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Showing 141 to 160 of 658 Records
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2008 (10) TMI 593 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ausing additional liability to tax on the assessee, cannot be construed as retrospective. Accordingly, it would apply only from the assessment year 2003-04 and will have no application to our case. As the said provision will not apply to the assessee in question, the computation of capital gain under section 48 will fail for the reason that there is no cost of acquisition of the business transferred by the assessee. From this view of the matter also, the assessee cannot be charged to tax for this amount under the head Capital gains . Viewed from any angle, be it is as the non-compete fee or the consideration for the transfer of marketing rights of the business chargeable to tax under the head Capital gains , we are of the considered opinion that the amount of Rs. 2.006 crores is a capital receipt and hence cannot be charged to tax at all. The ground raised by the assessee is accepted and that by the Revenue is dismissed. The order pronounced on this 22nd day of October, 2008.
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2008 (10) TMI 592 - ITAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... leted under section 158BD are bad in law. Therefore, the appeals filed by the Revenue have become infructuous. The other grounds raised by the assessees in their respective cross-objections have also become infructuous, for the reason that the assessments themselves have been held to be bad on the basis of the legal contention raised by the assessees. Therefore, we hold that the appeals filed by the Revenue in respect of these four assessees are liable to be dismissed. Naturally, the cross-objections are to be allowed. In the result, the appeal and the cross objection filed in the case of Shri Suresh Chand Bafna are treated as partly allowed. The appeals filed by the Revenue in the case of Smt. Padmavathy Bafna, Shri Adit Bafna, M/s. Mansi Foundation Ltd. and M/s. Mansi Chog Impex (Chennai) Ltd. are dismissed. The cross-objections filed by the above four assessees are allowed. The order pronounced in the open court at the time of hearing on the Fifteenth day of October, 2008.
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2008 (10) TMI 591 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... y repaid. It was not at all required to deposit the entire amount with the bank in fixed deposits. Had it been a case then the loan could not have been disbursed on a deposit of Rs. 2.59 crores in place of Rs. 15 crores. If the entire facts of the case are taken together, one would understand the fallacy in the arguments of the assessee. We are, therefore, of the view that the assessee has deposited part of equity share capital and the unsecured loan in fixed deposits with the bank though it was not required to do so and as such, the facts of the case, attracts the application of the judgment of the apex court in the case of Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. 1997 227 ITR 172 and we, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) who has rightly approved the order of the Assessing Officer. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is dismissed. The order pronounced in the open court, on this 7th day of October, 2008.
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2008 (10) TMI 590 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... -trust and the same having been shown separately under the specific heads in its books of account, we are of the view that this could not be made the basis to treat the entire accounts of the assessee-trust as unreliable and to deny its claim for exemption under section 80G which was otherwise allowable. For the reasons given above, we are of the view that the assessee-trust was eligible for renewal of registration/exemption already granted to it earlier under section 80G and the objections raised by the learned Commissioner of Income-tax while declining to grant such renewal were not sustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case as already discussed. In that view of the matter, we set aside the impugned order of the learned Commissioner of Income-tax and direct him to grant the renewal of registration/exemption to the assessee under section 80G. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed. The decision pronounced in the open court on the 24th October, 2008.
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2008 (10) TMI 589 - ITAT CHENNAI
Entitlement for exemption u/s 80IB(10) - flats having area measured less than 1500 sq. ft. - AO denied to allow the deduction because the housing project comprised residential units exceeding 1500 sq. ft. - CIT(A) allowed the deduction u/s 80-IB(10) in respect of the residential units with an area of less than 1500 sq. ft. - It was argued on behalf of the assessee that each block of residential units covered by a plan has to be considered as a separate project and deduction is to be allowed on that basis.
HELD THAT:- For enabling the benefit of section 80-IB it is necessary that profits must be derived in the previous year from housing project. The eligibility conditions include, inter alia, that the built-up area should not exceed 1500 sq. ft. in the context of cities other than Delhi and Mumbai. This restriction is applicable to the entire project. If some of the residential units of the project comprised area exceeding the prescribed limit, the benefit as per the language of the section cannot be extended to the project.
The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The same view is expressed in the case of Britannia Industries Ltd. v. CIT [2005 (10) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT]. In this case the hon'ble apex court has held that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts are to interpret the same in its literal sense and not to give a meaning which would cause violence to the provisions of the statute.
The term "project" is nomen generalissimum : It is a term of the most general meaning. It connotes a proposal for undertaking or a scheme for something to be done. The assessee did formulate four such schemes, namely, Agrini, Vajra, Porkudam Phase-I and Phase-II. These four schemes as such were approved by the local authority. A project cannot be approved in piecemeal. Approval is accorded to the entire project. Blocks of residential units are parts of a project and not project by itself. As such a block of residential units cannot be construed to be a separate project. It is therefore evident that the assessee did not comply with the conditions precedent for availing the benefit of section 80-IB(10). We, therefore, reverse the order of the CIT (A) and restore the order of the AO on this count.
In the result, the appeal of the Revenue stands allowed.
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2008 (10) TMI 588 - ITAT HYDERABAD
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... ... ..... dings and not intimation under section 143(1). Hence all the decisions relied on by learned counsel for the assessee are distiguishable and are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Since the Assessing Officer has not passed any speaking order while dropping the penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c), the noting in order sheet in dropping the penalty cannot be said to have been done after proper enquiry. Hence the orders passed by the Assessing Officer are not only erroneous but also prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Considering these aspects of the matter, in our view, the impugned orders passed by the learned Commissioner of Income-tax are not required to be interfered with. Accordingly the orders passed by the learned Commissioner of Income-tax are upheld. The grounds taken by the assessee in all these assessment years are therefore rejected. In the result, the assessee rsquo s appeals stand dismissed. Pronounced in the court on October 24, 2008.
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2008 (10) TMI 587 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... sment in the present assessment year. It is well-settled that principles of res judicata do not apply in income-tax proceedings. The assessee has to establish that the expenditure claimed by him is wholly and exclusively for the business which it was carrying on. The decision in the case of Sakal Papers P. Ltd. 1978 114 ITR 256 is on different facts and the submissions of the learned Departmental representative in this regard have to be accepted. On an overall appreciation of the evidence and explanation submitted on behalf of the assessee, we are of the view that the assessee has failed to explain and substantiate that the expenditure on staff training and salary paid to Mr. Naval Kumar was wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business of the assessee. We, therefore, confirm the orders of the Revenue authorities and dismiss Ground Nos. 2 and 3 of the assessee. In the result, appeal by the assessee is dismissed. The order has been pronounced on 31st Day of October, 2008.
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2008 (10) TMI 586 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... than 10 years. In the absence of the appeal, the Revenue would have come to the conclusion that the order of the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has been accepted by the assessee. Admission of appeal after 10 years without reasonable cause would frustrate this legitimate expectation of the Revenue. Therefore, on the facts of this case, we hold that the rule of limitation also contains a rule of justice, especially where a person chooses not to take up requisite legal remedies for an inordinate length of time and without reasonable cause, the Tribunal should apply the rule of limitation. Accordingly, we refuse to admit the inordinately late appeals. Such conclusion finds support from the decision in the case of Vinay Extraction P. Ltd. v. Vijay Khanna 2004 271 ITR 450. In view thereof, it is not necessary for us to go into the merits of the appeals. In the result, the appeals are dismissed in limine. The order was pronounced in the open court on October 17, 2008.
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2008 (10) TMI 585 - ITAT VISHAKHAPATNAM
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... ... ..... 7(iii) of the Income-tax Act. rdquo At page 340 of the report it was further observed as under We are, therefore, clear in our mind that section 47(iii) of the Income-tax Act, when it used the word lsquo gift , it meant the transfer made without any consideration as is generally understood and not what is meant for the purpose of the Gift-tax Act. Since section 49(1)(ii) of the Income-tax Act also uses the identical expression, i.e., gift , we are of the view that the ratio of the aforecited decision equally applies for the purpose of interpreting the meaning of the expression within the meaning of section 49(1)(ii) of the Act. In the light of the judgment of the jurisdictional High Court cited supra, we are of the view that the decisions rendered by the tax authorities are based on plain meaning of the provisions of the Act and therefore do not call for any interference. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed. Pronounced accordingly on October 31, 2008.
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2008 (10) TMI 584 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ontention of Smt. Malati Sridharan and set aside all these appeals to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication in accordance with law. The assessees, in this case, shall furnish documentary evidence such as e-mails, correspondence, bills, invoices or any other material, so as to enable the Assessing Officer to probe and come to a proper conclusion, as to what is the nature of services in question. The Assessing Officer shall take those evidence that would be filed by the assessees on record and verify if the facts of the case in this year are identical to the nature of the services rendered in the earlier years in the assessee rsquo s group cases and if the facts are identical, the propositions of law laid down by various Benches of the Tribunal on those set of facts have to be applied and the assessees granted relief. In the result, the appeals filed by the Revenue are treated as allowed, for statistical purpose. The order pronounced on this October 20, 2008.
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2008 (10) TMI 583 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Yeast from molasses - refund of the trade tax which the opposite parties have realised from the petitioner through Sugar Mills on the purchase of molasses - whether the State Government is already charging tax from the petitioner under the U.P. Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam, 1964, which is a Special enactment for molasses only and as such under the provisions of U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 no tax can be realised from the petitioner as it will amount to double taxation on the sale of same product i.e. molasses by the State Government under two different enactments?
Held that:- Sri J.N. Mathur, learned Additional Advocate General has fairly conceded that administrative charges collected by the Sugar Mills on the purchase of the molasses by the petitioner is a tax. He has also conceded that the U.P. Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam, 1964, being a Special enactment will override the provisions of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, which is a general Act providing for collection of taxes on sale and purchase of goods.
The petitioner is entitled for the refund of the trade tax which was illegally realised and collected by the opposite parties on the purchase of the molasses through Sugar Mills of the State of U.P. subsequent to 10.3.2003.
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2008 (10) TMI 582 - ITAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... ssee is arguing against the facts of the case. Even though the notice under section 148 was issued in the old address, the same was delivered on the assessee and he had acted on the basis of the notice and reassessment was completed after hearing the assessee. Certain intermediary notices were avoided by the assessee on a feeble thinking that he could escape reassessment by avoiding notices. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has erred in appreciating the true impact of the facts of the case. We, therefore, hold that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) is not justified in holding that the assessment is void ab initio. We hold that there is a valid notice and therefore, the assessment is valid. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) is vacated and reassessment order passed by the Assessing Officer is restored. This appeal filed by the Revenue is allowed. The order pronounced on the 22nd day of October, 2008.
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2008 (10) TMI 581 - CESTAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... The learned Counsel submits that the appellant had requested the Tribunal to dispose the appeal on merits by their letter dated 5-2-2008 addressed to the Assistant Registrar. However, that letter is not in the file. In any case, he prays for listing the appeal. This is accepted. In view of the explanation given, the RoA is allowed. The stay application to come up for hearing on 3rd December, 2008. (Pronounced and dictated in open Court)
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2008 (10) TMI 580 - CESTAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... . The service tax has been demanded from the applicants herein on the ground that their service of verification of information furnished by the prospective customers applying for credit cards, home loans and auto loans, which were outsourced by various banks, fell into the category of business auxiliary services attracting service tax liability to w.e.f. 1-7-2003. 2. We find that the applicants have made out a strong prima facie case for total waiver of pre-deposit in the light of the Tribunal rsquo s Order in S.R. Kalyanakrishnan v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Cochin - 2008 (9) S.T.R. 255 (Tri.-Bang.) wherein similar services provided by the applicants was held to be classifiable as business support service, which came into taxable net only w.e.f. 1-5-2006 only and the period covered in the appeal before us is prior to 1-5-2006. We therefore waive pre-deposit of service tax and penalty as set out and stay recovery thereof stayed pending the appeals. (Pronounced in Court)
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2008 (10) TMI 579 - CESTAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... e learned SDR, this proof is not available inasmuch as the invoices issued by the assessee to their customers did not separately indicate the value of goods and materials. It appears that this is a case where the evidence claimed by the assessee needs to be assessed and appreciated, which exercise can wait for the final hearing of the appeal. For the present, I think, the appellants should pre-deposit an amount of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act inasmuch as, according to the estimate of the learned consultant, this would be the outstanding amount of service tax in the event of the benefit of the notification being granted. The appellants shall deposit the above amount within four weeks and report compliance on 5-12-2008. In the event of due compliance, there will be waiver of pre-deposit and stay of recovery in respect of the penalties, interest on tax and the balance amount of tax. (Dictated and pronounced in open Court)
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2008 (10) TMI 578 - CESTAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... tea with snacks does not come within the definition of lsquo meal rsquo and the deductions have been rejected in terms of the Notification 12/2001-S.T. dated 20-12-2006. This is under contest. 2. We have heard both sides in the matter. We are of the considered opinion that prima facie, tea with snacks cannot be bifurcated within the term of lsquo meal rsquo . The interpretation given by the Revenue appears to be too narrow. Prima facie, the appellants are entitled to seek waiver of the amounts to be deposited in the matter. The stay application is allowed granting waiver of pre-deposit and staying the recovery till the disposal of the appeal. (Pronounced and dictated in open Court)
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2008 (10) TMI 577 - CESTAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... d that the items on which credit had been taken by the appellant are neither capital goods nor inputs. Consequently, duty was demanded and penalties were imposed. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order of the Original Authority. The learned Advocate stated that there is no reason why the credit should not be given as these items on which duty had been paid or utilized in the fabrication of the storage tank which is very necessary for running the service of storage and warehousing. Further, he pleaded time-bar. 5. The learned Departmental Representative reiterated the impugned order. 6. On a very careful consideration of the issue, I find that prima facie, the appellants have a strong case on merits. Time bar has also been pleaded. In these circumstances, I order full waiver of the pre-deposit of the amounts mentioned above till the appeal is decided. No recovery proceedings should be taken. Thus, stay is allowed in the above terms. (Pronounced and dictated in open Court)
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2008 (10) TMI 576 - CESTAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... x. They deny that they come within this category. They also submit that they are not liable for penalty and that the demands are time barred. 3. We heard both sides. Although there is an issue of interpretation under the category under which they are covered, in any case, we are not fully satisfied that the appellants have a very strong case in their favour. They are required to pre-deposit a partial amount. We direct them to pre-deposit a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) within a period of three months. On such deposits, the balance of duty and penalty stands waived and recovery stayed till the disposal of the appeal. Call on to report compliance on 19th January, 2009. (Pronounced and dictated in open Court)
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2008 (10) TMI 575 - CESTAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... ides. 5. We notice that the issue is contentious one and the judgments cited by the learned counsel have been clearly distinguished in the impugned order. Prima facie, the citations pertain to lsquo Mandap Keeper rsquo services, while in the present case the category is lsquo Club or Association rsquo . The appellant is a lsquo Club or Association rsquo and there is possibility of they being covered under the said heading. However, the plea of the appellants that demands being time barred has to be considered at length. They have already deposited a sum of Rs. 25,77,217/-. The said deposit is accepted for the purpose of contesting this case. The balance amounts are waived and recovery stayed. The prayer made for earlier hearing on account of high revenue is accepted. The stay application is allowed. There shall be no recovery during the pendency of the appeal and even after expiry of 180 days. Appeal to come up for hearing on 16-1-2009. (Pronounced and dictated in open Court)
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2008 (10) TMI 574 - CESTAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... - 2005 (183) E.L.T. 337 (S.C.). 4. The learned Counsel opposes the prayer and relies on more judgments wherein delay was not condoned as the appeals were filed in a casual approach as held in the case of CCE v. Anurag Ferro Products (P) Ltd. - 2008 (230) E.L.T. 51 (Tri.-Kolkata). 5. We have heard both sides. We are inclined to allow the application for condonation of delay, as the delay is marginal and the Revenue has given sufficient explanation. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Lipok AO (supra) applies to the facts of this case. The delay in filing the appeal is condoned. Appeal to come up in its turn. (Pronounced and dictated in open Court)
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