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Showing 141 to 160 of 2242 Records
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1982 (12) TMI 41 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ommission at a certain percentage of the profits of the managed company and, therefore, if a particular expenditure increased the profits of the managed company that also benefited the assessee-company. Further, the Tribunal misdirected itself in holding that expenses which were in the nature of capital expenditure if incurred by the managed company would also be of the same nature if incurred by the managing agents and, therefore, could not be allowed as business expenditure. As the Tribunal omitted to consider an important circumstance and misdirected itself in law, the finding reached by it cannot be said to be a pure finding of fact binding on us. For the reasons given above, we answer the question as follows The Tribunal was right in disallowing the item of Rs 4,800 but was not right in disallowing the items of Rs. 12,785 and Rs. 1,500 as expenditure under clause (xv) of section 10(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. There will be no order as to the costs of this reference.
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1982 (12) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assessment, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... te assessments one for the period April 1, 1976, to October 26, 1976, and the other for the period October, 27, 1976, to March 31, 1977, had to be made and that it was justified in directing the ITO to make the assessments accordingly. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee, who is entitled for the costs of the reference assessed as Rs. 250. While we are delivering judgment, learned counsel for the Commissioner submitted that as there is a conflict between the judicial opinions, on the point in controversy, as between this court and the Punjab and Haryana High Court, it is desirable that the said controversy should be finally resolved by the Supreme Court. He, therefore, prayed for the requisite certificate under s. 261 of the I.T. Act. Having considered the submission made by the learned counsel we are inclined to agree with it. We accordingly, certify that this case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.
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1982 (12) TMI 39 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 72, under the provisions of the West Bengal Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1972. The operation of all contracts including obligations and liabilities accruing thereunder were stopped altogether by the aforesaid notification. In view of this fact it cannot be said that the interest on the loan continued to accrue even in this year. In fact, the Tribunal in its order in the earlier year has disallowed the assessee s claim on the ground that the Government notification was published only in 1972. On behalf of the Revenue reliance has been placed on the decision of the assessee s case in the earlier assessment years but the facts in those assessment years were entirely different. The Government notification had come into force only in 1972. The question referred to in this reference is to be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, each party will pay and bear his own costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1982 (12) TMI 38 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Property Passing ... ... ... ... ..... ITR 533 (Guj), Smt. Gunvantibai v. CED 1981 130 ITR 122 (MP) and CED v. R. S. Gwalre 1981 130 ITR 261 (MP). The Karnataka High Court reaffirmed the principle of CED v. K. Nataraja 1979 119 ITR 769 (Kar), in a subsequent decision in CED v. N. Ramachandra Bhat 1980 123 ITR 841 (Kar). In view of the above uniform authority and the clear language of s. 34(1)(c), we must hold that the Revenue was right in clubbing the values of the share of the two sons (who are undoubtedly lenial descendants of the deceased) with the value of the share of the deceased for the purpose of determining the rate of estate duty on the estate of the deceased, as contemplated by s. 34(1)(c). For the above reasons we must answer the first question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the Department and against the assessee. Similarly, we must also answer the second question in the affirmative, in favour of the Department and against the assessee. Referred case is answered accordingly. No costs.
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1982 (12) TMI 37 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... affidavit. The rectification application appears to have been rejected on the ground that the option was exercised late. There appears to have been a misrepresentation of the facts to the Accountant-General which led to an objection by the Accountant-General. In view of the fact, stated in this latter (Annex. 2 of the supplementary affidavit), it is held that the assessment proceedings could not be reopened under s. 3AA on the ground that the petitioner had not exercised the option and had not sent the relevant information in time. In the result I find that the orders dated September 25, 1979, annex. 1 to the counter-affidavit, and 14th March, 1980, annex. 2 to the writ petition, are quashed. It is necessary to quash the appellate order dated December 31, 1981, as no appeal lay against an order under s. 3AA of the Act. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. If any tax has been deposited in pursuance of the aforesaid two orders, the same shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1982 (12) TMI 36 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Industrial Company, Of Business Or Entertainment Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... utable to its activity of manufacturing of carpets. Beyond saying that we agree with the reasoning of the Allahabad High Court, it is not necessary for us to say whether, in this particular case, the income derived by the assessee from the sale of import licences granted to it on the basis of its export performance, is to be held attributable to its business of processing or not. The question whether the assessee is mainly engaged in the processing of goods is yet to be determined. If so, it would be premature for us to express any opinion on this subsidiary question. The Tribunal may go into this whole question again in the light of the legal position adumbrated above. For the above reasons, we decline to answer the third question in terms it is framed and leave the matter to be re-determined by the Tribunal in the light of the principles set out in this judgment. The referred case is answered accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (12) TMI 35 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Company, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... t, but by reason of one or the other section of the I.T. Act, though capable of being included, in fact it is excluded, that is, not included, in the total income as computed under the provisions of the I.T. Act. On the above reasoning the learned judge held that any income falling under Chap. VI-A of the I.T. Act is includible, though allowed as deduction and, therefore, amounts allowed as deductions under Chap. VI-A are not covered by the words part of the income, profits and gains of a company is not includible in its total income as computed under the Income-tax Act in r. 4 of Sch. II to the Surtax Act, 1964. We respectfully agree with the said view. For the above reasons we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The Tribunal was right in holding that there should be no proportionate abatement or reduction in the capital base in respect of the amounts given as relief under s. 80J of the I.T. Act.
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1982 (12) TMI 34 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Firm, Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... r, be remembered that this is not again a case of admitting an adult member to the benefits of partnership. The working partner was equally liable for the losses along with profits. This case, therefore, is of no assistance to Mr. G. V. R. Mohan Rao. Another circumstance which we may mention in this behalf is that, under ss. 184 and 185 of the I.T. Act, a partnership must be a valid partnership in law for being registered under the I.T. Act. It has been held in several cases that where a minor is treated as a full-fledged partner, such a partnership deed is invalid in law and is not entitled to be registered under the Act. Here, the partnership deed is invalid in law for the reasons stated hereinbefore and it must follow that it could not have been registered under the Act. For the above reasons, we answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Department and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1982 (12) TMI 33 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Appeals, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... l difficulty in dealing with both the questions at the same time and there should be no question of insistence for filing of a separate appeal for that purpose. We have said rightly so only because taking any view different from ours will be piling unreason upon technicality, to borrow a phrase from a decision of the judicial Committee of the Privy Council. We, accordingly, hold and answer the question referred to this court in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Thus, it would be held that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the right of appeal under s. 246(c) of the Act against the status taken in the assessment order will include the status as unregistered firm. The matter should now go back to the Tribunal for passing appropriate orders for disposal of the appeal by the AAC on merits even with regard to the status of the assessee. On the special facts and in the circumstances of the case, we shall make no order as to costs.
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1982 (12) TMI 32 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
House Property ... ... ... ... ..... essee was given permission to change the accounting period by one ITO who had jurisdiction over the assessee s case at the material time. That order was communicated to the assessee and had become final and conclusive. His successor in office cannot summarily reverse that decision while passing the order of assessment. Detailed provision has been made in the I.T. Act for rectification or revision of an order passed by the ITO. But in this case the ITO has not invoked s. 154. In any event, there is no mistake apparent from the record which could be rectified under s. 154. In that view of the matter the decision of the ITO to treat the Diwali year 2029 as the accounting period for the assessment year 1973-74 is clearly erroneous and without jurisdiction. In that view of the matter both the questions are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties will pay and bear their own costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1982 (12) TMI 31 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Deduction, Tax Liability, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... is nevertheless outstanding for a period of more than twelve months on the valuation date. Now, the demand for the said amount of income-tax was served upon the assessee on March 28, 1972, which means that the said amount of tax was outstanding on the valuation date, viz., March 31, 1972. The amount of tax was payable immediately the demand notice was served. If so, the case clearly falls within sub-cl. (iii)(a) of the definition. The mere fact that an appeal was filed subsequent to the valuation date cannot affect this position. To deprive an assessee of the benefit of sub-cl. (iii)(a), the appeal, revision or other proceeding, as the case may be, must have been pending on the relevant valuation date. Then alone such a debt cannot be deducted from out of the aggregate value of all the assets, as contemplated by the definition. For the above reasons, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1982 (12) TMI 30 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Income, Deduction, Dividends ... ... ... ... ..... etting regular supply from Chingrihata Bone Mills (P.) Ltd., was an argument which was not advanced before the Tribunal. In that view of the matter, in our opinion, in the interest of justice, we should remand the case to the Tribunal for going into this question and decide this point according to law, and for this purpose both the assessee and the Revenue will, be entitled to adduce evidence before the Tribunal and the Tribunal will be entitled to consider the matter afresh. So far as the first question raised by the assessee is concerned , we are remitting the matter to the Tribunal for a decision in accordance with law after hearing the parties. So far as the second question raised by the assessee is concerned, we are remitting this question also to the Tribunal for a decision in accordance with law after hearing the parties as directed in this order. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1982 (12) TMI 29 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Firm, ITO To Rectify Assessment, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... y a rectification deed dated October 29, 1958. This fact was also brought to the notice of the ITO, within the prescribed time, and all the papers filed before him. For this assessment year, there was not only an application for renewal, but there was a fresh application for grant of registration. In this view, it cannot be said that the partnership deed, as modified by the rectification deed, was in any manner illegal, so far as the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1959-60 is concerned. Of course, the partnership was undoubtedly illegal so far as the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1958-59 is concerned. For the above reasons, our answer to the question referred is that the cancellation of registration made under s. 154 of the Act is competent and valid, in so far as the assessment year 1958-59 is concerned but is incompetent and unsustainable, in so far as the assessment year 1959-60 is concerned. The reference is ordered accordingly. No costs.
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1982 (12) TMI 28 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... beral attitude in directing deduction . We have said enough on this aspect in the preceding paragraphs of our judgment. If doctrinaire approach means adherence to law, we are happy to be doctrinaire and if the expression liberal attitude means ignoring the law and public interest, we would rather shun such a misguided liberal approach. For the above reasons, the question referred to us in R.Cs. Nos. 20, 73, 74 and 85 of 1979, is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Department and against the assessees. For the same reasons, the question referred in R.C. NO. 166 /1978, is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Department and against the assessees. No costs. Oral S.C.L.P. Mr. Anjaneyulu, the learned counsel for the assessees, makes an oral request for certifying this case to be a fit one for appeal to Supreme Court under s. 261 of the I.T. Act. We are of the opinion that this is a fit case for appeal to Supreme Court and accordingly we certify the same.
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1982 (12) TMI 27 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Income From House Property, Owner ... ... ... ... ..... wrongly decided the point in dispute in favour of the assessee. On the facts and in the circumstances, as discussed above, we must hold that the assessee must be deemed to be the owner within the meaning of s. 22 of the Act and shall be liable to tax from income out of house property under s. 22 as owner thereof. The second question, therefore, does not need any opinion. Hence, we decline to go into that question. Question No. 1 referred to this court, therefore, is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee in the negative, and so, far as the second question referred to us is concerned, it now remains of academic interest having no bearing upon the question in controversy. All the three cases are accordingly disposed of in favour of the Revenue. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, however, we shall make no order as to costs having regard to the non-consensuality of the opinion on a legal subject between some of the High Courts of this country.
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1982 (12) TMI 26 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Firm, Gift, Gift Tax ... ... ... ... ..... this decision is of any assistance to the Department in this case. We are, accordingly, of the opinion that it is not open to the Department to pick out one of the assets of the firm, namely, the goodwill, and say that the assessee has relinquished his share in the goodwill and levy gift-tax thereon. Such a course is not permissible, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in CGT v. P. Gheevarghese 1972 83 ITR 403 (SC). In the case of a transfer of the partner s interest, what is transferred is his interest in the partnership firm as elucidated in Narayanappa s case, AIR 1966 SC 1300 and not any particular share in any particular asset of the partnership firm. We hold that even treating the subject-matter of gift as the relinquishment of the assessee s share in the goodwill of the firm, it is not exigible to tax under the G.T. Act. For the above reasons, the question referred to us is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Department. No costs.
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1982 (12) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income, Produce Ordinarily Sold In Raw State ... ... ... ... ..... r sale price. Rule 7(2)(b), on the other hand, deals with agricultural produce which has no market price, because they are not sold in their raw state ordinarily. It is, therefore, impossible to arrive at a reasonable profit having as the basis of calculation the average market price. Rule 7(2)(b) has been drafted in the manner it has been done by requiring the ITO to take three elements, only because there is no market price for the produce. We do not, therefore, understand how the Tribunal can ask the ITO to arrive at the reasonable profit from a basis which is market price. We feel that the whole idea of r. 7(2)(b) has been thoroughly missed and confused by the Tribunal. We cannot help observing that the so called guidelines issued by the Tribunal are only likely to misguide the ITO. In view of our answers to these three questions, the entire reference is decided in favour of the Department. The assessee will pay the costs of the Department. Counsel fee Rs. 500 (one set).
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1982 (12) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ance was placed on the decision of the House of Lords in the case of B. S. C. Footwear Ltd. v. Ridgway (Inspector of Taxes) 1972 83 ITR 269 (HL), in the case of British Paints India Ltd. v. CIT 1978 111 ITR 53 at pp. 69-70(Cal), in the matter of Chouthmal Golapchand 1938 6 ITR 733 (Cal) and also in the case of Reform Flour Mills P. Ltd. v. CIT 1981 132 ITR 184 (Cal). On behalf of the assessee reliance was placed on s. 211 of the Companies Act as also on s. 29 of the Banking Regulation Act. Reliance was placed on the observations of the Madras High Court in the case of Indo-Commercial Bank Ltd. v. CIT 1962 44 ITR 22 (Mad). In view of the findings of fact made by the Tribunal it is not necessary to go into the controversies involved in those cases. In that view of the matter the first question is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, each party will pay and bear its own costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1982 (12) TMI 23 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s income and accordingly divided between the partners. Another significant finding is that the properties were also acquired with the funds of the firm and the cost of these properties was debited in the books of the firm. From all these circumstances, the departmental authorities and the Tribunal concluded and, in our opinion, rightly, that these properties became and were treated as the properties of the firm. Once that is so, it is not disputed that by merely making entries in the account books of the firm, the firm s properties cannot become and cannot be treated to have become the separate properties of the partners. Similarly, so long as they are the firm s properties, no partner can predicate that he owns a particular property or that he owns a specified share in the particular property or properties, as the case may be. For the above reasons, both the questions referred to us are answered in the negative and in favour of the Department, against the assessee. No costs.
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1982 (12) TMI 22 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof ... ... ... ... ..... hat he had failed to disclose his income. It is true that there is a subsequent return indicating the income in question but that return was filed with a condition that this was including the same as income from other sources as the same could not be proved. It appears to us on the order-sheet referred to hereinbefore that the admission, if any, was a conditional admission and could not be relied on for imposing penalty as an unconditional admission. This view was also corroborated by the observations of this court in the case of CIT v. Sarda Rice and Oil Mills 1979 117 ITR 917. We may further note that the findings of the Tribunal in this case had not been challenged either on perversity or on the basis of no evidence. Upon this finding and in the facts and circumstances of this case, the question must be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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