Home Case Index All Cases Income Tax Section Wise 1955 1955 (11) This

Law	-- All -- GST Income Tax Benami Property Customs Corporate Laws Securities / SEBI Insolvency & Bankruptcy FEMA PMLA Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Wealth tax Indian Laws
Court	-- Any -- Supreme Court SC Orders / Highlights High Court Appellate Tribunal Tribunal Appellate authority for Advance Ruling Advance Ruling Authority National Financial Reporting Authority Competition Commission of India ANTI-PROFITEERING AUTHORITY Commission Central Government Board DISTRICT/ SESSIONS Court Commissioner / Appellate Authority Other
Citation	--Year-- 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 Upto 1949 - -Volume- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 -
Landmark	Nil - N/A Referred in >= 3 Cases Referred in >= 4 Cases Referred in >= 5 Cases Referred in >= 10 Cases Referred in >= 15 Cases Referred in >= 25 Cases Referred in >= 50 Cases Referred in >= 100 Cases
Order by	TMI Citation Date of Decision

Advanced Search Options

Case Laws

Showing 21 to 31 of 31 Records

• 1955 (11) TMI 30 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... with the view that section 12(2) provides for the exclusion of time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment only in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for re- view. The application now before the Court being one asking for a reference to this Court of the question of law said to arise out of the order of the judge (Revisions) cannot be said to fall in any of these categories. As such the period taken in obtaining the copy cannot be excluded even if section 12 of the Limitation Act be applicable to the case. I agree that the question referred to this Bench should be answered in the negative. RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-I agree that the question referred to the Full Bench be answered in the negative as an application under sub-sec- tion (1) of section 11 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act is not covered by the provisions of section 12(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Reference answered in the negative.

  ---

• 1955 (11) TMI 29 - PATNA HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... cient. The interest grows out of the debt. If the creditor chooses to avail himself of rights in property conferred by the law of New South Wales in respect of land or chattels under the autho- rity of the legislature the law of New South Wales can impose upon him any liability which is relevant to the purpose of his doing so and the purpose of his doing so is to secure repayment of the moneys. Applying the principle laid down by these authorities, I am clearly of opinion that in the present cases there is a real and pertinent nexus or connection between the production of tea and its subsequent sale at Calcutta and the Bihar Legislature had jurisdiction to enact a law taxing such a sale. For the reasons expressed, I hold that all the questions referred to the High Court must be answered in favour of the State of Bihar and against the assessee. The State of Bihar is entitled to the costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. IMAM, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.

  ---

• 1955 (11) TMI 28 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... an embank- ment, earth belonging to Government is usually used. There is no reason to think, in the absence of further materials, that in this parti- cular case the earth was brought from a distant place or was separately charged for by the contractor. We would accordingly hold items 1 and 2 of the final bill should be exempted from assessment to sales tax. The rest of the claim put forward by the petitioners is rejected. The petition is thus allowed so far as the claim relates to items 1 and 2 of the final bill, and the Sales Tax Authorities will revise the assessment accordingly. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. O.J.C. No. 376 of 1954 In spite of repeated opportunities being given to the petitioner he has not been able to place any material before us to satisfy us that there was no element of sale in the contract undertaken by him. We have therefore no option but to reject this petition. We make no order as to costs. RAO, J.-I agree. Ordered accordingly.

  ---

• 1955 (11) TMI 27 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... even so, it is not a food. It is not eaten for its food value, but at the highest as an aid to digestion. It is not served as a part of a meal, but as a supplement to it. As a digestive agent, it might perhaps be considered a medicinal preparation, but the notifica- tion is careful to provide that in exempting vegetables, green or dried, medicinal preparations are not included . I respectfully agree with the above decision of their Lordships and hold that betel leaves do not come within the meaning of the expression green vegetables as used in the notification of the U.P. Government dated 7th June, 1948. The relevance of the subsequent notification of 1954 is only this that the State Government has now with effect from 1st July, 1954, exempted betel leaves from the payment of sales tax, but prepared pans will be subject to the payment of tax. For the above reasons this petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed. (1) 1950 1 S.T.C. 217 A.I.R. 1951 Pat. 367.

  ---

• 1955 (11) TMI 26 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... , a sample of which has been produced in Court, can certainly not be sold as wheat or wheat flour nor can it be used as wheat or wheat flour. That to my mind is the correct test and not whether in the last analysis murghi dana is mostly com- posed of condemned wheat and only a small quantity of some other product. The straight way to look at this matter is to ask if an ordinary person would ever confuse or identify this commodity called murghi dana with what is ordinarily called wheat or wheat flour, and I have not the slightest doubt that this can never happen and as ordinarily understood therefore murghi dana is neither wheat nor wheat flour. It follows that the commodity in dispute, namely murghi dana, is not exempt from the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948. I would therefore allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below and dismiss the plaintiffs suit and considering all the circumstances leave the parties to their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.

  ---

• 1955 (11) TMI 25 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... mand of this amount is likely to interfere with the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on their trade. If the sales tax depart- ment for some reason which has not been disclosed in this case thinks that the sale deed is invalid, it may bring a suit for setting aside the sale deed. So long as the sale deed stands it is obvious that the sales tax assessed on the previous owner cannot be recovered from the petitioners. The validity of the sale deed has not been challenged in the present proceedings. For the above reasons, this petition is allowed and a writ of mandamus shall be issued to the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 restraining them from recovering the amount of the sales tax for the years 1949 to 1954 from the petitioners as long as they do not succeed in getting the sale deed in favour of the petitioners set aside by some Court or com- petent authority. The petitioners will be entitled to get their costs of this petition from the respondent No. 1. Petition allowed.

  ---

• 1955 (11) TMI 24 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... thin the State of Madras. The sale was completed within the State before the goods were transported, and in the transport of the goods themselves, which was subsequent to the sale, there was no element of sale. Subsequent transport does not therefore entitle the purchaser to the benefit of Article 286(2) of the Constitution. The Appellate Tribunal was right in rejecting the claim of the peti- tioner Board that this item should be excluded from its taxable turnover. The last item to be considered is Rs. 4,681-7-3, which was the excess collection made by the petitioner Board and was therefore claimed by the Government under Section 8-B(2) of the Act. The decision of the Tribunal was right. The assessee did not press his claim even before the Tribunal because the learned Chairman recorded This point has not been argued. This petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed. (1) 1953 4 S.T.C. 133. (3) 1953 4 S.T.C. 205. (2) 1955 6 S.T.C. 446.

  ---

• 1955 (11) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... re unable to see any real substance in this contention. The Income-tax Act, for instance, cannot become void retrospectively and the assessments made thereunder illegal, because the rates of levy are changed from time to time by the Finance Acts. If, for example, the Sales Tax Act were to be repealed by the legislature, the assessments made under the Act before the repeal could not become illegal, and the plea of discrimination and denial of equal protection of laws would not be available. So long as the taxing power is there, it is open to the legislature to decide the basis of taxation and to alter that from time to time. Such alterations would not fall within the mischief of Article 14 of the Constitution. We are of opinion that Act XVII of 1954 is intra vires and valid. The only point raised in this revision was the validity of Act XVII of 1954, and that contention we have to negative. This revision case is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.

  ---

• 1955 (11) TMI 22 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
  

  Alteration of memorandum

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... e appeal. In the suit out of which the appeal has arisen, the plaintiffs challenged the validity of the appointment of Seth Narottamdas Jethalal as the managing agent of Chandulal and Co. Ltd., (defendant No. 1) and prayed for a declaration that defendant No. 5 was not validly and legally appointed managing agent of defendant No. 1 company and for an injunction restraining defendant No. 5 from acting as such. The trial court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to such a declaration and injunction and dismissed the plaintiffs suit with costs. As the original defendant No. 5, Seth Narottam Jethalal, is now dead, it is obvious that the plaintiffs right to sue does not survive against either defendant No. 1 company or the heirs and legal representatives of defendant No. 5. This position has been conceded by Mr. Munshi. First Appeal No. 549 of 1951 must, therefore, fail and must be dismissed. There will be no order as to costs of the appeal in the circumstances of the case.

  ---

• 1955 (11) TMI 15 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
  

  Directors – Power of

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... s without force, as the second defendant himself had stated that the agreement, Exhibit A-8, was intended to enure for the benefit of Subbiah Aiyar s estate, represented by Vengu Ammal, and not for the benefit of Vengu Ammal at all, any more than the acknowledgment in Exhibit A-7 of the entire debts on the same day was for the benefit of Vengu Ammal. In that view the lower court was right in holding that Parameswara Aiyar, the sole administrator appointed by court in respect of Subbiah Aiyar s estate, could rely on Exhibit A-8 also for fixing the personal liability of Sadagopal. We, therefore, reject this contention and are of opinion that the lower court was right in holding that Sadagopal was personally liable and in passing a decree against him personally. It follows from this that Sadagopal s appeal, A.S. No. 357 of 1952, has to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed with the costs of the first respondent, Parameswara Aiyar. The other parties will bear their own costs.

  ---

• 1955 (11) TMI 14 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
  

  Directors - Vacation of office by

  
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... mentioned in article 94 and also the grounds mentioned in section 86(1). Mr. Rege wants us to give a wide meaning to the expression otherwise and to hold that this particular contingency which was to take place would be included in the expression otherwise . Otherwise can only mean that the director vacates office according to law or according to the articles of association otherwise cannot incorporate a fresh ground of disqualification which is neither to be found in the articles or in section 86(1) of the Companies Act. Therefore, in our opinion, the learned Judge was right in the view that he took that the mere fact that the first defendant has transferred 150 of his ordinary shares to his grandchildren and he along with his wife and children no longer held the first 250 ordinary shares and thereby he has no longer the power to appoint a director nor has he the power to remove him, does not bring about a vacancy in the office of the first defendant as a nominated director.

  ---

12