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Showing 81 to 100 of 2019 Records
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2019 (7) TMI 1940
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - exercise of jurisdiction by correct AO - AO not issuing the notice u/s 143(2) which is mandatory for completing the assessment under the provisions of Act - HELD THAT:- Since the notice u/s 148 was not served on the assessee, the assessee did not have the opportunity to object to the same before the AO and therefore, has raised it before the CIT (A) for the first time. Since, the exercise of jurisdiction is a legal issue and if it is not exercised by the right person, the assessment is liable to be set aside, and on going through the assessment order before us, we find that the CIT (A) had not adjudicated the issue, we deem it fit and proper to remand the issue to the file of the CIT (A), with a direction to verify whether the AO who has completed the assessment had jurisdiction over the assessee. The CIT (A) shall decide the issue in accordance with law and also after taking into consideration the judicial precedents on the issue after affording the assessee a fair opportunity of hearing and if it is found that the AO had no jurisdiction over the assessee, the assessment shall be declared as null and void. Appeal of the assessee is treated as allowed for statistical purposes.
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2019 (7) TMI 1939
Sales tax subsidy - Nature of receipt - revenue or capital receipt - CIT-A held scheme of sales tax subsidy granted to the assessee to be for setting up of or for expanding existing industries in the developing region of Maharashtra - HELD THAT:- The main objective of the scheme was to intensify and accelerate the process of dispersal of industries from developed areas and for development of under-developed regions of Maharashtra. It is clear from the scheme that IPS incentive was granted not for carrying on day-to-day business of the unit more profitably but to provide impetus to the process of dispersal of industries to backward areas. The plant of the assessee falls in Group C, which also includes Khed, which is outside the Pune Metropolitan Region. In the present case the sales tax payment is only an yardstick to determine the quantum of incentive and cannot be construed as to mitigate the operational cost of the business.
In view of the above factual scenario we uphold the order of the Ld. CIT(A). Facts being identical and the grounds of appeal being same, our decision for AY 2011-12 applies mutatis mutandis to AY 2012-13.
Corporate social responsibility expenses - allowable business expenses u/s 37(1) - expenses as explained by the assessee before the AO were mainly related to expenses incurred on construction of school building, devasthan/temple, drainage, barbed wire fencing, education schemes and distribution of clothes etc. voluntarily - HELD THAT:- We are of the considered view that the Ld. CIT(A) has rightly allowed u/s 37(1) the expenses claimed by the assessee. Moreover, the decision in Jindal Power Ltd. [2016 (7) TMI 203 - ITAT RAIPUR] is applicable to the instant case. Accordingly, we dismiss the above grounds of appeal.
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2019 (7) TMI 1938
Application for suspension of sentence - Section 389 of Cr.P.C. - HELD THAT:- Upon a consideration of the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, including the fact that appellants No.2 & 3 were on bail during the trial. This court is of the opinion that it is a fit case for suspending the sentence awarded to the accused-appellants No.2 & 3.
Accordingly, the application for suspension of sentence filed under Section 389 Cr.P.C. is allowed and it is ordered that the substantive sentences passed by the Learned Special Judge NDPS Act Cases No.1, Chittorgarh vide judgment dated 16.01.2018 in Session Case No.45/2013 against the appellants-applicants 1. Nepal Singh Meena S/o Karulal Meena 2.Mohd. Israfil S/o Sarifur Rehman shall remain suspended till final disposal of the aforesaid appeal and they will be released on bail, provided they execute a personal bond in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- with two sureties of Rs.50,000/- each to the satisfaction of the learned trial Judge for their appearance in this court on 09/08/2019 and whenever ordered to do so till the disposal of the appeal on the conditions indicated.
The learned trial Court shall keep the record of attendance of the accused-applicant(s) in a separate file.
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2019 (7) TMI 1937
Utilization of credit of basic excise duty for payment of Education Cess And Secondary & Higher Education Cess - area based exemption under Notification no. 39/2001-CE availed - HELD THAT:- The issue that whether the credit of basic excise duty can be utilized for payment of Education Cess and Secondary & Higher Education Cess when the appellant availed the area based the Exemption Notification No. 39/2001-CE, has been decided in the case of M/S. SRD NUTRIENTS PRIVATE LIMITED VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE GUWAHATI [2017 (11) TMI 655 - SUPREME COURT] where it was held that The appellants were entitled to refund of Education Cess and Higher Education Cess which was paid along with excise duty once the excise duty itself was exempted from levy.
The issue is no longer res-Integra, accordingly, the appellant are entitled for utilization of credit of basic excise duty for payment of Education Cess and Secondary & Higher Education Cess - Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2019 (7) TMI 1936
Constitutional validity and vires of a 25th June 2019 amendment to the Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for appointments in public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act 2018 - reservation of seats for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) (Amendment) Act, 2019 - gravamen of Petitions is essentially that the SEBC Amendment Act 2019 attempts to nullify and render void decisions of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court and of the Supreme Court.
HELD THAT:- Where the language of a statute is plain and clear from its literal reading then no process of convoluted reasoning is permissible to arrive at some totally different result. We see no ambiguity at all in the newly introduced sub-clause (ia). It may be a distinct type of entrance test but it is clearly a specified entrance test. It applies to the State quota seats and nothing else. The non obstante provisions cannot be ignored and these non obstante provisions set it apart from all entrance tests covered by sub-clause (1). The phrase is ‘notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1) above’. The mere use of the words ‘notwithstanding any order, judgment or direction of any Court’ does not mean that the State legislature has tried to overrule or render void or nullify by legislature any judgment of any Court.
All challenges before the Nagpur Bench of this court and before the Supreme Court were only in relation to postgraduate courses. The Dr Sanjana Narendra Wadewale decision [2019 (5) TMI 1950 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] was in relation to a notification of March 2019 and was prior to the SEBC Amendment Act or even the SEBC Amendment Ordinance. The findings therein, therefore, cannot form the basis of a challenge to the SEaBC Amendment Act applied to undergraduate admissions. This is all the more so when we find that the Nagpur Division Bench dismissed a later challenge in DR. SAMEER S/O RAJENDRA DESHMUKH AND TWO OTHERS VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, THROUGH ITS SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF MEDICAL EDUCATION & DRUGS, MUMBAI & ORS. [2019 (6) TMI 1677 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] to the SEBC Amendment Ordinance (although even that challenge was also only in relation to postgraduate admissions).
Petition dismissed.
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2019 (7) TMI 1935
Admissibility of appeal - Levy of service tax - Cargo Handling services - It is submitted that the transportation with incidental loading would be classifiable under Goods Transport Agency service and Service Tax is payable by the client under reverse charge mechanism - HELD THAT:- Appeal admitted.
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2019 (7) TMI 1934
Disallowance of payments of PF/ESIC paid beyond the due date prescribed under the relevant statutes - HELD THAT:- We find that the issue is squarely covered against the assessee by the decision of CIT v. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation [2014 (1) TMI 502 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] wherein it was held that section 43B does not apply to employees contribution. Only section 2(24)(x) read with section 36(1)(va) is applicable and therefore, employees contribution is disallowed if not paid within due dates prescribed under relevant Provident Fund /ESI Act. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that there is no mistake in the orders of lower authorities in making disallowance in the light of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the above case (supra).
However, since the SLP has been admitted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the decision of Hon'ble High Court therefore, we set aside this matter to the file of the ld. CIT(A) with the direction that the matter be decide as per outcome of SLP, as and when matter will be decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Appeal of assessee allowed for statistical purposes.
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2019 (7) TMI 1933
Computation of book profit and MAT - only grievance of the Revenue was against the direction given by the CIT(A) to the AO to compute the MAT tax payable by the assessee, after verifying the claim of the assessee - HELD THAT:- Considering the pleadings made by the Revenue, we set aside the order of the CIT(A) giving aforestated direction and at the same time, we also direct the CIT(A) to adjudicate the issue himself after calling for a Remand Report on the facts of the issue from the A.O.
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2019 (7) TMI 1932
Validity of order passed u/s 201 and 201(1A) - period of limitation - Time limits of appeals for the assessment year 2009-10 - Filing of quarterly statement is in the financial years 2009-10 and 2010-11 - HELD THAT:- Considering the date of filing of the statements of TDS for 4 quarter of the year, the financial year involved is F.Y. 2009-10 & 2011-12. In that case, the due date for passing of order under sub-section (3)(i) of section 201 of the Act is 2 years from the end of the financial year 2009-10 or 2011-12, as the case may be. Thus, the Assessing Officer had time to pass an order for such appeals till 31st March, 2012 and 31st March, 2014, as the case may be.
Whereas in these 3 appeals, the Assessing Officer passed the order u/s 201(3)(i) of the Act only 30th March, 2016, 29th March, 2016 and 29th March, 2016 for the appeals respectively. From this point of interpretation of the Statute, we are of the opinion, the order passed by the Assessing Officer in these 3 appeals are without valid jurisdiction. The orders stand barred by limitation in these cases. Accordingly, the legal issue raised by the assessee is allowed.
Time limits of appeals for the A.Y. 2010-11 - Filing of quarterly statement is in the financial years 2009-10 and 2010-11 - There are 11 appeals in this group and they relates to the assessment year 2010-11. In this bunch of 11 appeals, the financial year in which the TDS statements are filed, covers the financial years 2009-10 and 2010-11. Considering the fact, the last quarter of the statement is filed in the financial year 2010-11, the time limits available to the Assessing Officer to pass an order u/s 3(i) of section 201 of the Act is two years from the end of the said financial year 2010-11. Thus, in that case, the Assessing Officer is under obligation to pass an order in these circumstances by 31st March, 2013.
Whereas the Assessing Officer passed the order in these 11 appeals in the year 2016 and 2017 respectively i.e. subsequent to the due date specified in the Act.
From this point of view and the interpretation of the Statute, the orders passed by the Assessing Officer are without any valid jurisdiction. Accordingly, the said relevant legal issue raised by the assessee in all the 11 appeals are allowed.
Time limits for passing the order in respect of assessment year 2009-10 (2 appeals) of 11 group of cases where quarterly statements of TDS are not furnished for all the 4 quarters of the financial year - As for this bunch of two appeals pertaining to assessment year 2009-10, the last due date for passing the order u/s 201(3)(i) of the Act is 31st March, 2013. In both the appeals, the order passed by the Assessing Officer on 29.03.2016 commonly i.e. subsequent to the said due date. Accordingly, this bunch of two appeals relating to assessment year 2009-10 has to be allowed on technical ground.
Time limits for passing the order in respect of assessment year 2010-11 (9 appeals) of 11 group of cases where quarterly statements of TDS are not furnished for all the 4 quarters of the financial year - Considering the fact, the last quarter of the statement is filed in the financial year 2011-12, the time limits available to the Assessing Officer to pass an order u/s 3(i) of section 201 of the Act is two years from the end of the financial year 2011-12 i.e. 31st March, 2014. Assessing Officer passed orders in this bunch of 9 appeals in the month of 2016 and in the month of 2017 i.e. subsequent to the expiry of the said due date. In any case, these orders were not passed before March, 2014.
Considering the above referred interpretation of the Statute as well as the facts available on record, we are of the opinion, the order passed by the Assessing Officer under sub-section 3(i) of section 201 of the Act is without any valid jurisdiction.
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2019 (7) TMI 1931
Rectification o mistake - Short payment of appeal fees - HELD THAT:- For the speedy disposal of appeal, the case was posted preponed to 5.7.2019 and Notice was issued on 14.6.2019 by RPAD and acknowledgement of RPAD is placed on record that the Notice has been received on 24.6.2019. But an adjournment letter dt.13.7.2019 was sent by post to the Asst.Registrar, Bangalore and was received by the office on 15.7.2019 at 2.15 P.M (letter placed on record). None appeared at the time of hearing, from the file record it was found that the assessee has not rectified the defect of short payment of appeal fees of Rs.9,500 and balance payment is outstanding payable. We considering the action of the assessee in not rectifying the defect and non- compliance of the directions of the ITAT, Registry, dismiss the appeal of assessee.
Disallowance of deductions claimed under Section 57 - HELD THAT:- Departmental Representative has emphasizing that the CIT (Appeals) has erred in restricting the deduction to Rs.24,65,753 whereas the Assessing Officer has made disallowance in the assessment order of Rs.95,73,377. The learned Departmental Representative supported the orders of Assessing Officer, we find that the learned Departmental Representative could not controvert the observations of the CIT (Appeals) with new evidence or cogent material except relying on the order of the Assessing Officer. We find that the CIT (Appeals) has considered the facts and taken a reasonable view which we are not inclined to interfere and uphold the same and dismiss the ground of appeal of the Revenue.
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2019 (7) TMI 1930
Dishonor of Cheque - partnership firms can be made as an accused or not - complaint can be filed straight away against the partners or not - vicarious liability - unregistered Partnership Firm can also be brought within the purview of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act or not - whether the Partnership Firm must be made as an accused along with the other partners, in order to maintain a complaint for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act?
HELD THAT:- This Court had an occasion to deal with a case where this bar Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act, was sought to be invoked while enforcing a common law right. This Court dealt with the issue in detail and held that the bar Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act, will not apply while enforcing a common law right.
In the present case, this Court is dealing with a provision under the criminal law wherein, the learned counsel for the respondent is seeking to justify the fact that insofar as an unregistered firm is concerned, it is not necessary to make the firm as an accused since it does not qualify the status of a legal entity. It is trite law that when the provisions of criminal law are interpreted, the concept of strict construction will apply. Therefore, this Court cannot read the provisions of Section 69(2) of Indian Partnership Act into the provisions of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Section 142 of the Act under caption "Cognizance of offences" provides that cognizance of the offence under Section 138 can be taken upon a 'complaint' in writing made by the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque. The word 'complaint' defined in Section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to taking action under the said Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. Since Section 138 is a penal provision, that prescribes punishment for bouncing of cheque on any of the grounds mentioned therein, the Legislature in its wisdom has used word 'complaint' and not 'suit' in Section 142 because a 'suit' can be maintained for recovery of money or for any other civil remedies.
Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act deals with the concept of vicarious liability, wherein for the offence committed by the Company or a partnership firm, the directors or the partners, as the case may, are deemed to be guilty of the offence when it is shown that they are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the day-to-day affairs of the business or the firm, as the case may be - The registration or non-registration of the Partnership Firm will have no bearing insofar as 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned.
This Court is not in agreement with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondent. In this case admittedly, the cheque was given in the name of the Partnership Firm and after the cheque was dishonored, no statutory notice was issued to the Partnership Firm, and the Partnership Firm was not made as an accused in the complaint. Only the partners have been shown as accused persons in this complaint. Such a complaint is unsustainable and not in accordance with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - petition allowed.
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2019 (7) TMI 1929
Maintainability of application - initiation of CIRP - Corporate Debtor failed to make repayment of its dues - Operational Creditors - in view of the existence if dispute, the application u/s 9 of the I&B Code was rejected - HELD THAT:- We are not deliberating on such issue whether the ‘Corporate Debtor’ accepted the liability or not as it is found that the ‘Corporate Debtor’ opposed the application u/s 9 of the I&B Code and the Adjudicating Authority noted from letters dated 14th September, 2017 and 9th October, 2017 that there was an ‘existence of dispute’ prior to issuance of Demand Notice u/s 8(1) of the I&B Code which was issued on 13th November, 2017.
The impugned order need not be interfered - appeal dismissed.
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2019 (7) TMI 1928
Exemption u/s 10(37) - compensation and interest u/s. 28 of Land Acquisition Act on account of compulsory acquisition of land - AR submitted that the interest received u/s. 28 of the L.A. Act is capital in nature and hence is not taxable - HELD THAT:- The Co-ordinate Bench of Tribunal in the case of Dnyanoba Shajirao Jadhav [2018 (2) TMI 105 - ITAT PUNE] after considering the judgment of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Ghanshyam (HUF) [2009 (7) TMI 12 - SUPREME COURT] and Bikram Singh & Ors. Vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors. [1996 (9) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT] held that the interest awarded u/s. 28 of the L.A. Act is in the nature of solatium and is integral part of compensation. The said interest is in the nature of capital receipt and hence not exigible to tax under the provisions of Income Tax Act. Whereas, interest received u/s. 34 of the L.A. Act is on account delayed payment of compensation and is a revenue receipt.
Though the amount received u/s. 28 and u/s. 34 of the L.A. Act are termed as ‘interest’ however they stand on different pedestal in so far as the provisions of Income Tax Act are concerned.
In the instant case, it is not disputed by the Revenue that the amount received by the assessee as interest is u/s. 28 of the L.A. Act. Therefore, entire amount is exempt from tax being capital receipt. We find merit in the contention of the assessee. Hence, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal of assessee is allowed.
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2019 (7) TMI 1927
Validity of detention order - section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA) - HELD THAT:- It is observed from the orders dated 28.03.2019 and 05.04.2019, annexed at page Nos.88 and 90 respectively, that the petitioner had appeared before the learned CMM in the proceedings, on those dates. Despite that the detention order, which had been rendered on 26.03.2019, was not executed upon him on behalf of the official respondents.
It is directed that no coercive action be taken against the petitioner, till the next date of hearing.
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2019 (7) TMI 1926
Modvat / Cenvat availed on inputs - Some input transferred to sister unit as stock transfer (which is not sale) - HELD THAT:- In the impugned order Tribunal has based its decision, on the facts on an earlier decision of the tribunal which followed COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NAGPUR VERSUS M/S BALLARPUR INDUSTRIES LTD [2007 (8) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT], where Tribunal has held that since there is no sale, Modvat is not required to reversed. SC has reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held that on even on stock transfer, Modvat is required to be reversed
There are no infirmity in the said order of the tribunal, let alone any substantial or ordinary question of law arising from it to be determined by this Court.
Appeal dismissed.
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2019 (7) TMI 1925
Deduction u/s 54 in respect of capital gains earned - investment made by the assessee in his own name - AO disallowed deduction in respect of investments made in the name of nephew - AO allowed the deduction only for half portion of one residential house purchased in the name of assessee and his brother u/s 54 of the Act for the reason that deduction u/s 54 can be allowed only for one house property purchased in the name of assessee himself - HELD THAT:- As assessee has made investment in his joint name alongwith brother, the same deserves to be allowed in terms of the decision of Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of Mahadev Bala [2017 (11) TMI 1622 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT, JAIPUR]. Also see SHRI JITENDRA V FARIA VERSUS ITO 18 (2) (1) , MUMBAI [2017 (5) TMI 12 - ITAT MUMBAI]
We direct the AO to allow claim of deduction u/s 54 of the Act in respect of the investments made by the assessee in his own name alongwith the name of his brother. - Decided in favour of assessee in part.
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2019 (7) TMI 1924
Deduction u/s 80-I-A - income derived by it from unit transfer/self-consumption of power cogenerated from the entitled undertaking and to the extent and principles for determination thereof - HELD THAT:- As relying on ALEMBIC LIMITED [2016 (7) TMI 1239 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] there is no difficulty in holding that captive consumption of the power generated by the assessee from its own power plant would enable the respondent-assessee to derive profits and gains by working out the cost of such consumption of power inasmuch as the assessee is able to save to that extent which would certainly be covered by section 80-LA(1). When such will be the outcome out of own consumption of the power generated and gained by the assessee by setting up its own power plant, we do not find any lack of merit in the claim of the respondent-assessee when it claimed by relying upon section 80-IA(1) of the Income-tax Act by way of deduction of the value of such units of power consumed by its own plant by way of profits and gains for the relevant assessment years.
Against the aforesaid judgment of Madras High Court, SLP was filed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, being SLP which was dismissed. In that view of the matter, learned Tribunal while considering the matter has not considered the issue in its true perspective. Therefore, only for adjudication on the factual matrix in terms of the aforesaid discussion, the matter is remitted back to the learned Tribunal for fresh adjudication.
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2019 (7) TMI 1923
TP Adjustment - Comparable selection - TPO by applying various filters, rejected certain comparables and reduced list comprising of following 10 comparables with average margin of 28.2% - HELD THAT:- Assessee held to be providing software development services to iPass U.S. and is remunerated on cost +16 % basis for services rendered. Functions performed by assessee under this segment are coding and documentation, project management, testing and quality assurance. Thus companies functionally dissimilar with that of assessee are to be deselected from final list of comparability.
Negative working capital adjustment - HELD THAT:- As relying on FNF INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED case [2019 (7) TMI 1760 - ITAT BANGALORE] there is no need for making any negative working capital adjustment when assessee does not carry any working capital risk. In fact, TPO should have done necessary working capital adjustment to the profits of the selected comparables so as to make them comparable to the assessee. In view of this, we direct the TPO not to make negative working capital adjustment.
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2019 (7) TMI 1922
Initiation of proceedings by the workers under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 - worker in employment after issuance of the prohibition notification dated 17th March 1993 under the Contract Labour( Abolition) Act, 1970 - HELD THAT:- After discontinuance of the service of the contract labour by the respective contractor in April, 1996, 2040 employees/contract labour through their union filed their respective applications in the year 1998 under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 before the prescribed authority to claim parity with the wages payable to the employees who were direct/regular employees of the establishment of SAIL under the Minimum Wages Act.
The claim of the respondents in their application filed under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 was that as they had discharged the same or similar nature of work as that of direct employee of the establishment, it makes them entitled for the wages which are payable to an employee who is directly/regularly appointed in the establishment to whom wages are paid in terms of NJCS memorandum of Agreement dated 30th July, 1975.
In the instant case, the establishment was duly registered under Section 7 of the Act and the contractor through whom the contract labour was engaged was holding its licence under Section 12 of the Act but in the changed circumstances, the appropriate Government took a decision to put a prohibition in making employment of contract labour in scheduled employment for various reasons which is not a subject matter of enquiry in the instant case and in consequence of the prohibition notification dated 17th March, 1993 published under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, the contract labour working in the establishment ceased to function and the contract between the principal employer and contractor stands extinguished.
In the instant case, after issuance of the prohibition notification dated 17th March, 1993 under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act having being published, in our considered view, the provisions of the CLRA Act or CLRA Central Rules, 1971 framed thereunder would not be available to either of the party to strengthen its claim - minimum wages as prayed for in the application filed by respondents before the prescribed authority under Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 could be claimed independently under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 which indisputedly in the instant case was Rs. 11.65/¬ per day over the minimum wages to be paid by the appellant to each of the respondent (2040 employees) in terms of the agreement executed between the parties and that was indeed complied with by the appellants in its true spirit.
The order of the prescribed authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 dated 2nd December, 2003 and confirmed by the High Court under the impugned judgment dated 11th December, 2006 are unsustainable and deserves to be set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2019 (7) TMI 1921
TP Adjustment - Exclusion of companies from list of comparables (software Development Services segment - Comparability of M/s. Larsen & Toubro Infotech Ltd., and M/s. Persistent Systems Ltd., to an assessee who only provides software development services to its AEs; like the assessee in the case on hand - HELD THAT:- We find that a Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the case of CGI Information Systems & Management Consultants Pvt. Ltd. where the assessee was also providing software development services to its AEs; in its order in [2018 (4) TMI 1755 - ITAT BANGALORE], considered the comparability of Larsen & Toubro Infotech Ltd., and Persistent Systems Ltd., and directed the exclusion of these two companies.
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