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Case Laws
Showing 381 to 400 of 460 Records
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1997 (1) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
Dutiability - Marketability - Goods ... ... ... ... ..... for the Revenue also fairly stated that he too did not see a definite finding on this issue recorded by the Central Government or the Tribunal. We, therefore, allow these appeals to this limited extent that the Tribunal should record a specific finding on the question of marketability of Acetylene gas in the form in which it emerges. 4. The learned counsel for the assessee submitted that he would like to adduce some additional evidence on the question of marketability. He may make that request to the Tribunal and if the Tribunal considers the same to be acceptable it may pass appropriate orders. The appeals will stand so disposed of with no order as to costs. Writ Petition (C) No. 3586/83 5. In view of the order passed in Civil Appeals arising from SLP (C) Nos. 12066-67/83, etc., the learned counsel for the petitioners does not press this Writ Petition and states that it may be disposed of as withdrawn. The Writ Petition shall stand so disposed of with no order as to costs.
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1997 (1) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
Refund claim - Held that:- It is obvious that question of refund shall be governed by the law declared in Mafatlal Industries v. Union of India 1996 (12) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA].
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1997 (1) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
Appeal - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... e dioxide is classifiable under Heading 28.01/58(1) has been upheld by this Court. 2. Having regard to the fact that the Tribunal had earlier allowed the appeals against the same order of the Collector of Appeals and the view of the Tribunal has been upheld by this Court, we are of the view that these are fit cases in which the Tribunal should have condoned the delay in the filing of the appeal and should have considered the matter on merits. Having regard to the fact that the Tribunal had in similar matters set aside the order of Collector of Appeals and the said view of the Tribunal has been affirmed by this Court in the case of Toshiba Anand Batteries v. Collector of Customs - 1991 (51) E.L.T. 200 (SC), we allow the appeals, set aside the order passed by the Tribunal and while condoning the delay in the filing of the appeal, allow the appeals, set aside the order passed by the Collector of Appeals and restore the order passed by the Asstt. Collector. No order as to costs.
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1997 (1) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
Tyres - Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... d exemption notification, the benefit thereof is available only to tyres which have been specifically designed for the use of animal drawn vehicles or hand carts. The tyres, in question, were, in fact, specifically designed for aircraft but were found defective and, therefore, not usable as such. Accordingly, the appellants degraded them by buffing what was printed thereon and substituting therefor the marking ADV . In our view, such degraded tyres do not qualify for the exemption given to tyres specifically designed for the use of animal drawn vehicles. We, therefore, uphold the order of the Tribunal insofar as the duty demand and confiscation of the seized degraded tyres is concerned. The Tribunal itself has noticed that actual misuse of these tyres has not been proved. We are of the view, therefore, that only a token penalty should be imposed which would be in the sum of Rs. 1,000/- (Rupees one thousand). 2. The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1997 (1) TMI 77 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the collection of special excise duty on clearances on or after 1st March, 1988, of goods which had been manufactured prior to that date was valid?
Held that:- In the instant case the said goods must be deemed to have been cleared on the last date of the levy of the special excise duty that was in force when they were manufactured; that is to say, they must be deemed to have been cleared on 28th February, 1988. On that day the said goods were, by reason of the exemption notification aforementioned, wholly exempt from the special excise duty. The appellants were, therefore, not liable to pay any special excise duty upon the said goods.
It is not possible to accept the Revenue's contention that the said goods would be liable to bear special excise duty as levied after 1st March, 1988, for the reason that the special excise duty that operated subsequent to 1st March, 1988 was a new levy under a different statute and distinct from that which operated during the period 1st March, 1987 until 28th February, 1988. Rule 9A does not operate in such circumstances. In favour of assessee.
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1997 (1) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, for the purpose of classification under Item 11AA(2), a product should be derived directly from the refining of crude petroleum?
Held that:- The use of the words "derived from" in Item 11AA(2) suggests that the original source of the product has to be found. Crude petroleum is refined to produce raw naphtha. Raw naphtha is further refined, or cracked, to produce the said products. This is not controverted. It seems to us to make no difference that the appellants buy the raw naphtha from others. The question is to be judged regardless of this, and the question is whether the intervention of the raw naphtha would justify the finding that the said products are not "derived from refining of crude petroleum". The refining of crude petroleum produces various products at different stages. Raw naphtha is one such stage. The further refining, or cracking, of raw naphtha results in the said products. The source of the said products is crude petroleum. The said products must, therefore, be held to have been derived from crude petroleum. In favour of assessee.
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1997 (1) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
Whether polymer chips manufactured by the assessees and used by them in the manufacture of nylon yarn can be classified, for the purpose of levy of excise duty, under Item 15A in Schedule I to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, as it stood during the period 1962 to 1972?
Held that:- Since the technical literature and dictionaries which have been cited have emphasised the conjunction of artificial or synthetic resins with plastics, it is not possible for us to ignore this association. Therefore, even if the term "Artificial or synthetic resin" is construed as covering products derived by processes technically described in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Clause (1) of Entry 15A, that product must answer the basic description as "artificial or synthetic resin". Polyamides in the form of polymer chips of textile grade are not known as synthetic resins. They are also not plastics. Hence Entry 15A does not cover them. The assessee is, therefore, entitled to succeed. In favour of assessee.
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1997 (1) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
Capital Gains, Firm, Retirement Of Partner ... ... ... ... ..... assessable to capital gains ?" The High Court has held that there was no transfer of any assets as contemplated by the expression "transfer" as defined in section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act. The High Court had placed reliance on the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Mohanbhai Pamabhai 1973 91 ITR 393, wherein it has been held that where a partner retires from a partnership and the amount of his share in the net partnership assets after deduction of liabilities and prior charges is determined on taking accounts in the manner prescribed by the relevant provisions of the partnership law there is no element of transfer of interest in the partnership assets by the retired partner to the continuing partners. The said judgment of the Gujarat High Court has been affirmed by this court in Addl. CIT v. Mohanbhai Pamabhai 1987 165 ITR 166 In view of the said judgment we find no merit in this appeal and the same is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1997 (1) TMI 73 - SC ORDER
Loss, Carry Forward And Set Off ... ... ... ... ..... d not apply to unabsorbed depreciation and development rebate ?" We have heard Shri Ranbir Chandra, learned counsel appearing for the Revenue, in support of the appeal. One of the conditions for the applicability of section 79 is that there should be a change in the shareholding of the company. Shri Ranbir Chandra has not been able to show that a finding has been recorded by any authority regarding the change of shareholding of the company for the applicability of section 79. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1997 (1) TMI 72 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Immovable Property By Central Government, Individual Property, Market Value, Movable Property
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1997 (1) TMI 71 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Central Government, Charitable Institution ... ... ... ... ..... rd of Direct Taxes conveyed to the petitioners that their application under clause (23C) cannot be considered because it falls under clause (23A), it was not open to it later on when it was called upon to consider it under clause (23A), to withdraw the reasons furnished in its earlier order and allow the order to be construed as rejection of application under clause (23C) simpliciter without reason. It not only betrays total non-application of mind to the question of determining the application for exemption on the merits but also adherence to procedure, which is neither fair nor just, which is an integral part of equality enshrined under article 14 of the Constitution. This, in our opinion, may suffice to dispel the contention of learned counsel for the Revenue that whether to grant exemption under clause (23A or clause (23C) or not is an absolute discretion of the Central Government and rejection of application does not call for application of mind and assigning of reasons.
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1997 (1) TMI 70 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax Act, Business Income, Expenditure Incurred, Income From Tea, Income Tax Rules, Manufacture And Sale, Wholly And Exclusively
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1997 (1) TMI 69 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Chit Fund ... ... ... ... ..... v. CIT 1962 45 ITR 478 while considering the case of the assessee under the 1922 Act. The contention raised by the Revenue that sub-section (4A) would take in profits and gains of any business including a business held in trust cannot be accepted in the light of the clear language of the section. By sub-section (4A) the benefit due to an assessee in the case of an income from a business held in trust is extended to an income from a business carried on by it on its satisfying the conditions laid down under clauses (a) and (b). The Tribunal has correctly held that the assessee is entitled to claim exemption under section 11(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect of its income from the kury business. In the light of the above, we answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1997 (1) TMI 68 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
High Court, Income Tax Authorities, Search And Seizure, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... hrough the records placed before me. The record also does not indicate that there was any instruction from the income-tax authority at Guwahati to make search of the petitioners locker. The income-tax authority in Delhi either by accident or on their own had made the aforesaid search and seizure. The action may be illegal and without jurisdiction but definitely the cause of action in respect of the search and seizure arose in Delhi. Therefore, in my opinion, no part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. Therefore, this court does not have any jurisdiction to entertain this application under article 226 of the Constitution as this is hit by the provisions of article 226(2). In view of the above, I hold that the petition is not maintainable for want of jurisdiction. The petitioners may file a petition in the appropriate court. Therefore, the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Joshi is sustained. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
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1997 (1) TMI 67 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Any Remuneration, Commission Payment ... ... ... ... ..... n the transaction of sale. In view of the materials, we are of the view that there were sufficient materials before the authorities below while arriving at the finding that a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs paid to IPCO was for the purpose of business. We, therefore, answer this question in the affirmative and against the Department. Since the finding arrived at by the Tribunal is based on materials, such a finding cannot be held to be arbitrary. We, therefore, answer this question in the affirmative and against the Department. So far as question No. 2 is concerned, it is admitted between the parties that it stands concluded by a decision in the case of CIT v. R. M. Investment and Trading Co. P. Ltd. 1994 209 ITR 121 (Cal). In view of this, we answer this question in the affirmative and against the Department. Let our opinion be transmitted to the Tribunal forthwith. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. BARIN GHOSH J.--I agree.
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1997 (1) TMI 66 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Obsolescence Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... sessee is not entitled to claim deduction in the year in which he had written off the same. There must be something positive to show that its value become nil in the particular year to justify the claim for deduction in that year. This legal position would not change with the assurance of the assessee to bring back the sale price as and when it was sold. In fact, the assessee will have to wait till it is sold or otherwise disposed of and only then it may be justified in claiming deduction of the difference between the purchase price and sale price in the computation of its income. In view of the above, in our opinion, in the instant case, the assessee is not entitled to claim deduction of the amount of Rs. 7,10,238 being the cost of PAN catalyst in computation of its total income for the year under consideration. Accordingly, we answer question No. 2 in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1997 (1) TMI 65 - PATNA HIGH COURT
High Court, Political Party, Public Interest, Transfer Of Case ... ... ... ... ..... r in all the cases. This apart, the petitioner has not shown any prejudice having been caused to it on account of the passing of a combined/common order in the case of the petitioner and its office bearers and members. It is to be mentioned here that the same order was challenged in C. W. J. C. Nos. 4141 of 1996(R) by Sri Siboo Soren, in 4142 of 1996(R) by Simon Marandi and in 4143 of 1996(R) by Suraj Mandal in this court and the same has been dismissed on December 20, 1996 (See Shibu Soren v. CIT 1997 225 ITR 298 (Patna)). Thus, in my view, none of the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner has any substance and the order of transfer fulfils all the requirements of section 127 of the Act, namely, giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, recording of relevant and valid reasons for transfer. The order has also been communicated to the petitioner. In the result, there is no merit in this application and the same is dismissed. S. K. CHATTOPADHYAYA J.--I agree.
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1997 (1) TMI 64 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Business Expenditure, Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... rcular No. 146, dated September 26, 1974, being in contravention of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Metal Box Co. of India Ltd. 1969 73 ITR 53, in so far as the law applicable for the assessment year 1972-73, is of no effect for that particular assessment year. We, therefore, dispose of the present appeal by directing the appellants to make fresh assessment in accordance with the law for the assessment year 1972-73, as declared by the Supreme Court in Metal Box Co. of India Ltd. v. Their Workmen 1969 73 ITR 53 ignoring Circular No. 146, dated September 26, 1974. It is made clear that for the assessment year 1973-74 onwards the applicable law would be in accordance with section 40A(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as declared by the Supreme Court in Shree Sajjan Mills Ltd. s case 1985 156 ITR 585 and followed by the Supreme Court in the case of D. V. Bapat, ITO 1986 159 ITR 938 referred to hereinabove. There will be no order as to costs. V. N. KHARE C. J --- I agree.
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1997 (1) TMI 63 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Cold Storage Plant, Plant And Machinery ... ... ... ... ..... sses through receiver. This process is repeated over and again and, accordingly, it is called a renewable device process. This is in reference to Harnarayan Lohia and Sons, Kaybee Corporation and Century Cold Storage Prop. Century Laminating Company Limited, having offices at 5, Alexandra Court, 60/1, Chowringhee Road, Calcutta 700 020. Sd. K. N. Kumar, Chartered Engineer F 2124 Registered Valuer CAT VII 116. Relying upon this certificate, the Tribunal found that the assessee s cold storage is run by a renewable energy device and as such was entitled to depreciation at the rate of 30 per cent. The finding of the Tribunal is based on materials on record and it cannot be called arbitrary or perverse. In view of the finding recorded by the Tribunal, we answer the question in the reference in the affirmative, in favour of the claimant and against the Revenue. Let our opinion be transmitted to the Tribunal forthwith. There will be no order as to costs. BARIN GHOSH J. --- I agree.
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1997 (1) TMI 62 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Premises, Levy Of Penalty, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... not received by the assessee according to his explanation. On the basis of these indefinite facts, we are also of the opinion that the application of the provision under section 271(1)(c) of the Act is not possible. We have also gone through the various decisions cited by learned counsel appearing for the assessee in order to support his contention that no penalty is leviable under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. Thus, in view of the fact that the penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) of the Act was cancelled by the Tribunal on the basis of appraisal of facts, we consider that no referable question of law arises out of the order of the Tribunal so as to warrant calling for a statement from the Tribunal. It is also significant to note that the Department is not questioning the finding given by the Tribunal on the basis of facts. Under such circumstances, we are unable to call for the statement from the Tribunal. In the result, these tax case petitions are dismissed. No costs.
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