot be said to be without relevance. Whether the material already in existence or to be collected during investigation would be sufficient for holding the concerned accused persons guilty has to be considered at the time of trial. At the time of framing the charge it can be decided whether prima facie case has been made out showing commission of an offence and involvement of the charged persons. At that stage also evidence cannot be gone into meticulously. It is immaterial whether the case is based on direct or circumstantial evidence. Charge can be framed, if there are materials showing possibility about the commission of the crime as against certainty. That being so, the interference at the threshold with the F.I.R. is to be in very exceptional circumstances as held in R.P. Kapoor [1960 (3) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT] and Bhajan Lal cases [1990 (11) TMI 386 - SUPREME COURT].
Ultimately, the acceptability of the materials to fasten culpability on the accused persons is a matter of trial. These are not the cases where it can be said that the FIR did not disclose commission of an offence. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR in the concerned cases.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals in cases where there was material evidence. It dismissed the appeals where the FIR did not disclose the commission of an offence. The Court directed early investigation and submission of the report u/s 173 of the Code, emphasizing that no opinion on the merits of the case was expressed.
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2004 (7) TMI 695 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
... ... ... ... ..... nd not to associate with capital market, dealing in securities or associating with any intermediaries in the capital market for a period of five years, is modified to the period already undergone by the appellants (nearly one year and four months). (3) The appellants shall redress all grievances of debenture-holders, if any, brought to their notice from the lime of issue till they were converted as preferential shares. 53. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. 54. There will no order as to costs. As we were about to pronounce the judgment, written submissions were filed by the counsel for the respondent. Obviously it is not possible to take the written submissions on record because they are filed as we were about to pronounce the orders. However, we carefully perused the written submissions and the written submissions are only a repetition of the long oral submissions made by the counsel for the respondent and those oral submissions have been taken into account in our order.
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2004 (7) TMI 694 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... 20-1-1996. All those occasions the shop remained kept locked. Commissioner has noted that the window frames were in a dilapidated stage. He has noticed termitariums and cob webs inside the room. The front side folding door was found full of termites in full thickness and a doom without bulb was also found in the middle of the room. Commissioner has observed that for about 2 years the premises has not been put to use. The evidence adduced by the landlord would positively show that the building was not in use for more than six months continuously prior to the date of filing of the rent control petition. On the side of the tenant, apart from his interested testimony no independent evidence was adduced either oral or documentary. In our view tenant has failed to discharge the onus. Consequently we are inclined to hold that the tenant ceased to occupy the premises within the meaning of section 11(4)(v) of the Act. Revision therefore lacks merits and the same would stand dismissed.
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2004 (7) TMI 693 - SUPREME COURT
Authority of the State to direct regularization of services of cooperative society employees - Applicability of the 1981 Act to cooperative societies - Compliance with statutory rules for appointments - Validity of appointments made on compassionate grounds - HELD THAT:- It is trite that appointments cannot be made on political considerations and in violation of the government directions for reduction of establishment expenditure or a prohibition on the filling up of vacant posts or creating new posts including regularization of daily-waged employees.
Although we do not intend to express any opinion as to whether the cooperative society is a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India but it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the writ petition will be maintainable when the action of the cooperative society is violative of mandatory statutory provisions. In this case except the Nodal Centre functions and supervision of the cooperative society, the State has no administrative control over its day to day affairs. The State has not created any post nor they could do so on their own. The State has not borne any part of the financial burden. It was, therefore, impermissible for the State to direct regularization of the services of the employees of the cooperative societies. Such an order cannot be upheld also on the ground that the employees allegedly served the cooperative societies for a long time.
We are in the opinion that in a case of this nature, where the validity or otherwise of a government order is in question, the principles of natural justice will have no role to play and in any event recourse thereto would result in futility.
It appears that the appellant was appointed as supervisor in 3rd respondent Bank by the President of the Bank on a consolidated pay of ₹ 2500/- by an order dated 5.03.2001. Her appointment is said to have been made on compassionate ground on the plea that her husband had deserted her. It has not been shown before us that there exists a scheme in terms whereof deserted woman can be appointed on compassionate grounds. Even such appointment, in our opinion, would be illegal.
Thus, we do not find any merit in these appeals which are dismissed accordingly.
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2004 (7) TMI 692 - ITAT DELHI
... ... ... ... ..... ke a gift and that it had actually been received as a gift from the donor. In the present case, such onus was not satisfactorily discharged by the assessee and the Assessing Officer still having accepted the said gifts without making further enquiry about the creditworthiness of the donors as well as source of funds in their bank accounts, which was required in law as well as on facts of the present case, his order passed under section 143(3) was erroneous as well as prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. As such, considering all the facts of the case as well as keeping in view the legal position emanating from the aforesaid pronouncements, we hold that the learned CIT was fully justified in exercising his powers under section 263 to set aside the said order of the Assessing Officer with a direction to make it afresh and upholding his impugned order passed under section 263, we dismiss the appeal of the assessee. 7. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is dismissed.
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2004 (7) TMI 691 - ITAT DELHI
... ... ... ... ..... on freight and insurance and in the process has recovered the same also. Although, such incomes cannot be said to have been derived from export activity and are, therefore, in principle, excludible in terms of Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC, however, it is only the net income on such account, if any, which is liable to be excluded to the extent of 90 per cent in terms of Explanation (baa). 11. Now, with regard to insurance claim received of ₹ 8,51,696. Admittedly, the aforesaid claims are in relation to various assets of the appellant and do not bear any direct relation to the turnover of the appellant and, thus, the same is excludible to the extent of 90 per cent out of the profits of business in terms of Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC. Therefore, we direct the Assessing Officer to recompute the deduction under section 80HHC by applying Explanation (baa) to the impugned incomes in the aforesaid light. 12. The appeal of the assessee is, accordingly, disposed of.
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2004 (7) TMI 690 - ANDHRA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ffence under Section 138 of the Act. The fact that 1st respondent has a right to sue petitioner also for recovery of the debt due to him is not and cannot be a ground for making the petitioner liable for an offence under Section 138 of the Act, when the dishonoured cheque was not drawn for and on behalf of that company, on an account maintained by it in a bank. Therefore the fact that A1 who drew the dishonoured cheque happens to be a Director in the company of which petitioner is the Managing Director, for the debt allegedly due to 1st respondent from the said company, is of no consequence. 5. Therefore even if all the allegations in the complaint are taken to be true, petitioner cannot be said to have committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act. Therefore, in view of the ratio in State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, AIR 1992 SC 60 (1992 Cri LJ 527) the complaint against the petitioner is liable to be and therefore is quashed. 6. The Criminal Petition is accordingly allowed.
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2004 (7) TMI 689 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... siness income, that comes to ₹ 1,80,000. That has been reduced by the CIT(A) to ₹ 75,000. The Tribunal in para 23 of its appeal order held that as no additions have been sustained in respect of assets expenditure, therefore, this ground i.e., addition on account of telescoping requires no discussion. If we read para 23 of the order of Tribunal with the decision of CIT(A) on the issue, the admitted facts are that no addition has been made on account of investment in the assets. The result will be the same that when no addition has been made on account of investment in assets, the addition sustained by the CIT(A) on account of business income, that has been sustained by the Tribunal and there is no apparent mistake in the impugned order of the Tribunal, which can be corrected in miscellaneous application. As there is no apparent mistake in appeal order, Tribunal has rightly dismissed the application under Section 254(2) of the Act, 1961. The appeal stands dismissed.
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2004 (7) TMI 688 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... nt of the respondents is that. as the appointment of the petitioner was made by His Excellency Governor and appointment includes termination and termination was also made by the same authority, argument of the petitioner has no force. 82. Moreover, the termination order was ratified by the Board as per Annexure-C.A. 8 to the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 1. 83. The argument of the respondent's counsel is that, contention of the petitioner that there is no merit in termination of the petitioner's services is not correct, in view of Annexure-C.A, 7 to the counter-affidavit, in which, it has been mentioned that proper step has not been taken by the Managing Director, Varanasi (petitioner) and there is dissatisfaction in the employees and officers and due to strike of the employees, distribution of the electric supply is disturbed. There is adverse effect in realisation of revenue and salary of the employee as not been disbursed. 84. The writ petition is dismissed.
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2004 (7) TMI 687 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... nt of the respondents is that. as the appointment of the petitioner was made by His Excellency Governor and appointment includes termination and termination was also made by the same authority, argument of the petitioner has no force. 82. Moreover, the termination order was ratified by the Board as per Annexure-C.A. 8 to the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 1. 83. The argument of the respondent's counsel is that, contention of the petitioner that there is no merit in termination of the petitioner's services is not correct, in view of Annexure-C.A, 7 to the counter-affidavit, in which, it has been mentioned that proper step has not been taken by the Managing Director, Varanasi (petitioner) and there is dissatisfaction in the employees and officers and due to strike of the employees, distribution of the electric supply is disturbed. There is adverse effect in realisation of revenue and salary of the employee as not been disbursed. 84. The writ petition is dismissed.
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