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Showing 161 to 180 of 206 Records
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1984 (6) TMI 46 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Liability To Penalty, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... , we find that, in the present case, the assessee, which is a registered firm, paid advance tax, which is admittedly larger than the amount of tax payable on the total income determined in the hands of the registered firm as such on regular assessment. Consequently, there is no assessed tax within the meaning of the Explanation to clause (i) of s. 271 (1) and it cannot be said that the assessee is liable to penalty for the default falling under s. 271(1)(a) in not filing the return of income within the time allowed Since, there is no liability to penalty, the provisions of s. 271(2) of the Act do not come into operation. The ITO is not, therefore, empowered to levy penalty under s. 271 (1)(a) read with s. 271 (1)(i) of the Act. The Tribunal erred in holding that the levy of penalty by the ITO is valid. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 500.
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1984 (6) TMI 45 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return ... ... ... ... ..... re it would be revenue expenditure. Though these observations are made in the context of technical knowhow with regard to manufacture of fertilisers, they apply with equal force in the case of supply of technical know-how with regard to other products also. As found supra, the purpose of the second agreement is only to improve and maintain the quality of the products, already manufactured by the assessee. The agreement is to last only for seven years and the licence to manufacture is a non-exclusive licence. There is no right to trade mark or patent right granted either permanently or for an indefinite period. The assistance and knowledge is only with regard to manufacture of products with a view to earn more profits and has nothing to do with the manufacture of machinery. In the circumstances, the view of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal that the expenditure is revenue in character is fully justified. We answer the reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee.
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1984 (6) TMI 44 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Determination Of Cost Of Acquisition ... ... ... ... ..... he asset is not subject to any artificial deduction except by those specified in s. 48 of the Act. Whether the deductions specifically referred to in s. 48 are exhaustive or not is quite a different matter for consideration but it would be wrong to say that the full value of the consideration for the sale of the property could be reduced by the estate duty liability, unless such a liability could be held to be a valid deduction under s. 48 of the Act. We have already held that, even on commercial considerations, we do not consider estate duty liability to be a valid deduction under s. 48 of the Act. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal was in error in directing that the estate duty payable in respect of the asset should be deducted from the full value of the consideration received for the sale of the property. For the aforesaid reasons we answer the question referred in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 500.
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1984 (6) TMI 43 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... had to be gathered on further enquiries ? The dispute in respect of both the questions relates to the applicability of rule IBB. The Tribunal has held that it is a procedural rule and, therefore, it may be given effect to even in respect of pending matters. There is no dispute and indeed it cannot be disputed that rule I BB is procedural in nature. That being the position, we fail to see any question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal, since it is always not disputed that the rules of procedure can be called into aid in respect of pending matters. Civil petitions are, accordingly, rejected.
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1984 (6) TMI 42 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons ... ... ... ... ..... dated April 13, 1950, as the guardian of Chettiappa. By the deed she acknowledged having received the share of Chettiappa in the property. On these facts the Tribunal found that the integrity and management of the estates have continued undisturbed throughout the period. The volition of various members necessary was only all too apparent with the entrustment of the management to M.S.M.M. firm for a proper management. It implied a prior agreement to which the guardian of the minor must have given her consent too. It was on these findings of fact the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the parties formed an association of individuals to earn income from the trading venture. In the present case, there cannot be any such finding. In the result, we allow these revision petitions and while reversing the order of the Commissioner, we direct the assessing authority to recompute the income in the light of the observations made. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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1984 (6) TMI 41 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Deduction From Profits And Gains, New Industrial Undertaking In Backward Area ... ... ... ... ..... proximity. The Bombay High Court in Hindustan Lever s case 1980 121 ITR 951, and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gwalior Rayon Silk s case 1983 143 ITR 590, have dissented from the view taken by the Madras High Court in the above-said case. In our opinion, the decision of the Madras High Court proceeded not with the precise meaning of the word derived as judicially determined by the Privy Council in Kamakhaya Narayan Singh s case 1948 16 ITR 325 (PC) and the Supreme Court in Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. s case 1978 113 ITR 84. In Metal Rolling Works Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT 1983 142 ITR 170, the Bombay High Court again reiterated the view taken in Hindustan Lever s case 1980 121 ITR 951. We are firmly of the opinion that the assessee is not entitled to relief under s. 80HH in respect of the profits and gains derived from the sale of import entitlements and we answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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1984 (6) TMI 40 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Deduction, Other Sources ... ... ... ... ..... to the bank. This liability has got a direct nexus to the earning of the dividend income. This is, therefore, not a simple case of refund of interest which was claimed as deduction. The claim was based on the fact that the assessee had to withdraw the fixed deposit for utilising the same for the purpose of purchasing shares. The interest paid to the bank, therefore, is an expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of earning the dividend income. The assessee, in our opinion, is entitled to the relief under s. 57(iii). The Tribunal has correctly reached the conclusion. A similar case came up for consideration before this court in CIT v. Sri Ananth G. Pat in ITRC No. 171 of 1981, disposed on January 12, 1984 1984 150 ITR 249. The question referred therein was also answered in favour of the assessee allowing the deduction claimed under s. 57(iii) of the I.T. Act, 1961. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
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1984 (6) TMI 39 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Educational Institution Solely For Education, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... s. 10(22) on the ground that the income and expenditure of the Board were controlled and directed towards development and expansion of educational purposes. This case, in our opinion, stands on a different footing. The. Secondary Board of Education was concerned with the controlling of the educational institutions and holding examinations for students. Its primary object was to impart education to students through the colleges controlled by it. It was not just concerned with extending financial assistance to students as in the present case. The ratio of the decision, therefore, in our opinion, cannot be extended to the present case. It seems to us that the assessee which extends financial assistance to students for their educational purposes would squarely and fairly fall under s.11 and not under s. 10(22). In the result, we answer the first question in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. The second question must be answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
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1984 (6) TMI 38 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... red in favour of the assessee. As regards question No. 2, it is stated that the bonus paid to the employees drawing salary in excess of the statutory limit of Rs. 1,600 per month was disallowed under s. 40(c)(iii) of the I.T. Act, 1961. The bonus was paid in cash to the employees concerned. The preponderance of judicial opinion on this question is that the provisions of s. 40(c)(iii) and s. 40(a)(v), after amendment with effect from April 1, 1969, do not apply to allowances paid in cash to employees, as there is no question of convertibility into money where cash was paid. This court has taken the same view in CIT v. Warner Hindustan Ltd. 1984 145 ITR 24 (AP). Following the above view, we hold that no part of the bonus paid to the employees in cash could be disallowed under s. 40(c)(iii) of the I.T. Act, 1961. In the result, both the questions are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1984 (6) TMI 37 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Unexplained Investments ... ... ... ... ..... iness of smuggling. It was a loss in much the same way as if the currency notes had been stolen or dropped on the way while carrying on the business. It was a loss occasioned directly from the carrying on of the business and was incidental to it. These were the reasons for allowing deduction under s. 10. It is true that the I.T. Act is not concerned as to how an assessee earns income. It may be by any method legal or illegal. So far as the State s share in the income is concerned, every assessee is treated alike irrespective of his method of earning. But, in the instant case, the assessee was not consistent in his contentions. He never contended before that he was engaged in the smuggling of watches and the confiscation thereof should be treated as a loss in his business of smuggling. It is, therefore, not possible for us to consider for the first time the contention raised in this reference. In the result, the question is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee.
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1984 (6) TMI 36 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... r in Parliament at the relevant time. We cannot take a different view and, therefore, the answer to question No. 2 must be in the negative. We must say that the provisions of s. 52(1) cannot be applied to the transactions with Gayatridevi, Keshardevi, Sushiladevi and Govindlal. So far as question No. 1 is concerned, the learned counsel on both sides agree that as soon as question No. 2 is answered, the answer to question No. 1 would be an academic exercise which need not be done. Under these circumstances, question No. 1 is not answered. We answer question No. 2 referred to us in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue and the answer to question No. 1 would be an academic exercise in view of the answer to question No. 2. Under the circumstances, question No. 1 is not answered. There will be no order as to costs. A copy of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench A .
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1984 (6) TMI 35 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Circulars, Company, Employee Or Any Other Person, Managing Director Or Director, Travelling Expenses
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1984 (6) TMI 34 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Deduction From Profits And Gains, New Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... ns made for the next following assessment year and so on. In view of the above position of law, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that it was not obligatory On the part of the assessee to make a claim for the said deduction in the previous assessment years when no profit was made and that the assessee is entitled to the said deduction for all the assessment years in the assessment year 1972-73. In other words, while determining the amount to be granted by way of deduction under s. 80J in the assessment year 1972-73, he was bound not only to grant for that particular assessment year, but also for the previous assessment years, for which the assessee was entitled to in law. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the resort to s. 154 in this case was called for or not. For the above reasons, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the Department. No costs.
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1984 (6) TMI 33 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Company, Reserve, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... t affected by the proposal to draw the same from the dividend reserve account to declare appropriate dividends. The Tribunal will look into this question before determining the matter while passing an order conformably to this judgment. In the result, we answer the second question referred to us at the instance of the assessee to the effect that the development rebate reserve transferred to the profit and loss account for each of the three assessment years is not liable to be excluded in the computation of capital under r. 1 (iii) of the Second Schedule to the Surtax Act, and at the same time, whatever sums were drawn for the purpose of declaring dividends from out of the general reserve accounts affecting the credit balance on the opening day of the accounting year for each of the three assessment years should be reduced in computing the capital under r. 1 (iii) of the Second Schedule to the Surtax Act. The reference is answered accordingly. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 500.
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1984 (6) TMI 32 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat is the avowed object of the enactment is material, as rightly referred by my learned brother Talati J. Even assuming that industrial development also would develop a city, town or village, if the Act is not intended for that purpose, but intended for the purpose of industrial development of certain areas which call for such development and generally the development of industries, it would not fall within s. 10(20A) of the I.T. Act. The Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act is an enactment which fits the bill as it establishes a body with the objective of development of town planning schemes in the State of Gujarat. A copy of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench C . The counsel for the assessee prays for a certificate to file appeal to the Supreme Court. Under s. 261 of the I.T. Act, the case is fit for appeal to the Supreme Court, Certificate is granted.
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1984 (6) TMI 31 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ITR 682 (Kar), Mysore Kirloskar Ltd. v. CIT 1978 114 ITR 443 (Kar) FB , CIT v. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. P. Ltd. 1980 123 ITR 538 (Bom) and Praga Tools Ltd. v. CIT 1980 123 ITR 773 (AP) FB . Thus, we are unable to agree with the reasoning given by the Tribunal in deciding these two points against the assessee. In the result, this reference is decided in favour of the assessee and against the Department. Our answer to question No. 1 is that 1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal has erred in law in holding that the expenditure on repairs to the extent of Rs. 90,000 was capital in nature. Similarly our answer to question No. 2 is that 2. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal has erred in law in holding that the amount of Rs. 93,100 expended by the assessee in the purchase of know-how relating to the existing line of business was capital in nature. The reference is answered, accordingly, with no order as to costs.
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1984 (6) TMI 30 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ght perspective. The Tribunal is bound to consider the applicability of the Explanation to the case. The non-consideration of the Explanation has thus resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The findings of the Tribunal, therefore, are defective in law. We have accordingly to conclude that the question referred to this court cannot be answered in view of the defective nature of the findings by the Tribunal. The decisions in CIT v. Laxmi Auto Stores 1977 106 ITR 626 (Orissa), CIT v. Prabhat Bakery 1979 118 ITR 35 (Mad) and Addl. CIT v. Ram Prakash 1980 121 ITR 774 (All) lend support to this view. In the light of the above conclusion, we decline to answer the questions referred to us. The Tribunal should, however, re-hear the appeal and decide it in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made by us above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1984 (6) TMI 29 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Income From House Property, Vacancy Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... he purpose of applying clause (ix). In the present case, the question posed before us cannot be answered in the form in which it has been raised, for, during the relevant year, only two floors were let out and the other two floors were unoccupied. Even if the question is recast on the basis of those facts, it would still not admit of an easy answer in the absence of a clear finding as to the nature of the building. In the circumstances, we do not answer the question referred, but we make it clear that the answer must necessarily depend upon a proper determination of the relevant facts. In the circumstances, it is open to the Tribunal to consider the question afresh by determining the relevant facts in the light of what is stated above. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in these tax referred cases. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1984 (6) TMI 28 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... be taken into consideration in such cases is the larger question whether the hands of the investigating agency can be fettered by an order of this court on the ground that they have used their powers in excess of the rights conferred on them under the Act. Undoubtedly, the respondents are entitled under law to conduct searches and to proceed with their investigation and enquiry on the materials gathered by them. If the investigative powers of authorities like the respondents are restrained by orders of injunction, the investigation of cases themselves will come to dead stop and that will not be in the interest of the State. In that perspective, therefore, I am inclined to vacate the injunction and, accordingly, it will stand vacated. The writ petitioner apprehends that he will be put to harassment by the respondents. It is needless to say that the respondents are bound to act in a responsible manner and use their powers in such a fashion as would not transgress their limits.
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1984 (6) TMI 27 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration, Specification Of Shares Of Partners ... ... ... ... ..... th the decisions has reiterated the view taken in Hyderabad Stone Depot s case 1977 109 ITR 686, by observing thus at page 378 We must, therefore, hold that the case of Mandyala Govindu and Co. v. CIT 1976 102 ITR 1 (SC), is distinguishable on facts. The decision of the Full Bench of this court in CIT v. Hyderabad Stone Depot 1977 109 ITR 686 must be upheld as, on a reasonable construction of the instrument of partnership as a whole, it was found that there was specification of the shares of the partners in respect of loss, if any, of the partnership in the same proportion as they distribute the partners share of profits. We are unable to agree with Sri P. Rama Rao, learned standing counsel for the Revenue, that the Full Bench decision must be deemed to have been overruled or is no longer good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mandyala Govindu and Co. v. CIT 1976 102 ITR 1 . In the result, we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee.
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