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Showing 341 to 360 of 16027 Records

• 2014 (12) TMI 1097
  

  Club Membership - Constitutionality of section 65(105) - laiblity for service tax - Whether services provided by the assessee club to its members would be liable to service tax - the club is rendering service or selling any commodity to its members for a consideration then whether the amounts to sale or not – Held that:- In the case of SPORTS CLUB OF GUJARAT LTD Versus UNION OF INDIA & 3 [2013 (7) TMI 510 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] the provision of Section 65(25a), Section 65(105) (zzze) and Section 66 of the Finance (No.2) Act,1994 as incorporated / amended by the Finance Act,2005 to the extent that the said provisions purport to levy service tax in respect of services purportedly provided by the petitioner club to its members, was declared as ultra vires. - order passed by the Commissioner of Service Tax is required to be set aside - Decided in favour of assesse.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1096
  

  Waiver of pre deposit - Renting of immovable property - Held that:- Appellant himself has admitted before the Adjudicating Authority that they would collect service tax from its users and remit the same. Hence, the appellant should not now raise a question that the lease was entered into long before the introduction of Section 65(105)(zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994 and hence not liable to pay service tax. The appellant has not produced any material showing that they are suffering from financial hardship. - Following decision of P.K.Hospitality Services Ltd. V. UOI reported in [2014 (8) TMI 820 - Supreme Court of India] - appellant is directed therein to pay the arrears in equated monthly instalments - stay denied.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1095
  

  Denial of refund claim - Petitioner initially paid service tax and claimed refund as the activity is not liable for service tax – Refund rejected by the original authority, partly allowed by the Commissioner (Appeals) subject to verification of unjust enrichment – Refund not grated even after the order of Commissioner (Appeals) - Held that:- Once the petitioner asserted that it did not pass on the liability of service tax to its customer i.e .. BSNL, it could have been verified as to whether BSNL paid any amount to the petitioner towards service tax. The irresponsibility on the part of the incumbents, who held the office of the 3rd respondent from time to time, is evident from the fact that they just sat over the matter and did not release even a single rupee to the petitioner. If this is the treatment accorded to a Government of India undertaking, one can easily understand the type of treatment, which the officials of that Department are exhibiting towards ordinary citizens.

  It is to the effect that the Board issued Circular, dated 18.12.2002 clarifying that the activity of laying of cables and erection of equipment would attract service tax, since it falls under the technical assistance rendered by Consulting Engineer. The lack of bona fides on the part of the deponent of the counter affidavit is evident from the fact that though the very Board issued Circular dated 13.05.2004 stating that the Circular dated 18.12.2002 was issued by mistake and stands withdrawn, no reference was made to it. The attitude of the deponent is worse than that of a seasoned litigant. Unfortunately, it is on account of the irresponsible behaviour of such officers, that the entire Department gets bad reputation. By resorting to objectionable means, the Department is trying to enrich itself, at the cost of the petitioner. amount which remained unpaid, shall be refunded to the petitioner with interest, as provided for under the Act, within four (4) weeks - Decided in favour of assesse.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1094
  

  Waiver of pre deposit - Manpower Supply Services - employees deputed by Dell International from abroad - Held that:- Assignment letter has been issued by foreign company abroad and not by Dell International Services India Pvt. Ltd. Moreover, the agreement itself in paragraph relating ‘Compensation and Benefits’, the agreement says during the assignment, salary continues to be paid from the home location. Promotional increase, merits salary grade changes, etc. must follow the guidelines of the home location. The assignment letter issued by the company abroad and salary should be paid at home location would show prima facie that the foreign company has provided the ‘manpower supply service’. There is no exclusive relationship of employer-employee was maintained not only in Indian company but foreign company. The Tribunal finally took the view that stay has been granted on the ground of limitation. In this case, the entire demand is within the normal period. Therefore, revenue neutrality may not be appropriate for unconditional waiver of pre-deposit and stay against recovery. - Entire amount of service tax directed to be deposited - interest and penalty stayed - Stay granted partly.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1093
  

  Works Contract Service - commercial or industrial service - Held that:- Claim of the appellant that they have paid the entire tax liability in respect of ‘works contract service’ is required to be verified since there is a dispute on this issue. The liability of balance amount attributable to construction of staff quarters, students’ hostel etc. for Polytechnic College, we hold that the demand does not exist. Since there is a dispute regarding the payment of Service Tax claimed to have been made by the appellant, we consider it appropriate that matter has to be remanded to the original authority for the limited purpose of quantifying the correct amount and verifying the payment made by the appellant. In case of any discrepancy, the original authority shall intimate the same to the assessee for making payment. At this stage, learned counsel also undertakes that in case of any discrepancy, they would make payment of the same. As regards penalties, the appellant’s submission regarding non-liability or alternatively request to invoke Section 80 of Finance Act, 1994 may be considered by the original authority. - Matter remanded back - Decided in favour of assessee.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1092
  

  Invocation of extended period of limitation - Mandap Keeper Service - Held that:- No doubt, in June 2006, decision in the case of Shree Gujarati Samaj Bhavan [2006 (6) TMI 470 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] was rendered and an argument can be advanced that the appellant who was monitoring the case law for entertaining bona fide belief should have taken note of this decision and started paying service tax. However, we take note of the fact that even the Govt. has chosen to amend the definition in 2007 and therefore it cannot be stated that appellant was not at all entitled to bona fide belief and extended period can be invoked. - appellant had informed the department by writing a letter giving reasons for non-payment and also taking note of the fact that appellant started paying service tax after the definition was amended, we consider that in this case extended period could not have been invoked. Accordingly, the entire demand cannot be sustained. - Decided in favour of assessee.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1091
  

  Condonation of delay - Delay in receipt of order - Order retained by acting partner who forgot about the letter - Held that:- A Limitation Act as is well-known is a statute of repose; and after the specified period of limitation is over, the other party to a cause of action is entitled to assume absence of a potential litigative trauma. Due diligence in prosecuting the litigation is also a valid criterion that could legitimately be considered in condoning delay in preferring an appeal. The reasons set out in the present application do not commend acceptance for grant of COD. Since no reasonable cause is shown, we find no justification for condoning the delay - Condonation denied.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1090
  

  Penalty u/s 77 & 78 - Payment of service tax as recipient of service - Held that:- Appellants did not to pay service tax in cash as they were entitled to avail Cenvat credit and the same was utilised. In such a situation, there was no need for the appellant to evade tax. When there is no need to evade tax, extended period could not have been invoked. In these circumstances, the penalty under Section 78 of the Act which is to be imposed when there is an intention to evade duty or suppression, fraud or collusion, mis-declaration etc. could not have been imposed. Accordingly, penalty under Section 78 of the Act is set aside. Coming to the penalty under Section 77, this penalty has been imposed for non-filing of returns. It is quite clear that the appellant has failed to file returns. Therefore, the penalty imposed under Section 77 of the Act is sustainable and the same is sustained. - Appeal partly allowed.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1089
  

  Search and seizure of factory - Failure to submit details of clearances of earlier period - Invocation of extended period of limitation - Suppression of facts - Misdeclaration - Held that:- Even though the Appellant had informed about the applicability of excise duty the activity carried out by them, on 25th July, 1997 and promised to furnish details of clearance value for the earlier period, but the same was not submitted. The relevant data could be retrieved only after search and seizure consequent to the visit of their factory on 23.10.97 by the Anti Evasion Unit of the Kolkata I Commissionerate. Thus, it reveals that there was an element of suppression with intent to evade payment of duty for the relevant period in not furnishing the data and also non-payment of appropriate duty for earlier period. In these circumstances, I do not see any justification to interfere with the observations of the ld. Commissioner (Appeals) on the issue of imposition of penalty and confirming the demand invoking extended period of limitation.

  The contention of the Appellant is that the demand is highly inflated as their sale price was considered as assessable value and not cum-duty price, is also found to be incorrect in as much as in the show-cause notice itself, the sale price was treated as cum-duty price and the assessable value was determined accordingly. The next argument of the ld. Advocate is that in any case, if the demand is confirmed, they would be entitled to modvat credit. The said plea also would not hold good, at this stage, as such plea has been neither raised before the lower authorities nor in their grounds of appeals. Besides, after a period of two decades, it would be difficult and impractical to ascertain from the records about the eligibility of modvat credit. Also, I find that the ld. Advocate has simply advanced the said plea without supporting the same with any evidences. In the result, this contention also merits rejection when examined from all angles. - Decided against assessee.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1088
  

  Duty demand under Rule 96 ZO - whether the duty liability of the appellants for the year 1999-2000 is to be assessed in terms of Rule 96 ZO(3) after considering the plea of the appellants that for the financial year 1999-2000 under Rule 96 ZO(3), the option as required under Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 96 ZO had not been given by them - Held that:- As has been recorded by CESTAT in its order dated 7.10.2005 the appellants filed necessary declaration opting to pay duty under Rule 96 ZO(3) in the year 1997 and also again on 1.4.1998. The said Rule does not require filing of declaration on an annual basis. Indeed the format of the declaration prescribed under Rule 96 ZO(4) also makes it clear that the declaration is not for any particular financial year nor is it required to be filed for every financial year. - Even the appellants’ declarations did not indicate that they were valid only for one financial year. Therefore unless the appellants specifically opted out of the scheme, the declarations they filed opting for the compounded levy scheme obviously continued to be valid. The Supreme Court in the case of CCE Vs. Venus Castings Pvt. Ltd. - [2000 (4) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] has held that the assessee if they have availed of the procedure under Rule 96 ZO(3) at their option, cannot claim the benefit of determination of production capacity under Section 3A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which is specifically excluded.

  This itself means that the assessee can opt out of the scheme at the end of the financial year. It is matter of record that the assessee never opted out of the compounded levy scheme after having opted in for the same. Letters cited by them only show that they were not happy with the quantum of duty liability in terms of the said Rule 96 ZO(3). But such unhappiness can never be equated to a formal opting out of the scheme. For example, expressing unhappiness in a marriage can never be taken to be tantamount to opting for divorce. Thus it is evident that in the wake of the fact that the appellants never opted out [after having opted in for paying under Rule 96 ZO(3)], they continued to be liable to be assessed thereunder. There is not even an iota of doubt that there was no requirement to file the option to opt for the scheme in every financial year. Similarly, there is no ground to even suggest that the declaration to opt for the scheme was valid only for one financial year. Thus once having opted in, one had to expressly opt out of the same. Appellants were liable for payment of duty for the year 1999-2000 under Rule 96 ZO - Decided against assessee.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1087
  

  SSI exemption - clubbing of clearance - flow of funds - mutuality of interest - common partner, common premises, common purchase of raw materials, exchange of raw material from one unit to another, common managerial control, transfer of fund from unit to another - Notification No. 175/86-CE dated 1.3.1986 - Held that:- the Tribunal in the earlier round held that all the units are independent and the benefit of exemption Notification is required to be extended. It is noticed that the order of the Tribunal was not challenged by the Revenue before the higher appellate forum. So, the Revenue is not permitted to proceed on the same grounds in the remand proceedings.

  Clubbing cannot be established without any evidence of flow of funds. In the case of VIR Industries Vs. CCE, Bombay - [1997 (4) TMI 269 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI], it has been held that the three units having some common partners operating from the same premises and having common facilities, entire production of two units sold to third unit, no finding of special financial relationship involving common funding and financial flow back or manipulation of accounts and therefore clearance cannot be clubbed and assessable value to be the sale price of each unit. In the case of Techno Device Vs. CCE, Chennai - [2009 (6) TMI 219 - CESTAT, CHENNAI], it has been held that maintenance of accounts of various units by a single person and at one office is not a ground for justifying clubbing. - Revenue has not placed any material for clandestine removal of the goods as directed by the Tribunal in earlier order. Regarding, the clubbing of the four units, we have already observed that the Tribunal decided the issue in favour of the respondents. Further, the Commissioner (Appeals) has also given detail findings and we agree with it - Decided against Revenue.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1086
  

  Denial of CENVAT Credit - Invocation of extended period of limitation - Suppression of facts - Malafide intention - mere procedural violations - whether extended period is invokable for mere suppression on the part of the appellant or the suppression should be with an ‘intention to evade’ payment of duty - Held that:- So far as fraud and collusion are concerned, it is evident that the requisite intent, i.e., intent to evade duty is built into these very words. So far as mis-statement or suppression of facts are concerned, they are clearly qualified by the word ‘wilful’ preceding the words ‘mis-statement or suppression of facts which means with intent to evade duty. The next set of words ‘contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or Rules’ are again qualified by the immediately following words ‘with intent to evade payment of duty’. It is, therefore, not correct to say that there can be a suppression or mis-statement of fact, which is not wilful and yet constitutes a permissible ground for the purpose of the proviso to Section 11A. Mis-statement or suppression of fact must be wilful. Words ‘suppression of facts’, used in Rule 57I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 are in the company of words like collusion and wilful mis-statement and will have to be understood to mean ‘with intent to evade payment of duty’. The observations made by the Adjudicating authority that ‘no intention to evade’ is required for invoking extended period of 5 years, can not thus be appreciated as the correct interpretation of law. Though there is no dispute that provisions of Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 are independent of recovery machinery under Rule 57-I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, but the ratio of the words ‘suppression of facts’ and ‘wilful’ as interpreted by the Apex Court will also be applicable to the recovery provisions of Rule 57-I of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. - Decision in the case of Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company vs. CCE, Bombay [1995 (3) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] followed.

  Credit was admissible to the appellant but for not filing the required/ proper declaration. Appellant has correctly relied upon the case laws mentioned in Para 2.1 above to the extent that for mere procedural violations CENVAT credit cannot be denied. Though in the present proceedings appellant is not agitating the issue of admissibility of credit but there is no evidence on record that there was any deliberate act on the part of the appellant to avail inadmissible credit. In our opinion extended period of 5 years cannot be invoked in these proceedings for not following the procedure properly when otherwise the credit was admissible. - Decided in favour of assessee.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1085
  

  Benefit of Notification No. 5/2006-CE dated 1.3.2006 - clearance of Silver till 16.1.202. Sr No 25 of Notifications - On being amended by Notification No 2/2012-CE dated 16.1.2012 and the word silver was deleted from the entry mentioned at Sr No,. 25 of the said Notification No. 5/2006-CE dated 1.3.2006. As a result of the said amendments, appellant started paying duty on silver from 17.1.2012 onwards - SCN issued for recovery of Central Excise duty on the clearances of silver during the period 1.3.2001 to 16.1.2012 under Section 11A(1) - whether appellant is eligible for the benefit of ‘nil’ rate duty on the ‘silver’ which arises/manufactured during the continuous process of manufacturing of copper cathode or not. - Held that:- It can be seen from the existing entries under Notification No. 5/2006 at Sr No. 25, exempts silver in their primary form and it is undisputed appellant had availed the benefit of this entry. The said Notification No. 5/2006-CE underwent an amendment wherein an entry No. 21C was inserted which indicated that sliver in any form is liable to concessional duty, which arises during copper smelting from copper ore or concentrate. For the period in question in this case i.e., 1.3.2011 to 16.1.2012 both the entries entry No 25 and entry No.21C were present in Notification No. 5/2006-CE.

  Reasoning recorded by the Adjudicating Authority are incorrect. First of all, when the Notification No. 5/2006-CE was amended, it did not amend the general entry No. 25 in the said notification; secondly, this lacunae was subsequently rectified by Notification No. 02/2012-CE dtd 16.1.2012 wherein the word ‘silver’ from entry No. 25 was deleted. It is undisputed that the appellant was manufacturing ‘silver’ in primary form during the manufacture of copper. When the two benefits are available to the appellant under the same Notification, the most beneficial entry suitable to him can be availed, is the settled law. We find that the apex court in the case of Share Medical Care [2007 (2) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] has held so. - Decided in favour of assesse.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1084
  

  Marketability - Manufacture of sugar solution (concentrated sugar syrup according to the Revenue) - Captive consumption - Held that:- just because the product can be kept for a week, it cannot be said that the same is marketable. There is no evidence of marketability produced by the Revenue either before the Commissioner or in the appeal memorandum. Further, we also find that the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Moti Laminates Pvt. Ltd. (1995 (2) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) is applicable to the facts of this case as regards marketability. Commissioner has considered the marketability aspect and also use of preservatives. We find that the Commissioner’s order is in accordance with law and principles of classification and determination of liability of goods for excise duty. Hence it requires no interference - Decided against Revenue.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1083
  

  Denial of refund claim - Unjust enrichment - additional duty has been paid by the respondent at various appellate stages - Held that:- It is a case where duty has been demanded from the respondent after clearance of the goods. This fact is not in dispute. Further, the fact is that the respondent has not received any amount over and above the amount shown in the invoices at the time of clearance. These facts are also not in dispute. The additional duty has been paid by the respondent at various appellate stages. The Revenue has also not produced any evidence on record that the respondent has recovered any amount towards duty over and above invoices price from the buyers. Apart from bar of unjust enrichment the respondent has produced a certificate from the Cost Accountant that no amount over and above invoices price has been received from the buyers and the same does not form a part of cost of production. In these circumstances, I do not find any infirmity and the same is upheld. - Decided against Revenue.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1082
  

  CENVAT Credit - moulds and dies supplied by M/s. Maruti Udyog Limited were old and had been supplied to the appellant on a price much lower than the price of new moulds and dies, but still M/s. Maruti Udyog Limited paid the excise duty on their original value without any depreciation - whether the cenvat credit in respect of moulds and dies available to the appellant would be restricted only to the duty payable on the transaction value of the moulds and dies or whether they would be eligible for Cenvat credit of the duty actually paid by M/s. Maruti Udyog Limited - Held that:- there is no evidence produce by the Department that the assessment of duty in respect of duty payable by M/s. Maruti Udyog Limited on the moulds and dies had been revised by the jurisdictional central excise authorities or that the excess excise duty paid by M/s. Maruti Udyog Limited has been refunded to them. The Cenvat credit available to the appellant can be varied only if the duty paid by M/s. Maruti Udyog Limited had been varied, which is not the case here. In terms of the Apex Court’s judgment in the case of MDS Switchgear Ltd. (2008 (8) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT), the recipient manufacturer who has received the inputs from a supplier is entitled to avail the Cenvat credit of the duty paid by the supplier/manufacturer and the central excise authorities having jurisdiction over the recipient/manufacturer cannot review the assessment of duty at the end of the supplier/manufacturer. This judgment of the Apex Court in the case of MDS Switchgear Ltd. (supra) is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. The impugned order, therefore, is not sustainable. The same is set aside. - Decided in favour of assesse.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1081
  

  Availment of ineligible Modvat credit - shortage of finished products which were not accounted for - clearance of goods without payment of duty - Held that:- As regards the demand of ₹ 9.12 lakhs (approx.) being the Modvat credit involved on the raw materials found short and not used, we find that difference between the quantity of raw materials consumed and finished products manufactured is very negligible and below 0.5 % in all the cases. We also note that as per the standard input of norms, the percentage of wastage for perfumery products is much higher up to 50%. Compared to this, the process loss in the appellant’s case is very low and, therefore, the explanation of processing loss of the material during the manufacturing process is reasonable and has to be accepted. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the contention of the Revenue that ₹ 9.12 lakhs is recoverable from the appellant. Accordingly, we set aside the same. In addition, an amount of ₹ 78,420/- has been confirmed in respect of the shortage of 1269 kgs which occurred at the job-worker’s end out of 14,400 kgs of raw materials and this loss is also reasonable and, therefore, there is no reason for confirmation of duty demand on this count also.

  As regards the demand of ₹ 1,70,990/-, in the statement recorded under Section 14 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, Mr. J.V. Shah, Manager of the appellant firm had admitted to the clearance of finished products without payment of duty. Only at the time of reply to the show cause notice, new grounds were adduced claiming that the difference in finished product stock was on account of invisible loss and material lying in process. These objections were not raised when stock taking was done. In these circumstances, the plea of invisible loss and material lying in process cannot be accepted and, therefore, the confirmation of demand of ₹ 1,70,990/- has to be upheld with interest - Decided partly in favour of assessee.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1080
  

  Compounded Levy Scheme of Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Rule 96ZO - determination of the annual capacity of production of the appellant - Held that:- When the appellant had informed the department from the very beginning that they are operating only one furnace w.e.f. 1-3-2001 and other furnace of 1.00 M.T. capacity is idle, and when initially the duty liability had been determined provisionally on the basis of both the furnaces being operational, the Commissioner should have passed a final order determining their annual capacity of production after considering the appellant’s representation that the other furnace has never been operated and is lying idle. But no final order was passed. Thus, the department’s action of recovery of differential duty is without any basis. Even if this matter is remanded for re-determination of capacity of production and their duty liability, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Krishna Processors (2012 (11) TMI 954 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT), the proceedings for recovery of differential duty, if any, cannot be initiated - order of the department demanding the differential duty is set aside - Decided in favour of assessee.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1079
  

  Waiver of pre deposit - Tribunal has directed the assessee to deposit an amount of ₹ 20,00,000 /- by way of pre-deposit - benefit of notification No.12 /2012 as amended under SI. No.123 - Reclassification of goods - Held that:- Having regard to the overall facts of this case, it is not possible to state that the impugned order does not conform to the principles enunciated - As regards the decision of the Kerala High Court in Binani Zinc Ltd. v. Asst. Collector of Central Excise (1994 (10) TMI 74 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM) on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellant, the same turns upon the facts of the said case wherein though there was an arguable case, the Tribunal has directed pre-deposit of a huge amount as a condition precedent for the hearing of the appeal. In the present case, as noted hereinabove, the Tribunal had directed the appellant to pre-deposit a small fraction of the entire liability under the order-in-original and hence, the said decision would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. The decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Sri Krishna v. Union of India (1998 (7) TMI 97 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI) also does not carry the case of the appellant any further inasmuch as in the facts of the said case, the petitioners therein were poor persons and were not in a position to deposit the amount as directed by the Tribunal and consequently would have been denied of the valuable right of their appeal being heard and decided on merits, whereas in the facts of the present case, it is not the case of the appellant that is not in a position to deposit the amount as directed by the Tribunal. Tribunal, while considering the appellant's application under section 129E of the Act, has exercised its discretion judicially. Under the circumstances, it is not possible to state that there is any legal infirmity in the impugned order so as to give rise to any question of law, much less a substantial question of law, so as to warrant interference - Decided against assesse.

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• 2014 (12) TMI 1078
  

  Imposition of fine and penalty - Valuation of goods - Whether the Hon'ble Tribunal is justified in holding that the misdeclared value of the goods cannot be reduced to the actual market value of the goods attempted to be exported specially when the Act and the rules do not whisper so. - Imposition of redemption fine and penalty - Held that:- On a plain reading of the language of the substantive part of sub-section (1) of Section 125, it is clear that the legislature has not imposed a restriction of the kind which has been sought to be implied on behalf of the appellant. What the proviso to sub-section (1), however, stipulates is a ceiling on the fine in lieu of confiscation, insofar as it stipulates that such fine shall not exceed the market price of the goods confiscated. Now, it is in the background of the provisions of Section 125 that the legality of the order would have to be assessed.

  Quantum of fine is concerned) so long as the quantum of redemption fine was not in excess of the stipulation contained in the proviso to sub-section (1) to Section 125. In fact, before the Tribunal, it was sought to be urged, as recorded in the impugned order, that the value declared in respect of the mis-declared goods must be reduced to the extent of the value of the actual goods in the consignment. The Tribunal was justified in holding that no such exercise could be carried out and the Court has no jurisdiction to do so, so as to legalize a patent illegality. The case of the appellant was that the goods were mis-declared as a result of a mistake of its labourers. That is besides the point, because the fact does remain that, in his declaration of the goods which were meant for export, the appellant had mis-declared the goods. A case for confiscation of the goods was, therefore, clearly made out. The order of the Tribunal, on a considered view of the matter, reducing the redemption fine and the penalty to the extent indicated in the order, is fair and does not call for interference in the appeal by the exporter. - No substantial question of law arises - Decided against assesse.

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