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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 501 Records
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1996 (9) TMI 643 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... udicious restraint in such matters only lends more dignity to the high office the learned Judge holds and imparts greater respect for the judiciary. For the foregoing discussion we allow this appeal and quash the earlier quoted disparaging remarks made against the appellants. 14. Before parting with this judgment we wish to point out that while dismissing the revision petition filed by Smt. Kalita the learned Judge has recorded the following order Accordingly I uphold the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate which was passed against these Govt. officials with direction to show cause and 1 direct the Court to proceed accordingly under the provisions of law. (emphasis supplied) 15. This direction of the High Court is not in conformity with the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate (quoted earlier) for therein the direction is for holding an enquiry into the conduct of Dr. A.C. Bora, Superintendent, MMCH and Investigating Officer and not the two appellants before us.
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1996 (9) TMI 642 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rivate company whose polishing center is situated in Chittor District and Head Office in Madras to secure unjustifiable enrichment. We have got out own doubts with regard to the very constitution and genuineness of the partnership said to have been entered into between P. Rama Rao and other partners of Magam Inc. However, in this case, it is not necessary for us to go into that issue. Suffice it to state that the entire transaction is smacked of malafides and would defeat the constitutional objectives. The Government should restructure their rules and contractual clauses consistent with constitutional philosophy. The Government, therefore, has rightly, though for different reasons, set aside the assignment of leases granted by P. Rama Rao and sub-lease in favour of Magam Inc. by exercising its sou motu power. 6. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the High Court stands set aside and that of the Government stands confirmed, but in the circumstances, without costs.
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1996 (9) TMI 641 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fact that he was now handed over vacant possession of the suit premises, we do not wish to send him behind the bars again by imposing substantive sentence. At the same time we feel that he should be punished with fine not only for the wrong done by him but also to deter others from filing such false affidavits. We, therefore, sentence him to pay a fine or ₹ 2000/-, in default of payment of which he will suffer simple imprisonment for one month. The fine, if realised, shall be paid to the petitioner as compensation. The Rule is thus made absolute. As regards the notices issued for the forfeiture of the bonds executed by the respondent and his surety for the failure of the former to appear on a date fixed we do not wish to pursue the matter further for we find that the respondent has given a satisfactory explanation of his such absence. we also drop the case for proceeding against the respondent for perjury in view of the punishment imposed upon him in the contempt case.
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1996 (9) TMI 640 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in which the Apex Court had held that the delay and latches in filing writ petition cannot be allowed. There is no dispute with regard to the proposition of law, however the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court is not applicable in the case at hand. Firstly, here is the question whether the competent authority has exercised the power in violation of the conditions laid down in the advertisement thereby abused the process of the power and secondly, there was no inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing writ petition in the case at hand as already observed above. 23. For the reasons aforestated, these two writ petitions are allowed as indicated above. The letter of intent dated 7.1.96 and the resident certificate dated 23.10.95 are hereby quashed. Consequently, the recommendation of the 3rd and the 4th respondents are also quashed however without costs. The interim order dated 19.7.96 passed by the Id. Single Judge of this Court in CR. No. 592/96 stands vacated.
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1996 (9) TMI 639 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s treated as a contract entered into by the assessee with the Tata Aircraft Ltd. and the benefit of the same was transferred by the assessee in favour of Messrs. Pokhraj Hirachand for a consideration of ₹ 3 lakhs. In the view that we take of the matter, therefore, the sum of ₹ 1,87,000, which has been found by the Tribunal as having been received by the assessee was a sum received by the assessee for transferring the benefit of a contract entered into by him in the ordinary course of his business. The said sum had nothing to do with his relinquishment for forgoing the right to participation in the profits of any partnership. In our view, therefore, the Tribunal was right in taking the view that the sum of ₹ 1,87,000 was an income of the assessee liable to income-tax. The result, therefore, is that our answer to the question, which has been referred to us in the present reference, must be in the affirmative. The assessee will pay the costs of the department.
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1996 (9) TMI 638 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ot find any illegality in the action taken by the respondents in having the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 simultaneously published. It is then sought to be contended that the appellant has a small extent of the land and other lands have been excluded from acquisition and, therefore, it is arbitrary exercise of power. He also seeks to contend the procedural infirmities, but unfortunately none of the contentions have been pressed before the High Court, though might have been raised in writ petition. Under those circumstances, we cannot permit the appellants to argue these points afresh which are purely questions of fact to be verified on the basis of the material as the State had no opportunity to deal with them. 25. The appeals are accordingly dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs. The Land Acquisition Officer is directed to pass the awards within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of the order of this Court.
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1996 (9) TMI 637 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dditional ground of objection at the stage of second appeal. The said judgment is based upon three decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court. The question Nos. 1 and 3 are, therefore, no more referable questions of law. The assessee, though filed return of income in compliance with the notices under section 143, but it could not be thereby taken that he had waived the objection as to the jurisdiction of the ITO when the notices under section 148 were not validly served. The question of waiver has been discussed by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in P.V. Doshi v. CIT in the light of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The question No. 3 is, therefore, not a referable question of law." 13. We are satisfied that the common question as proposed in these two cases is not a referable question of law. 14. Accordingly, we dismiss these cases, but with no orders as to costs. Counsel fee for each side in each case is, however, fixed at ₹ 750, if certified.
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1996 (9) TMI 636 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hat the Scheme itself mentions the documents which are required to be produced before the Government. It is not possible for this Court to scrutinize the documents which according to the petitioners they had produced in support of their claim, and pronounce upon their genuineness. It is the function of the Government to do so. We would, therefore, direct accordingly. 5. It is seen that the High Court had directed the Government, in the earlier writ petition, and in compliance thereof the Government of India had considered the documents relied upon by the respondents and came to the conclusion, as a fact, that these documents are not sufficient to conclude that the respondents had suffered imprisonment. The High Court found it, on appreciation of evidence, to be sufficient, which the High Court cannot embark upon. 6. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the High Court stands set aside. The writ petition stands dismissed but under the circumstances without costs.
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1996 (9) TMI 635 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the stadium would create traffic hazards and, therefore, the Scheme was rightly framed for providing entry into the main gate. We have seen the plan. The Scheme has taken the property of minimal dimension rather than the large area in the locality. Under these circumstances, the Scheme was properly framed by the Government for providing access to the Guru Nanak Stadium. 7. It is then contended by Shri Sehgal that the appellant had purchased the property for residential purpose and he is deprived of his right for his residence in the locality. In view of the fact that competing public interest would outweigh the personal interest of the appellant, we think that he could be suitably accommodated in any available housing Schemes taken up by the respondent-Trust. The respondent-Trust, therefore, is directed to provide any suitable site of an extent of 250 sq. yds. as per the prevailing reserved price. 8. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with the above observations. No costs.
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1996 (9) TMI 634 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... narily a single Judge either he sits in the original side or in the appellate side of this Court is ordinarily bound to consider with respect to the decision of another Judge either sitting in the original side or in the appellate side produced before him but if he is convinced that the decision is based on concession or erroneous, he is not under any obligation to follow it against his own judgment. Reference can be made in this connection in the case of Virji Ban Dass Moolji v. Bissesswar Lal Hargobind 24 C WN 1032 AIR 1921 Cal 169). 17. For the reasons aforesaid, I am unable to interfere with the orders impugned in these applications under Article 227 of the Constitution, as in my view, the Tribunal was fully justified in holding that the jurisdiction point shall be decided along with the other issues raised in the proceeding. 18. Accordingly, these applications under Art. 227 of the Constitution are rejected. 19. There will be no order as to costs. 20. Order accordingly.
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1996 (9) TMI 633 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, DELHI
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... ... ..... he ceases to be a Director on cancellation of his shares whichever is earlier. 13. After the final hearing of the case an application was submitted on behalf of the petitioner for expeditious disposal in view of one more annual general meeting becoming due and in view of the criminal proceedings instituted by respondents under section 630 of the Act. We have not given any hearing on this application as the petition is now disposed of which takes into account both the apprehension of the petitioners. 14. We have considered the prayer of petitioners for a declaration under Schedule XI of the Companies Act. Taking into account the nature of the company and the allegations we do not consider it necessary to make such declaration. 15. All interim orders vacated. A copy of this order shall be sent to Justice Babulal Jain, K.L. Chatrath & Co., Chartered Accountants as well as the present Auditors and Bankers for their necessary compliance. Liberty to apply. SCL q NOVEMBER, 1996
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1996 (9) TMI 632 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pondent that he had surrendered the suit property after the expiry of the lease and thereafter re-entered the suit land and continued in possession in his own right. However, this case was not accepted by the trial court as well as by the appellate court for well-founded reasons as noticed above. That being the position the possession by the defendant on the facts as found by the First Appellate Court, in this case, after the expiry of the lease further continuance was only permissive and will not give cause for prescribing title by adverse possession. Further, for the first time, while replying to the notice by the vendor of the plaintiff, the defendant openly set up a hostile title and the suit having been filed within five years therefrom is not barred by limitation. 26. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the judgments of the courts below. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (9) TMI 631 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... relationship between the appellant and respondent No. 1 at this stage and the appellant was entitled to look at the totality of circumstance in deciding whether to enter into a binding contact with respondent No. 1 or not. 8. Respondent No. 1 contends that in anticipation of entering into a contract with the appellant, respondent No. 1 incurred heavy expenses. This statement of respondent No. 1 has to be established on evidence. A writ petition is not an appropriate proceeding if any claim for damages based on disputed facts is required to be established. We do not wish to pronounce on the question whether, in anticipation of entering into a contract, a party which incurs expenses, can recover them from the other party if that other party ultimately, rightly declines to enter into a contract. 9. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (9) TMI 630 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he respondent No. 1 has filed appeal on 22nd Nov. 82 and thus, there is inordinate delay in filing the appeal, The said delay was not explained even formally assigning any sufficient cause so that it can be considered by the Tribunal to satisfy itself to condone the delay and entertain the appeal. We also do not find in the judgment of the Tribunal any sufficient cause being considered by the Tribunal and the delay has been condoned by the Tribunal and, therefore, we feel that the Tribunal has committed an illegality in entertaining the appeal and exercising the jurisdiction under Section 9 of the MEPS Act. In view of the facts and circumstances stated above, we find that the order of the Tribunal is bad and illegal, and is required to be quashed and set aside. 10. In the result, the petition is allowed. Order dated 7.1.1984 (Annexure-1) passed by the School Tribunal, Nagpur, impugned in the petition, is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs.
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1996 (9) TMI 629 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... espect of rectifiers, heavy engineering, iron and steel, electronic components and industrial software design goods. 59. The injunction restraining use of USHA (India) Ltd. and USHA HOME APPLIANCES LTD. as corporate names shall remain suspended in its operation for a period of three months, from today so as to allow the defendants an opportunity of taking steps for altering the name. 60. Each of the plaintiffs shall within four weeks from today place on record an undertaking in the shape of affidavit sworn in by duly constituted attorney or representative to indemnify each of the defendants for any loss or damage caused or may be caused to later on account of the injunctions above said and determined in these suits or any other legal proceedings in the event of the plaintiffs being held not entitled to the relief sought for in the suit. 61. Nothing said hereinabove shall prejudice in any manner the rights of either party to have their pleas determined on merits at the trial.
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1996 (9) TMI 628 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n 6. It is true that the respondent had offered to accept the compensation by shifting the date of the notification by 4 to 5 years from the date of the notification under Section 4(1). For this view, reliance was placed by Shri Sachar on the judgment of this Court in Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj Kumar Johri & Ors. (1992) 1 SCC 328 where this Court had allowed the shifting of the date for the determination of the compensation. In that case since the award had not been passed, this Court had given the direction but in this case award determining the compensation has attained finality. It is not a case to shift the date for the determination of the compensation. Thus considered, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the notification and declaration under Section 4(1) and 6. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court stands set aside. The writ petition stands dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1996 (9) TMI 627 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... also seeks to rely upon certain orders said to have been passed by the High Court in conformity with enforcement of the Government Resolution. We do not think that this Court would be justified in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any another public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose. It is not intended that any land which remain unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions. The special leave petitions are dismissed.
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1996 (9) TMI 626 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for an opportunity, to lead evidence, in case the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the enquiry was bad. He, therefore, pleaded that the Court should remand the application for trial on the merits of the case. I am unable to agree. It is not as if the Tribunal has accepted the contention of the Petitioner Company that there was compliance with the statutory provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act and then disagreed with the legality and validity of the domestic enquiry. The Tribunal has held against the Petitioner Company on all points. If the Petitioner Company failed to comply with the statutory requirements of the proviso of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the Petitioner Company cannot now be heard to seek a further opportunity of making good the omission. 11. In my view, the writ petition must fail. I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order which renders adequate justice to the parties. 12. Writ petition dismissed. Rule discharged with no order as to costs.
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1996 (9) TMI 625 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... the instant case, where at the instance of the assessee the Commissioner had intervened and directed the Assessing Officer to complete the assessment at the returned figure, which the Assessing Officer, who was subordinate to the Commissioner, had followed and concluded the assessment. 5. In view of the above, the conclusion is that in the present facts which show that the assessment was framed according to the directions received from the Commissioner, the successor Commissioner is not empowered to revise the said order because it tantamounts to revising his predecessor’s directions. On this jurisdictional aspect we uphold the claim of the assessee. While doing so we may observe that we have taken guidance from the Supreme Court decision in Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd.’s case (supra). 6. In view of the above, merits need not be gone into and is considered not worthwhile hearing and give any conclusion thereon. 7. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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1996 (9) TMI 624 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ssible to assess the value of the land without making any attempt in that direction. (10) As regards the point of standard rent fixed by Shri F.T. Jones, Rent Controller, Delhi by order dated 24th June, 1942, it may be mentioned that the standard rent was fixed in respect of Premises No. 56, Queensway, New Delhi. If in those circumstances, standard rent of Premises No. 56 was fixed, it is not possible to accept it as the standard rent of the Premises No. 54, Janpath under Section 6 of the Drc Act in the light of the observations of Dewan Daulat Rai Kapur v. NDMC, and Dr. Balbir Singh & Others v. MCD & Others. (11) The impugned resolutions and the judgments in these three writ petitions are hereby quashed. NDMC is directed to assess the property afresh in the light of judgment in Dr. Balbir Singh v. MCD (supra) after giving an opportunity to the petitioner of being heard. (12) The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. (13) Parties are left to bear their own costs.
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