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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 2242 Records
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1982 (12) TMI 191 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... evidence like the contract, purchase order and correspondence with the foreign manufacturer etc. which could throw light on the composition of the impugned grinding wheels. The appellants stated that in the purchase order etc. the grinding wheels were described merely as type L-67 and that there was no evidence available to connect this particular type with synthetic abrasive gratins as the constituent raw material. We observe that the appellants’ appeals were rejected more than three years ago for non-production of catalogue and technical literature and yet even till the day of hearing before us the appellants appeared to had made no effort to produce these documents or any other collateral evidence. In view of the default on the part of the appellants, we hold that the Department was justified in classifying the goods u/i 71(1) of the ICT. 5. Accordingly, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned Orders-in-Appeal and reject both the appeals as unsubstantiated.
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1982 (12) TMI 190 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... the resumed hearing, Shri Chatterjee only reiterated that the impugned sets were essentially laboratory glassware that having been imported separately. They were not entitled to the concession under the Accessories Rules and should, therefore, be classified under Heading 70.17/18. 3. We have carefully considered the matter. We find considerable force in the appellants’ contention that the impugned sets are highly matched and sophisticated spares and accessories of spectrophotometer. They have specialised optical functions to perform with spectrophotometer and they cannot, therefore, be put in the general category of laboratory glassware. Once their classification under heading 70.17/18 is ruled out, the impugned sets become correctly classifiable under the heading relating to the main instrument, i.e., heading 90.25(1), by virtue of Note 2 to Chapter 90 of the Tariff. 4. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and direct that consequential relief be granted to the appellants.
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1982 (12) TMI 189 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... sed for medicinal purposes. For the same reasons, affidavits of experts in only one field of use of the impugned goods could hardly be relied upon for understanding the true nature of the impugned goods. In any case, no such affidavits were produced before us. 8. The argument that since the goods were accepted as raw material for Ayurvedic medicines and released under the Open General Licence should also be a factor for their assessment under Heading 12.07 has no force. The Open General Licence in the Import Policy and the Customs Tariff are intended to achieve two different purposes and follow their own separate schemes of listing the commodities for the purpose of import and assessment. If the Customs Tariff contains a more specific heading to cover the goods, they have to be covered thereunder irrespective of how they may be treated for the purpose of the Import Policy. 9. Accordingly, we uphold assessment of Caraway Seeds under Heading 09.04/10 (1) and reject the appeal.
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1982 (12) TMI 188 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... facts, we find no case to interfere with the order of the CC(A). Therefore, the appeal is dismissed on the above stated ground itself. 3. Before parting with the case, we like to observe that though Mrs. Vijay Zutshi, Senior Departmental Representative, has assisted us on the question of merit of the case by submitting that the order appealed against is in order and the CC(A) rightly did not give any relief on the given set of facts, she raised unnecessary and avoidable question persistently insisting that since the Revenue has not been given time for filing cross objection, the Bench should not proceed with the case. Such submission on the above stated facts seems to us to be very strange. Since the CC(A) did not give any relief, the question of the Revenue contemplating any cross objection even if the present appeal was filed before the Tribunal, could not arise. To repeat, we earnestly hope that the parties impose self-restraint by not raising frivolous matters before us.
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1982 (12) TMI 187 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... While conceding that M/s. H.A.L. were owned by the Govt. of India, in strict law, they were a corporate body conducting their business on a commercial basis. It was further submitted that while the work of clearance through the Customs had been handled by the Embarkation Hdqrs., the importers were M/s. H.A.L., who were not entitled in law to the time limit of one year for filing of refund claims. 4. We are of the considered view that since the importation which is the subject of the present proceedings had been made by M/s H.A.L., who are a Govt. undertaking and not ‘Government’ per se, the time limit of one year for filing of refund claims is not available to them. The order dated 1-5-1980 passed by the Appellate Collector is, therefore, correct in law and based on facts. As regards the alternative plea of condonation of twelve days delay, the Tribunal can only interpret the law and has no powers to allow such condonation. In the result, the appeal is rejected.
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1982 (12) TMI 186 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a "contrary intention" appears from the provisions of the Central Amendment Act so as to exclude the applicability of s.8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act?
Held that:- t is settled both on authority and principle that when a later statute again describes an offence created by an earlier statute and imposes a different punishment, or varies the procedure, the earlier statute is repealed by implication. The rule is however subject to the limitation contained in Art. 20(1) against ex post facto law providing for a greater punishment and has also no application where the offence described in the later Act is not the same as in the earlier Act i.e. when the essential ingredients of the two offences are different.
In the premises, the Central Amendment Act having dealt with the same offence as the one punishable under s. 16(1)(a) and provided for a reduced punishment, the accused must have the benefit of the reduced punishment. We wish to make it clear that anything that we have said shall not be construed as giving to the Central Amendment Act a retrospective operation insofar as it creates new offences or provides for an enhanced punishment. Appeal dismissed.
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1982 (12) TMI 185 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not maida . It should also be noticed that shevaya is a commodity of fairly common use. It is really an article of food and in such cases it is but appropriate that they should be treated as outside the net of higher taxability, if that can be done without doing violence to the language. The idea in including maida in the First Schedule was to subject it to single point tax, the rate of tax being only one per cent. If, on the other hand, we hold that shevaya is not maida, it will become general goods and would be taxable at each point of sale at the rate of 3 per cent, now 4 per cent. We are also of the opinion that in case of any doubt or ambiguity on the question, it should be answered in favour of the assessee for the reason that it in turn goes to make the goods available at a lesser price to the common man. For the above reasons, we see no ground warranting interference in these tax revision cases which are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.
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1982 (12) TMI 184 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t the transportation charges were to be reimbursed. It was held that the aggregate amount which the assessee received for the sand which he supplied to the purchaser was the price of the material and not the transportation charges which was paid for separately. This case clearly supports the contention of the assessee that the transportation charges, etc., could not be included in his turnover. In the result, the revisions are partly allowed. The orders of the Tribunal are modified to this extent that only the cost of the ballast as shown in the tender shall be included in the assessee s turnover and the other charges, viz., carting to the site and unloading, handling, stacking, etc., received by the assessee shall be excluded while determining his turnover. The papers will now go back to the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of section 11(8) of the Sales Tax Act for making appropriate orders. The assessee is entitled to his costs, which I assess at Rs. 200 one set.
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1982 (12) TMI 183 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and it was not as though the additional discount was allowed subsequently on second thought, nor is there any suggestion by the assessing authority that Rs. 52,285.27 was not, in fact, paid by way of discount. This being so, the Tribunal held that the amount cannot form part of the sale price at which the goods were sold and hence it cannot be included in the turnover much less in the taxable turnover. The Tribunal s decision is quite right both on the facts and on the application of the law, especially on the definition of section 2(h) of the Central Sales Tax Act. Hence, the tax case is dismissed.
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1982 (12) TMI 182 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ction 55 carries a three-year period of time to rectify the error, and this shows that an error can become apparent at any time within that period, which means that it could become apparent subsequent to the commission of the error. This argument is misconceived. Section 55 contains two things one is the commission of apparent error the other is its rectification. The period of limitation prescribed by the section relates to the aspect of rectification. The learned counsel s contention is based on a transference of the limitation period of three years prescribed for rectification to the very basic requirement, namely, the commission of an apparent error which is the provocation for the exercise of the rectificatory power. For the reasons aforesaid, we allow the revision petitions, set aside the orders passed by the Tribunal under section 55 and restore their earlier orders in appeal. The State Government will get its costs from the assessees. Counsel s fee Rs. 250 (one set).
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1982 (12) TMI 181 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d suffered tax in regard to the transactions under which the assessee purchased the concerned goods. When the matter was taken in appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee cited the decision of this Court in Govindan and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1975 35 STC 50 and contended that when it was established by evidence that Honesty Electricals had sold the goods to the assessee it was not necessary for the assessee to farther establish that that concern had also paid the single point tax. The Tribunal accepted this contention and deleted the turnover in question from the assessable turnover. In this revision, the order of the Tribunal is questioned, but having regard to the principle laid down by this Court in Govindan and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1975 35 STC 50, and having regard to the material facts to which the Tribunal had adverted in its order, there is no scope for our interference in this revision so as to uphold the finding of the Tribunal. This petition is dismissed.
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1982 (12) TMI 180 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s it then stood. It accordingly set aside the order of the Sales Tax Officer and remanded the matter to the Sales Tax Officer to impose a proper penalty under the law. In this revision, the assessee s grievance is that the assessee s explanation was not taken into account by the Tribunal while making the impugned order. It is true that the assessee had not appealed against the order of the Sales Tax Officer but, in an appeal by the State in which a higher penalty was sought to be imposed on the assessee, the assessee s version should also have been examined by the Tribunal. Nevertheless, in this revision no interference is required as the assessee s explanation will also be considered by the Sales Tax Officer who shall decide the matter in accordance with law. If the Sales Tax Officer finds that the explanation of the assessee is not satisfactory, it shall impose the penalty in accordance with law. In the result, the revision is dismissed. Their will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (12) TMI 179 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ss amount to be forfeited. In arriving at its decision, the Tribunal followed a decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in Appeal No. 571 of 1971-Kasamvali Mohamed Motiwalla v. State of Maharashtra decided on 26th March, 1974. In that case, the Tribunal held that it would be incorrect to interpret the second part of section 46(2) as restricting the operation thereof to individual sales and that the expression the amount of tax payable by him under the provisions of this Act means the amount of tax levied on the turnover of sales of the registered dealer. We must point out that this judgment is no longer good law in view of the decision of this High Court in Ramkrishan Kulwantrai s case 1979 44 STC 117 where this High Court has held to the contrary. For the reasons set out above, we answer both the questions submitted to us in the negative, that is in favour of the department and against the assessee. The respondents will pay to the applicant the cost of this reference.
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1982 (12) TMI 178 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Second Schedule. However, if the sales by the appellant which attracted sales tax at first point only were otherwise exempted from sales tax, then a demand on the second appellant to produce proof of such tax being paid by appellant No. 1 was not justified and could not be sustained. The Sales Tax Officer and the Tribunal were, therefore, not right in demanding such a proof from appellant No. 2. 7.. It also cannot be said that by reason of exemption from sales tax granted to appellant No. 1 for sales of Indian-made foreign liquor effected by them under item 68 of the Second Schedule to the Act, being a small-scale industry, the point of tax fixed for such sales, under section 8 of the Act at first point only, could not be shifted to the other subsequent point, that is, to the sale by appellant No. 2. 8.. We, therefore, answer the questions referred to us as under Question No. (1) In the negative. Question No. (2) In the negative. Respondent to pay the costs of the reference.
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1982 (12) TMI 177 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mpted. 19.. In our view, in the facts of the case, the said contention of the learned counsel for the appellant could not be accepted. Firstly, the proviso to the said section 8 empowers the Government to fix the first or other point of sale in the case of series of sales of successive dealers otherwise than as provided in the section. In fact, in this case, by a notification issued by the Government under the said proviso, the sale of Indian-made foreign liquor was made liable to sales tax at the first Point only. The said notification, therefore, makes it clear that irrespective of the sale being to a registered dealer, the sale of Indian-made foreign liquor was liable to tax at the first point only and therefore sales by appellant No. 1 to appellant No. 2 who was another registered dealer were not exempted. 20.. We, therefore, answer the questions as under Question No. (1) Affirmative. Question No. (2) Affirmative. 21.. Respondents to pay the costs of both the references.
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1982 (12) TMI 176 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tax to the Government when it sold the goods or used them in contravention of the declarations made by it in the certificates issued by it in form 15. The amounts collected by it by way of tax was, as found by the Tribunal, equivalent to the amount of purchase tax which had become payable by it under section 14. The amount so collected is described in the debit notes themselves as purchase tax. For the above reasons in our opinion, there was no contravention by the respondent-company of the provisions of section 46(2) and the Tribunal ought to have allowed the second appeal filed by the respondent-company and ought to have held that the said sum of Rs. 1,231.76 was not liable to be forfeited. The question referred to us must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessees and against the department, though for reasons different then upon which the Tribunal proceeded. The applicant will pay to the respondent-company the costs of this reference.
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1982 (12) TMI 175 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... being made in the course of the assessment year during which the sale of the goods had been occasioned, when the goods themselves were returned and the claim for refund itself could arise only beyond the assessment year. We are in respectful agreement with these observations of the Kerala High Court. In the present case neither the language of section SA nor the relevant provisions of the Rules require the benefit granted under section 8A to be confined only to those cases where the goods are returned by the purchaser in the same assessment year in which they were sold. In the circumstances, the questions referred to us are answered as follows Question No. (1) in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. Question No. (2) in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. The respondent to pay to the applicant costs of the reference. The fee of Rs. 100 paid by the applicant before the Tribunal to be refunded to him.
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1982 (12) TMI 174 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... arty as respects the relief denied to it. There can be no doubt whatever about the substantial nature of the questions involved in these cases. The interpretation and application of section 22(2) is not an easy affair. Although we have applied the decision of the Supreme Court in R.S. Joshi, Sales Tax Officer v. Ajit Mills Ltd. 1977 40 STC 497 (SC), to sustain the constitutionality of section 22(2) the decision relied on is not a direct decision. Besides, a question of this kind is of a general character in its impact likely to recur constantly in tax administration not only under this particular State Act, but also under other State enactments in pari materia. The cases in this group involve substantial revenue to the State and big money stakes to the parties concerned. Having regard to all these considerations, we grant certificates of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court for all the parties in all these cases under article 132 and article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.
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1982 (12) TMI 173 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the concurrent jurisdiction enjoyed by these officers, it is not necessary to pass any order of transfer under section 70 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. It is open to either of these officers to exercise jurisdiction either in assessment proceedings or in reassessment proceedings. After this point was argued for some time, Mr. Jetly stated that he did not wish to press this point and we need not give our findings on this point. In view of this statement, we are not dealing with this aspect of the case. In the premises, the order of reassessment which was passed by the Sales Tax Officer, Enforcement Branch, was passed without there being any order of transferring the proceedings to him from the Sales Tax Officer, E Ward. As such, the order of reassessment was without jurisdiction. We accordingly answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the deparment. Applicant will pay to the respondent costs of this reference.
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1982 (12) TMI 172 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s constitute capital assets of the respondents or goods of a capital nature. This question, therefore, falls to be determined by the Tribunal, when the case goes back to it for disposal in the light of our judgment. For the reasons set out by us above, we answer question No. (1) as follows The purchases of building materials made by the respondents for carrying on their business of construction of or repairs to building were purchases made in the course of their business as building contractors. The purchases of scaffolding materials made by the respondents cannot be said to be purchases made by the respondents in the course of their business as building contractors if such goods were adjuncts to the carrying on of the business of the respondents or if those goods formed part of the capital assets of the respondents. We answer question No. (2) in the negative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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