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Showing 41 to 60 of 234 Records
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1982 (3) TMI 243 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e law if admitted tax on the turnover is not paid, the return becomes non est and the assessee becomes liable to be visited with penalty. On the admitted position, the assessee, therefore, was liable to be penalised. It was open to the Tribunal to take into consideration the explanation of the assessee that there was no contumacy in his conduct in omitting to include in his gross turnover of sales the sales turnover of gundi, and exercising the powers of the Sales Tax Officer the Tribunal could have exempted the assessee from penal liability. But as a proposition of law, the assessee s liability to be penalised cannot be disputed. Since the condition precedent to imposition of penalty is satisfied, this Court cannot in the advisory jurisdiction hold that no penalty is exigible. Our answer to the question referred to the court is, therefore, in the affirmative, that is, against the assessee. There would be no order for costs. BEHERA, J.-I agree with my Lord the Chief justice.
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1982 (3) TMI 242 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in respect of those despatches, they endorsed the railway receipts in favour of the assessee and the latter endorsed them in favour of the ex-U.P. buyers. It would have to be seen as to whether the transactions were covered by the provisions contained in section 3(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act. An almost similar question had come up before me in Sales Tax Revision No. 1123 of 1978 (Commissioner, Sales Tax v. Ram Charan Sajan Kumar) decided on 11th February, 1980, and there also for proper investigation into facts the matter was referred back. In view of the above discussion, this revision succeeds and is allowed and the order of the revising authority, in so far as the claim of the assessee for exemption under section 3-D(1) in respect of disputed purchases of notified commodities and Nepali rice are concerned, is set aside and it is referred back to the Sales Tax Tribunal for decision afresh on merits. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 241 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e 226 of the Constitution of India (sic). There is yet another reason why the power to review should not be exercised or invoked under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the legislative intent is clear and no power of review is conferred by the statute then it should not be invoked in exercise of inherent power. The legislative history of various Acts introducing amendments in the Act indicate that wherever the legislature intended to confer the power of review on this Court it specifically provided so in the amending Act itself, for instance, sub-section (2) of section 33 of U.P. Act 38 of 1975 and sub-section (2) of section 26 of Act 2 of 1980. These provisions negative the arguments of the learned standing counsel that even if the Act does not contain any specific power of review it can be exercised under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the result, the application filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax is rejected as not maintainable with costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 240 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ture and arbitrariness, but where it is correlated to a sound reason, we do not think we can interfere with the finding. There does not, however, seem to be any justification for the addition of ten per cent nor can there be any rule depending upon any commercial experience that there would be a steady increase of ten per cent in the annual turnover on the basis of the previous turnover. Once the daily turnover is enhanced by one hundred per cent on the basis that there has been a return for the investment, there is no scope for the further addition of ten per cent. That would be without any justification. We would accordingly answer the question by saying that on the facts the determination of the daily turnover at Rs. 480 is not justified and the same has to be scaled down and it is open to the authorities under the Act to proceed on the estimated basis of daily turnover at Rs. 440 only. There would be no order for costs. BEHERA, J.-I agree with my Lord, the Chief justice.
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1982 (3) TMI 238 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... within any one of the items mentioned in section 14(iv) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. We have already pointed out that the admitted case of the assessee was that the tubes were made out of steel strips and coils and steel strips and coils is not one of the entries found in section 14(iv), and therefore, we are of the opinion that the reasoning of the Gujarat High Court in the decision referred to above will have no application to the present case. We come to this conclusion without reference to the very elaborate details given in the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal showing the elaborate, varied and different processes that have to be gone through before the steel strips and coils could be converted or made into steel tubes in which the assessee was dealing. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the conclusion of the Tribunal is correct and the revision case is accordingly dismissed with costs of the revenue. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 250.
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1982 (3) TMI 237 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... based on the incorrectness of the information supplied during those proceedings or the non-deposit of tax as a result of those orders, have to fall and deserve to be set aside. The learned counsel for the respondents however seeks to contend that the impugned orders of penalty are wholly independent orders and have nothing to do with the assessment order, annexure P1 in both the petitions. This submission obviously has no legs to stand upon for the reason that it is only during the course of the assessment proceedings that the Assessing Authority has found that either the petitioner had filed incorrect information or statement or the tax so assessed had not been deposited by the petitioner. For the reasons recorded above, these petitions succeed and the impugned orders of penalty are quashed. This, however, does not debar the authorities under the Act to look into the matter afresh in accordance with law and the observations made above. I, however, pass no order as to costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 236 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ity making them unworthy of acceptance. The Tribunal has noticed in its order that in the preceeding two years 1971-72 and 1972-73 also the accounts of the dealer were accepted. Further, that as against the taxable turnover of Rs. 1,07,907.53 disclosed by him in the year 1972-73, the taxable turnover disclosed by the dealer in the year in question was to an extent of Rs. 1,30,673.27. Clearly there was a progressive increase in it. In the totality, it cannot be said that in upholding the disclosed turnover of the dealer, the Tribunal acted arbitrarily. Though the order of the Tribunal is not in consonance with law in so far as it states that non-issuance of cash memos by the dealer would not constitute a ground for the rejection of his accounts, no case has been made out for interference with the Tribunal s order in so far as it relates to acceptance of the taxable turnover disclosed by the dealer. The revision, therefore, succeeds in part. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 235 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d the long period of limitation to expire during which the error could have been corrected by the department. Mr. Bhatt did his best to persuade us to take such a view but to no useful purpose. As a result of our aforesaid discussion, we must say that the reasoning of the Tribunal and the ultimate conclusion in favour of the respondent-assessee in the instant case are absolutely correct. This is a clear case where the respondent-assessee must get complete statutory protection in regard to its taxation liability having regard to sub-section (4) of section 9 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969. As a result of our aforesaid discussion, we must answer both the questions in favour of the respondent-assessee, and against the State but having regard to the fact that the respondent-assessee was driven from litigation to litigation by filing a second appeal and even had to resist the reference, we direct the appellant-State to pay to the respondent-assessee the costs of the reference.
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1982 (3) TMI 234 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n 8-A(1)(a) so as to attract the provisions of section 8-A(3A). 4.. Accordingly, as the notification under section 8-A of the Act (exempting the purchase turnover in old gold and silver articles subject to certain conditions set at therein), cannot be held to have been cancelled by the attraction of section 8-A(3A), the impugned notices are without the authority of, and unsupportable in, law. 5.. In view of this short ground on which the petitions admit of being disposed of, it is not necessary to go into and pronounce upon other contentions raised in the writ petitions. They are left open. 6.. These petitions are allowed in part and the impugned notices, in so far as they seek to bring to tax the purchase turnover in old gold and silver articles on the basis that such turnover has ceased to enjoy the benefit of the exemption, are quashed. No costs. Smt. Vanaja, the learned High Court Government Advocate, is permitted to file her memo of appearance within 3 weeks from today.
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1982 (3) TMI 233 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is invested with authority to determine the nature of the transaction and its liability to tax, and against his decision there is an appeal to the appellate authority and a further right of revision to the Commissioner. It is true that the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 is extensive, but normally the High Court does not exercise that jurisdiction by entertaining petitions against the order of taxing authorities, when the statute under which tax is sought to be levied provides a remedy by way of an appeal or other proceeding to a party aggrieved and thereby by-pass the statutory machinery........................ Moreover, it is a very petty matter involving an amount of Rs. 2,330, and no injustice is done to the petitioner-firm. Thus I am of the opinion that no case is made out for invoking extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 500.
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1982 (3) TMI 232 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oner has to have some material to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him under section 20 of the Act suo motu, that material could, as well be, what is contained in the application filed by the aggrieved party. What section 20 in our opinion lays down is that while no aggrieved party has any right to file a revision petition under section 20, the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes could suo motu exercise the revisional powers and call for and examine records of any order or proceeding taken by the authority subordinate to him. In that view of the matter no question of law arises in these cases. It was however argued that the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to direct the Deputy Commissioner to exercise the revisional jurisdiction. Such a contention was not raised before the Tribunal nor was any decision taken by it. That question of law therefore does not arise in these tax revision cases. These tax revision cases are dismissed. Advocate s fee Rs. 150 in each.
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1982 (3) TMI 231 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and that having regard to the object, purpose, structure and tenor of the rule, it is not necessary that in order to earn set-off, the sale of the manufactured goods by a certified manufacturer should be within the State only. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in reaching the conclusion that the assessee was entitled to set-off of the whole amount of tax paid on the purchases of raw materials under rule 42-A of the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970, and that the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax committed an error of law in levying purchase tax under section 15 of the Gujarat Act. The Tribunal was also justified in removing the order of penalty imposed under section 45(6) of the Gujarat Act. The result is that questions Nos. (1), (2) and (3) referred to us should be answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the State Government. The State Government shall pay costs of this reference to the assessee. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1982 (3) TMI 230 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it sought to rely. After carefully examining the contents of the impugned orders in the light of the above-noted judgments of this Court, I find that there was no evidence, much less a reliable or dependable evidence, to show that the declarations furnished by the petitioner-firm in form S.T. XXII were either not genuine or were forged. In the face of this conclusion of mine, the latter part of the order imposing a penalty on the petitioner-firm under section 10(7) of the Act for either furnishing incorrect return or accounts, or supplying incorrect information to the Assessing Authority, can also not be sustained. For the reasons recorded above, the impugned orders, annexures P-1, P-2 and P-3, are set aside and it is held that the petitioner-firm is entitled to the deductions claimed (sales made in favour of the six dealers mentioned in these orders). The imposition of penalty on the petitioner-firm is also set aside. I, however, pass no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 229 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ough there are 19 petitioners, only Rs. 100 has been paid as court-fee. Therefore, the disposal of the writ petition will be confined only to the first petitioner, viz., M/s. Chandra Bhavan, represented by its proprietor M.S. Suryanarayana Iyer, and the rest of 18 petitioners are struck off from the petition. So also in W.P. Nos. 4130, 5361 and 8760 of 1981. In the light of the principle laid down in the judgment, the extent of applicability of section 6-A to each of the individual cases, could be canvassed before the appropriate authorities under the Act. In the result, the writ petitions are partly allowed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. Oral applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court are made on behalf of the petitioners in all these writ petitions. We do not see that there is any substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be considered by the Supreme Court involved in these writ petitions-Dismissed. Petitions partly allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 228 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... separated, husked or dehusked should be treated as a single commodity, the section does not mention about fried dhall. For all the above reasons, we hold that entries 144 and 147 of the First Schedule to the State Act are intra vires and continued to hold good even after the Central Sales Tax Act is amended by Act No. 103 of 1976 with effect from 7th September, 1976. The commodities mentioned in items 144 and 147 cannot be considered as declared goods under section 14 of the Central Act and consequently section 6 of the State Act. has no application to the goods mentioned therein. In the result, the writ petitions and the T.R.C. are dissmissed, but in the circumstances without costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. An oral application is made on behalf of the petitioners for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not see any substantial question of law of general importance involved in these cases. The oral application is dismissed. Writ Petitions and T.R.C. dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 227 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... estion as to whether the assessee-society was a dealer or not was in dispute between the parties. On these facts and in the circumstances, therefore, if at all the liability of the assessee-society arises, assuming that it is held to be a dealer, it cannot go beyond a period of five years from 1972-73 in which year notices for reassessment were issued. In other words, assessments of the periods prior to 1st April, 1968, are time-barred. In that view of the matter, therefore, we have to answer question No. (2) in the affirmative. The result is that we answer the questions referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. There would be no order as to costs in this reference since no appearance was filed on behalf of the assessee-society, and therefore, we had requested Mr. R.D. Pathak to assist us in dealing with this reference which he readily agreed for which we express our gratitude to him. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1982 (3) TMI 226 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 6(c) of the Rules framed under the Act. It is equally not disputed by the learned Government Pleader that freight has been separately shown in the invoices. It was not disputed that even after 1st January, 1968, the factual position, viz., that freight has been specified and charged for separately by the dealer, continued to be the same. In the circumstances, following our earlier decision in Ramco Cement Distribution Co. (P.) Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu T.C. No. 31 of 1979 (batch) (decided on 23rd December, 1981) 1982 51 STC 171, we hold that the freight incurred by the dealer in the despatch of goods to the place of destination of the purchasers has to be deducted from the total turnover under rule 6(c) of the rules framed under the Act for the period 1st January, 1968, to 31st March, 1968, as well. The tax revision cases are therefore allowed to the extent of deleting the freight charges in both the tax cases with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250, one set. Petitions allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 225 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d down that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by suit in a civil court must be brought, may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under article 226 of the Constitution can be measured. The court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action but where the delay is more than that period, it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is unreasonable. Hence, in any event, for the payments made long back and for which the relief in a civil court has become barred, should not be allowed by the writ court even if such oral prayer is made. In the circumstances aforesaid, the instant rule succeeds and is made absolute. But I make no order as to costs. Mr. Dutt has prayed for stay of the operation of the judgment. Let the operation of the judgment be stayed for a period of two weeks from today. Rule made absolute.
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1982 (3) TMI 224 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... esentatives, the shortfall was 61 quintals only. Mr. Agarwalla does not dispute the statement of the learned standing counsel that it was the practice of the petitioner to pay purchase tax by following the back calculation method. Since there was a shortfall of 61 quintals of paddy, it must be assumed that the paddy had been purchased but for some reason or other was not available to be converted into rice and there was ultimately no supply or sale of rice to the corporation. In this position, it must be assumed that on 61 quintals no purchase tax has really been paid. Mr. Agarwalla accepts this position. We would accordingly hold that in the facts and circumstances of the case the assessee was liable to pay purchase tax on 61 quintals of paddy. Effect may be given to raise a demand of purchase tax against the assessee on the turnover of 61 quintals of paddy. There would be no order for costs. BEHERA, J.-I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice. Reference answered accordingly.
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1982 (3) TMI 223 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lay and not for one full month. In the instant case in respect of the return for the month of April, 1976, there is delay of two days and in respect of the return for the month of April, 1977, there is delay of four days. The petitioner has paid interest for the actual period of default. In view of what has been held above the petitioner is liable to pay interest only for the actual days of default and not for the whole month. The petitioner is thus entitled to issue a writ of mandamus to the Sales Tax Officer, Allahabad, respondent No. 2, to the effect that he should not charge interest for the whole month in respect of the aforesaid default. The petitioner hence succeeds and is allowed in part. The respondent No. 2 is directed that he should not charge interest for the whole of the month in respect of which there was default. Interest under section 7(1-B) will be chargeable only for the actual period of default. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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