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2024 (4) TMI 965
Refund of CENVAT Credit - Discretion Power of the refund sanctioning authority - denial on the ground that improper description of the input services noted in the invoices of the Appellant/exporter of services - HELD THAT:- On account of legal services availed as input services, no invoices were raised showing the services as legal services and on the other hand copy of G.A.R.-7 Challan evidencing payment of Service Tax clearly indicates that the said payments were made under ‘Business Auxiliary Services’, ‘Cab Operators Services’, ‘Sponsorship Services’, etc. This being the ground for refusal, it is not to understood as to why the question of re-assessment is to come into play when such refusal is permissible well under Rule, 9 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
If particulars of description of goods or taxable service is not properly reflected in the duty paying document and that to the satisfaction of the Dy. Commissioner/Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise about its receipt and accounting for, then the discretion lies with the refund sanctioning Authority namely the Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise to allow the CENVAT Credit or not and such discretion having been exercised judicially, there are no irregularity on the part of Assistant Commissioner (Refunds-II) CGST, Mumbai East in not allowing the same refund that got confirmed by the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).
The order passed by the Commissioner of GST & CX (Appeals-III), Mumbai in rejecting grant of refund to the Appellant on legal expenses is hereby confirmed - Appeal dismissed.
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2024 (4) TMI 964
Non-payment of service tax - CHA Service - Business Auxiliary Services - reimbursement expenses received - failure to discharge service tax on the incentives / brokerage received by them from steamer agents / shipping lines - demand of differential duty with interest and penalty.
Differential service tax demand raised by the Department under CHA Services - HELD THAT:- The issue as to whether the reimbursable expenses has to be included in the taxable value is settled by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. VERSUS M/S. INTERCONTINENTAL CONSULTANTS AND TECHNOCRATS PVT. LTD. [2018 (3) TMI 357 - SUPREME COURT]. Following the same, the said demand cannot sustain and requires to be set aside.
Demand under Business Auxiliary Services - It is the case of the Department that the appellant received incentives / brokerage from the steamer agents / shipping lines for promoting and marketing the business of steamer agent and shipping lines - HELD THAT:- It is to be noted that the appellant has not been engaged by the steamer agents / shipping lines to provide any service to them. They act as agent for the importer or the exporter. Merely because the steamer agent has paid some incentive to the appellant when they facilitate the export consignment of the importers / exporters it cannot be said that the same would become consideration for providing services. Every flow of money from a person to another cannot be said to be a consideration for providing services. The relationship of service provider and service recipient has to be looked into which is absent in this situation - the demand under Business Auxiliary Services cannot sustain.
The impugned order is set aside - The appeal is allowed.
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2024 (4) TMI 963
Levy of Service tax - renting of immovable property service - religious body or not - assessee has paid the service tax along with interest under VCES - period from 01.10.2008 to 30.06.2012 - penalty - HELD THAT:- The assessee fits in to the category of ‘religious body’. As per the definition of Renting of immovable property service, such service rendered by a religious body or to a religious body is excluded from the levy of service tax. The assessee herein is not liable to pay service tax under the category of renting of immovable property services up to 30.06.2012. Therefore, the demand for the period prior 30.06.2012 cannot be sustained and require to be set aside.
For the period after 30.06.2012 the assessee discharged the service tax up to 31.12.2012 under VCES. As per the said scheme assessee is not required to pay interest or penalty. In the present case the assessee inadvertently paid the interest also. On being pointed out the adjudicating authority has appropriated the said amount towards the interest payable for the period prior to 01.07.2012.
Penalty for the period after 30.06.2012 - HELD THAT:- The assessee being a religious body was not liable to pay service tax prior to 01.07.2012. after the amendment w.e.f. 01.07.2012 the assessee is liable to pay service tax and has discharged the same before passing the order. The issue being interpretational and the period being transitional when the new service tax regime become applicable, we do not find any grounds to impose penalty for the period 31.12.2012 to 30.09.2013. the view of the adjudicating authority in not imposing penalty is upheld. The department appeal is dismissed.
Appeal allowed.
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2024 (4) TMI 962
CENVAT Credit - mentioning of wrong address in the invoice - HELD THAT:- The orders dated 22.08.2019 and 20.08.2020 are hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back to the adjudicating authority-Additional Commissioner of CGST and Central Excise who shall decide the proceedings on remand, after giving fullest opportunity to the petitioner, without in any way being influenced by this order and on merits. None of the findings and observations recorded in this order would in any manner influence or prejudice either side.
Application disposed off.
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2024 (4) TMI 961
CENVAT Credit - Input service distribution - credit distributed by M/s. Parle Biscuit Private Ltd. i.e. ‘inputs service distributor’ to the appellant, a contractual manufacturer/job worker, for the period prior to 01.04.2016 is in accordance with Rule 7 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 as prevailing at the relevant time or not - HELD THAT:- Prior to 01.04.2016 also, Rule 7 allows distribution of credit to ‘its manufacturing units.’ Here the words used are ‘its manufacturing units’ which, in absence of anything contrary, cannot be said to be limited to ‘manufacturing unit’ owned by Parle Biscuits only. The first principle of interpretation is that the words used in any statute have to be interpreted without adding any words. The term ‘its manufacturing unit’ has certainly a wider term to include an outside manufacturing unit or the job worker. Another thing which supports my aforesaid view is the Registration Exemption Notification issued in the year 2001 under Rule 9(2) of Central Excise Rules, 2001 which provides for exemption from registration of the authorised person to manufacture goods on behalf of principal manufacturer - As per the agreement between appellant and Parle Biscuits, they were receiving the raw materials from them and finished goods were processed at their factory with their won labour but Trademarks of Parle Biscuits were cleared on payment of duty to the depot of Parle Biscuits.
Number of decisions have been placed on record by the learned Counsel in support of her submission that even prior to 01.04.2016 Rule 7 ibid permitted distribution of credit by the Input Service Distributor even to contract manufacturer or the job worker. I have gone through all the decisions. In my view the issue involved herein is no more res integra in view of those decisions and in particular the reference answered by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal on the very same issue in the matter of the M/S. KRISHNA FOOD PRODUCTS, MS. MARIAMMA R. IYER AND M/S. PARLE BISCUITS PVT LTD. VERSUS THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF CGST & C. EX [2021 (7) TMI 296 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] in which it has been held even in terms of the provisions of rule 2(m) and rule 7 of the CENVAT Rules, as they stood prior to 01.04.2016, the appellant could distribute CENVAT credit in respect of the service tax paid on inputs services to its manufacturing units, including a job workers.
M/s Parle Biscuits Pvt Ltd. i.e., the input service distributor has rightly distributed the Credit to the appellant and the appellant is justified in availing the same - the impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
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2024 (4) TMI 960
MODVAT Credit - proper duty paying documents or not - challans-cum-invoices issued by M/s. SAIL, do not contain the duty payment details - HELD THAT:- N/N. 15/1994-C.E.(N.T.) dated 30.03.1994 provides relaxation to avail MODVAT Credit on the basis of challans-cum-invoices issued by stockyards of manufacturers subject to the condition that such challans-cum-invoices shall contain all the duty payment particulars. In the present case, it is alleged that the challans-cum-invoices based on which the appellant availed credit did not contain the details of payment of duty and accordingly, the MODVAT Credit has been disallowed.
There is no allegation in the Show Cause Notice or the impugned Order-in-Original that the appellant had not received the goods in the premises of the factory. There is no allegation that the supplier viz. M/s. SAIL has not made payment of duty. If there was any doubt regarding payment of duty by M/s. SAIL, then the Department should have demanded the duty from M/s. SAIL and not from the appellant. As far as the appellant is concerned, they have received the goods into the factory on payment of appropriate duty and utilized the same in the manufacture of their finished products based on the challans-cum-invoices issued by the depots of M/s. SAIL. Thus, we observe that there is no dispute regarding the duty-paid nature of the goods.
The substantive benefit of MODVAT Credit cannot be denied due to procedural lapses.
Thus, the substantive benefit of MODVAT Credit cannot be denied on the ground of procedural lapses. Accordingly, the appellant is eligible for the MODVAT Credit on the basis of the challans-cum-invoices issued by the depots of M/s. SAIL - the impugned order is set aside.
Appeal allowed.
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2024 (4) TMI 959
Non-payment of duty fixed for the month of March 2000 - Compounded Levy Scheme - invoking the proviso to Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 alleging suppression of fact - extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- It is observed from the Show Cause Notice that the demand has been raised by invoking the provisions of Section 11A of the Act and penalty has been imposed for contravention of the provisions of Section 11A on the ground that the appellant had mala fide intention to evade the payment of duty.
The appellant has declared the non-payment of duty for the month of March 2000 in the return filed by them. They have not suppressed any information from the Department. The Show Cause Notice was issued by invoking the proviso under Section 11A on the ground that the appellant had deliberately not paid Central Excise Duty. No suppression of fact with intention to evade payment of duty exists in this case. The appellant has declared all the information in their RT-12 return and the Notice has also been issued upon scrutiny of the RT-12 return filed by the appellant for the month of March 2000. Accordingly, the extended period of limitation as provided under proviso to Section 11A is not invokable in the present case.
The demand has been raised by invoking the proviso to Section 11A of the Act. As the ingredients for invoking proviso to Section 11A does not exist in this case, the demand confirmed in the impugned order is not sustainable on the ground of limitation.
The demand confirmed in the impugned order set aside on the ground of limitation - appeal allowed.
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2024 (4) TMI 958
SSI Exemption - clubbing of clearances of four units - dummy unit created for the purpose of claiming benefit of SSI exemption - Confiscation of the goods and imposition of redemption fine - HELD THAT:- Though the units were jointly managed by way of common employee, common workers, common marketing set-up etc., the benefit of SSI exemption notification was claimed individually by each of one of them. M/s Precision Equipment Co. was started in the year 1991 as proprietary firm under the proprietorship of Shri Rajubhai Jaisinghani. Later on, one by one other firms were created. Another allegation of the Revenue is that all the units were so much interdependent on each other that production and marketing were commonly managed by Proprietors and Directors of the firm and there is financial flow back between them.
It is found that all the units have their own separate and independent existence. M/s Precision Equipment Co. was a proprietorship firm of Shri Rajubhai Jaisinghani, M/s Pratik Enterprises was a proprietorship firm of Shri Bhagubhai Prajapati, M/s Precision Industries was a proprietorship firm of Shri Prembhai Manuskhani and M/s Precision Rotogravure pvt. Ltd. had three directors viz. (i) Rajubhai Jaisinghani, Shri Bhagubhai Prajapati and Shri Prembhai Mansukhani. Separate Locations, Central Sale Tax Registration Certificate, Gujarat Commercial Tax Registration Certificate, separate Electricity Meters and separate Bank Accounts. Appellants also produced before us their separate profit & loss accounts, balance sheets, Audit reports, VAT return filed by them, sample bank account statements, purchase accounts and sales accounts.
In the present matter it is admitted fact by the revenue itself that M/s Precision Industries had bought raw materials and got finished goods manufactured on Job Work Basis. The Job Workers had also accepted that they had done job work of M/s Precision Industries also. The officers had also visited the premises of all units and found that all the units have separate existence and have separate premises and independent electricity connection etc. Some processes were being done outside the premises on job work basis by the said units, which were also confirmed by the job workers.
In the present case the individual manufacturing appellants have independent identities since the Revenue could not establish that their books of accounts are common, that their bank accounts are common, that their registration with Income Tax, Sales Tax are common and that there is common funding and that there is mutuality of interest and that there is financial flowback. In the absence of any such evidence, it is held that the manufacturer units are independent units and therefore, their clearances could not be clubbed together. Therefore, the issue of clubbing the clearances is not sustainable in the absence of concrete and corroborative evidences.
Confiscation of the goods and imposition of redemption fine - HELD THAT:- Confiscation of the goods which were not available is not legal and correct, therefore consequently redemption fine was not warranted as held in the Larger Bench’s judgment in the case of SHIV KRIPA ISPAT PVT. LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF C. EX. & CUS., NASIK [2009 (1) TMI 124 - CESTAT MUMBAI].
The impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
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2024 (4) TMI 957
Validity of assessment order - Levy of penalty u/s 53(1)(ii) of the AP VAT Act - wilful evasion of tax or not - SCN also do not categorically mention that it was a case of wilful evasion of tax - SCN barred by time limitation - Section 21(4) of AP VAT Act, 2005 - HELD THAT:- As seen from the show cause notice dated 24.06.2021 there is a mention of under declaration of 14.5% purchases during the year 2016-17. It is also mentioned that penalty proceedings would also be issued separately as the dealer was found to have committed offence under the provision of AP VAT Act. In the revised show cause notice also it is mentioned that the petitioner consumed lot of time and avoided production of records in-time. Provisions of Section 21(5) of the Act were made applicable to the facts of the case.
Now coming to the applicability of the extension of period of limitation by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in view of the then prevailing Covid situation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in IN RE: COGNIZANCE FOR EXTENSION OF LIMITATION [2021 (3) TMI 497 - SC ORDER] has considered the difficulties that may be faced by the litigants across the country in filing their petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings and extended the period of limitation in all such proceedings irrespective of limitation prescribed under the general law or special laws whether condonable or not.
The period of limitation has to be extended to all proceedings including the issuance of show cause notice or passing of assessment orders or filing of appeals before the Appellate Tribunals against the orders which arise out of the show cause notices and the assessment orders - That apart, Section 21(5) of the AP VAT Act would entitle the authorities to conduct the assessment within a period of six years of the date of filing of the return or the first return relating to such offence. It is explicitly mentioned in the show cause notice dated 24.06.2021 that it was the case of under declaration of purchases during the year 2016-17. In our considered opinion this would suffice for proceeding with the assessment within a period of six years from the date of filing of the return or first return relating to such offence. That apart on these grounds the writ petitions deserves to be dismissed. There is an efficacious, alternate and statutory remedy available for the petitioner.
Petition dismissed.
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2024 (4) TMI 956
Interest on delayed refund - relevant period for calculation of refund - Section 42(1) of the DVAT ACT, 2004 - HELD THAT:- Reference may be had to Article 25 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, which stipulates that the period of limitation for “money payable for interest upon money due from defendant to the plaintiff” is 3 years and the time from which the period begins is when the interest becomes due.
The petitioner would be entitled to interest for a period of three years immediately preceding the filing of the subject petition till the date payment was made of the petitioner. The rate of interest applicable would be @ 6 % per annum in terms of Notification No. F.3(59)/Fin.(T&E)/2005-06/903 Dated 30th November, 2005 whereby the annual rate notified by Central Government is 6% per annum.
This petition is disposed of directing the respondents to pay interest @6% on Rs. 37,99,453/- refunded on 28.07.2022 for the period of three years immediately preceding the filing of the petition till the date of disbursal of refund to the petitioner.
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2024 (4) TMI 955
Time limitation for passing assessment order - Classification of goods - Polymer Nylon Chips - classifiable under Entry 83 Schedule-II(B) of the Uttarakhand Value Added Tax Act, as “Plastic Granules” or not - whether re-assessment, under Section 29(4) of the Act could be made on the change of opinion, especially keeping in view that the same records had already been scrutinized by the Assessing Authority?
Time limitation for passing assessment order - HELD THAT:- As per Section 29(7) of the U.P. Commercial Tax Act, reassessment can be made within a period of 8 years after expiry of the Assessment Year. In the present case, as per the Uttarakhand Value Added Tax Act, Section 29(4) deals with the procedure for doing reassessment - In the present case, the Assessment Year is 2011-12, and before the end of six years, the reassessment order can be passed. The reassessment order has been passed on 27.03.2017, which is before the end of six years of the Assessment Year 2011-12, and hence the reassessment order passed under Section 29(4) of the Act was done within limitation, and this aspect has been affirmed by the Tribunal, and the Appeals, qua this ground, has been rightly dismissed.
Whether Nylon Chips manufactured by the appellant are covered by Entry 83 of Schedule-(II)(B) of the Act? - HELD THAT:- The appellant-department have themselves accepted that, with respect to the Plastic Granules, when they are put into procedure by adding fillers and additives, the strength of the plastic becomes better. Further, as per the opinion given by the British Plastics Federation, and Central Institute of Plastics Engineering & Technology (CIPET), Nylon refers to a group of Plastics known as Polyamide, and there is no change in the original material (raw material) in this manufacturing process of Nylon-6. Hence, the use of raw material, i.e. Plastic Granules to produce Nylon Chips will not alter the character of Nylon Chips, being a Plastic, and under the British Plastics Federation, Nylon is considered under the Plastics group - There is no substantial question of law, which requires to be considered in the present Revision. The Nylon Chips have been rightly held to be falling in Entry 83 of Schedule II(B) of the Act by the Tribunal.
There is no merit in the present Revision, and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2024 (4) TMI 954
Food Safety and Standards - Inadequate labeling - Misbranding - Adulteration of foods or not - sugar boiled confectionaries - packets did not show the prescribed particulars such as complete address of the manufacturer and the date of manufacturing - violation of Rule 32(c) and (f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955.
Appellants would argue that the entire case of the prosecution is liable to be dismissed for the simple reason that the Appellants were charged Under Rule 32(c) and (f) of the Rules but these provisions were not related to misbranding and were regarding something else.
HELD THAT:- The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was repealed by the introduction of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 where Section 52 provides a maximum penalty of Rs. 3,00,000/- for misbranded food. There is no provision for imprisonment.
Whether the Appellant can be granted the benefit of the new legislation and be awarded a lesser punishment as is presently prescribed under the new law? This Court in T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe [1982 (12) TMI 186 - SUPREME COURT], had held that when an amendment is beneficial to the Accused it can be applied even to cases pending in Courts where such a provision did not exist at the time of the commission of offence.
The present Appellant No. 2, at this stage, is about 60 years of age and the crime itself is of the year 2000, and twenty- four years have elapsed since the commission of the crime. Vide Order dated 06.08.2018, this Court had granted exemption from surrendering to Appellant No. 2. Considering all aspects, more particularly the nature of offence, though the findings of the Courts below regarding the offence is upheld, but the sentence of Appellant No. 2 from three months of simple imprisonment along with fine of Rs. 1,000/- is convertred to a fine of Rs. 50,000/-. The sentence of Appellant No. 1 which is for a fine of Rs. 2000/- is upheld.
The appeal is partly allowed.
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2024 (4) TMI 953
Dishonour of cheque - insufficient funds - vicarious liability - liability of group companies - liability common Directors of the group, namely, Right Choice Group of Companies - Lifting of the corporate veil - HELD THAT:- Section 141 of the NI Act is neither intended nor extends the vicarious liability on the group companies. It is intended to create vicarious liability only on the persons and officers who are either in-charge of the company, which is the main accused, or have connived or are negligent, resulting in the accused company committing the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act. Section 141 of the NI Act, therefore, cannot extend to the group companies - Section 138 of the NI Act, in fact, creates liability only on the ‘drawer of the cheque’. As it creates a criminal liability, there is no scope of lifting of the corporate veil. It is only because of the application of Section 141 of the NI Act, that the liability, in case the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is committed by a company, has been extended by a deeming fiction on the person in-charge of or holding an office, making them equally liable for the offence. The said provision, however, cannot extend to other corporate entities or group of companies.
This Court in Yashovardhan Birla v. CECIL Webber Engineering Ltd., [2023 (4) TMI 706 - DELHI HIGH COURT], has reiterated that large business conglomerates may have a number of companies under them, which may be ultimately managed by a particular family or group of investors, but to run the day-to-day affairs, officers and professionals are appointed in such companies. In such cases, the head of the Company cannot be made liable and taken into the purview of Section 141 of the NI Act, doing so would unfairly and unnecessarily expand the provisions of vicarious liability under the NI Act.
Thus, the respondent no. 3 could not have been proceeded against only on the allegation that it is a group company of the accused no. 1, which is the drawer of the cheque in question.
Liability of common Directors of the group, namely, Right Choice Group of Companies - HELD THAT:- The petitioner has placed no document on record to show that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 were the Directors of the accused no. 1, which is the drawer of the cheque. There is no averment in the complaint that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 were persons in-charge of or responsible to the accused no. 1 for the conduct of its business. Apart from stating that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 have acted in connivance with accused nos. 1 and 3 or that the accused no. 3 has acted on their express instructions, there is no material placed on record by the petitioner for the said averment - The only reliance of the petitioner even in the present petition is on the alleged LinkedIn profile of respondent no. 1, which inter alia claims respondent no. 1 to be the Director of the Right Choice Group. However, accused no. 1 is not the Right Choice Group but Right Choice Marketing Solutions JLT.
There are no merit in the challenge made by the petitioner in the present petition - petition dismissed.
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2024 (4) TMI 952
Validity Of Order passed by Joint Commissioner of State Tax - No opportunity of hearing - directed to pay / reverse the alleged ITC claimed - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, the impugned order has been passed after scrutiny of returns u/s 61 of the Act, 2017 and it has been passed u/s 73 of the Act, 2017. Under the Act, 2017, there is specific provision for filing appeal before the appellate authority, if there is any grievance to the assessee from the impugned order, but without preferring appeal, the petitioner has directly approached before this Court invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.
Since there is already alternative efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner to file appeal against the impugned order, hence, I do not feel inclined to entertain this petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is hereby dismissed reserving liberty in favour of the petitioner to challenge the impugned order before the appropriate authority in accordance with law.
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2024 (4) TMI 951
Violation of principles of natural justice - opportunity of personal hearing, not provided to petitioner - exemption for the services provided to the Government - attachment of Bank Accounts of petitioner - HELD THAT:- This issue has already been decided by the Division Bench of the Principal Seat of this Court in W.P.No.24996 of 2019, dated 30.11.2022, wherein, similar contractors are directed to approach the appellate authority and it was held that wherever the Orders-in-Original have been passed, the respective petitioners are given liberty to file statutory appeal before the Appellate Authority subject to the compliance of the other requirements of pre-deposit the amount as is contemplated under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as made applicable to the Finance Act, 1994, within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
This writ petition is disposed of with a liberty to the petitioner to file a statutory appeal before the Appellate Authority concerned within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
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2024 (4) TMI 950
Validity Of order passed by the competent authority in purported exercise of powers u/s 129 (3) - detention of the goods and vehicle - stock transfer - Penalty - Demand of applicable tax - HELD THAT:- The short contention is that the detained goods were being transported as part of a stock transfer. The goods were not being moved in pursuance to any sale or purchase. The goods were not liable to tax. The detention of the goods and imposition of tax and penalty were unlawful. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the aforesaid ground has not been considered by the appellate authority while rejecting the appeal of the petitioner.
Thus, the ground raised by the petitioner merits consideration by the appellate authority in the first instance. Clearly, the appellate authority has failed to do so. Failure of the appellate authority to advert to the said objections of the petitioner, reflects non application of mind to germane issues and vitiates the impugned order passed by the appellate authority.
The impugned order dated 28.12.2020 passed by the appellate authority is consequently set aside. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above.
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2024 (4) TMI 949
Penalty for Non-filing of monthly return - Seeking permission to file GSTR 3B Return - Seeking refund of amount illegally debited from the Electronic Cash Ledger towards interest and penalty - HELD THAT:- Whatever be the true facts, this much is clear that the petitioner had initiated the payment of tax for the month of April, 2023 within time, in the manner prescribed. The amount was debited from its account, within prescribed time. To that extent, "failure" may never be attributed to the petitioner- in timely payment of the tax amount. The levy of late fee (Section 47) and interest (Section 50) under U.P. GST Act, 2017 may arise only in the event of "failure" on the part of an assessee to file a return and/ or payment of due tax within time.
Insofar as the delay may be attributed exclusively to the respondent-bank after such payment was made by the petitioner within time, on that statement itself the levy of penalty remains unwarranted. What errors may have been committed by the bank/ or GSTN may not involve the petitioner.
Thus, leaving it open to the GSTN and the Bank to device a better mechanism to ensure prompt credit and debit entries to arise in real time as may not create any doubts or disputes in future, the present writ petition stands disposed of as below.
The amount of penalty Rs. 1,07,710.51/- and interest Rs. 100/- deposited by the petitioner under protest may be adjusted against the tax liability for the month of April, 2024 onwards without incurring any liability as to interest on that amount.
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2024 (4) TMI 948
Validity Of Order passed u/s 73 - Show Cause Notice issued proposing a demand - Penalty - excess claim Input Tax Credit [“ITC”] - No opportunity granted to file reply - HELD THAT:- Perusal of the Show Cause Notice dated 24.09.2023 shows that the Department has given separate headings i.e., under declaration of output tax; the tax on outward supplies under declared on reconciliation of data in GSTR-09; excess claim Input Tax Credit [“ITC”]; Scrutiny of ITC availed and ITC claimed from cancelled dealers, return defaulters & tax non payers. To the said Show Cause Notice, a detailed reply was furnished by the petitioner giving disclosures under each of the heads.
The observation in the impugned order dated 28.12.2023 is not sustainable for the reasons that the reply dated 11.10.2023 (uploaded on portal on 24.10.2023) filed by the Petitioner is a detailed reply. Proper Officer had to at least consider the reply on merits and then form an opinion. He merely held that the reply is unsatisfactory, which ex-facie shows that Proper Officer has not applied his mind to the reply submitted by the petitioner.
Thus, the impugned order dated 28.12.2023 cannot be sustained, and the matter is liable to be remitted to the Proper Officer for re-adjudication. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 28.12.2023 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Proper Officer for re-adjudication.
It is clarified that this Court has neither considered nor commented upon the merits of the contentions of either party.
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2024 (4) TMI 947
Cancellation of the GST registration retrospectively - Validity Of Order passed and Show cause notice - barred by limitation - Petitioner unable to conduct business because of the owner’s ill health resulting in default of filing returns and obeying notices - HELD THAT:-Pursuant to the said impugned order, Petitioner filed an application dated 02.11.2019 seeking revocation of cancellation of GST registration. On the said application, Petitioner was issued Show Cause Notice dated 24.05.2022 for rejection of application for revocation of cancellation of registration. It merely stated “Any Supporting Document - Others (Please specify) - GSTIN is neither Aadhaar Authenticated nor e-KYC verified.
We notice that the Show Cause Notice and the impugned order are bereft of any details. Accordingly, the same cannot be sustained. Neither the Show Cause Notice, nor the order spell out the reasons for retrospective cancellation.
It is important to note that, according to the respondent, one of the consequences for cancelling a taxpayer’s registration with retrospective effect is that the taxpayer’s customers are denied the input tax credit availed in respect of the supplies made by the taxpayer during such period. Although, we do not consider it apposite to examine this aspect but assuming that the respondent’s contention in this regard is correct, it would follow that the proper officer is also required to consider this aspect while passing any order for cancellation of GST registration with retrospective effect. Thus, a taxpayer’s registration can be cancelled with retrospective effect only where such consequences are intended and are warranted.
Thus, order dated 24.09.2019 cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside. The GST registration of the petitioner is restored. Petitioner shall, however, make all necessary compliances and file the requisite returns and information inter alia in terms of Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.
The petition is accordingly disposed of in the above terms.
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2024 (4) TMI 946
Validity of Orders passed u/s 73 - excess claim of Input Tax Credit [ITC] - Inadequate Consideration of Replies - Levy of penalty - No opportunity of Personal Hearing - HELD THAT:- Perusal of the Show Cause Notices dated 05.09.2023 and 29.09.2023 shows that the Department has issued both the notices on similar grounds and headings i.e., excess claim Input Tax Credit [“ITC”]; Scrutiny of ITC availed and scrutiny of ITC reversals, to the said Show Cause Notices, detailed replies were furnished by the petitioner giving disclosures under each of the heads. Pursuant to the said Show Cause Notices, Petitioner was issued reminders dated 21.12.2023 thereafter Petitioner filed replies dated 26.12.2023 to the said reminders.
The observation in the impugned orders dated 31.12.2023 is not sustainable for the reasons that the replies dated 14.12.2023 and 03.10.2023 filed by the Petitioner are detailed replies with supporting documents. Proper Officer had to at least consider the reply on merits and then form an opinion. He merely held that the reply dated 03.10.2023 is unsatisfactory and reply dated 14.12.2023 is not supported with proper calculations/reconciliation and relevant documents, which ex-facie shows that the Proper Officer has not applied his mind to the replies submitted by the petitioner.
Further, if the Proper Officer was of the view that any further details were required, the same could have been specifically sought from the Petitioner. However, the record does not reflect that any such opportunity was given to the Petitioner to clarify its reply or furnish further documents/details.
Thus, impugned orders dated 31.12.2023 cannot be sustained, and the matter is liable to be remitted to the Proper Officer for re-adjudication. Accordingly, impugned orders dated 31.12.2023 are set aside and the matter is remitted to the Proper Officer for re-adjudication.
Petition is disposed of in the above terms.
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