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2009 (7) TMI 1340
Issues Involved:
1. Whether a tank falls within the definition of "land" u/s 2(f) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961.
2. Interpretation of the term "land" as defined in the Act.
3. Applicability of amendments to the Act in the State of Jharkhand.
4. Role of the object of the Act in interpreting its provisions.
Summary:
1. Definition of "Land" u/s 2(f) of the Act:
The primary issue is whether a tank falls within the definition of "land" u/s 2(f) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961, as applicable in Jharkhand. The Act defines "land" to include various categories, including "even land perennially submerged under water."
2. Appellant's Contention:
The appellant, a land-holder, argued that tanks should not be considered "land" as they are not used or capable of being used for agriculture or horticulture. They contended that the definition of "land" should only include land used or capable of being used for agriculture or horticulture, and tanks, being water bodies, do not fit this definition.
3. Previous Judgments and Legislative Intent:
The appellant's objections were rejected by the Addl. Collector, the appellate authority, and the Board of Revenue. The Patna High Court and its Division Bench also upheld these decisions, interpreting the legislative intent to include tanks within the definition of "land" by including "even land perennially submerged under water."
4. Interpretation of "Land":
The Supreme Court emphasized that the definition of "land" in the Act includes "even land perennially submerged under water." The Court noted that the term "land" in the Act is specifically defined to include various categories, and the word "includes" is used to enlarge the meaning of "land." Therefore, tanks, which are perennially submerged under water, fall within this definition.
5. Applicability of Amendments:
The Court clarified that the amendment to the Act in Bihar, substituting "even land" with "also the land," does not apply to Jharkhand, as Jharkhand has not made such an amendment. The Court also noted that the word "even" was intended to mean "level surface" rather than "also."
6. Object of the Act:
The Court acknowledged that the object of the Act is to take over surplus land from large land-holders and distribute it among the landless. However, it emphasized that this object does not restrict the definition of "land" to only those lands that can be distributed for agricultural or horticultural purposes. The clear and specific words used in the statute cannot be ignored.
7. Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that tanks meant to provide water for agricultural/horticultural purposes are "land" for the purposes of the Act. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the orders of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench.
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2009 (7) TMI 1339
Territorial Jurisdiction of police officer - Validity of notices issued u/s 160/91 CrPC - Seeking personal attendance of witnesses to produce document or other thing - Petitioners, who are residing in New Delhi, to appear before C.I.D. Headquarters, at Shillong - HELD THAT:- So read Section 160 CrPC, it becomes clear that such police officer making the investigation can enforce the attendance of a person acquainted with the facts arid circumstances only if the latter resides within the limits of his own police station or adjoining station. If the person being summoned does not reside within the limits of the police station of the police officer making the investigation or, at any rate, within the limits of the adjoining police station, it appears that such police officer cannot enforce his attendance even though he may be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case being investigated by him.
Consequently, this writ petition succeeds. The impugned notices issued by the respondent No. 6 to the petitioners u/s 160, Cr.P.C. are hereby quashed. No further notice u/s 160, Cr.P.C. shall be issued by him upon the petitioners hereafter to enforce their attendance from Delhi as witnesses in connection with Laban P.S. Case No. 63(11)04. Insofar as the notice u/s 91, Cr.P.C. is concerned, it is hereby declared that the personal attendance of the petitioners before the respondent No. 6 is not necessary merely for production of the documents required by him in connection with that case. However, there shall be no costs.
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2009 (7) TMI 1338
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court to entertain an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
2. Interpretation of Article 19 of the Agreement concerning governing law and dispute resolution.
3. Applicability of Indian arbitration law to international commercial arbitration held outside India.
4. The principle of comity of jurisdictions and forum non-conveniens.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court to entertain an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:
The primary issue was whether the Delhi High Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for interim measures, given that the arbitration was to be conducted under the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) rules in Singapore. The Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, emphasizing that the parties had chosen Singapore as the venue for arbitration and agreed that the courts of Singapore would have jurisdiction over disputes. This choice implied the exclusion of Indian courts' jurisdiction, even for interim measures.
2. Interpretation of Article 19 of the Agreement concerning governing law and dispute resolution:
Article 19 of the Agreement specified that the agreement would be governed by Singapore law and that disputes would be resolved under the SIAC Rules, with the venue of arbitration in Singapore. The Court noted that this clause clearly indicated the parties' intention to have their disputes resolved in Singapore, applying Singapore law. The Court emphasized that this choice of law and forum was a conscious decision by the parties, indicating an "unmistakable intention" to exclude the jurisdiction of Indian courts.
3. Applicability of Indian arbitration law to international commercial arbitration held outside India:
The appellant argued that, under the Supreme Court's decision in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading SA, Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, including Section 9, would apply to international commercial arbitrations held outside India unless specifically excluded. However, the Court distinguished the present case from Bhatia International, noting that the parties had expressly chosen Singapore law and jurisdiction, which implied the exclusion of Indian arbitration law. The Court concluded that the parties' agreement to apply Singapore law and confer jurisdiction on Singapore courts amounted to an implied exclusion of Part I of the Indian Act.
4. The principle of comity of jurisdictions and forum non-conveniens:
The Court also discussed the principle of comity of jurisdictions, which refers to the respect one jurisdiction gives to the laws and judicial decisions of another. The Court held that, given the clear choice of Singapore as the forum for arbitration and the application of Singapore law, it would be inappropriate for Indian courts to intervene. The principle of forum non-conveniens, which allows courts to refuse jurisdiction when another forum is more appropriate, was also applied. The Court found that Singapore was the appropriate forum for resolving disputes and seeking interim measures, given the parties' agreement.
Conclusion:
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appellant's application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, holding that it lacked jurisdiction. The Court emphasized the parties' clear and unmistakable intention to have their disputes resolved in Singapore under Singapore law, which implied the exclusion of Indian courts' jurisdiction. The principles of comity of jurisdictions and forum non-conveniens further supported this conclusion. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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2009 (7) TMI 1337
Issues involved: Exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Income Tax Act for the petitioner society for the assessment year 2007-08 based on the objects clause of the society.
Summary:
Issue 1: Exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) for the assessment year 2007-08
The petitioner, a society engaged in educational activities, sought exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Income Tax Act for the year 2007-08. The request was initially rejected on the grounds that the society's objects clause included activities beyond education, such as uplifting the weaker sections of the Sikh community and promoting Sikh culture. However, the petitioner contended that despite the mentioned objects, the society had solely engaged in educational activities, specifically managing a Senior Secondary school. An order dated 24th March, 2009, revealed that for the assessment year 2008-09, exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) was granted subject to certain conditions. The petitioner submitted an affidavit affirming its commitment to solely conducting educational activities and agreed to amend its memorandum of association to reflect this focus. Consequently, the court directed the Director General of Income Tax (Exemptions) Delhi to grant exemption to the petitioner for the assessment year 2007-08, mirroring the terms and conditions of the exemption granted for the subsequent year.
This judgment highlights the importance of aligning the actual activities of an organization with its stated objects to qualify for tax exemptions under relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act.
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2009 (7) TMI 1336
The Supreme Court ordered that the High Court should decide on the question of forfeiture of shares in accordance with the law. Status quo on the transfer of shares will be maintained until the High Court makes a decision. The Special Leave Petition has been disposed of.
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2009 (7) TMI 1335
Issues Involved:
The issues involved in this case are the legality and validity of the order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure summoning the appellants as additional accused in connection with a case under Sections 306/509/420/120B/456 of the Indian Penal Code.
Details of the Judgment:
Issue 1: Summoning of Appellants as Additional Accused
The deceased, in her dying declaration, named both Sarabjit Singh and the appellants as responsible for her death. The evidence presented before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge indicated that the appellants not only supported Sarabjit Singh but also threatened the deceased regarding marriage and blackmail. The court found sufficient material to proceed against the accused, stating that a lady at the time of her death will never tell a lie. The High Court upheld the summoning of the appellants, emphasizing that the evidence showed commission of an offense and that the dying declaration, along with witness statements, supported the need to add the appellants as accused.
Issue 2: Legal Principles and Discretion of the Court
The appellants argued that the immediate cause for the deceased's suicide, throwing of nude photographs, was attributed to Sarabjit Singh alone, and thus, they should not have been summoned as additional accused. However, the court cited legal precedents stating that the court can add other accused based on evidence even if they were not charge-sheeted initially. The court emphasized that the evidence disclosed some offense, and the court's discretion to add accused should be exercised judiciously. The court rejected the argument that the court must wait until cross-examination is over before adding accused, stating that each case must be decided based on its own facts.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the judgment that summoned the appellants as additional accused. The court found no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment based on the evidence and circumstances of the case.
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2009 (7) TMI 1334
Issues involved: Interpretation of clauses in a company agreement, liability for payment of licence fee, validity of winding up petition.
Interpretation of Clauses in the Agreement:
The appeal was against an order directing the appellant-Company to deposit a specific amount due to termination of a licence agreement. The agreement stated a lock-in period and conditions for termination. The Single Judge held the company liable for payment based on the agreement's interpretation. However, the High Court analyzed the clauses and concluded that different interpretations were possible. It emphasized that the lock-in period must have commenced for the payment to be due, and the liability was only for the balance period left. The Court highlighted the importance of bonafide disputes in interpreting agreement terms and suggested civil law remedies for such cases instead of winding up petitions.
Liability for Payment of Licence Fee:
The respondent filed a Company Petition seeking winding up of the appellant-company for non-payment of dues u/s 433 and 434 of the Companies Act. The dispute arose from the termination of a licence agreement before the commencement of the licence period. The respondent claimed payment based on the agreement's clauses, specifically clause 7, which mentioned payment for the balance period left of the lock-in period. The Single Judge considered this amount as liquidated damages and directed the company to pay. However, the High Court disagreed with this interpretation, stating that the liability for payment arises only if the agreement is terminated after the commencement of the lock-in period. It concluded that the winding up petition was not justified in this case due to the differing interpretations possible.
Validity of Winding Up Petition:
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Single Judge's order and dismissing the Company Petition. It emphasized that when there are genuine disputes over agreement terms, the remedy of filing a winding up petition should not be used. The Court highlighted the importance of considering different interpretations of contract clauses and suggested resorting to civil law remedies in such cases. The appeal was allowed, and the Company Petition was dismissed, with the Court emphasizing the need for clarity in interpreting contractual terms to avoid unnecessary legal actions.
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2009 (7) TMI 1333
Issues Involved:
1. Evidence connecting the appellant to the incident
2. Conviction under Section 3(2)(i) of TADA(P) Act without being charged
3. Charge under Section 3(5) of TADA(P) Act for an offence not in existence at the time of the incident
4. Fairness of Section 313 Cr.P.C. examination
5. Application of mind by the Designated Court
Summary:
1. Evidence connecting the appellant to the incident:
The Supreme Court found that there was no direct evidence linking the appellant to the alleged incident of killing the victim. The prosecution's case was based on circumstantial evidence, and several key witnesses either turned hostile or provided testimony that did not implicate the appellant. For instance, P.W.1, the brother of the deceased, did not know who kidnapped and killed his brother, and P.W.2, who was declared hostile, denied any knowledge of the incident.
2. Conviction under Section 3(2)(i) of TADA(P) Act without being charged:
The appellant was convicted u/s 3(2)(i) of the TADA(P) Act, although he was not charged under that section. The Court noted that a charge under Section 3(2)(i) and a charge under Section 3(5) of the TADA(P) Act are different and one is not encompassed by the other. The Court emphasized that the requisite intention for a terrorist act, as defined in Section 3(1), was missing in this case.
3. Charge under Section 3(5) of TADA(P) Act for an offence not in existence at the time of the incident:
The appellant was charged under Section 3(5) of the TADA(P) Act, which was inserted in 1993, while the incident occurred in September 1991. The Court held that the appellant could not be charged for an offence that was not in existence at the time of the alleged commission.
4. Fairness of Section 313 Cr.P.C. examination:
The Court found that the examination of the appellant u/s 313 Cr.P.C. was unfair. The questions put to the appellant did not reflect the evidence on record, particularly the question about his membership in ULFA, which was not supported by any witness testimony. The Court emphasized that Section 313 examinations are meant to benefit the accused by allowing them to explain the circumstances appearing in the evidence against them.
5. Application of mind by the Designated Court:
The Supreme Court criticized the Designated Court for failing to apply its mind both at the stage of framing charges and at the time of convicting the appellant. The Court reiterated the importance of scrutinizing the material on record and ensuring that the stringent provisions of the TADA(P) Act are applied correctly. The Court cited the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur to highlight the duty of the Designated Court to ensure that the evidence strictly falls within the parameters of the Act before framing charges or convicting an accused.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the judgment and order of conviction, declaring it unsustainable in law. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other case.
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2009 (7) TMI 1332
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) at Calcutta.
2. Integral parts of the cause of action under SARFAESI Act.
3. Application from a non-party in the original proceeding.
Summary:
1. Jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) at Calcutta:
The primary issue was whether the DRT at Calcutta had jurisdiction to entertain an application u/s 17 of the SARFAESI Act concerning actions taken by a bank u/s 13(4) for the sale of mortgaged property in Gujarat. The petitioner argued that part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the DRT at Calcutta, citing several actions and communications that occurred in Kolkata. However, the bank contended that these actions did not form an integral part of the cause of action for enforcement of security interest, which was centered in Gujarat where the mortgaged property was located.
2. Integral parts of the cause of action under SARFAESI Act:
The court examined the provisions of Section 13 and Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act along with Section 19 of the DRT Act. It was determined that the integral part of the cause of action for filing an application u/s 17 arises only after measures are taken u/s 13(4). The court noted that the entire realization process is divided into two phases: the first phase involving the service of notice u/s 13(2) and the second phase involving measures u/s 13(4). The court concluded that the measures u/s 13(4) are in the nature of execution proceedings, and thus, the DRT within whose territorial jurisdiction the secured assets are located (Gujarat) is the competent tribunal to entertain the application.
3. Application from a non-party in the original proceeding:
An application filed by Dhir & Dhir Asset Reconstruction and Securitisation Company Ltd., which was not a party to the original proceeding, was also considered. The court rejected this application, stating that there is no scope for entertaining an application from a stranger who is not a party in the original proceeding. The court noted that the relief claimed had no correlation with the subject matter of the dispute under consideration.
Conclusion:
The court upheld the decision of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Kolkata, which had reversed the judgment of the DRT, Kolkata, and held that the DRT, Kolkata, had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application u/s 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The application by the petitioner was rejected, and the application by Dhir & Dhir Asset Reconstruction and Securitisation Company Ltd. was also dismissed.
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2009 (7) TMI 1331
The Appellate Tribunal CESTAT, New Delhi directed the original authority to re-examine the matter within four weeks as per the Commissioner (Appeals) directions. The goods have been with the Department's custody since 2013. The appeal and application for early hearing were disposed of. (2009 (7) TMI 1331 - CESTAT, New Delhi)
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2009 (7) TMI 1330
Issues involved: Jurisdictional error in summoning appellant as an additional accused without proper notice u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
In the judgment, the appellant challenged a writ petition filed by him questioning the correctness of being arrayed as an additional accused in a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The original accused had issued a cheque which bounced due to insufficient funds, leading to a complaint being filed. The complainant filed an application under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. to summon the appellant as an additional accused based on the Bank Manager's statement linking the appellant to the account. However, it was noted that the conditions precedent specified in Section 138 of the Act, including serving notice to the appellant, were not met. The learned Magistrate's order summoning the appellant was deemed to be a jurisdictional error. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and allowed the appeal due to the lack of maintainability of the complaint petition against the appellant.
This judgment highlights the importance of adhering to the procedural requirements set out in the law, specifically in cases involving complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It underscores the significance of serving proper notice to the accused before taking legal actions, emphasizing the need for strict compliance with statutory provisions to ensure the validity of court orders and judgments.
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2009 (7) TMI 1329
Arbitration Proceedings - interest upto and from the date of award - Disputes arose between the parties by reason by rejection of claims of appellant and they were referred to Arbitration - whether the Arbitrator can award interest for pre-reference period and pendente lite, when the contract prohibits the employer from entertaining any claim for interest? - Aggrieved by the deletion of interest upto the date of award and reduction of interest from the date of award to 6% per annum, the appellant has filed this appeal.
HELD THAT:- Clause G-1.09 makes it clear that no interest or damages will be paid by Government, in regard to : (i) any money or balance which may be lying with the Government; (ii) any money which may become due owing to any dispute, difference or misunderstanding between the Engineer-in-charge on the one hand and the contractor on the other hand; (iii) any delay on the part of the Engineering Charge in making periodical or final payment; or (iv) any other respect whatsoever.
The clause is comprehensive and bars interest under any head in clear and categorical terms. In view of clause (a) of sub-section (7) of section 31 of the Act, it is clear that the Arbitrator could not have awarded interest upto the date of the award, as the agreement between the parties barred payment of interest. The bar against award of interest would operate not only during the preference period that is up to 13.3.1997 but also during the pendente lite period that is from 14.3.1997 to 31.7.2001.
The arbitrator awarded interest at the rate of 18% per annum on ₹ 24,18,586/-, 14% per annum on amount found due on finalisation the final bill and 12% per annum on the security deposit amount if any that has to be refunded. As noticed above, clause (b) of sub-section (7) of section 31 of the Act provides that if the award does not otherwise direct, the amount awarded shall carry interest as directed by the award and in the absence of any provision of 18% per annum. Any provision in the contract barring interest, will therefore operate only till the date of award and not thereafter.
The arbitrator has awarded interest at three different rates on three different amounts which are all less than 18% per annum. The said award of interest by the arbitrator is not contrary to section 31(7)(b) of the Act. Unless the award of interest is found to be unwarranted for reasons to be recorded, the court should not alter the rate of interest awarded by the Arbitrator. The High Court has not assigned any reasons for reducing the rate of interest to 6% per annum. Therefore, such reduction cannot be sustained.
We allow this appeal in part and modify the judgment of the High Court as follows :
(a) The Judgment of the High Court setting aside the award of interest upto the date of award is affirmed.
(b) The decision of the High Court reducing the rate of interest to 6% per annum from the date of award is set aside. The rate of interest on the amounts due and payable under the award, from the date of award till date of payment shall be in terms of the award of the Arbitrator.
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2009 (7) TMI 1328
Issues involved: Challenge to order dismissing writ petition for waiver of pre-deposit u/s Article 226 of the Constitution.
Summary:
The appellant was issued a show cause notice u/s 8(3) and 8(4) of FERA, 1973 for under-valuation of imported marble. The Special Director imposed a penalty of Rs. 20,00,000 u/s 50 of FERA, 1973. The Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appellant's application for dispensation of pre-deposit, leading to the dismissal of the appeal if the penalty was not paid within 30 days. The appellant's writ petition against the Tribunal's order was also dismissed by the Single Judge.
The appellant contended that Sections 8(3) and 8(4) of FERA, 1973 were inapplicable to the case, while the respondent argued that the penalty was imposed due to under-invoicing.
The High Court, considering the case u/s 19 of FEMA, observed that undue hardship and safeguarding penalty realization are crucial. It noted that undue hardship must be disproportionate to the requirement and benefit derived. The Court found no independent finding of under-valuation and doubted the applicability of Sections 8(3) and 8(4) as goods were imported with RBI permission. Due to doubts on the adjudicating order's sustainability and the appellant's financial hardship, the Court granted waiver of pre-deposit, allowing the appeal.
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2009 (7) TMI 1327
Issues involved: Challenge to order setting aside demand for interest and penalty based on delay in payment of excise duty.
Summary:
The appeal arose from an order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), Chandigarh, setting aside the demand for interest and penalty due to the duty amount being deposited before the show cause notice was issued, despite a delay in payment as per the law. The challenge to the order was centered around the argument that the relevant provisions of Rule 96ZO and 96ZQ of the Central Excise Rules did not allow any discretion in imposing penalty or interest in case of delayed payment of excise duty.
The appellant relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Dharamendra Textile Processors to support their position. The records confirmed the delay in payment of excise duty by the respondent, although the duty was paid before the show cause notice was issued, along with part of the interest. The Commissioner (Appeals) referred to a decision of the Larger Bench in the case of CCE vs. Machino Montell and concluded that payment of duty before the notice did not justify imposing a penalty, thus setting aside the direction for penalty and interest.
The provisions of law regarding interest on delayed duty payment and the authority's obligation to demand interest and impose penalty were deemed clear. The decision of the Larger Bench in Machino Montell was considered not good law, especially since it had been set aside by the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court. The order was set aside, and the original authority's decision was restored based on the clarity provided by the Apex Court in the Dharamendra Textile Processors case.
In conclusion, the impugned order was not sustainable, and the appeal was allowed, disposing of the matter accordingly.
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2009 (7) TMI 1326
Issues involved:
The appellant challenged the order of detention u/s 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, passed by the learned Single Judge. The issues included the jurisdiction of the court, delay in executing the detention order, and the justification for preventive detention.
Jurisdiction of the Court:
The appellant contested the detention order on the grounds of jurisdiction, as it was passed at Gandhinagar, Gujarat, while he anticipated execution in Ludhiana. The Single Judge held that the court had territorial jurisdiction based on the alleged violation of the right to life and liberty within its jurisdiction, citing precedent cases.
Delay in Execution of Detention Order:
The detention order was passed five years prior, for a one-year period, but was never executed. The appellant relied on previous judgments where orders were quashed due to significant delays in execution. The court, considering the lack of execution and the cited precedents, concluded that the order of detention should be quashed.
Justification for Preventive Detention:
The detention order was based on allegations of evasion of customs and central excise duties by the appellant. Statements from individuals implicated the appellant in illegal activities related to duty evasion. However, due to the significant delay in executing the order and lack of satisfactory explanation for the delay, the court decided to quash the order with the possibility of a fresh order if necessary.
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2009 (7) TMI 1325
The Bombay High Court admitted a question regarding the finding of the CESTAT on the penalty imposed under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962. The case is to be heard along with Customs Appeal No. 54 of 2009, with appellants required to serve respondents within eight weeks to avoid dismissal for non-prosecution.
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2009 (7) TMI 1324
Issues involved:
The judgment involves the cancellation of bail granted to the appellant by the learned S.D.J.M., Purnia u/s 498A IPC based on allegations of mental and physical cruelty, insufficient dowry, and illicit relations. The issues include the procedural irregularities in granting bail without proper consideration and relevant documents, leading to the subsequent cancellation of bail by the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court.
Details of the Judgment:
*Issue 1: Allegations of mental and physical cruelty, insufficient dowry, and illicit relations*
The respondent No. 2 alleged that the appellant and his family subjected her to mental and physical cruelty for insufficient dowry and objected to illicit relations. The complaint filed by the respondent No. 2 led to the appellant's bail being cancelled u/s 498A IPC.
*Issue 2: Procedural irregularities in granting bail*
The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class granted bail to the appellant without proper consideration and without hearing the respondent No. 2 or her counsel. The bail application was heard hastily on the same day without waiting for relevant documents from the Sessions Court, leading to adverse inferences by the learned Sessions Judge and subsequent cancellation of bail.
*Issue 3: Judicial discretion and arbitrary exercise of power*
The learned Magistrate's decision to grant bail was deemed arbitrary and motivated by oblique motives. The High Court confirmed the cancellation of bail, noting that the learned Magistrate considered irrelevant documents and exercised discretion in an arbitrary manner, justifying the decision to set aside the bail order.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the cancellation of bail due to procedural irregularities and the arbitrary exercise of judicial discretion by the learned Magistrate. The judgment emphasized the importance of proper consideration, relevant evidence, and fair procedures in granting and cancelling bail under the law.
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2009 (7) TMI 1323
Issues involved:
The judgment involves issues related to additions made on account of agricultural produce sale proceeds and low household withdrawals for two different assessees.
Issue 1: Agricultural produce sale proceeds
The CIT(A) confirmed the addition of Rs. 1,25,008 as agricultural produce sale proceeds under section 68 of the Act. The Assessing Officer treated the claim of sale of agricultural produce as unexplained cash credit based on an inquiry from a ginning factory partner. The CIT(A upheld this addition. The appellant argued that the Assessing Officer did not allow cross-examination of the partner and disregarded positive evidence of agricultural production. The appellant had shown agricultural income in previous years, duly accepted by the revenue. The tribunal noted the appellant's landholding and past accepted income, concluding that the onus to prove the transaction as bogus was not met by the Assessing Officer. The tribunal deleted the addition and directed the Assessing Officer to treat the receipt as part of agricultural income.
Issue 2: Low household withdrawals
The addition of Rs. 60,000 for low household withdrawals was made without specific evidence of expenses or family size. The appellant contended that some expenses were met from agricultural produce and that the son also showed withdrawals for household expenses. Citing relevant case law, the tribunal held that under section 69C, the Assessing Officer must first prove the expenditure before shifting the onus to the assessee. As the Assessing Officer failed to discharge this onus, the tribunal deleted the addition. Both parties agreed that similar views should be taken for the other assessee, leading to the allowance of the appeals for both assessees.
This judgment by the Appellate Tribunal ITAT Ahmedabad, delivered by Shri P.K. Bansal, Accountant Member, on 24-07-2009, addressed issues of additions on agricultural produce sale proceeds and low household withdrawals for two assessees. The tribunal found that the Assessing Officer failed to prove the transactions as bogus and deleted the additions, directing the Assessing Officer to treat the receipts as part of agricultural income. The tribunal emphasized the importance of discharging the onus of proof before making such additions under the Income Tax Act.
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2009 (7) TMI 1322
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal as the issue was already decided in a previous judgment involving Oracle Software India Ltd. (293 ITR 353). The appellant's appeal had no merit.
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2009 (7) TMI 1321
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in the case as per the order by Mr. S.H. Kapadia and Mr. Aftab Alam, JJ. [Citation: 2009 (7) TMI 1321 - SC]
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