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Showing 221 to 234 of 234 Records
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1982 (3) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Information That Income Has Escaped Assessment, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... id down by the Supreme Court, would be no ground or any excuse for the ITO concerned under the provisions of the said Act. As such, the impugned notice and the proceedings as initiated must beset aside and the rule is thus made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. Let the telex message and the letter that followed, the copies whereof were produced, be kept in the record. The above order, as proposed by me, should also be made in Civil Rule Nos. 11266-67(W) of 1976 (Century Enka Ltd. v. ITO) as the facts and points involved in these cases, excepting the assessment years, were the same. It should be noted that the assessment year 1972-73 was involved in Civil Rule No. 11266(W) of 1976 and in Civil Rule No. 11267(W) of 1976, the assessment year involved was l971-72. The above rules are also made absolute on the same reasoning and findings as in Civil Rule No. 11265(W) of 1976. There will be no order as to costs. The prayer for stay of operation of the order is refused.
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1982 (3) TMI 13 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Shares In Private Company ... ... ... ... ..... r us to go into the details of this decision. In the premises, we are of the opinion that the Board had applied wrong yardstick which was not in accordance with the law. The decision of the Board is, therefore, perverse in law and not justified in law. Therefore in view of what we have stated before, so far as item No. (i) of question No. 1 is concerned, we answer by saying that the Board did not act in accordance with law and would be at liberty to act in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. So far as item No. (ii) of question No. 1 is concerned we are of the opinion that the Board acted in accordance with law and, therefore, this question is answered in the affirmative. So far as the reframed question, being question No. 2 is concerned, we answer this question by saying that the finding of the Board was perverse and not in accordance with law. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1982 (3) TMI 12 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nds upon the circumstances of each case. This question was considered by a Division Bench of this court in Addl. CIT v. Bhartiya Bhanday 1980 122 ITR 622 (MP). This is not a case where the assessee had filed a revised return admitting certain items of income which were not disclosed earlier. This appears to be a case where the assessee agree( to the figure of income assessed by the ITO to purchase peace. The assessment on the agreed basis cannot, in our opinion, be taken to be an admission. For these reasons, we answer the questions referred as follows (1) The Appellate Tribunal was not right in law in holding that the Explanation to section 271 ( 1)(c) was not attracted. (2) In the circumstances of the case, the presumption arising from the Explanation can be said to be rebutted and, therefore, the Tribunal could be said to be right in saying that there was no material to show that the assessee was guilty of concealment. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1982 (3) TMI 11 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o point out that in CIT v. Jabalpur Transport Development Co. (M.C.C. No. 3 of 1978, decided on 25th August, 1981 1983 143 ITR 964 (MP)), we held that an order refusing continuation of registration under s. 184(7) is also appealable under s. 246(j). Our decision that an order under s. 184(4) dismissing an application for registration on the ground of limitation is also an order under s. 185(1)(b) and, therefore, appealable under s. 246(j) is in line with our previous decision. For the reasons given above, we answer the questions as follows (1) The application was barred by time. It could, however, be entertained if sufficient cause was shown under the proviso to s. 184(4). (2) In view of our answer to question No. (1), this question does not arise. (3) Sections 184(7) and 184(8) are independent provisions. (4) Appeal lay against the order of the ITO refusing to condone lay and for that reason refusing to register the firm. There will be no order as to costs of this reference
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1982 (3) TMI 10 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Deduction, Insurance Business ... ... ... ... ..... nt has been made by the assessee-company to the credit of the provident fund account of its employees of the Singapore branch to make good the loss resulting from devaluation of the Indian rupee and it has been solely made to maintain cordial relationship with its employees and as a matter of commercial expediency. We do not find any reason to dissent from the finding entered by the Tribunal. Once we accept that the incurring of the expenditure of Rs. 26,955 on the part of the company has been dictated by considerations of commercial expediency then the case falls within the third test formulated by the Supreme Court in Gordon Woodroffe s case 1962 44 ITR 551. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the said expenditure is a revenue expenditure and there is no reason to disallow the deduction under s. 37 of the Act. We, therefore, answer the second question in the affirmative and against the Revenue. In view of the mixed results, there will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 9 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
HUF, Partition ... ... ... ... ..... our opinion, was clearly a pretence for executing the sale deed. Even if Prabhudayal was indebted to some extent to Seth Gopikishan or to his daughter, the whole idea in selling the houses was to shield the properties from the I.T. authorities and to evade payment of income-tax. We are unable to accept that it was merely a case of preference of one creditor over another. The sale deed (Ex. CP-1) executed by Prabhudayal and Harishchandra in favour of Seth Gopikishan and the trust deed executed by Seth Gopikishan in favour of the appellants (Ex. CP-2) were both unreal and were bit by s. 281 of the I.T. Act as they were executed with the clear intention of defrauding the Revenue. The suit houses are, therefore, liable to be attached and sold as properties of the HUF, Shivnarayan Prabhudayal, in the recovery proceedings for the income-tax dues of the assessment years 1957-58 and 1958-59. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs in favour of respondent No. 1, Union of India.
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1982 (3) TMI 8 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Failure To File Return, Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... er s application under s. 18(2A) and give a disposal on merits. It is brought to our notice that since there is no order of this court staying the hands of the WTO during the pendency of this writ petition, that authority felt free to proceed with the penalty proceedings and had passed orders levying penalty against the petitioner for all the three assessment years. It is explained by the learned standing counsel that while the Commissioner declined to interfere, the WTO had to go ahead with the penalty, in view of the period of limitation prescribed under the Act drawing near, especially in the absence of any orders of stay from this court. It is quite clear, however, that the orders of penalty passed by the WTO would become ineffective in the event of the Commissioner exercising his discretion to waive or reduce the penalty under s. 18(2A) pursuant to our directions in the writ petition. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in this petition.
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1982 (3) TMI 7 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Collaboration Agreement, Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, Income Deemed To Accrue Or Arise In India, Royalty
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1982 (3) TMI 6 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessment and which truly reflect his attitudes. In the case of business, whether at man is good or bad, the question of love and regard does not arise . Commercial men rarely pay money without good reason . Any payment made by the businessman to the banker is only by way of compensation to the banker for the business service . No wonder the officer further observed that the amounts were received not because the assessee is Shri Paramanand Uttamchand, but because be is a banker . These sentiments are unbecoming of a revenue official charged by Parliament with the responsibility of administering the tax code without prejudice and without bias. For the reasons we have earlier stated, we do not think that in this case the inquiry leads us to any result excepting the one at which the Tribunal had arrived. We, therefore, answer the reference in the affirmative and against the Department. The Department will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1982 (3) TMI 5 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... unreasonable having regard to the legitimate business needs of the company and the benefit derived by or accrued to it therefrom. In the circumstances, the fact that in the instant case the ITO did not disallow the remuneration and commission received by the assessee as unreasonable or excessive in the assessment proceedings as against the company, cannot alter the character of the remuneration and commission received by the assessee into his separate income, if otherwise, it can only be treated as the income of the HUF. Even now the Revenue has not put forward any plea that the quantum of remuneration and commission payable to the assessee by the company is excessive and unreasonable in relation to the business. We, therefore, over rule the argument of Mr. Uttam Reddi on the basis of s. 40(c) of the Act. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. The Revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 500 one set.
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1982 (3) TMI 4 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... over in the company s business and the part played by Anusuyadevi was brought out in the course of the examination of that lady. In answering a question put to her, she frankly admitted that while her son, Ravindranath, had put in efforts to canvass orders, she had not put forth any individual efforts of her own. This answer does not support the contention of the learned counsel that the commission paid by the company to Anusuyadevi can be justified on the basis of her efforts in increasing the company s turnover. As we earlier stated at the beginning, this case really turns on the findings of fact by the Tribunal. On those factual findings, the question which has been brought for our consideration admits of but one answer, and that is, that the commission paid to Anusuyadevi was correctly disallowed as inadmissible expenditure under s. 40(c) of the l.T. Act. The reference is answered accordingly. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 3 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Income From House Property ... ... ... ... ..... conferred on her by the testator under the will, we must also hold that such rights of ownership as were given to her have practically become a delusion and a snare, in the words of the earlier Bench judgment. The second question proceeds as though rental income had, in fact, arisen during the year from the house properties in question. This is mistake, because it is nobody s case that the houses were let out to any one. Even the sons who were in permissive occupation of the houses under the terms of the will were not tenants. Nor were they bound to pay anything resembling a rent to the assessee. Since the houses were neither occupied by the owner nor occupied by any tenants, our answer to this question is that the assessment to property income in respect of these items of house properties is not in accordance with law. The Tribunal was in error in sustaining the assessment. Having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 2 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... s. 10(2)(xv) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, if the remuneration was bona fide and in the interest of and expedient for the business of the family and that the payment was genuine and not excessive. In the instant case, it has been found by the Tribunal that Prakashchandra Agrawal was looking after the joint family business. It has also been found that the salary was being paid to Prakashchandra Agrawal by the HUF for the services rendered by him for the joint family. It has not been found that the remuneration was not genuine or was excessive. In view of these findings, it must be held that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the sum of Rs. 18,000 paid to Prakashchandra Agrawal as remuneration by the assessee-HUF was a permissible deduction from the income of the assessee. Our answer to the question referred to this court is, therefore, in the affirmative and against the Department. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1982 (3) TMI 1 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Mistake Apparent From Record, New Industrial Undertaking, Rectification ... ... ... ... ..... siness and it must not be capital loss. The tests to determine capital losses are much the same as those for capital expenditure. For all the above reasons, we answer the question of law in the affirmative and against the Department. The assessee is entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 one set. Certificate for leave to appeal Although the question of law in this case was whether a particular item of expenditure was capital or revenue, it raises a peculiar problem of application of the principle which, in our experience, does not often arise. On our consideration of the principle bearing on the subject, we decided the case against the Department. Learned standing counsel for the Department applied for oral leave for appeal to the Supreme Court against our decision. Having regard to the importance of the principle involved, we are satisfied that this is a fit case for issue of a certificate of fitness of appeal to the Supreme Court. We issue the certificate accordingly.
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