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Showing 221 to 240 of 286 Records
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1994 (9) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the benefit of Notification No. 119/75 dated April 30, 1975 can be claimed by the appellant?
Held that:- All that Modipon does is to supply steel pipes. The appellant purchases guide rings and strengthening rings from the market. It fits these rings into those steel pipes by itself or gets them fitted in another unit. Thereafter, adopters are fitted on the sides of the cops and then the plastic sleeves are fitted on the cylinders of the cops. This is not a case where the rings and the adopters and sleeves are supplied by Modipon. It is not suggested that the value of rings, adopters and sleeves is very small vis-a-vis the value of steel pipes. The additions made by the appellant are not minor additions; they are of a substantial nature and of considerable value. Except the pipes, all other items which go into the manufacture of cops are either purchased or procured by the appellant himself and he manufactures the cops out of them. The work done by him cannot be characterised as a job-work. If all the requisite rings, adopters and sleeves had also been supplied by Modipon, it could probably have been said that the appellant's work is in the nature of job-work. But that is not the case here. The Tribunal was, therefore, right in holding that the appellant cannot avail of the benefit of the Notification. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.
Civil Appeal Nos. 1384-85 of 1987 - It does not appear that the respondent adds any of his own material while manufacturing the transmitters and components as job work, the High Court was right in extending the benefit of the Notification to the respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 3464 of 1988 - Tribunal has not clearly dealt with the process of manufacture undertaken by the appellant. It appears that the customer entrusts lead ingots to the appellant who manufactures lead suboxide and litharge from them. Whether the appellant adds any of his own material or whether the said manufactured products are made wholly or substantially from the material supplied by the customer is not clear from the judgment of the Tribunal. Thus remit the matter to the Tribunal for decision afresh according.
Civil Appeal Nos. 19-22 of 1980 - The judgment of the Gujarat High Court too the process employed by the respondent is not clearly set out - matters remitted to the High Court for ascertaining the relevant fact.
Civil Appeal No. 3331 of 1984 - The notification cannot be forced to operate in conditions it is not qualified to operate. In the case before us now, we have the added factor that acetic anhydride by Sirsilk is not known to be the product of the acetic acid brought by the particular customer, because Sirsilk uses this process for its own production programmes as well. The acetic acid first gets mixed with other acetic acid or the finished anhydride gets mixed with anhydrides obtained from other acetic acid. There is no segregation and therefore no one can tell that the acetic anhydride was the result of this or that acetic acid. Denial accepted.
Civil Appeal No. 3963 of 1990 - The judgment of the High Court does not set out the relevant facts nor the manufacturing process undertaken by the respondent-writ petitioner - the appeal is allowed and the matter remitted to the High Court for looking into the relevant facts.
Civil Appeal No. 2867 of 1991 - The respondent receives high density polythene fabric from its customers and prepares bags out of it. He also prints a logo or some other matter on the said bags as per the specification of the customer. The High Court of Bombay at Nagpur held that, in the above circumstances, the work done by the respondent-writ petitioner was in the nature of job work. We see no error in the reasoning of the High Court.
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1994 (9) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the said liquid paraffin fell within T.I. 68 as the appellants urged or it fell under T.I. 8 as one Assistant Collector held or under T.I. 14E as another Asstt. Collector did?
Held that:- It is no one's case that the said liquid paraffin is a lubricating oil. The said liquid paraffin does not, therefore, fall outside T.I. 8 on this account. It is the case of the appellants that the said liquid paraffin is processed from spindle oil. The appellants' contention that the said liquid paraffin is not a mineral oil cannot, therefore, be accepted. It may also be pointed out that no evidence in support of this contention has been adduced; in other words, no evidence has been adduced to show that the said liquid paraffin has a chemical composition or derivation other than that mentioned in Explanation I of T.I. 8.
Appeal is confirmed only insofar as it upholds the imposition of excise duty in the sum of ₹ 30,877.04 for the period 1st February, 1981 to 31st July, 1981.
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1994 (9) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... er or mother and not to the class-I heirs in the order specified in sub-s. (1) of s. 15 and in the order of s. 16. In other words, the children and the children of the pre-deceased son or daughter of the Hindu female alone are entitled to get such property. Thus, the husband stands excluded from the succession to the property inherited by a female Hindu from her father s side. Accordingly, we hold that since the mother of the appellant had inherited the suit property from her grandfather, her husband-respondent stood excluded from intestate succession to the estate left by her. The Courts below obviously had overlooked the provision in s.15, in particular, sub-s. (2) thereof, and illegally granted a decree. 4. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The decree of the High Court in the second appeal and that of the appellate Court in the first appeal are set aside. Though for different reasons, the decree of the trial Court stands confirmed, but in the circumstances, without costs.
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1994 (9) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
Assessment Notice, Estate Duty Act, Family Property, Original Assessment, Rectification Of Mistakes
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1994 (9) TMI 62 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Assessment Notice, Income Tax Act, Law Applicable, Reassessment Notice ... ... ... ... ..... ding with regard to the assessment cases prior to April 1, 1979. It may be observed that the ratio of this decision cannot be applied to the cases in hand as the aforesaid amendment remained in force from April 1, 1979, to March 31, 1989, and it was held that during that period the said rule remained in force. The present cases are fully covered by the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in S. C. Prashar s case 1963 49 ITR (SC) 1, and the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Addl. CIT v. Watan Mechanical and Turning Works 1977 107 ITR 743. That being the position, the amending Act having come into force before expiry of the period prescribed under the old Act, the notices issued could not be challenged as being time-barred and without jurisdiction. Holding as above, the writ petitions are dismissed with liberty to the petitioners to take any other point available to them while complying with the notices issued under section 147 of the Income-tax Act.
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1994 (9) TMI 61 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Question Of Law
... ... ... ... ..... d before us and none was placed before the Tribunal to displace the finding of fact entered by the Commissioner (Appeals) that the amount given was only a reimbursement of the expenses. If this be the finding of fact, necessarily, the amount is liable to be exempted under section 10(14). The contention raised by counsel for the Revenue based on the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Tejaji Farasram Kharawalla Limited 1968 67 ITR 95 and of the Bombay High court in Sohanlal G. Sanghi v. CIT 1966 61 ITR 203 that the account should be rendered or the actual amount spent before claiming the exemption under section 10(14) does not appeal to us for the reason that the amount granted as allowance per day is only Rs. 150, which, we are of the view, could have been incurred by the assessees for meeting their expenses. In fact that was the finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) also. There is, therefore, no referable question of law. The original petitions are, therefore, dismissed.
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1994 (9) TMI 60 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Offences And Prosecution, Wilful Attempt To Evade Tax ... ... ... ... ..... was that the estimates were high when considered visa-vis the amount of bank drafts detected. The turnovers to be assessed may have relevance to the quantum of punishment, if any awarded. In that view of the matter, the order of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate is indefensible and is vacated. I make it clear that no observation or conclusion made shall be construed to be the expression of opinion about the merits of the case relating to liability for prosecution. The parties shall appear before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate on October 21, 1994, and indicate about the stage of fresh assessment. Further proceedings before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate shall be kept in abeyance till December 31, 1994. Fresh assessment shall be completed by that date, if pending. Parties shall give intimation to the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate immediately after assessment is completed. Applications are accordingly disposed of.
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1994 (9) TMI 59 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Contemporanea Expositio, High Court, Income Tax Act, Income Tax Authorities, Tax At Source, Words And Phrases, Writ Petition
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1994 (9) TMI 58 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Law Applicable To Assessment, Taxing Statutes, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... include within the purview of exemption valuable articles such as jewellery while granting exemption for the value of furniture, household utensils, wearing apparel intended for personal or household use of the assessee. If it is held that jewellery includes ornaments made of gold, silver, platinum, whether or not studded with precious stones, if would not be permissible to give to the word a narrow meaning as to exclude ornaments made only of precious metals, merely because an Explanation added subsequently clarified that jewellery would include ornaments made of gold, silver or any other precious metal or alloy whether or not containing any precious or semi-precious stone. The Explanation merely made explicit what was implicit in the earlier provision. In this view of the matter, the answer to both the questions referred to this court must be in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. They are answered accordingly. K. VENKATASWAMI C. J.--I agree.
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1994 (9) TMI 57 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Income Tax Act, Income Tax Proceedings, Question Of Law, Res Judicata, Rubber Trees
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1994 (9) TMI 56 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... ee-company is entitled to exemption under section 10(22A) of the Income-tax Act ? 4. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in finding that,--- (i) the hospital is existing for philanthropic and charitable purposes ? (ii) the requirement of public control and accountability is satisfied ? (iii) the hospital is not run on commercial lines in the sense that the object is to make profit ? (iv) so long as there is no such private gain in the year of account, the assessee is entitled to exemption under section 10(22A) ? The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, is, therefore, directed to state a case and refer the aforesaid questions of law for the opinion of this court under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Communicate a copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar to the Assistant Registrar of Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, for information and compliance.
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1994 (9) TMI 55 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Entertainment Expenditure, Taxing Statutes ... ... ... ... ..... unbusiness like that these hotels should give a preview of their attractions to such prospective customers. We, therefore, see nothing wrong in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner looking upon such expenses, in the factual context of this case, more as sales promotion, publicity or advertisement than as entertainment. It is true, that under these heads, entertainment expenses also might be included. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has estimated the same at 1/5th and we do not see the estimate to be unreasonably low on the facts for this year. We endorse this finding, since the finding cannot be considered unreasonable in the circumstances of the case. In the result, the question referred in Income-tax Reference No. 285 of 1977 (wherein the reference is at the instance of the assessee) is answered in the negative and against the Revenue. In other references, the questions are answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. References answered accordingly. No costs.
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1994 (9) TMI 54 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Finding Of Fact, Income From Undisclosed Sources, Income Tax Act, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... come and the mother had, in the course of the assessment proceedings, accepted that she had furnished the amount of Rs. 70,000 for purchase of the car. The Tribunal has found as a fact that this cannot be true. The Tribunal noted that apart from the mother s statement accepting the advancement of the amount for purchase of the car, there was no other evidence to show that the mother had actually advanced any amount or that she had even any source of funds for providing the advance. It was also noted that the assessee had transferred the car subsequently to her own business. The finding that the amount of Rs. 70,000 belonged to the assessee and had not been advanced by the mother is again a question of fact on which all the authorities have concurrently found against the assessee on an appreciation of the evidence in the case. No question of law arises for reference in that case as well. Both the original petitions are, therefore, without merit. They are accordingly dismissed.
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1994 (9) TMI 53 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Income, Factory Building, Income From Other Sources, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... for instance, a case where an assessee leases the asset to another person during the previous accounting year, the use of the plant and machinery is not for the business of the assessee for which the development allowances were accorded under section 33(1) since the machinery was not wholly used by the assessee for his/its business during the previous accounting year. Suppose the plant or machinery was used for a purpose other than the business of the assessee, then also the assessee is not eligible for development rebate, obviously for the reason that the plant or machinery was not used for the purpose of the business of the assessee in the previous accounting year or a portion thereof. The idea is neatly summed up (if we can say so with respect to the learned judges) when the court said, There must exist unity of ownership and user in the business . The answer to the second question, therefore, is in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. Reference answered accordingly.
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1994 (9) TMI 52 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Finding Of Fact, Income Tax Act, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... and did not have the character of income in the hands of the assessee. This finding of fact entered by the Tribunal though sought to be challenged by the Revenue as wrong, perverse and unsupported by any material, is really one based on the materials available in the case. Nothing has been brought to our notice which shakes the finding of the Tribunal about the real character of the surplus amount. There is nothing to show that the amounts were actually income and not surplus amount due to the subscribers as contended by the assessee. If this be the true position regarding the surplus amount, the finding of the Tribunal that the amounts really stood to the credit of the subscribers and did not constitute the assessee s income during the relevant year has only to be accepted. No purpose will, therefore, be served by referring any question for the decision of this court as sought by the Revenue. We do not, therefore, find any merit in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed.
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1994 (9) TMI 51 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Income From Undisclosed Sources, Income Tax Act, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... oner of Income-tax (Appeals) and in second appeal by the Tribunal. The question as to whether the assessee has explained the source of this money and traced it to her husband and mother as claimed is essentially a question of fact. No cogent material was placed before any of the authorities to prove that the money did really belong to the husband or the mother. In fact, even the respective amounts which were alleged to have been advanced by the mother and the husband were not disclosed at any point of time. All the three authorities have considered the materials in the case and come to the finding that there was no proper explanation for this investment and that this amount has to be assessed in the hands of the petitioner as income from undisclosed sources. We do not find any question of law liable to be referred to this court under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the question involved being essentially one of fact. The original petition is, therefore, dismissed.
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1994 (9) TMI 50 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Question Of Law, Rejection Of Accounts ... ... ... ... ..... made various payments to various officials. It was also noted that the assessee had sold arrack at an average price of Rs. 26 per litre in the previous year while the average sale price during the year in question was only Rs. 18. It was in these circumstances that the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed in part and an estimate was made with an addition of Rs. 5 lakhs to the income. It could not be said that the finding is not based on any materials or evidence available on record. There is a thorough and threadbare discussion of the matter by the Tribunal. We do not find any perversity in the appreciation of the materials available on record. Nor can it be said that the finding of the Tribunal is based on any guesses or surmises as contended by either side. The findings entered by the Tribunal are on questions of fact and based on appreciation of the materials available on record. There is no question of law liable to be referred. We, therefore, dismiss these petitions.
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1994 (9) TMI 49 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... ioner of Income-tax had power to remand the case as contended on behalf of the Revenue and also whether the finding recorded by the Tribunal has been challenged. We find that the Revenue has not challenged this finding. Once the Tribunal has recorded its finding as aforesaid, upsetting the finding of the Commissioner of Income-tax by holding ....the learned Commissioner of Income-tax has himself not made enquiry to come to the conclusion that the gifts were not genuine. He neither had anything before him, documentary or oral. . . . mere report of the Deputy Director (Intelligence), Madras, suggesting some of the gifts may be non-genuine and that too not confronted to the assessee was not sufficient to conclude that the gifts were not genuine. and these findings, not being challenged by the Revenue, the question sought for reference does not arise from the facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the present application is devoid of merit and is accordingly rejected.
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1994 (9) TMI 48 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
High Court In Directing Reference, Income Tax Act, Jurisdiction Of High Court, Question Of Law, Supreme Court
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1994 (9) TMI 47 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Partial Waiver, Voluntary Disclosure Of Income, Waiver Of Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... turn was not filed in good faith and, secondly, that he did not co-operate in the proceedings. Both are essential conditions before consideration of either reducing or waiving the penalty imposed. Next, it was urged that the Commissioner of Income-tax exercised quasi-judicial power and even in case some of the conditions were not fulfilled, he should have proportionately reduced the penalty. The argument is misconceived as even the authority, exercising quasi-judicial power has to decide in terms of the provisions under the Act, not contrary to the same. When the provisions contained a minimum requirement before considering either reduction or waiver of penalty and that having not been complied with only because he was exercising judicial power, the petitioner is not entitled to any proportionate reduction in penalty. The argument is misconceived and has no leg to stand. In view of the aforesaid findings, we find no merit in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed.
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