|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 705 Records
-
1964 (12) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that this amount represented concealed income arising out of the partnership or other business in the taxable territory, or (2) that it was derived from sources entirely outside the taxable territory. That the petitioner had no business of any description or any source capable of yielding income outside the taxable territory was in fact conceded at every stage. It accordingly left only the other alternative, and when it is seen that the petitioner did have a source of income in the taxable territory, it is logical to infer that this income should have arisen out of that business in the taxable territory. We are therefore unable to agree with the learned counsel that the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal was speculative, that is to say, that there was no evidence on foot of which the Tribunal could reach the conclusion it did. It follows that the question has to be answered against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
-
1964 (12) TMI 55 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... at, though officers of the Burma Government are officers of the Crown, they can be regarded as officers of the Crown within the meaning of the Indian Income-tax Act. Learned counsel argues that equally when the expression "local authority" is used in the third proviso, it must mean a local authority within the Indian territory. We are unable to accept this decision as compelling any such inference. In our opinion, this expression must be understood in the context in which it appears, and we have no hesitation in holding that, in the instant case, the wording of the section is broad enough to cover such local authority which in respect of the property in question levied the tax. It would follow that both the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal were correct in their view. The question is answered in the affirmative and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1964 (12) TMI 54 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... with a suit and the only ground on which res judicata can be urged against such a suit can be the provisions of S. 1 1 and no other." These observations, in my view, correctly represent the law on the subject. This view, while it does not make S. 1 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure an unnecessary provision, does not also lead to any practical difficulties, for the decision of a High Court on a question of law will be binding as an authority on subordinate Courts and its decision on a question of fact will rarely be differed from by the said Courts. I would, therefore, hold that the decision given by the High Court in the writ petition would not preclude the Court from deciding the same question on merits in the present suit. The order of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is remanded to the High Court for disposal on merits in accordance with law. Costs will abide the result. ORDER In accordance with the Opinion of the Majority the Appeal is dismissed with costs.
-
1964 (12) TMI 53 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ar Bhagwan Das 1964 52 I.T.R. 335 (S.C.). There their Lordships construed the expressions "finding" and "direction" and held that where the appeal related to a particular assessment year, the finding and direction must necessarily be limited to that particular year. So then, the Appellate Tribunal had no power or jurisdiction under section 33(4) to give directions with regard to the proceedings of the earlier year or to include the amount to be deleted from that year's assessment in the previous year's assessment. In this state of law, the second question must also be answered in favour of the assessee to the effect that the Tribunal had no power or jurisdiction to direct the Income-tax Officer to tax the assessee for the assessment year 1949-50, as the appeal related to the assessment year 1950-51. The references are answered accordingly. The assessee shall get his costs in Reference R.C. No. 9 of 1961. Advocate's fee is fixed at ₹ 250.
-
1964 (12) TMI 52 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... might well be considered to be taxable. Finally, the sale itself may be a trading operation. When tangible assets or rights equivalent thereto are sold, the position may not present much difficulty but in the case of intangible assets or secret process, the problem may not be an easy one. It is not difficult to conceive of cases of joint receipts in exploitation as a commercial venture. Looking at the facts which are binding on us in the instant case and on a consideration of all the circumstances, it appears to me to be a case of joint commercial exploitation by the partners and the payment to the assessee is for successive user even of the "KNOW-HOW". The sum in question is, therefore, in the nature of a revenue receipt which is assessable income. We are accordingly of the view that the question referred should be answered in the affirmative and we hereby do so. The respondent will have his costs which we fix at ₹ 250. Reference answered in the affirmative.
-
1964 (12) TMI 51 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... vided family firms were benamidars of the petitioner-firm, would be nothing more than conjecture or speculation. In our view, therefore, the only information that can be said to have been derived by the respondent, which information was not before the former Income-tax Officer, was with regard to substantial profits having been made by the two Hindu undivided family firms. But that information would not by itself give reasons for a belief that there was escapement of assessment. In this view, the respondent cannot be said to have complied with the conditions precedent laid down by section 147(b) and, therefore, the notices must be held to have been without jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid. We will, therefore, make the petition absolute and issue a writ of mandamus, quashing and setting aside the aforesaid notices, and restraining the respondent from taking proceedings in pursuance of those notices. The respondent will pay to the petitionerfirm the costs of this petition.
-
1964 (12) TMI 50 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e of the aforesaid decision of the Madras High Court in East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1957 31 I.T.R. 803. It is one of the ordinary canons of construction that when the words of an old statute are either incorporated in or by reference made part of a new statute, this is understood to be done with the object of adopting any legal interpretation which has been put on them by the courts Barras v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co. 1933 A.C. 402 In view of this position of the law, the question must be answered in the negative, and it must be held that, having regard to the provisions of section 10(2)(iii) of the Act, the income-tax authorities had no power to scale down the rate of interest on the ground of reasonableness and/or on the ground of non-business considerations. The department will pay ₹ 100 (one hundred) to the assessee towards the costs of these references. NARASIMHAM C.J.--I agree. Question answered in the negative.
-
1964 (12) TMI 49 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... incorporated entity cannot be ignored, so that it is no longer a case of the same body of persons contributing to a common fund which is shared by the same body of persons again. On the other hand, the income that is earned becomes that of the incorporated company which according to the law distributes portions of that income by way of dividends to its shareholders, whether they contributed to the common fund or not. Looked at from that point of view, the entire structure of the case alters and it should necessarily follow that even though there may be certain persons who both contributed to and participated in the common fund, that would not suffice to satisfy the test of mutuality. We are unable to agree that despite the decision of the Supreme Court, there is still scope for exemption of any portion of the income as claimed. The question is accordingly answered in the negative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1964 (12) TMI 48 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... plots was published on December 3, 1948 and immediately thereafter possession appears to have been taken as is recited in Ex. A-18 which we have extracted earlier. In these circumstances, we do not consider that any inference adverse to the appellant could be drawn from his not tendering the rent for the period up to the date on which possession was taken. 21. We, therefore, hold that the learned Judges were in error in holding that the appellant had incurred a forfeiture of his tenancy, assuming it was a permanent tenancy, by the claim that he made in Ex. A-18 and the other documents to which we have referred so as to justify the forfeiture which the Government claimed to enforce by Ex. A-15. 22. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the matter remanded to the High Court for being dealt with in accordance with law. The appellant would be entitled to his costs here and in the High Court. The costs to be incurred in future will bar subject to the directions of the High Court.
-
1964 (12) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nding Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957 came into force; and the application was rightly allowed by the Mahalkari. We have already pointed out that the High Court was in error in quashing the Collector’s order on this ground. But the High Court should have set aside the Collector’s order on the ground that having already decided that there was no ground for interference with the Mahalkari’s order, the Collector could not subsequently revise that order. We, therefore, hold that the Collector’s order was liable to be quashed, though on grounds different from those on which the High Court proceeded. On this ground, in all these appeals the order of the High Court setting aside the order of the Collector and restoring that of the Mahalkari should be affirmed. In the result, the appeals are dismissed with costs. There will be one hearing fee. ORDER In accordance with the Opinion of the majority, the appeals are dismissed with costs. There will be one hearing fee.
-
1964 (12) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... en proceed to interpret it. So far as a Court whose duty it is to give effect to a decree of a Court of competent jurisdiction is concerned it is immaterial whether the term or direction as it stands is contrary to law. So long as it is, on its face, complete and capable of enforcement it has no power to go behind. For these reasons I am of opinion that the first contention raised on behalf of the appellant must fail. As regards the question of quantum of mesne profits I agree with my learned brother that the High Court has given no good reasons for enhancing the amount. In dealing with various items it seems to have proceeded on assumptions or raised the rates of profits to be allowed without referring to the basis for the enhancement. In the circumstances I would agree to the course proposed by him. The appeal, therefore, succeeds only partially and in the circumstances the appropriate order for costs would be for each party to bear its costs in this Court. Appeal allowed.
-
1964 (12) TMI 45 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... to be estimated as the price which it would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date. As the asset in this case is a non-transferable one it cannot be sold in the open market but that does not establish that it has no value. For the purpose of the Act the Wealth-tax Officer must proceed to value it as if it was an asset which could be sold in the open market. This would depend on actuarial valuation. An actuary would probably value it taking into account the age of the person who is in receipt of it and his estimated length of life. If the property is of a wasting nature probably that too would be considered but these are not matters with which we are concerned in this case. All that we have to see is whether it is one which is capable of being given a capitalised value. In the result, the answer to the question must be in the affirmative and against the assessee who will pay the costs of this reference. MASUD J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1964 (12) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rding to him, accused No.8 also has played a leading part and had been specially sent for from a place named Jamsalai in Saurashtra, to receive smuggled gold which was sent in the four trips. We have already discussed that there is no substantive evidence establishing these facts. We have also discussed that on the evidence on record, the part played by accused No. 8 appears to be a minor one. In the circumstances, in our opinion, interests of justice would be served if accused No. 8 is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. The sentence of two years is thus altered to that of one year. The sentences are to run concurrently. (76) Counsel for accused Nos. 5 and 8 pray for sometime to surrender to bail. Neither of them is in Court. Accused on bail have to remain in Court on the date of hearing. no discretion can be exercised in their favour. The applications are rejected. Both accused Nos. 5 and 8 to surrender to their bail. (77) Appeals dismissed.
-
1964 (12) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 37-441 and 996 of 1963 the decrees of the trial court shall be restored with costs here and in the High Court. In Civil Appeal 306 of 1962 the amount decreed by the trial Court shall be modified by deducting therefrom a sum of ₹ 2,725/14/- made up of ₹ 2,261/8/- paid for the surcharge in July, 1947 together with ₹ 464/6/- being the interest claimed on the said sum. Subject to this modification the decree of the trial Court shall be restored with costs here and in the High Court. In Civil Appeals 303, 837, 840-857 of 1962 the suits will be decreed for the amounts prayed for with costs throughout. In the computation of the costs in this Court two sets of hearing fees shall be allowed--one set to be shared by the appellants in Civil Appeals 131, 170, 307 to 309 and 837-857 of 1962 and the other set by the successful appellants in the other appeals to whom we have awarded costs. ORDER In accordance with the majority judgment, appeals are dis- missed with costs.
-
1964 (12) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ion could be altered from one under s. 409 to that under s. 403. Section 403 runs thus “Whoever dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use any moveable property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” It is obvious that an owner of property, in whichever way he uses his property and with whatever intention will not be liable for misappropriaion and that would be so even if he is not the exclusive owner thereof. As already stated, a partner has, undefined ownership along with the other partners over all the assets of the, partnership. If he chooses to use any of them for his own purposes he may be accountable civilly to the other partners. But he does not thereby commit any misappropriation. Mr. Chatterjee’s alternative contention must be rejected. in the result we allow the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence passed against him. Appeal allowed.
-
1964 (12) TMI 41 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n accountsheet showing distribution of the loss amongst the different partners in accordance with their respective shares. There is nothing in the Rules to show that the losses were to be accounted for in any particular manner and in no other way. In that view of the matter, I do not think it can be said that there was no compliance by the assessee about the fulfilment of this condition also. That being the position, it must be held that the application for registration was in order and the registration should have been renewed for the assessment year 1959-60. We therefore answer the question in the affirmative and hold that the registration of the firm should have been renewed for the assessment year 1959-60 under section 26A, read with the Rules made under the Income- tax Act, 1922. The department shall pay a sum of ₹ 250 (Rupees two hundred and fifty) to the assessee towards the costs of this reference. NARASIMHAM C.J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1964 (12) TMI 40 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... cancies (i.e. 3 vacancies). Thus on the actual appointments made the total reservation for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes would be 9 while 34 would be available for the unreserved quota. The petitioner secured 37th place in the unreserved quota. Out of these 37, one unreserved candidate was recruited to another service and thus the petitioner's position may conceivably be said to have bettered and become 36th. According to the calculation which we have already indicated, 9 out of 43 vacancies actually filled will go to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes together and 34 would go to the unreserved quota. The petitioner however was 36th on the unreserved quota and therefore even on the basis of there being no carry forward rule only 34 candidates would be appointed from the unreserved quota and the petitioner being 36th on his own showing can not claim appointment. The petition therefore fails. In the circumstances we make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1964 (12) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tax. In the other case, where it merely authorises the subordinate law making authority to levy the tax without indicating the essential legislative features of such a tax it is not really legislation on the taxation entry but is merely authorising the subordinate legislature to enact a law on that topic. If these provisions, referred to earlier, do not afford any guidance to the Municipal Corporation to fix the rate of the levy it was not suggested that there were any others in the Act which performed that function. Sections 443 and 548(2), it is admitted, do not afford any help for this purpose. It has, therefore, to be held that viewed as a tax, the delegation is unconstitu- tional as the essential legislative functions are parted with to the subordinate law making body and the provision is, therefore, unconstitutional. The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. ORDER In accordance with the majority judgment, the appeal is allowed with costs throughout.
-
1964 (12) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT
whether s. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code applies to an accused person?
Held that:- S. 94, on its true construction, does not apply to an accused person. The result is that the appeal is dismissed. It is not necessary to give facts in the other appeals because nothing turns on them.
-
1964 (12) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessment list of house tax and conservancy tax confirmed by the Municipal Council, Khurai, at a special meeting on February 24, 1964 is effective or is liable to be quashed on the ground that it was not made in accordance with the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The assessment list authenticated by the Chief Municipal Officer was not prepared according to law and, therefore, the provisions of s. 141 were not available to the Council. Upon the view we take we do not find it necessary to consider whether the reason given by the High Court is right or not.
........
|
