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Showing 201 to 220 of 2976 Records

• 1993 (11) TMI 246
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the company was justified in registering the transfer and delivering the share certificates to the transferee.
  2. If the company is not justified, whether a rectification can be ordered.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Justification of the Company in Registering the Transfer and Delivering the Share Certificates:
  
  The petitioner, Shri Subhash Chandra, requested the company to change his specimen signatures on February 10, 1990. However, on February 8, 1990, the company received an application for the transfer of 50 equity shares owned by the petitioner along with a transfer instrument executed on January 23, 1990. The company registered the transfer on February 24, 1990, as the signatures matched the specimen on record.
  
  The petitioner contended that the company registered the transfer despite prior intimation about changing the specimen signature and that the transfer deeds were not duly stamped as per the Indian Stamp Act, rendering the transfer void. Additionally, the petitioner claimed he lost the blank transfer deeds before January 23, 1990, and the company should have reversed the decision upon learning about the loss.
  
  The company argued that they had no intimation about the loss of share certificates at the time of registration and that the transfer deed was complete and valid. The company also stated that they had a practice of canceling stamps to avoid inconvenience to investors, which they believed was a curable technicality.
  
  2. Validity of Rectification Order:
  
  The petitioner sought rectification of the register of members to restore the 50 equity shares in his name. The company had already transferred the shares to third parties who purchased them in good faith. The petitioner did not implead the transferee, R. K. Malhotra, as a party, despite being given the opportunity, and thus, the reply on behalf of the transferee was not considered.
  
  The facts indicated that the company received the transfer documents on February 8, 1990, and approved the transfer on February 24, 1990. The share certificate was dispatched on June 2, 1990, after obtaining a clarification from the transferee. The petitioner's claim of losing the share certificates and blank transfer deeds was not substantiated as he did not implead the transferee to prove the case.
  
  The petitioner cited cases to argue that the transfer deed was not duly stamped, making the registration illegal. However, the company contended that the stamps were canceled before the registration, fulfilling the legal requirement. The Board noted that the objective of Section 12 of the Indian Stamp Act is to ensure stamps are not reused, and the company had ensured this.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The registration of the transfer was found invalid as the company did not comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 108 of the Companies Act, 1956, which requires the instrument of transfer to be duly stamped at the time of delivery. However, the Board could not order rectification of the register of members without hearing all affected parties, as the shares had been further transferred. The petitioner was given liberty to implead all parties involved in the subsequent transfers, and the company was directed to furnish details of the transfers within 30 days.
  
  The petition was disposed of with no order as to costs.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 245
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Applicability of Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) regarding the immunity of a foreign state.
  2. Determination of whether the appellant is an instrumentality of the German Democratic Republic.
  3. Requirement of Central Government's consent for suing a foreign state.
  4. Examination of commercial contracts within the purview of Section 86.
  5. Burden of proof for claiming immunity under Section 86.
  
  Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Applicability of Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) regarding the immunity of a foreign state:
  
  The appellant argued that it was an instrumentality of the German Democratic Republic, a recognized sovereign foreign state, and thus the suit could not be entertained without prior consent of the Central Government as required by Section 86 of the CPC. The court emphasized that Section 86 aims to give effect to the principles of International Law, providing a qualified privilege to foreign states, which can only be sued with the Central Government's consent.
  
  2. Determination of whether the appellant is an instrumentality of the German Democratic Republic:
  
  The appellant produced a certificate from the Consul-General of the German Democratic Republic and the Constitution of the German Democratic Republic. Article 12 of the Constitution stated that various enterprises, including ocean shipping, were nationally-owned property. Based on this, the court concluded that the appellant should be deemed a department of the German Democratic Republic, thus entitled to claim immunity under Section 86.
  
  3. Requirement of Central Government's consent for suing a foreign state:
  
  The court highlighted that Section 86(1) clearly states that no foreign state may be sued in any court except with the consent of the Central Government, certified in writing. Sub-section (2) prescribes that such consent shall not be given unless the case falls within specific clauses. The court reiterated that this provision acts as a bar on the court's power to entertain suits against foreign states without such consent.
  
  4. Examination of commercial contracts within the purview of Section 86:
  
  The respondent contended that Section 86 should not apply to commercial contracts. However, the court referred to sub-section (2)(b) of Section 86, which requires consent even for commercial or trading contracts. The court concluded that commercial contracts entered on behalf of a foreign state are not beyond the purview of Section 86, and the Central Government's consent is necessary.
  
  5. Burden of proof for claiming immunity under Section 86:
  
  The court noted that the initial onus of establishing the right to immunity lies with the foreign state or its instrumentality. The appellant had discharged this burden by producing relevant constitutional provisions and certificates. The court emphasized that the Central Government must consider requests for consent objectively and grant it if a cause of action exists, while also protecting foreign states from frivolous litigation.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Division Bench's order and restoring the trial court's decision. The suit filed by the respondent was not entertained due to the lack of Central Government consent as required by Section 86. The court underscored that the question of entertaining a suit against a foreign state should be addressed at the earliest opportunity to avoid unnecessary litigation and uphold the purpose of Section 86.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 244
  
  Issues:
  1. Whether the defendant should be restrained from using the word "Benz" in connection with undergarments.
  
  Analysis:
  The judgment by the Delhi High Court, delivered by Justice Mahinder Narain, pertains to a trademark dispute involving the use of the mark "Benz" and the symbol "Three Pointed Human Being in a Ring" by the defendant in relation to undergarments. The court considered the reputation and distinctiveness of the mark "Benz," particularly associated with the renowned "Mercedes Benz" cars. Justice Narain highlighted the unique reputation of the mark "Benz" globally and its association with high-quality, well-engineered products, emphasizing that such a prestigious mark should not be diluted by use in connection with ordinary goods like undergarments. The court noted the defendant's argument regarding a city named "Mercedes" in South America but dismissed it, emphasizing the widespread recognition and reputation of "Mercedes Benz" cars. The judgment underscored that the Trade Mark law aims to prevent individuals from benefiting from someone else's reputation and that deliberate use of a well-known mark like "Benz" should not be tolerated. The court granted an injunction, restraining the defendant from using the word "Benz" and the associated symbol in connection with any undergarments manufactured by them, emphasizing the need to protect the integrity of the renowned mark. The judgment concluded by directing the defendant to cease and desist from trading under the name "Benz" and "Three Pointed Human Being in a Ring" immediately.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 243
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the election of Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao.
  2. Allegations of corrupt practices under Section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
  3. Declaration of E.V. alias Balasaheb Vikhe Patil as duly elected.
  4. Naming of Sharad Pawar under Section 99 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of the Election of Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao:
  The election of Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao was challenged on the grounds of corrupt practices under Section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The High Court declared Gadakh's election void based on allegations that he made false statements about his rival, Vikhe Patil, to prejudice Patil's election prospects. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision declaring Gadakh's election void, specifically focusing on the allegation that Gadakh falsely claimed Vikhe Patil paid Rs. 20 lakhs to the Janata Dal candidate B.G. Kolse Patil to withdraw from the constituency. This statement was found to be a false statement of fact, believed to be false by Gadakh, and reasonably calculated to prejudice Vikhe Patil's election prospects.
  
  2. Allegations of Corrupt Practices under Section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951:
  The Supreme Court examined various statements attributed to Gadakh and Sharad Pawar. For Gadakh, the Court found that his statements alleging payment of Rs. 20 lakhs to B.G. Kolse Patil constituted corrupt practices under Section 123(4). However, other statements attributed to Gadakh, such as the distribution of bicycles, sarees, and liquor, were found to be speculative and not meeting the requirements of Section 123(4).
  
  For Sharad Pawar, the Court found that none of the statements attributed to him constituted corrupt practices under Section 123(4). The statements made by Sharad Pawar were found to be general exhortations and opinions rather than false statements of fact relating to the personal character or conduct of Vikhe Patil.
  
  3. Declaration of E.V. alias Balasaheb Vikhe Patil as Duly Elected:
  The High Court had declared E.V. alias Balasaheb Vikhe Patil as duly elected after declaring Gadakh's election void. The Supreme Court set aside this declaration, stating that the mere fact that Vikhe Patil secured the next highest number of votes did not justify declaring him elected. The Court emphasized that there was no cogent reason to support the conclusion that but for the votes obtained by Gadakh through corrupt practices, Vikhe Patil would have obtained a majority of valid votes.
  
  4. Naming of Sharad Pawar under Section 99 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951:
  The High Court had named Sharad Pawar for committing corrupt practices under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act. The Supreme Court set aside this order, finding that the statements attributed to Sharad Pawar did not constitute corrupt practices under Section 123(4). The Court noted that while some statements made by Sharad Pawar were undesirable, they did not meet the legal requirements to be considered corrupt practices.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision declaring Gadakh's election void due to corrupt practices but set aside the further declaration of Vikhe Patil as duly elected. The Court also set aside the order naming Sharad Pawar for committing corrupt practices under Section 123(4). The appeals were disposed of accordingly, with specific directions on costs and reliefs.
  
  Operative Orders:
  1. Civil Appeal No. 2115 of 1993 filed by Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao is partly allowed, dismissing the appeal against the declaration of his election as void but allowing the appeal against the declaration of Vikhe Patil as duly elected. Vikhe Patil to receive Rs. 20,000 as costs from Gadakh.
  2. Civil Appeal No. 1758 of 1993 filed by Sharad Chandra Govindrao Pawar is allowed, setting aside the order naming him for corrupt practices. No costs.
  3. Civil Appeal No. 2116 of 1993 by Deshmukh Bhagwan Rangnath is allowed, setting aside the declaration of Vikhe Patil as duly elected. No costs.
  4. Civil Appeal No. 2444 of 1993 by Najan Rambabu Maruti is allowed, setting aside the declaration of Vikhe Patil as duly elected. No costs.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 242
  
  Issues:
  1. Jurisdiction of CIT under s. 263 when CIT(A) already passed order in the same assessment.
  2. Justification of Tribunal's decision regarding the effective date of a notification for purchase tax liability.
  
  Analysis:
  
  Issue 1:
  The case involved the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Income Tax (CIT) under section 263 when the CIT(A) had already passed an order in the same assessment. The respondent, an assessee to income tax, had made a provision for purchase tax in the accounting period ending on 31st March 1979. The CIT, in suo motu revisional proceedings, held that the provision for purchase tax was an error and directed revision of the assessment order. The Tribunal later held that the CIT was not justified in directing the taxation solely based on the date of a notification. The High Court, after considering the arguments, held that the Tribunal was in error in invoking the theory of merger and that the CIT had jurisdiction under s. 263 since the point considered by the CIT was not part of the appeal before the first appellate authority. The Court answered this question in the affirmative, in favor of the Revenue and against the assessee.
  
  Issue 2:
  The second issue revolved around the legal effect of a notification dated 3rd April 1979 regarding the purchase tax liability. The High Court referred to a previous Bench decision where it was held that the notification published on 29th March 1979 was effective only from 3rd April 1979. Consequently, the liability towards the purchase tax did not fall within the accounting period ending on 31st March 1979. The Court upheld this interpretation, answering question No. 2 in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favor of the assessee. Therefore, the notification's effective date played a crucial role in determining the purchase tax liability for the relevant assessment year.
  
  In conclusion, the High Court clarified the issues regarding the jurisdiction of the CIT under s. 263 and the effective date of the notification for purchase tax liability, providing a detailed analysis and ultimately disposing of the reference accordingly.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 241
  
  The Bombay High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision regarding deduction of commission expenses for an agent of Life Insurance Corporation of India. The Court found no issue with the Tribunal's interpretation of the circular allowing a 50% deduction for commissions below Rs. 60,000. The revenue's application under section 256(2) was dismissed, and costs were awarded against them.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 240
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the Stock Exchange membership card is a property under the Wealth-tax Act.
  2. Whether the ex parte decision by the CWT (Appeals) was justified.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Whether the Stock Exchange membership card is a property under the Wealth-tax Act:
  
  The primary issue in this case was whether the Stock Exchange membership card held by the assessee could be considered a property under the Wealth-tax Act for the assessment years 1988-89 and 1989-90. The assessee contended that the membership of the Stock Exchange is a personal privilege and inalienable right, relying on the Bombay High Court's decision in Mrs. Sejpal R. Datal v. Stock Exchange. The CWT (Appeals) rejected this argument, stating that the membership card is a property as per section 2(e) of the Wealth-tax Act, which defines property in the broadest terms. The CWT (Appeals) further distinguished the assessee's case from the cited High Court case, noting that the membership card can be transferred through nomination or inheritance, and can be forfeited and auctioned to pay off liabilities, thus having a definite value.
  
  The Tribunal examined the relevant rules and bye-laws of the Bombay Stock Exchange, including rules on membership, inalienability, nomination, and eligibility. It noted that while Rule 5 states that membership is a personal permission, Rule 11 allows for nomination under certain conditions, indicating that the membership has transferable value. The Tribunal emphasized that the membership card's ability to be sold and the proceeds used to settle liabilities further supports its classification as a property. The Tribunal also referenced the Supreme Court's broader interpretation of property, which includes non-transferable assets, and concluded that the Stock Exchange membership card falls within the definition of property under section 2(e) of the Wealth-tax Act.
  
  2. Whether the ex parte decision by the CWT (Appeals) was justified:
  
  The second issue was whether the ex parte decision by the CWT (Appeals) was justified. The Tribunal noted that the assessee did not present any material evidence before the CWT (Appeals) to support their contention. The Tribunal reviewed the orders and decisions of the revenue authorities and found that the CWT (Appeals) had correctly applied the law and relevant rules in making the ex parte decision. The Tribunal upheld the CWT (Appeals)'s decision, confirming that the membership card is a property under the Wealth-tax Act and that the ex parte order was justified due to the lack of evidence from the assessee.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The Tribunal dismissed both appeals by the assessee, confirming the ex parte order of the CWT (Appeals) and holding that the Stock Exchange membership card is a property under the Wealth-tax Act. The Tribunal's decision was based on a thorough examination of the relevant rules, legal definitions, and precedents, emphasizing the broad interpretation of property and the transferable value of the membership card.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 239
  
  Issues:
  1. Admission against reserved seat for backward areas
  2. Creation of additional seat on compassionate ground
  3. Interpretation of statutory provisions regarding admission capacity
  4. Violation of statutory rules and regulations in admissions
  
  Analysis:
  The Supreme Court heard appeals filed by the State of Punjab challenging a High Court order directing the admission of two respondents against reserved seats. The first respondent, Renuka Singla, claimed a seat that had become vacant due to another student's withdrawal from the BDS course. The second respondent, Savita Gera, sought admission against an additional seat created on compassionate grounds. The Court noted that Renuka Singla did not initially claim admission against a reserved seat for backward areas, while Savita Gera did so with proper documentation. The High Court's order was based on compassionate grounds and was not intended to set a precedent.
  
  The State argued that Renuka Singla's late claim for a reserved seat should not be considered as she did not meet the initial requirements. The Dental Council of India also opposed the creation of an additional seat, citing regulations under the Dentists Act, 1948, which limit admission capacity without prior permission. The State maintained that only one seat was vacant due to the withdrawal of the previous student.
  
  The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory rules and regulations in admissions to maintain academic excellence and infrastructure balance in educational institutions. It criticized the practice of seeking court directions to admit students outside the fixed seats, disrupting the competitive admission process. The Court highlighted the need to respect the limits set by regulatory bodies like the Medical Council of India and Dental Council of India.
  
  Ultimately, the Court set aside the direction to admit Renuka Singla against the vacant seat, favoring Savita Gera's rightful claim based on proper documentation. The Court clarified that Renuka Singla could not be readmitted to the BAMS course but could be considered for admission if a seat became available. The appeals were allowed, and no costs were awarded in the case.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 238
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Interpretation of Regulation 3 of the Gujarat Housing Board Services Classifications of and Recruitment Regulations, 1981.
  2. Validity of the State Government's direction to appoint an officer on deputation.
  3. Amendment of pleadings in the context of adverse possession.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Interpretation of Regulation 3 of the Gujarat Housing Board Services Classifications of and Recruitment Regulations, 1981:
  The primary issue in this case revolves around the correct interpretation of Regulation 3 of the Gujarat Housing Board Services Classifications of and Recruitment Regulations, 1981. The appellants argued that no appointment on deputation could be made to the post of Assistant Housing Commissioner (Technical) unless it was determined that no suitable eligible candidate was available for promotion from among the eligible Executive Engineers of the Housing Board. The State Government, on the other hand, contended that Regulation 3 provides three alternative modes of appointment to the said post and that the appointment in question was directed to be made under sub-clause (b) of clause (1), which allows for calling Executive Engineers on deputation from the State Building and Communication Department.
  
  2. Validity of the State Government's direction to appoint an officer on deputation:
  The Supreme Court examined the provisions of Regulation 3 in detail. Clause (1) of Regulation 3 provides three modes of filling the post: (a) by promotion of employees working as Executive Engineers in the Housing Board, (b) by calling Executive Engineers on deputation from the State Building and Communication Department, and (c) by direct selection from among candidates called for interview. Clause (2) sets out the eligibility criteria for promotion, and Clause (3) specifies the conditions under which an Executive Engineer from the State Government's Building and Communication Department can be appointed on deputation. The Court concluded that Clause (3) does not set out an additional, fourth mode of filling the post but merely provides the conditions for deputation if no suitable candidate is available for promotion. The Court emphasized that Regulation 3 must be interpreted to avoid arbitrariness and uncanalised power, ensuring that the post is filled by promotion first, and only if no suitable candidate is available, by deputation or direct selection.
  
  3. Amendment of pleadings in the context of adverse possession:
  In the second appeal, the respondent sought to amend the written statement to include a plea of adverse possession. The Supreme Court reiterated the settled law that parties can raise mutually inconsistent pleas, and amendments to pleadings can be made at any stage of the proceedings. However, the Court noted that the plea of adverse possession is inconsistent with the respondent's earlier plea of ownership. The respondent had never renounced his title nor admitted the appellant's title, and the plea of adverse possession was not raised in the initial written statement. The Court found that the High Court erred in permitting the respondent to raise the plea of adverse possession at a belated stage without any explanation. The judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits according to law.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment and order under appeal. The direction given to the Gujarat Housing Board by the State Government to fill the post of Assistant Housing Commissioner (Technical) by deputation was set aside. The Gujarat Housing Board was directed to proceed with filling the post in accordance with the interpretation of Regulation 3 as provided by the Court. The appeal regarding the amendment of pleadings was also allowed, and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 237
  
  Issues:
  1. Validity of High Court's decision to quash orders and grant ryotwari patta.
  2. Admissibility and reliability of additional documents in writ jurisdiction.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. The main issue in this appeal was the validity of the High Court's decision to quash the orders passed by the appellants and grant ryotwari patta to the respondents for approximately 340 acres of land. The respondents claimed rights under the Andhra Pradesh Muttas Regulation, which entitled a ryot in a Mutta to a ryotwari patta if found in lawful possession for a continuous period preceding the notified date. The single Judge found the respondent entitled to ryotwari patta based on possession since 1951. The Division Bench upheld this finding as a question of fact. However, the Supreme Court noted allegations of tampering with land records. The Deputy Director's affidavit revealed discrepancies in the survey land registers, casting doubt on the respondent's possession claim.
  
  2. The second issue revolved around the admissibility and reliability of additional documents in writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court deliberated on whether the High Court erred in admitting photostat copies without determining their genuineness or allowing secondary evidence. The Court highlighted the critical nature of the authenticity of documents, especially if tampering was suspected. Despite the usual non-interference with the High Court's discretion, the Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental importance of ensuring the integrity of evidence. Consequently, the Court directed the Commissioner of Survey and Settlement to examine the original records, affording both parties an opportunity to present evidence and ascertain the authenticity of the documents filed by the respondents.
  
  In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the single Judge and Division Bench. The Commissioner of Survey and Settlement was tasked with reevaluating the dispute, focusing on the genuineness of the documents in question. The judgment emphasized the need for a thorough examination of original records to determine the validity of the respondent's claims. The parties were instructed to bear their own costs in the matter.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 236
  
  The Bombay High Court addressed various questions regarding IT Act provisions. The court ruled in favor of the Revenue for questions 1 and 2, and in favor of the assessee for question 3. Question 4 was decided in favor of the assessee based on a Supreme Court decision. The reference was disposed of with no order as to costs.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 235
  
  Issues:
  Challenging the release of seized goods under Section 13 - A (4) of U. P. Sales Tax Act
  
  Analysis:
  The judgment revolves around the challenge to the release of goods seized under Section 13 - A (4) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. The case involved a truck carrying bicycles and bicycle parts from Ludhiana to Imphal, which was seized by Sales Tax authorities in Uttar Pradesh. The authorities alleged that the truck had entered the state without proper documentation, leading to a penalty under Section 15 - A (1) (o). The owners of the goods and the transporter filed an objection under Section 13 - A (6) before the Assistant Commissioner, which was dismissed as infructuous due to a penalty order already being passed. Subsequently, the owners and the transporter appealed to the Sales Tax Tribunal, which allowed the appeal, directing the release of goods without any security, deeming the seizure unjustified.
  
  The transporter and the owner of the goods provided an explanation for the delay in reaching the exit check post, citing an accident in Basti that caused the truck to be repaired. The Tribunal found their explanation to be correct based on the evidence presented, noting the lack of investigation by the department into the facts alleged by the objectors. The Tribunal's factual finding regarding the truck being on its way to its destination with a valid exit pass was deemed well-founded and not subject to revision.
  
  The Court rejected the argument put forth by the Standing Counsel that the exit pass was wrongly discharged, leading to a presumption that the goods could be sold in Uttar Pradesh. The Court found this assumption to be based on mere conjectures and lacking substantial evidence. Additionally, the Court clarified that the penalty under Section 15 - A (1) (o) did not render the proceeding under Section 13 - A (6) infructuous, as the authorities retained the power to release the goods despite the penalty order.
  
  Furthermore, the Court addressed the contention that the goods were seized from the possession of the driver but the penalty was levied on the owner of the truck, questioning the release of goods to the transporter. The Court clarified that the transporter could be considered a person in charge of the goods under Section 13 - A, as the term was not defined in the Act. Therefore, the Tribunal's decision to release the goods to the transporter was upheld.
  
  In conclusion, the Court dismissed the revision petitions, affirming the Tribunal's decision to release the goods without delay in accordance with the law.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 234
  
  Issues:
  1. Cancellation of FL-3 licences by the Kerala Government.
  2. Challenge to the cancellation orders in the High Court.
  3. Renewal of licences for the year 1993-94.
  4. Fundamental right to carry on trade in liquor.
  5. Policy decision of the Government and its implementation.
  6. Rejection of renewal applications and classification of licensees.
  7. Validity of the Government Order issued on 9th November 1992.
  8. Compliance with rules and uniform policy by the State.
  
  Analysis:
  
  1. The appeals were filed against the cancellation of FL-3 licences granted to hotel and restaurant owners in Kerala. The licences were cancelled following a policy decision by the Government in November 1992. The appellants challenged these cancellations in the High Court through writ petitions, which were dismissed. Special Leave Petitions were filed in the Supreme Court against these orders, leading to interim stays and directions for renewal applications.
  
  2. Lengthy arguments were presented on whether the appellants had a fundamental right to engage in liquor trade. This question was referred to a Constitution bench by a three-judge bench. The appeals arising from the Special Leave Petitions were tagged with the relevant Civil Appeal numbers for further consideration.
  
  3. The specific issue in one of the appeals was whether there was an error of law in rejecting the renewal applications for the year 1993-94. Challenges were made against the Government's policy, alleging inconsistency in its implementation and discrimination in renewing other licenses. The State defended its policy decision and the rejection of renewal applications.
  
  4. The Court expressed disapproval of the vague and unsatisfactory affidavit filed by the Excise Secretary regarding the State's statements and decisions. The lack of clarity in the affidavit raised concerns about the decision-making process and potential external influences. The Court highlighted the importance of clear and specific averments in legal documents.
  
  5. The Court refrained from deciding on the renewal versus fresh grant distinction but focused on the correctness of the order rejecting the renewal applications. The State's justification for not renewing the appellants' licenses was based on the prohibition policy. However, the Court found discrepancies in the State's actions, especially regarding the increase in liquor consumption and the permission for arrack import.
  
  6. The Court noted inconsistencies in the State's policy decisions regarding liquor licenses, highlighting the lack of a uniform approach. The cancellation and rejection of licenses without valid justification were deemed contrary to the rules. The Court directed the tagging of relevant appeals for further consideration.
  
  7. One of the appeals was allowed, restraining the respondents from interfering with the appellants' FL-3 licensee activities. The appellants were required to comply with conditions and pay annual rentals until their license applications were decided on merits or until a uniform policy decision was enforced. Each party was directed to bear its own costs.
  
  This detailed analysis covers the various legal issues, arguments presented, and the Court's findings in the judgment.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 233
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether an industrial dispute survives when the workman concerned dies during its pendency.
  2. Whether the proceedings before the Tribunal/Labour Court can be continued by the legal heirs/representatives of the deceased workman.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Survival of Industrial Dispute Upon Workman's Death:
  The primary issue was whether an industrial dispute continues to exist if the workman dies during its pendency. The Tribunal, relying on the Patna High Court's decision in Bihar Working Journalists' Union v. H.K. Chaudhuri, concluded that the dispute does not survive and must be terminated. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with this view, stating that the death of the workman does not necessarily end the industrial dispute. The Court emphasized that the primary objective of the Industrial Disputes Act is to maintain industrial peace, and this objective should not be thwarted by the death of a workman.
  
  2. Continuation of Proceedings by Legal Heirs/Representatives:
  The second issue was whether the legal heirs or representatives of a deceased workman can continue the proceedings before the Tribunal/Labour Court. The Tribunal had rejected this possibility, but the Supreme Court overturned this decision. The Court reasoned that the right to claim monetary benefits or other compensations survives the death of the workman and can be pursued by the legal heirs. The Court referred to various High Court judgments, noting the divergence of opinions among them, and ultimately sided with the Kerala and Gujarat High Courts' view that the legal heirs can continue the proceedings.
  
  Analysis of High Court Judgments:
  - Assam High Court: Held that the cause of a dead man could not be taken up by workmen's union and that the dispute expires with the workman's death.
  - Patna High Court: Concluded that heirs or legal representatives cannot continue an industrial dispute, interpreting clauses (c) and (d) of Section 18(3) of the Act to mean that the dispute ends with the workman's death.
  - Delhi and Orissa High Courts: Held that applications under Section 33-C(2) of the Act cannot be continued by the legal heirs, suggesting that such claims should be pursued in civil courts.
  - Bombay High Court: Contrarily, held that legal heirs could claim monetary benefits due to the deceased workman under Section 33-C(2) of the Act.
  
  Supreme Court's Reasoning:
  The Supreme Court found the reasoning of the Assam, Patna, Delhi, and Orissa High Courts unconvincing and sided with the Kerala and Gujarat High Courts. The Court highlighted that the Industrial Disputes Act's primary aim is to ensure industrial peace and that the death of a workman should not undermine this objective. The Court also referenced the maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" (a personal action dies with the person), noting its limited application and criticism even in English law. The Court stated that the applicability of this maxim depends on the relief claimed and the specific facts of each case.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court held that on the death of a workman, the Tribunal does not become functus officio, and the reference does not abate. The legal heirs or representatives of the deceased workman have the right to continue the proceedings and claim any benefits due. The appeal was allowed, the Tribunal's award was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court No. 3, Dhanbad, Bihar, for a decision on merits within six months. The appellant was awarded costs quantified at Rs. 10,000.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 232
  
  Issues involved: Interpretation of Section 15(2) of the Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Act, 1965 and the exercise of discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
  
  Summary:
  The Supreme Court considered an appeal against a judgment of the Bombay High Court regarding the interpretation of Section 15(2) of the Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Act, 1965. The case involved a lecturer who was appointed as a supervisor at an examination center where mass copying was discovered. The University cancelled the results of the candidates from that center, leading to a series of legal actions. The Government proposed to remove the lecturer from the State Board due to his alleged failure as a supervisor. The High Court initially quashed the order removing the lecturer, citing that the Government's action did not meet the criteria specified in Section 15(2) of the Act.
  
  The Court analyzed Section 15(2) of the Act, emphasizing that the Government's power to remove a member of the Board can only be exercised if the member's activities are detrimental or obstruct the Board's functioning. The Court noted that the lecturer's past actions of allowing mass copying made him unsuitable for the position, even if the specific wording of the section was debated. The Court highlighted the importance of maintaining a proper social image for individuals holding responsible positions.
  
  Furthermore, the Court deliberated on the High Court's jurisdiction to interfere with the Government's decision. It explained the principles guiding the exercise of writ jurisdiction, emphasizing that such powers should be used for the sake of justice and societal welfare. The Court opined that appointing the lecturer to a position of responsibility despite his involvement in mass copying could harm the educational system's integrity and public trust. Ultimately, the Court allowed the appeal, overturning the High Court's decision and dismissing the writ petition filed by the lecturer, with each party bearing their own costs.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 230
  
  Issues involved:
  The issue involves inconsistency in the conditions for granting stay orders by different Benches in the High Court, leading to a lack of uniformity and predictability in judicial decisions.
  
  Judgment Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Variability in conditions for grant of stay orders
  The petitioner raised concerns regarding the disparity in the conditions for granting stay orders by different Benches in the High Court. While a previous case had an unconditional stay, the present case imposed a condition of payment of 25% of the demand. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of consistency and uniformity in judicial discretion to avoid grievances of discriminatory treatment. It was acknowledged that factual differences may warrant varied treatment, but overall, similar matters should receive similar treatment to ensure predictability and certainty in judicial decisions.
  
  Resolution:
  The Supreme Court set aside the order under appeal and granted an interim stay for eight weeks. The matters were scheduled for final hearing on a specific date. If the matters were not resolved within eight weeks, the petitioners were permitted to seek further stay, with the Chief Justice of the High Court instructed to list all similar and connected matters before a specific Bench to ensure uniformity in treatment.
  
  Conclusion:
  The special leave petitions were finally disposed of in accordance with the directions provided by the Supreme Court, aiming to address the issue of inconsistent conditions for granting stay orders and promote consistency, uniformity, and predictability in judicial decisions.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 229
  

  Whether the contract was put an end to by final payment?

  Whether the arbitration clause contained in the contract will perish with it?

  Held that:- In this case, there was a termination of the contract due to non- performance, the existence of the contract has been assumed for the purposes of such termination.

  In the circumstances, as we have held that where in a contract there is an arbitration clause, notwithstanding the plea that there was a full and final settlement between the parties, that dispute can be referred to the arbitration, the Subordinate Judge. is directed to dispose. of the petition of the appellant according to law. The reasons for further consideration on this aspect were fully set out in the petition which was placed before us on November 6, 1973. After hearing the learned counsel for the respondent we found no justification for giving any directions or for changing our view that the High Court was in error in dismissing the petition under s. 9(b) read with s. 33 of the Act. We accordingly dismissed the Civil Mscellaneous Petition.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 228
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Repeated detention in civil prison for non-payment of sales tax.
  2. Validity of ex parte assessments and demands.
  3. Physical and financial incapacity of the petitioner.
  4. Legal provisions and their application regarding recovery of dues.
  5. Rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
  6. Department's efforts to ascertain the petitioner's assets.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  Issue 1: Repeated Detention in Civil Prison for Non-Payment of Sales Tax
  The primary question is whether a defaulter of sales tax can be detained in civil prison repeatedly. The petitioner, a sole proprietor and partner in two firms, was detained for 40 days due to non-payment of sales tax. The court examined the legality of re-arresting the petitioner to recover the dues. It was argued that repeated detention would be futile and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The court noted that while the department has the authority to arrest and detain defaulters, this should be the last resort and only if there is evidence of the defaulter's ability to pay or fraudulent behavior.
  
  Issue 2: Validity of Ex Parte Assessments and Demands
  The petitioner contended that the ex parte assessments and demands were created without proper service. The respondent-department countered that notices were duly issued, but the petitioner intentionally did not appear. The court acknowledged the department's claim that the assessments were made following due process, and the petitioner had filed appeals against some orders, which were pending.
  
  Issue 3: Physical and Financial Incapacity of the Petitioner
  The petitioner claimed to be physically weak and financially incapable of meeting the tax demands. He stated that he was 65 years old, a heart patient, and living on charity. The respondent-department denied knowledge of the petitioner's physical condition and asserted their right to arrest him if he failed to pay the arrears. The court emphasized the need for the department to verify the petitioner's financial status before considering re-arrest.
  
  Issue 4: Legal Provisions and Their Application Regarding Recovery of Dues
  The court examined Sections 34 and 59A of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973, which allow for the recovery of tax as arrears of land revenue and declare fraudulent transfers void. These provisions were found insufficient to address the specific question of repeated detention. The court also referenced judgments in Gomti Devi v. Kalka Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. and Maruti Ltd. v. Pan India Plastic Pvt. Ltd., which stressed that detention should be the last resort.
  
  Issue 5: Rights Under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India
  The court considered the implications of Articles 14 and 21, which guarantee equality before the law and the right to life and personal liberty. The petitioner argued that repeated detention violated these rights. The court referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin, which held that imprisoning a debtor due to poverty was violative of Article 21 unless there was proof of willful failure to pay despite having the means.
  
  Issue 6: Department's Efforts to Ascertain the Petitioner's Assets
  The respondent-department claimed to be actively gathering information on the petitioner's assets. The court held that until the department had concrete evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay or fraudulent asset transfers, re-arrest would not be justified. The court allowed the department to re-arrest the petitioner if they obtained positive information about his financial status or fraudulent behavior.
  
  Conclusion:
  The petition was disposed of with the court directing that the petitioner should not be re-arrested unless the department gathered substantial evidence of his ability to pay or fraudulent actions. The court emphasized the need for fairness and reasonableness in enforcing tax recovery, balancing the petitioner's rights under the Constitution with the department's authority to recover dues. No order as to costs was made.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 227
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Violation of natural justice.
  2. Adequacy of opportunity to file objections.
  3. Availability and furnishing of documents.
  4. Legitimacy of the impugned order.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Violation of Natural Justice:
  The petitioner contended that the impugned order was passed in violation of the rules of natural justice, specifically the principle of audi alteram partem. The petitioner argued that it was not given an adequate opportunity to file objections to the proposed tax liability because the necessary documents were not provided by the respondent. The court agreed, noting that the sequence of events demonstrated that the petitioner was led to believe it would be given an opportunity to file objections after receiving the requested documents. The court held that the impugned order was passed without observing the rules of natural justice, rendering it void.
  
  2. Adequacy of Opportunity to File Objections:
  The court found that the petitioner was deprived of a valuable opportunity to project its points of view effectively. The petitioner had repeatedly requested copies of the debit notes, which were crucial for filing objections. The absence of any indication from the department that these documents would not be furnished led to a legitimate expectation that they would be provided. The court observed that the petitioner could not file objections in the best possible manner without these documents, thus violating the principle of natural justice.
  
  3. Availability and Furnishing of Documents:
  The court noted that the debit notes were the "igniting factor" leading to the impugned order. The department assumed that these notes would be available with the petitioner, based on statements from the petitioner's personnel. However, the petitioner claimed that these debit notes were not traceable at the head office and might be with the customers. The court held that the absence of these documents significantly handicapped the petitioner in presenting its case effectively. The court directed that copies of all relevant documents and statements of accounts, which were the basis for the impugned order, be furnished to the petitioner within a week.
  
  4. Legitimacy of the Impugned Order:
  The court concluded that the impugned order deserved to be set aside due to the violation of natural justice. The court also considered the alternative remedy of filing an appeal under Section 31 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. However, it found that this would not be a practical solution, as the petitioner would still lack the necessary documents to support its case. The court emphasized that mandating the appellate authority to admit additional evidence would be beyond its jurisdiction. Consequently, the court set aside the impugned order and directed the authorities to provide the requested documents to the petitioner, allowing it to file objections within three weeks thereafter.
  
  Conclusion:
  The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside the impugned order due to the violation of natural justice. The court directed the authorities to furnish the necessary documents to the petitioner within a week, allowing the petitioner three weeks to file objections. The court dismissed the W.M.P. and made no order as to costs.

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• 1993 (11) TMI 226
  
  The core legal question considered by the Court is whether proceedings for assessment of escaped turnover under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 can be initiated under section 10-B or whether such proceedings must be initiated under section 21 of the Act. The issue arises from the issuance of a notice under section 10-B for reassessment of allegedly escaped turnover relating to the assessment year 1981-82.

  The Court's analysis centers on the interpretation and application of sections 10-B and 21 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, and the analogous provision under the Income-tax Act, 1961, namely section 263, to determine the scope and limits of the revisional power conferred under section 10-B.

  Regarding section 10-B, the Court notes that it confers revisional jurisdiction on the Commissioner of Sales Tax or an authorized officer to call for and examine records relating to any order passed by a subordinate officer to satisfy itself as to the legality or propriety of such order and to pass such order as deemed fit. The language of section 10-B clearly limits the power to revision of existing orders, focusing on legality and propriety.

  In the present case, the impugned notice under section 10-B was issued not to examine the legality or propriety of the earlier assessment order but to initiate proceedings for levying tax on turnover alleged to have escaped assessment. The Court finds that this use of section 10-B is inconsistent with the statutory scheme and the language of the provision.

  Turning to section 21, the Court highlights that this provision specifically deals with assessment or reassessment where turnover has escaped assessment, been under-assessed, or wrongly allowed deductions or exemptions. Section 21 empowers the assessing authority to issue notice, make inquiries, and reassess the dealer accordingly. The Court underscores that section 21 is the exclusive and appropriate provision for initiating proceedings for escaped turnover assessment.

  The Court further examines the analogy with section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which confers revisional powers on the Commissioner of Income Tax to examine any order passed by an assessing officer for errors prejudicial to revenue interests. The Court refers to the precedent in Ganga Properties v. Income-tax Officer, where it was held that revisional powers under section 263 are confined to the material on record and cannot be used to initiate reassessment or rectification proceedings based on new material or subsequent information.

  Applying this reasoning, the Court concludes that section 10-B of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, being in pari materia with section 263 of the Income-tax Act, similarly restricts the revisional authority to reviewing the legality or propriety of existing orders and does not empower it to initiate reassessment proceedings on escaped turnover. The Court emphasizes that the revisional power cannot be used as a substitute for the reassessment mechanism provided under section 21.

  The Court notes that the Revenue did not allege any illegality or impropriety in the original assessment order but relied solely on the claim of escaped turnover discovered after the assessment. Therefore, the proper course was to invoke section 21 for reassessment, not section 10-B.

  In conclusion, the Court quashes the notice issued under section 10-B and restrains the Revenue from proceeding under that notice. It holds that reassessment proceedings for escaped turnover must be initiated under section 21, and the use of section 10-B for such purpose is illegal, void, and without jurisdiction.

  Significant holdings include the following verbatim legal reasoning:

  "From a perusal of the language used by the Legislature in section 10-B of the Act, it is abundantly clear that the power under section 10-B has been conferred on the authority mentioned therein to call for and examine the record relating to any order passed by any officer subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such order and pass such order with respect thereto as he thinks fit."

  "We find ourselves in full agreement with the view taken [in Ganga Properties] that revisional jurisdiction is confined to the materials on record and will empower the authorities under the Act only to satisfy itself about the correctness, propriety and legality of the order and will not empower the authorities for initiating the proceedings for rectification or reassessment."

  "In the instant case, the turnover of the assessee for the assessment year in question was fully examined and after full scrutiny, the same was subjected to tax by the Sales Tax Officer, and subsequently if it was found on the basis of material not already on record that a part of the turnover of the assessee had escaped assessment then the only course available to the authorities under the Act was to issue notice under section 21 of the Act for assessment but the impugned notice issued under section 10-B of the Act could not have been issued as there appears to be no illegality or impropriety in the assessment order passed by the Sales Tax Officer."

  The core principle established is that revisional powers under section 10-B are limited to examining the legality or propriety of existing orders based on the record before the assessing officer and cannot be used to initiate reassessment proceedings for escaped turnover, which must be done exclusively under section 21.

  Final determinations are that the notice issued under section 10-B for reassessment of escaped turnover is illegal and void, and the reassessment proceedings must be initiated under section 21 alone. The Court accordingly quashes the impugned notice and restrains further proceedings thereunder.

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