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1984 (6) TMI 226
... ... ... ... ..... ceutical necessities are therapeutically inert and do not interfere with the therapeutic or prophylactic activity of chloramphenicol. It is seen that the Commissioner has added ‘anaesthetic’, along with diluent, preservative etc. mentioned in the notification. For one thing, ‘anaesthetic’ is not mentioned in the notification and, for another, it is not a category similar to the specified categories such as diluent, preservative etc. 9. In the result, we hold that the benefit of Notification No. 116/69, dated 3rd May, 1969 was correctly denied by the lower authorities. The impugned order is upheld and the appeal is rejected. 10. The appellants have referred to certain demands issued to them in respect of periods subsequent to those covered by the original proceedings which has led to the present appeal. These subsequent demands do not form part of the present proceedings and, as such, we are not passing any orders in respect of those demands.
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1984 (6) TMI 225
... ... ... ... ..... ce at all material times." 13. In view of the above retrospective amendment of the Central Excises and Salt Act, only the money paid as duty by the appellants can be regarded as the duty payable in the Act. Any money recovered by the manufacturer ostensibly as duty, but which was not payable and was not paid as duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, cannot be accepted as forming part of the duty. 14. That being the position, the money recovered in excess of the effective duty (viz. 75% of the duty payable), must form part of the assessable value unless it is shown to be deductible for any other reason, such as being a sales tax. We have seen that it is not such a deductible sum, and the appellants do not claim it as any such permissible deduction. They maintain it as duty. We hold that it is not duty and must form part of the assessable value. Therefore, the action of including the money in the assessable value is correct and we cannot pronounce it wrong.
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1984 (6) TMI 224
... ... ... ... ..... rticles are not specifically listed in an entry of the Customs Tariff, the Interpretative Rules applicable to the Customs Tariff required that they should be classified according to the constituent material which gives the composite goods their essential character. The said Interpretative Rule does not apply to the Central Excise Tariff and the Central Excise Tariff itself has no provision corresponding to that rule. We, therefore, hold that the subject goods, not being specified in any entry of the C.E.T., should rightly fall under the residuary Item No. 68 of the said Tariff. We order accordingly. Since, by virtue of their classification under Item 68 C.E.T., the goods were entitled to exemption from CV duty under Notification No. 364-Customs, dated 2-8-1976, the refund due to the appellants should be given to them. 7. Accordingly, we allow the appeal in respect of the countervailing duty but dismiss it as not pressed for so far as the basic customs duty is concerned.
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1984 (6) TMI 223
... ... ... ... ..... f excisable article at the factory gate.” 15. There is thus a specific and direct authority for inclusion of cost of such type of packing material, which, as discussed above, is in the nature of essential packing for this type of commodity, like the biscuits, prepared in loose form or in small packets, which, without the help of this secondary packing, like large size tin containers, cannot obviously be marketed or dispatched from the factory gate. 16. We thus feel satisfied that the view taken by the lower authorities was the right view, and in the absence of any evidence that by an agreement between the appellants and their buyers, these containers were “returnable” or were actually returned, and in the nature of things as outlined above, to the effect that this type of packing constitutes necessary or essential packing, refund claim has been rightly rejected. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed.
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1984 (6) TMI 222
... ... ... ... ..... nders are no glass cylinders of ordinary use but are specially designed parts of photo-copying machine and have a definite functional role to play in that machine. We, therefore, agree with the appellants that by virtue of the various Chapter Notes referred to by them, these cylinders which are solely used as a component of photo-copying machine correctly fall under Heading 90.10. We have noted the recent change in the Department’s practice of classification as evidenced from the Bill of Entry of M/s. General Industries and the order dated 22-2-1984 of the Collector (Appeals) produced by the appellants. The analogies of articles of glass which are components of machinery etc. falling in Chapters 84 and 85 cited by the Department’s Representative are misplaced for the simple reason that Notes governing the scope of these two Chapters are different. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned orders and allow both the appeals with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1984 (6) TMI 221
... ... ... ... ..... The Bench further held that just because the materials used for the normal minimum packing are not “used up”; in the process, it would not be correct to say that they have not been used in an incidental or ancillary process to complete the manufactured product by turning it into marketable goods. 10. We are, therefore, of the view that the benefit of the proforma credit under Rule 56A of the duty paid on the packing or wrapping paper used for packing or wrapping of other varieties of paper is admissible for being set off against the duty payable on the packed or wrapped paper. We do not accept the learned SDR’s contention that the Appellate Collector should not have adjudicated on this new ground but asked the Assistant Collector to decide on it. The Appellate Collector had authority to entertain additional grounds for good reasons and he has chosen to do so. We cannot fault him on this ground. 11. In the result, the appeal fails and is rejected.
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1984 (6) TMI 220
... ... ... ... ..... of articles made out of steel and not steel as such. The same is the case with rubber. Though rubber is also a product, the expression “Rubber Products” would include products made out of rubber and not rubber as such. For rubber as such, the tariff has a separate entry - 16AA, which relates to synthetic rubber. In contradistinction to that, the entry 16A covers “Rubber Products”. According to the appellants’ own statements, backed by the technical literature produced by them and the trade opinion elicited by themselves, their reclaimed rubber sheets are purely a rubber raw material and not a product made out of rubber. The reclaimed rubber sheets cannot, therefore, fall under Item 16A. Since there is no separate tariff entry for reclaimed rubber (though there is entry 16AA for synthetic rubber), we hold that re-claimed rubber sheets are correctly classifiable under the residuary Item 68 of the Tariff. 8. Accordingly, we reject this appeal.
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1984 (6) TMI 219
... ... ... ... ..... s, Nasik (Supra) on which Shri Banerjee has relied and the Departmental Representative had no comments. In the case (Supra , the Bench relying on Government of India decision held that where a manufacturer’s plant and machinery is not equipped for production of ’strips’, ‘pattis’ produced by such manufacturers cannot be classified under sub-item (iii) of T.I. 26AA, but would be classifiable under sub-item (ia) of T.I. 26AA. Further, it is not disputed that the appellants’ mill is not a strip mill or equipped for the purpose. In view of our earlier decision (supra), the appellants claim for classification of their product ‘pattis’ under sub-item (ia) of T.I. 26AA would have to be accepted. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the order classifying the appellants product ‘pattis’ under sub-item (iii) of T.I. 26AA is set aside and classification under sub-item (ia) of T.I. 26AA accepted. The appeal is thus allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 218
... ... ... ... ..... sed solely or predominately as drugs, not elsewhere specified.” Having classified the goods under the above heading, it is difficult to see why the customs authorities did not consider the goods as eligible for the benefit of Notification No. 55/75 as covered by the description “all drugs, medicines, pharmaceuticals and drug intermediates, not elsewhere specified. “Pharmaceutical” means a chemical used in medicine. The very fact that the Custom House has classified (correctly, in our opinion) the goods as pharmaceutical chemical under heading No. 29.01/45(13) would show that the goods were pharmaceuticals within the meaning of Notification No. 55/75. The question of main or predominant use would not, in the circumstances, be a relevant consideration. 5. In the result, we allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants which should be granted by the concerned Asstt. Collector within 3 months from the date communication of this order.
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1984 (6) TMI 217
... ... ... ... ..... ing with the question regarding levy of penalty this Court observed that where a return is filed subsequent to the date of inspection and discovery of secret accounts and such a return is accepted by the assessing authority as complete and correct and assessment made on the basis of the turnover furnished therein, it would be a misnomer to term such an assessment as best judgment assessment . The above decision of this Court provides a complete answer to the question involved in the present case. We are satisfied that the assessment made by the Commercial Tax Officer accepting the turnover declared in the return cannot be regarded as a best judgment assessment and consequently it is not open to the Commercial Tax Officer to levy any penalty under section 14(3) read with section 14(8) of the Act. The Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the penalty was illegal. The revision case is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1984 (6) TMI 216
... ... ... ... ..... clearly within the language of item 1, viz., component parts of motor vehicles, articles (including batteries) adapted for use as parts and accessories of motor vehicles not being such articles as are ordinarily also used for other purposes than as parts and accessories of motor vehicles . In the context of the motor car bulbs, entry 37 should be read as a general entry and entry 1 special if so, the special entry should prevail. For these reasons, we hold that the Tribunal was in error in holding that the motor car bulbs fall under entry 37 as it stood at the relevant time and not under entry 1. The judgment of the Tribunal is accordingly set aside to the extent it held that the motor car bulbs fall under old entry 37 and not under entry 1. The tax revision case is accordingly allowed in part as indicated above. The authorities shall pass consequential orders in pursuance of this judgment. There shall be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Petition partly allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 215
... ... ... ... ..... ther, in the facts and circumstances of the case, sale price as defined under section 2(o) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, means only that amount which is payable to a dealer as valuable consideration for the sale of any goods from the purchaser of the goods or it would also include any amount payable or paid to the dealer by any person other than the purchaser of the goods? We see no valid ground to reframe the same because the Tribunal has found that the amount of Rs. 33,263 was by way of reimbursement to the distributor by the manufacturer. 11.. In the result our answer to the question referred to is That, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the reimbursement of Rs. 33,263 received from the principals will not form part of sale price as defined under section 2(o) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958. Thus, the reference is answered in favour of the assessee and against the department with no order as to costs.
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1984 (6) TMI 214
... ... ... ... ..... is not controlled by article 271 of the Constitution. The two are separate and distinct and the power conferred on the State Legislature is not denuded by the power conferred on Parliament for a different purpose under article 271 of the Constitution. 6.. Whenever additional tax or surcharge on sales tax is levied, what is really levied is a tax on sale or purchase and the same does not lose the character of a tax on sale or purchase vide S. Kodar v. State of Kerala 1974 34 STC 73 (SC) AIR 1974 SC 2272. On any view of the matter, the Karnataka State Legislature was competent to enact section 6C of the Act and the same is not violative of article 271 of the Constitution. The challenge of the petitioner to section 6C of the Act is wholly misconceived and is devoid of merit. 7.. In the light of my above discussion, I hold that this writ petition is liable to be rejected. I, therefore, reject this writ petition at the preliminary hearing stage without notice to the respondents.
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1984 (6) TMI 213
... ... ... ... ..... d the assessee s twofold explanation, firstly that he was not an assessee till the year 1978 and therefore he was unfamiliar with the tax proceedings and secondly there was a controversy on the question whether the supply of stone ballast would come within the meaning of sale or a works contract . The Tribunal accepted the contention that the assessee was under a bona fide mistake. Invoking the proviso to section 14(8) the Tribunal held that no penalty is leviable. The question whether the assessee was under a bona fide mistake or not is essentially a question of fact. The Tribunal dealt with the matter at considerable length and gave cogent reasons for coming to the conclusion that the assessee failed to file the return under a bona fide mistake entitling him to the benefit under the proviso to section 14(8). We are not persuaded to interfere with this finding recorded by the Tribunal. The tax revision case is dismissed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1984 (6) TMI 212
... ... ... ... ..... eous ground leaving aside the real determinative factor. We therefore quash the impugned order and remit the matter to the Superintendent of Taxes, Dibrugarh, for disposal according to law. The copy of the contract filed by the dealer is with the Superintendent, on perusal thereof, the Superintendent shall dispose the matter at an early date after serving due notices to the parties. We would observe that while considering the moot question, the Superintendent shall consider as to whether price paid by the buyer was on the basis of the meat content of the animal or the price was fixed per animal and thereafter determine as to whether the goods supplied fall in item 11 of Schedule III to the Act . 8.. In the result the writ petition is accepted, the impugned orders are quashed, however, we make no order as to costs. Send down the records to the Superintendent of Taxes, Dibrugarh, for disposal of the case according to law and the directions set out above. Writ Petition allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 211
... ... ... ... ..... e maintains no books of account, nor submits a return to the assessing authority as enjoined by the Act and the Rules, and the extent of the transactions carried on by him has to be estimated from the materials recovered from the assessee s place of business as a result of surprise inspection. These materials clearly indicate that the assessee intended to suppress the transactions found in the said records recovered from the assessee s place of business. On the facts, the Tribunal also has specifically found that but for the surprise inspection and the recovery of various records, the assessee would not have disclosed turnover before the assessing authority. Therefore, this is a case certainly attracting section 12(3) of the Act. The tax cases are therefore allowed and the Tribunal is directed to fix the quantum of penalty in proportion to the suppressed turnover as estimated by the Tribunal. The revenue will have its costs, one set. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petitions allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 210
... ... ... ... ..... stay to the petitioners and for not accepting the bank guarantee offered by them for the disputed tax amount till the disposal of the appeal, the petitioners are entitled to have the same quashed. Accordingly the impugned order of the second respondent will stand quashed. However, it is not possible to issue a writ to the second respondent to accept the security offered by the petitioners and grant an order of absolute stay of collection of the disputed tax. Therefore the proper direction to be given is to direct the second respondent to dispose of the stay petition filed by the petitioners before it afresh in accordance with the ratio contained in the above decisions. The second respondent will dispose of the said petition within three months from to-day (29-6-84) and till such disposal, the recovery of the disputed tax amount from the petitioners will be kept in abeyance. 7. The writ petition is accordingly allowed, as stated above, and there will be no order as to costs.
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1984 (6) TMI 209
... ... ... ... ..... r pointed out that the assessee had also produced purchase bills which ought to have been properly scrutinised by the authorities. If the declarations in form 32 have been misused by those selling dealers, the assessing officer should promptly initiate proceedings under the Act and the Rules to take action against such sellers. In the result this revision petition is allowed and the assessment order as affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal so far as it relates to the levy of tax on purchase turnover of groundnuts is quashed. The assessing officer shall give an opportunity to the assessee to produce evidence and redo the assessment in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made. The assessee is permitted to adduce whatever evidence he chooses to show that the sellers in question were taxable under the Act. The petitioner shall appear before the assessing authority on 16th July, 1984, to receive further notice. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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1984 (6) TMI 208
... ... ... ... ..... which the adjustment has been made as detailed above, I am of opinion that this is a matter in which the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Zone), Ernakulam, should make an investigation into the matter bearing in mind the observations made hereinabove and submit a detailed report to the Board of Revenue (Taxes) within six weeks from today, explaining the position for further action, as the Board of Revenue (Taxes) deems fit to adopt in the facts and circumstances of the case. I should record my appreciation for the assistance rendered by the Senior Government Pleader, Mr. N.N. Divakaran Pillai, and the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Zone), Ernakulam, Mr. Karunakara Panicker, and for having placed fairly all the available materials before the Court. Carbon copy of this judgment may be sent to the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Ernakulam, and another copy to the Board of Revenue (Taxes), Trivandrum. Order on C.M.P. No. 9359 of 1983 in O.P. No. 3006 of 1983-M. Dismissed.
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1984 (6) TMI 207
... ... ... ... ..... hould be annulled. I hereby do so. 4.. In view of section 3(1)(b)(iii) of Act 23 of 1967 the recovery proceedings can be continued in relation to the amount that is found to be due, after the revisions, for which, the proceedings, as it stood on 31st January, 1981 can be continued. I make this position clear. So that, after intimation by the 1st respondent of the reduced amount under section 3(1)(b)(ii) of Act 23 of 1967, if such reduced amount is not paid within a reasonable time, the recovery authorities can proceed under section 3(1)(b)(iii) of Act 23 of 1967 from the stage of attachment. The attachment of the properties dated 31st January, 1981 will be valid and effective for pursuing further, with recovery proceedings, if the amounts due as per revisional orders are not paid after intimation by the 1st respondent. 5. The original petition is disposed of as above. There shall be no order as to costs. Order on C.M.P. No. 9072 of 1982 in O.P. No. 3110 of 1982-G. Dismissed.
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