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Showing 21 to 40 of 172 Records
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1982 (6) TMI 194
Registers, etc., to be Evidence ... ... ... ... ..... al. Mr. Cooper submits that the said extract can be prima facie evidence only of matters directed or authorised to be inserted therein by the Companies Act. He refers to the last page of the extract which sets out the names of the holders of privately placed convertible debentures, the number of debentures held by each of them, the number thereof as have been converted into equity shares, and the number of equity shares allotted on 5th June, 1979. He submits that all this information is in excess of the requirements of section 159 and its correctness cannot be prima facie established thus. Section 159 makes a reference to Sch. V, Pt. 1 to the register of debenture holders to the debentures and to the debenture holders, past and present. It does not appear to me that there is, therefore, anything in excess in the annual return. I now hold that the said extract (Ex. 18) proves, by reason of section 164 of the Companies Act, prima facie the truth of the contents of its original.
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1982 (6) TMI 186
... ...
... ... ..... n the case of Ellerman Lines Ltd vs. CIT 1972 CTR (SC) 7 (1971) 82 ITR 913 (SC) has referred to those circulars which gave relief which is not available in the law and had stated that those circulars are binding on the Department because certain concessions are given therein. In this case, there is no concession given to any assessee. Whether a return under s. 139(4) would be valid or not in not a case of concession. It might to against the assessee rsquo s case in some circumstances or it may go against the Department in some other. A direct example of this is the Delhi High Court decision (1981) 129 ITR 379 (Del) where such a submission went against the assessee. In this case before us the same submission is canvassed as a concession given by the Board. Such an agreement to our mind is devoid of any merit. We do not consider it as a circular which the ITO is bound to obey and grant a concession to the assessee. For the reasons stated, we dismiss the assessee rsquo s appeal.
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1982 (6) TMI 185
... ...
... ... ..... f interest appears to be this. The levy of interest u/s 139 is automatic, if there is a delay in filing up the return and the tax payable exceeds the advance income-tax and tax deducted at source. 10. The ITO has no discretion in the matte. But the assessee can ask for either a waiver of the interest or its production as per the provision in r. 117A. The rule specifically states that the ITO may reduce or waive . This envisages that the levy of interest may precede an application for waiver or reduction of interest. After the levy of interest, it is open for the ITO if the assessee shows that his case comes within the exemptions given in r. 117A that the interest levied can be reduced. The word lsquo reduced rsquo presupposes an earlier levy of interest at a higher figure. We will, therefore, restore the order of the ITO but it is open for the assessee to show that there were circumstances to invoke the provisions of r. 117A. In the result, the departmental appeal is allowed.
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1982 (6) TMI 184
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... ... ..... for the ITO to continue the penalty proceedings from the point from where the irregularity pointed out by the AAC set in. In this case if there was no time-limit completing the penalty proceedings, it is open for the ITO to continue the proceedings where the irregularity had set in. But unfortunately in 1961 Act a specific time-limit has been put in. It will not be open for the ITO to treat the earlier order of the AAC as an order setting aside the penalty order. So the ruling in Guduthur Bros. also does not help. 18. In the result, we are of opinion that the AAC was justified in following the A.P. High Court rsquo s decision reported in (1970) 78 ITR 743 (AP). We may however mention that we do not find any merit in the submission made by Shri Jayaraman that the ITO has passed the order without applying his mind. On this point, we are satisfied that his order was only after applying his mind to the facts of the case. 19. In the result, the departmental appeals are dismissed.
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1982 (6) TMI 177
Backward Area, Being Heard, Industrial Undertaking, Late Filing, Profits And Gains ... ... ... ... ..... rest appears to be this. The levy of interest under section 139 is automatic, if there is a delay in filing the return and the tax payable exceeds the advance income-tax and tax deducted at source. The ITO has no discretion in the matter. But the assessee can ask for either a waiver of the interest or its reduction as per the provision in rule 117A. The rule specifically states that the ITO may reduce or waive . This envisages that the levy of interest may precede the application for waiver or reduction of interest. After the levy of interest, it is open for the ITO if the assessee shows that his case comes within the exemptions given in rule 117A, to held that the interest levied can be reduced. The word reduced presupposes an earlier levy of interest at a higher figure. We will, therefore, restore the order of the ITO but it is open for the assessee to show that there were circumstances to invoke the provisions of rule 117A. In the result the departmental appeal is allowed.
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1982 (6) TMI 174
Depreciation, Initial Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... rpose of allowing the higher rate of development rebate, item 2 of the Fifth Schedule would include the manufacture of aluminium (metal) both from bauxite as well as from aluminium scrap, and the same interpretation should be given to item 1 of the Fifth Schedule. 5. The ratio laid down in the above cases squarely apply to the instant case. In the instant case, the assessee manufactures flats, rounds, bars, etc., from billets. The assessee falls under item 1 of the Ninth Schedule as the articles manufactured by the assessee are basically iron and steel (metal) within the meaning of item 1 of the Ninth Schedule. We prefer to follow the above decisions, in preference to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Iron Steel and Wire Products Ltd. Following with respect, the above decisions, we hold that the Commissioner (Appeals) has rightly allowed the claim of the assessee for initial depreciation and investment allowance. 6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (6) TMI 171
... ...
... ... ..... ch, 1980 and the ITO/IAC had not availed of the extended time in consequence of s. 144B under Explain. I(iv) to s. 153. There cannot be a grievance merely on the ground that the IAC had vetted the re-assessment though the IAC had added anything to the proposed reassessment or has otherwise acted in a manner detrimental to the assessee. The assessee is not aggrieved by it. It is, if the opinion of the Tribunal that s. 144B does not apply to reassessment is correct, a superfluity amounting to an irregularity which inversed a valid reassessment. Such a superfluous or irregular action will have no legal effect and it cannot set at naught an otherwise legal action. The assessment does not become invalid merely because the exercise u/s 144B was gone through though it was not statutorily required. The reassessment has been completed in time without availing the extended time limit available for reference u/s 144B. Hence, the assessee rsquo s objection even on this point has to fall.
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1982 (6) TMI 170
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... ... ..... t a method of accounting which is devoid of any merit. The pros and cons of that method of accounting has been discussed in the order of the Tribunal and that discussion having turned on pure facts, does not give rise to any question of law. 6. Before parting with this case, we wish to mention that while preparing the statement of facts by the Department it was only to be confined to stating the facts found by or admitted before the Tribunal which are necessary for drawing up the statement of the case and should not contain any criticism of the order of the Tribunal which we find copiously in the statement of case prepared by the Department, in para 4 of its statement. Not that we are touched by this criticism but it is, in our opinion, not warranted by the Rules, and not a healthy practice to adopt, because the criticism is neither a fact found by or admitted before the Tribunal. We hope such criticism will be avoided in future. 7. In the result, the application is rejected.
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1982 (6) TMI 167
Bona Fide, Family Arrangement, Taxable Gift ... ... ... ... ..... t to a family settlement upon the broad and general ground that its object is to settle existing or future disputes regarding property amongst members of a family. The word family in the context is not to be understood in a narrow sense of being a group of persons who are recognised in law as having a right of succession or having a claim to a share in the property in dispute. . . . The assessees are, therefore, entitled to succeed merely on the ground that it is a bona fide family arrangement. In this view, it is not necessary to go into the merits of different valuations placed by the GTO and the AAC, in any detail, since, even as concluded in the immediately preceding paragraph, valuation being subjective, the variations as between the assessees and the revenue are not such, as to warrant an inference of gift in the fact of the assessees case. The assessees are, therefore, entitled to succeed in any view. 6. In the result, the appeals are allowed and assessments cancelled.
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1982 (6) TMI 164
... ...
... ... ..... s the deemed gift. It is also clear that without the payment of the additional stamp duty the property could not have been validly and effectively conveyed to the transferee which gives rise to the gift-tax charged. In these circumstances, it is clear to us that the assessee is entitled to the deduction of the additional stamp duty u/s 18A. It is no doubt true that in this case the charge to gift-tax is attracted on account of the legal fiction contained in s. 4(1)(A) of the GT Act, but it is well-settled that a legal fiction has to be carried to its logical conclusion and since in this case the very charge of gift-tax is attracted with reference to the transfer under an instrument, we are satisfied that the fiction has to be extended to all relevant purposes including the provision u/s 18A. In the circumstances, we allow the assessee rsquo s claim and direct deduction of additional stamp duty as stated above in determining the value of the gift. The appeal is partly allowed.
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1982 (6) TMI 163
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... ... ..... wn principle that if a particular item of receipt falls under a specific head of income but cannot be charged for any reason, it cannot be charged under any other or residuary head. 4. Reference was made at the hearing by the ld. Departmental representative to the introduction of s. 10(10A) of the IT Act specifically, providing for exclusion of payment received by an employee on encashment of earned leave at his credit. In the first place, this section has been introduced with effect from 1st April, 1978 by Finance Act, 1982 and further the fact that this section exempting the encashment of leave salary on retirement has been specifically enacted does not necessarily mean that otherwise it is chargeable, as the question as to whether a particular receipt is chargeable or not has to be independently decided on correct law applicable to the same. In these circumstances, we find no merit in the department rsquo s objection and it is accordingly rejected. The appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (6) TMI 158
Charge Of Tax ... ... ... ... ..... preme Court decision in Mammed Kayi, the facts in that case are also distinguishable from the facts in the assessee s case before us. In that case, the petitioner before the High Court was the Orient Club, an unregistered AOP, acting through its Honorary Secretary. In the case of the assessee before us, we have already pointed out that it is an independent juristic entity by virtue of its registration under the Indian Trade Unions Act with a perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire and hold both the movable and immovable properties and to enter into contract and also entitled to sue and to be sued in its name. We are, therefore, satisfied that the assessee is chargeable to wealth-tax and the assessments made by the WTO have to be sustained, if necessary with the status modified as individual . The order of the AAC cancelling the assessments is, therefore, set aside and the assessments made by the WTO are restored. 5. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1982 (6) TMI 157
Property Within Disposing Capacity ... ... ... ... ..... e deceased s credit. But even if it is assumed that he has such power, the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Smt. Lakshmisagar Reddy shows that such a power cannot be equated to a right of the deceased to dispose of the amount at the time of his death. It is well settled that in interpreting the principles of a taxing statute if more than one view is possible in regard to the liability under the provisions of the statute, then the view which is favourable to the taxpayer and leaves him with a lesser burden should be adopted. In the present case, the Andhra Pradesh High Court decision in Smt. Lakshmisagar Reddy s case, directly supports the accountable person s claim in regard to the dispute. We would, therefore, uphold the claim of the accountable person, respectfully following the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and reject the objection of the department. The order of the Appellate Controller is, therefore, upheld and the appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (6) TMI 152
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... ... ..... nation has been omitted by the Finance Act, 1974 w.e.f. 1st April 1975 i.e., from the asst. yr. 1975-76 onwards, the advantage of this Explanation was not available. During the period, the Explanation was in force, the excess reserve of one year is available to make good the deficiency of succeeding year, subject to the stipulated condition. Perhaps the argument of the assessee rsquo s counsel is based upon this Explanation. But with the omission of this Explanation, the excess reserve of an earlier year is no more available for making good the deficiency of succeeding year. Once this is found out to be the intention of the Legislature, and when there is such a prohibition introduced, by withdrawing the specific advantage conferred by the Explanation, we cannot now say that benefit is still available to the assessee. 7. Thus, it seems to us that the view taken by the CIT(A) is not correct. We, therefore, reserve his view and accept the departmental appeal on the second issue.
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1982 (6) TMI 151
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... ... ..... of any such conversion on record. It may be pertinent to find out the treatment of the properties received by the other sons also. It is also noticed that there was a subsequent partition between jambulingam and his sons and proceedings under s. 171 are pending though it is not clear whether any of the properties which devolved by testamentary succession were either partially of fully partitioned between jambulingam and his sons. Since this question as to whether Jambulingan has impressed the properties by receiving the testamentary sucession with the character of joint family properties is a question of fact to be decided, with reference to relevant evidence and as such evidence is not on record we deem it fit to set aside the orders of the authorities below on this point and restore the matter to the WTO for fresh disposal in accordance with law after marshalling all the necessary evidence. 5. In the result, the appeals are treated as allowed for statistical purposes only.
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1982 (6) TMI 150
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... ... ..... and set aside his order. 9. In the view that we have taken on merits, we do not think it necessary to go into the question raised on behalf of the assessee whether in a case where the IAC gives direction under s. 144B of the IT Act, the CIT will still have jurisdiction under s. 263 of the Act to interfere with that order. This argument is based on the contention that the CIT can only interfere with an order passed by the ITO and since the order in this case was passed, though by the ITO, but at the instance of the IAC, whose directions were binding upon the ITO and in that sense the order must be deemed to have been passed by the IAC the it did not possess jurisdiction to interfere with the order passed by any authority other than the ITO. 10. We are therefore of the opinion that on merits the assessee is entitled to succeed and, therefore without expressing any opinion on the legal contention raised, we accept, the assessee s appeal and set aside the order passed by the CIT.
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1982 (6) TMI 149
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... ... ..... the manner contemplated u/s 271(1)(a) r/w s.297(2)(d)(ii). The High Court answered one of the questions viz. Whether in the circumstances of the case the levy of penalty for 1960-61 and 1961-61 u/s 271(1)(a) of the IT Act 1961 was valid in the affirmative. Their Lordships did not lay down that the failure to apply for extension of time would amount to default justifying the levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(a). The High Court only held that there was default giving scope for proceeding u/s 271(1)(a). But then, levy of penalty u/s 271(a) could be made only when the default was without reasonable cause. There is no dispute that there was default in this case. But the only point I have to consider is whether the default was without reasonable cause. The same findings hold good for the penalty levied u/s 273(c), in which case also the default was not without reasonable cause. 10. For the foregoing reasons I cancel the penalties both u/s 27(1)(a) and u/s 273(C). The appeals are allowed.
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1982 (6) TMI 141
Salaries, Profit In Lieu Of Salary ... ... ... ... ..... tated that the ex gratia payment has been made for the loyal services rendered by the assessee. The rendering of loyal services, which necessitated the payment, was interpreted by the assessee as a receipt of casual and non-recurring nature. It is non-recurring because the assessee retired from service. It is a well-settled proposition of law that payment made by former employer for past loyal services is profits in lieu of salary liable to be taxed as such. 6. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken by the AAC is not incorrect and the ex gratia payment has been rightly taxed. 7. In judging the issue, it is also relevant that when the employer was deducting tax on the entire sum of Rs. 63,000, it was in the contemplation of the employer and the employee that the ex gratia payment had become the subject of taxation. The ITO was, therefore, justified in relying upon this circumstance in arriving at the conclusion he did. 8. In the result, this appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (6) TMI 139
Individual Property ... ... ... ... ..... rd. It may be pertinent to find out the treatment of the properties received by the other sons also. It is also noticed that there was a subsequent partition between Jambulingam and his sons and proceedings under section 171 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, are pending though it is not clear whether any of the properties which devolved by testamentary succession were either partially or fully partitioned between Jambulingam and his sons. Since this question as to whether Jambulingam has impressed the properties received by testamentary succession with the character of joint family properties is a question of fact, to be decided with reference to relevant evidence and as such evidence is not on record, we deem it fit to set aside the orders of the authorities below on this point and restore the matter to the WTO for fresh disposal in accordance with law after marshalling all the necessary evidence. 5. In the result, the appeals are treated as allowed for statistical purposes only.
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1982 (6) TMI 138
Expenditure Incurred, Market Value, Partnership Deed ... ... ... ... ..... he market value of these improved lands as though they were free and absolute holdings. In fact, the assessee did not become a partner and had only rights over these lands subject to partnership rights. It is only these rights, he gifted. No allowance has been made by the GTO for these restrictions. There is no material to suggest that the value of Rs. 1 lakh placed by the assessee is low even after making allowances for such restrictions. Hence, whatever might be the justification or otherwise for the value adopted in wealth-tax assessment for these lands, we are not in a position to say that the value confirmed for gift-tax assessment is unjustified. The learned Commissioner (Appeals) has also given some other factual material (approved valuer s report at Rs. 22,916 on 9-11-1969) for holding that the value returned by the assessee is not unfair. In any view of the matter we have to uphold the order of the first appellate authority. 5. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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