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Showing 161 to 180 of 831 Records
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1969 (10) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d who seems to be an independent witness. We agree with the High Court that the Magistrate was not entitled to reject the evidence of the eye-witnessess. No reason has been shown to us why we should interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the High Court. The learned counsel further contends that no offence was committed because the accused had a right of private defence of property. Assuming that he had a right of private defence of property he had ample opportunity of having recourse to the authorities and there was no need for the appellant to have taken the law into his own hands. The only question that remains now is the question whether the benefit of s.6 of the Probation of Offenders Act should be extended to the appellant. In spite of opportunity being given no good proof has been furnished to establish that the appellant was at the relevant time under the age of 21 years. For the aforesaid reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed. R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (10) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nding, it is desirable not to express any opinion on the merits and demerits of the charges as also the rival contentions of the parties because such an opinion may cause prejudice. The appellant raised a contention as to the vires of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and the validity of the investigation. In view of the fact that sanction for the trial is pending pursuant to the investigation under the First Information Report dated 17 August, 1967 the appellant did not want a decision on this point in this appeal because the appellant would raise that contention in the criminal case. We have, therefore, left open the contention as to the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 to enable the appellant to agitate that contention, if so advised, in the criminal trial. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. In view of the fact that there was no order as to costs in the High Court, we are of opinion that each party should bear its costs in this Court.
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1969 (10) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... (2) of Section 59 of the Government of India Act, 1935), are directory and substantial compliance with those provisions is sufficient - See P. Joseph John v. State of Travancore Cochin 1955 SCR 1011 and Chitralekha v. State of Mysore . In this case the impugned order was made in the name of the State Government. It was signed by the Chief Secretary. Therefore prima facie it is a valid order. We need not go further into that question in view of our conclusion that the respondent has failed to prove that he was appointed by an authority higher in rank than the Chief Secretary of the State. 18. For reasons mentioned above this appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and the decree of the trial Court restored. The respondent shall pay costs of the appellant both in this Court and in the High Court. The respondent brought the suit from which this appeal arises in forma pauperis. Hence he is liable to pay the Court-fees payable on the suit claim.
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1969 (10) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... State but no such remedy in another. The rule ' therefore, is that a plea of lis alibi pendens will not succeed and the court will not order a stay of proceedings unless the defendant proves vexation in point of fact. He must show that the continued prosecution of both actions is oppressive or embarrassing, an onus which he will find it difficult to discharge if the plaintiff can indicate some material advantage that is likely to result from each separate action. Each case, therefore, depends upon the setting of its own facts and circumstances. In the facts of the present case I am of opinion that no case for injunction has been made out and the order of Ramamurti, J., dated April 12. 1968 allowing the application of respondent in no. 106 of 1968 should be set -aside. I would accordingly allow the appeals nos. 1208 of 1969 and 1833 of 1969 with costs. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Y.P.
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1969 (10) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd Mahabir Ji. As aforesaid, our conclusion is that the dominant intention of the settlor was to set up and maintain an Akhara, the said two idols as also the tasweer of Hazrat Ali having been installed there only to attract wrestlers of the two communities. That being the position, reluctant though we are, particularly in view of the fact that the said Akhara has been maintained for nearly a century, we find it extremely difficult, in the absence, of any authority, textual or by way of a precedent, to hold that the dedication in question was for either a religious or charitable purpose as recognised by Hindu Law. For the reasons aforesaid we are constrained to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the High Court. In the circumstances of the case, however, we consider it just that there should be no order as to costs. Collector will be at liberty to recover the Court fees payable in the plaint from the next friend of the plaintiffs. Appeal allowed.
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1969 (10) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... consequences which the. decision in The State of Punjab v. Amar Singh (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1313) contemplates. But such consequences would not occur in the case of an officer who has proceeded on leave and against whom an order of’ suspension is passed because in his case there is no question of his doing any act or passing any order and such act or order being challenged as invalid. In this view, we must hold that the order of suspension was validly passed and was communicated to the respondent before August 4, 1958, and therefore, was effective as from July 31. 1958. Accordingly, we allow the State’s appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the High Court. But as the High Court did not decide the aforesaid three questions raised on behalf of the respondent, we remand the case to the High Court with the direction to give its decision thereon in accordance with law. The cost of this appeal will be costs before the High Court. Appeal allowed and case remanded.
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1969 (10) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ts to a release. It signifies nothing more than an intention not to insist upon the right." It is well known that in the law of preemption the general principle which can be said to have been uniformly adopted by the Indian courts is that acquiescence in the sale by any positive act amounting to relinquishment of a preemptive right has the effect of the forfeiture of such a right. So far as the law of preemption is concerned the principle of waiver is based mainly on Mohammedan Jurisprudence. The contention that the waiver of the appellant's right under s. 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act must be founded on contract or agreement cannot be acceded to and must be rejected. A faint attempt was made to assail the finding of the High Court that on the facts which had been proved waiver had been established. We find no reason or justification for interfering with the conclusion of the High Court on the point. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (10) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ain the delay. Learned Counsel for the petitioners says that the petitioners were under the impression that the Departmental Promotion Committee had held a meeting in 1948 and not on April 29, 1949, and the real true facts came to be known in 1961, when the Government mentioned these facts in their letter dated December 28, 1961. We are unable to accept this explanation. This fact has been mentioned in the minutes of the meeting of the Committee which met in Feb. 1952 and we are unable to believe that the petitioners did not come to know all these facts till 1961. But even assuming that the petitioners came to know all these facts only in Dec. 1961, even then there has been inordinate delay in presenting the present petition. The fact that Jaisinghani's case(1) was pending before the High Court and later in this Court is also, no excuse for the delay in resenting the present petition. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1969 (10) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... do not think that the period of 30 days given for disposal of the sugar is in any manner generous. That being so, we are clearly of the opinion that the 28 days time given to the appellants for the disposal of the sugar cannot be considered as reasonable. We think that the second respondent unreasonably rejected the apAppellants request to extend the time for the disposal of the sugar released for sale in the open market. He appears to have acted mechanically. 7. For the reasons mentioned above we allow these appeals and direct the respondents (in accordance with the Orders made in these appeals on June 6, 1969) to release to the appellants an equivalent quantity of sugar for free sale out of the appellants quota of levy sugar for the season 1968-69 in lieu of the sugar that they had to surrender from out of the quota released to them for sale in the open market for the year 1967-68. The appellants are entitled to their costs both in this Court as well as in the High Court.
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1969 (10) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dence, with the result that it must be held to be in violation of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. A fortiori the order of the Government made under s. 3 (2) exclusively on the basis of the recommendation of the Special Officer must in consequence be held to be not in conformity with the provisions of the Reduction of Rent Act and, therefore, outside the purview of s. 3 (2) of that Act. Section 8 (1) would accordingly be inapplicable and the jurisdiction of Civil Courts cannot be excluded. The notification Ex. A-13 must, therefore, be struck down as contrary to law and ultra vires the Reduction of Rent Act. We accordingly allow the appeals with costs and strike down the report of the Special Officer as also the notification Ex. A-13. As observed earlier challenge to Exhibit A-1 was not pressed at the hearing by the appellant. It would be open to the authorities concerned to proceed to reduce the rent in accordance with law. One set of costs. Appeals allowed.
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1969 (10) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... less at the interval contemplated by the section. The merchant in such a case cannot validly make a grievance that as his account is not settled, Chapter VIII should not or cannot be applied to him. The evidence was that the appellant-firm failed to supply the details, and consequently, the respondent-Municipality could not settle his account and had to prepare the bills and serve the demand notice in respect of the duty due by the appellant-firm without settling the said account. If the appellant-firm had any dispute about the amount claimed by the Municipality as due, it had a clear remedy by way of an appeal under Section 110 and ventilate therein its grievance. That remedy was not resorted to. In these circumstances, the appellant-firm could not legitimately object to steps for recovery taken against it by the respondent-Municipality under Chapter VIII of the Act. Both the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-firm thus fail and the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1969 (10) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the coils of cotton yarn cleared out of the appellant's factory during the period from 17-8- 1962 to 14-11-1962 are exempt from excise duty in view of Exts. P. 2 and P. 3 which exempt from payment of excise duty cotton yarn of 17 counts or more but less than 35 counts, if cleared out of factory in 'hanks'?
Held that:- The department did not support the impugned demand on the basis of the retros- pective effect purported to have been given to the explanation referred to earlier by the notification dated February 16, 1963 (Exh. P-12) for obvious reasons. The rule making authority had not been vested with the power under the Central Excise and Salt Act to make rules with retrospective effect. Therefore the retrospective effect purported to be given under Exh. P-12 was beyond the powers of the rule making authority. Appeal allowed
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1969 (10) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sum of ₹ 2,50,000 was paid by the plaintiffs as and by way of part payment or as earnest deposit?
Whether the defendants were entitled to forfeit the said amount?
Held that:- In the case before us, the contract read with the Terms of Business of the company, clearly refers to the earnest money being paid and to the fact of ₹ 2,50,000 having been paid as earnest. Therefore, there is no ambiguity regarding the nature of the above payment and the right of the respondents to forfeit the same, under the terms of the contract, when the appellants admittedly had committed breach of the contract, cannot be assailed. The first contention for the appellants therefore fails.
The question of the quantum of earnest deposit which was forfeited being unreasonable or the forfeiture being by way of penalty, were never raised by the appellants. The Attorney General also pointed out that as noted by the High Court the appellants led no evidence at all and, after abandoning the various pleas taken in the plaint, the only question pressed before the High Court was that the deposit was -not by way of earnest and hence the amount could not be forfeited. If the. appellants had proceeded on that basis, then the contract would have been voidable at their instance under s.19 of the Contract Act. But they have abandoned that plea and have admitted that the breach of contract was committed by them. Hence s. 64 cannot be invoked by the appellants. In this view, the second contention also fails. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (10) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a person is willing to perform his part of the contract?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. In view of the arrangement made by Phoolchand it was clear that he had at all relevant times made necessary arrangements for paying the amount due, but so long as Nathulal did not carry out his part of the contract, Phoolchand could not be called upon to pay the balance of the price. It must, therefore, be held that Phoolchand was at all relevant times willing to carry out his part. of the contract.
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1969 (10) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Shri M. S. Chaddha, while exercising the power of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, had no jurisdiction to revise the order made by the Claims Commissioner exercising the revisional power of the Chief Claims Commissioner under the principal Act?
Whether there was a clear error of law apparent on the face of the record with the result that the learned Single Judge was fully justified in quashing the order of the Settlement Commissioner, and that the Letters Patent Bench was in error in allowing the appeal?
Held that:- Allow the appeal and setting aside the order of the Letters Patent Bench restore that of the Single Judge. It was agreed at the bar that as directed by the Single Judge the case should go back to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision in accordance with law.
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1969 (10) TMI 65 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as it proposes to assess the petitioner s turnover on watery cocoanuts at ten per cent. is illegal and without jurisdiction and the sales tax authorities are not entitled to call upon the petitioner to show cause in this behalf. The other part of the notice, viz., the proposal to tax the petitioner s turnover at two per cent. is perfectly legal and valid and the respondents are fully competent to issue the same and, therefore, they cannot be restrained by the issue of a writ or direction by this court. As the two items proposed to be taxed are distinct, they could be severed and the notice to the extent it is illegal and without jurisdiction is, therefore, quashed and the respondents are restrained from proceeding to impose a tax at the rate of 10 per cent. on the petitioner s turnover of watery cocoanuts. In the result the petitioner succeeds in part as indicated above and the writ petition is allowed accordingly. The petitioner will get his costs. Petition Partly allowed.
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1969 (10) TMI 64 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n opportunity to produce evidence in that behalf. We do not think that there is any reason for remanding the case. At no stage of the case, such a request was made. No reason is shown as to why at the first instance or even subsequently attempt was not made to produce the relevant material. Even now, it is not stated that there is any contract between the dealer and Reply and Co. If it was there, it could have been produced even in this court. But nothing was forthcoming. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation, we are not inclined to remit the case for that purpose. For the reasons aforesaid, we partly allow the revision and hold that the first item covering the transaction of Rs. 40,393-6-0 is exempt from the sales tax while the second item covering the transactions amounting to Rs. 2,30,880-11-0 is not exempt from the sales tax. In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their costs of this court. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition partly allowed.
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1969 (10) TMI 63 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e principles drawn from the decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the order of the Deputy Commissioner in this case directing the Sales Tax Officer to make further investigation regarding escaped turnover and to assess the same is illegal. We, therefore, set aside the said order, however, without costs. But this does not close the case. In this case, the Sales Tax Officer started proceedings against the petitioner for assessing escaped turnover even before the Deputy Commissioner was seized of the matter and that proceeding is pending. But the counsel of the petitioner points out that, as a result of the direction by the Deputy Commissioner, the Sales Tax Officer s powers are controlled to that extent, the order of the Deputy Commissioner is prejudicial to the petitioner. Now that we have set aside that order, the Sales Tax Officer may proceed with the enquiry to assess escaped turnover untrammelled by the direction of the Deputy Commissioner. Ordered accordingly.
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1969 (10) TMI 62 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ce, pine-apple is not considered to be a vegetable whether in its ripe state or in its unripe state it is considered only as a fruit when it is ripe. Therefore, the first condition for pine-apple to come under item 10 of Schedule III, namely, that it should be a vegetable, is not satisfied. If it is not a vegetable then, even in its ripe form, it cannot be green fruit -in the second meaning we have suggested for this expression. Thus pine-apple is neither a vegetable nor a green fruit. 8.. For the reasons given above, we are of opinion that the Appellate Tribunal was in error in holding that pine-apple was a green fruit coming within item 10 of the Third Schedule. The said finding is consequently set aside and the conclusion of the Sales Tax Officer, as confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, is restored. Since the assessee did not appear, we do not pass any order regarding costs. We thank Mr. M.I. Joseph who appeared amicus curiae and helped us. Petition allowed.
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1969 (10) TMI 61 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is consequential to the imposition of penalty. When an appeal lay against the imposition of penalty under section 13 of the Act, the Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to pass any order and set aside the order of penalty in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under section 14 of the Act. In Commercial Taxes Officer, Special Circle, Jaipur v. Messrs Chhaganmal Bastimal of Beawar, D.B. Civil Sales Tax Reference No. 15 of 1968 decided on 22nd October, 1969, we have pointed out that revisional jurisdiction invested in the Board of Revenue under section 14 of the Act is a limited jurisdiction and can only be exercised if the conditions Reported at p. 341 supra. mentioned in that section are satisfied. In this view of the matter, our answer to question No. (1) is in the affirmative. In view of this answer to question No. (1) we do not consider it necessary to answer question No. (2). The reference is answered accordingly. No order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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