Home Case Index All Cases Income Tax Section Wise This

Law	-- All -- GST Income Tax Benami Property Customs Corporate Laws Securities / SEBI Insolvency & Bankruptcy FEMA Law of Competition PMLA Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Wealth tax Indian Laws
Court	-- Any -- Supreme Court SC Orders / Highlights High Court Appellate Tribunal Tribunal Appellate authority for Advance Ruling Advance Ruling Authority National Financial Reporting Authority Competition Commission of India ANTI-PROFITEERING AUTHORITY Commission Central Government Board DISTRICT/ SESSIONS Court Commissioner / Appellate Authority Other
Citation	--Year-- 2025 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 Upto 1949 - -Volume- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 -
Landmark	Nil - N/A Referred in >= 2 Cases Referred in >= 4 Cases Referred in >= 5 Cases Referred in >= 10 Cases Referred in >= 15 Cases Referred in >= 25 Cases Referred in >= 50 Cases Referred in >= 100 Cases
Order by	TMI Citation Date of Decision

Advanced Search Options

Case Laws

Showing 41 to 60 of 435282 Records

• 2025 (7) TMI 166
  

  Confiscation of Gold - failure to appreciate scope and ambit of section 111(b), 111(d), 123, 112(a), 112(b) and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 - burden of proof under section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 is upon the respondent to establish with cogent evidence that the seized gold in question are not smuggled goods or not - violation of the principles of natural justice by not considering the outcome of the investigation of DRI Authority - validity of statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 - levy of penalties - HELD THAT:- The Court orally made an observation to the learned senior Advocate appearing for the respondent that the application need not be pressed for the time being since this Court is inclined to take up the appeal on an early date. This broad understanding was not recorded as the Court was of the earnest belief that the same will be conveyed to the learned Advocate/authorized representative who will appear for the respondent before the learned Tribunal. However, we are surprised to note that the authorized representative of the respondent had made submissions on merits before the learned Tribunal when the application was heard on 30th June, 2025 and a direction has been issued to the concerned Officer of the Revenue to remain present on 2nd July, 2025 to apprise the Tribunal as to whether they have obtained any stay order against the order passed by the Tribunal or complied with the order passed by the Tribunal till date or not.

  Considering the fact that the appeal is admitted, the order impugned in this appeal passed by the learned Tribunal as well as the order passed by the learned Tribunal in Customs Miscellaneous Application No. 75363 of 2025, dated 30th June, 2025, shall remain stayed until further orders.

  Let the appeal be listed for hearing on 15th July, 2025.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 165
  

  Seeking provisional release of imported goods - Dry Dates - reliability of Circular No. 35 of 2017- Customs dated 16 August 2017, containing Guidelines for provisional release of seized imported goods pending adjudication under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 - HELD THAT:- Permitting the perishable goods [dry dates] to decay would not benefit the Respondents and would cause severe prejudice to the Petitioner. If, following the proposed investigations and adjudication, no fault is found with the imports, the goods would most likely have perished. Therefore, a balanced approach was necessary to ensure that neither party's interests or concerns suffered disproportionately. The circular dated August 16, 2017, is a step in that direction.

  It is not intended to address the issue of waiver of Detention-cum-Demurrage charges at this stage. However, if the Petitioner submits a request for waiver, it is directed that it be disposed of in accordance with the law within three months of receipt.

  Petition disposed off.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 164
  

  Seizure of 17085 Kgs of Betel Nuts and truck - alleged violation of Section 7, 11, 46 and 47 of the Customs Act, 1962 read with Section 3(2) of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 and Government of India, Ministry of Finance N/N 9/96 (NT) – CUS dated 22.01.1996 issued u/s 110 of the Customs Act, 1962 - HELD THAT:- This writ application is being disposed of in similar terms as has been done by this Court in the case of M/s Ashoke Das [2025 (2) TMI 1123 - PATNA HIGH COURT] where it was held that 'The proper officer has to record his reasons to believe that the goods that he proposes to seize are liable to confiscation. The said reasons for exercise of the power have to be recorded prior to the seizure. The subsequent instruction issued by the Department clearly says that in addition to panchnama reason to believe should be indicated in the seizure memo/order.'

  This writ application is being disposed of in similar terms as has been done by this Court in the case of M/s Ashoke Das.

  The Seizure Memo as contained in Annexure ‘5’ is quashed, however, in terms of the observations in paragraphs ‘44’ and ‘45’ in the case of M/s Ashoke Das, it is once again held that quashing of Seizure Memo would not mean that the Department cannot investigate and proceed in accordance with law under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962. Other observations shall also apply in the present case - the application disposed off.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 163
  

  Classification of goods - 26 Mixtures of Odoriferous (MOS) compound flavoured preparation - to be classified under heading 3302.10 of the Customs Tariff Act or under heading 3302.90.90 of the Customs Tariff Act? - HELD THAT:- In the decision of the Bangalore Bench in GIAVUDAN INDIAN PVT. LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, BANGALORE [2009 (12) TMI 786 - CESTAT BANGALORE] which has been relied on by the appellate authority as well as the adjudicating authority, it has been held that 'The imported flavours impugned in the show cause notice are compound alcoholic preparations and the same are not entitled to concessional rate of duty as provided in Notification No. 21/2002-Cus., dated 1-3-2002 and accordingly, M/s GIPL are liable to pay the differential duty in respect of those flavours.'

  Thus, even as per the above decision of the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal, it was necessary to determine whether the imported flavours were of a kind used for the manufacture of beverages. The Tribunal, finding that as regards the flavours not sold to manufacturers of beverages, it is not established in the order that they are of a kind used for the manufacture of beverages, found it necessary that the Commissioner therefore has to examine and categorically find if these compounds are also of a kind used for the manufacture of beverages. Therefore, the tribunal remanded the dispute relating to the remaining flavour compounds to the Commissioner for a fresh decision.

  Given the fact that both parties are ad idem that the matter requires examination and reconsideration by the Original authority afresh, we are of the view that the interest of justice will be served if the matter is remitted back for decision afresh. Accordingly, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the matter, we set aside the impugned order and remit the matter back to the jurisdictional Adjudicating Authority for denovo adjudication with specific directions to give a reasoned order on the contention on facts that the appellant had raised, and render a categorical finding as to whether or not the goods imported by the appellant in the present case are of a kind used for the manufacture of beverages. Needless to say, the adjudicating authority has to adhere to the principles of natural justice.

  The appeals are allowed by way of remand.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 162
  

  Valuation of imported goods - Investigation by SVB - the invoice prices of the foreign supplier can be accepted in the absence of higher contemporaneous import prices or not - reliability of LME prices alone for determination of value of imported goods between related parties in the absence of noticing any flowback in the form of royalty/technical knowhow fees - HELD THAT:- It is observed that there is no evidence of higher contemporaneous import prices recorded either in the OIO or the impugned order. Further we find that LME prices cannot be the sacrosanct evidence to substantiate the charge of undervaluation, especially when contemporaneous import of almost same price was available during the material time. The law is well settled in the following cases, that transaction value cannot be rejected, unless there is contemporaneous import prices as evidence to reject the invoice value.

  The impugned Order- in-Appeal for mechanically remanding without cogent reasons could not be sustained and the value declared by the Indian Importer cannot be rejected in view of the detailed examination carried out by the SVB not once but twice that after examining all the invoices and documents as relevant.

  Further, on going through the impugned order, it is found that the objections raised by the appellants are justified. The OIA is very cryptic and does not give any cogent reasons for rejecting the declared assessable value. In the absence of any evidence of contemporaneous import or any other factors that rendered the invoice unacceptable, it is not possible to say that the transaction value was not the correct value acceptable under Section 14 of Customs Act. It would have been a different matter if the Department was able to show by reference to contemporaneous imports, or other evidence that the goods were undervalued. There is however no such evidence placed. It is to be noted that the importer has filed his questionnaire, all the invoices and related documents before the SVB - the Appellate Authority did not discuss any problem in the methodology to arrive at the import price having rejected the declared value. No directions are given to the lower authorities about the manner in which the valuation is to be arrived at and the rules thereunder to be applied. Such an order cannot be implemented.

  Further, it is noted that the submissions of the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant who has averred that in the absence of any evaluation by the assessing group or any allegation even to state that the contemporaneous import prices of aluminium ingots during the relevant period were higher than the price declared by the appellant, there is no requirement to probe the documents pertaining to the transactions between the foreign related supplier and their unrelated suppliers (LME Registered Suppliers). Therefore, there is no justification or any compelling reason to interfere with order of the Lower Adjudicating Authority and the impugned order of the Commissioner (Appeals) setting aside the Order-in-Original No.20495/2013 dated 21.03.2013 is not legally sustainable.

  Appeal allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 161
  

  Interest on delayed refund - refunded revenue deposit in provisional assessment not contemplated for allowing interest under section 27A of Customs Act, 1962 - Enhancement of value prompted by alleged relationship of seller and buyer - HELD THAT:- There is no doubt that the order of the Tribunal entitling the respondent herein to refund of ₹ 74,72,348 was entailed as consequential relief. That interest may be thus entailed is an assertion perfectly within the empowerment of the Tribunal and, not being amendment of order of the Tribunal issued under section 129B of Customs Act, 1962, which, as fresh cause of action, could have been challenged appropriately or clarifications sought from the Tribunal by appropriate statutory instrument, was to be implemented. A lower authority may contrarily be obdurate at its own peril and it was inconceivable that they should have been expected to do otherwise. There was no option but to dismiss the appeal, founded solely on non-applicability of interest liability to refund of revenue deposit, as ‘point of no return’ was crossed by failure to challenge the clarification by the Tribunal.

  With ‘revenue deposits’, proffered by importer as consequence of direction of the ‘special valuation branch (SVB)’, held as unauthorized by law and entitled to refund, subsequent cause of action that led to the doors of the Tribunal, was entitlement to secure refund for themselves. That it was not a refund of duties, to which section 27A of Customs Act, 1962 was indubitably applicable, had ceased to be lis and, if refund was due, operation of section 27(3) of Customs Act, 1962 precluded assigning any other hue to the collection for any purpose whatsoever - The order of the Tribunal had no pretence to be the law; it proceeded to direct that which was within the law and the composition of the direction assumed legality from lack of challenge. All that the lower authorities could do was to work the law. The claim of the appellant-Commissioner is that excess allowed by the first appellate authority has not been tested against provisions of law.

  The challenge to order of the first appellate authority rejecting the ground of disentitlement for interest is found to be without merit. As far as the appeal against the order enhancing interest liability, there is no examination of the facts to which the provisions of section 27A of Customs Act, 1962 should have been applied.

  Matter remanded back to the original authority for a fresh decision on the appeal of M/s Borsara Machines against the order limiting sanction - Appeal disposed off by way of remand.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 160
  

  Violation of provisions of Regulation 13(b) of IA Regulations and Clause 1 of Code of Conduct for Investment Advisers read with Regulation 15 (9) of IA Regulations - whether the activities carried out by the Noticees through the six partnership firms were in violation of provisions of Regulation 13(b) of IA Regulations and Clause 1 of Code of Conduct for Investment Advisers read with Regulation 15(9) of IA Regulations?

  HELD THAT:- Regulation 13(b) of the IA Regulations, inter alia, provides that any certificate granted under regulation 9 shall be subject to the investment adviser informing SEBI in writing, if any information or particulars previously submitted to SEBI are found to be false or misleading in any material particular or if there is any material change in the information already submitted.

  Code of Conduct for Investment Advisers, inter alia, provides that an investment adviser shall act honestly, fairly and in the best interests of its clients and in the integrity of the market.

  DA has observed that the Noticees had not declared the investment advisory activities through unregistered partnership firms at the time of applying to SEBI for registration as IA in their individual capacity, which by itself is a suppression of facts.

  It has been observed by the DA that as per the requirement of Regulation 13(b) of the IA Regulations, at least subsequently, Noticees ought to have informed SEBI about their IA activities through six partnership firms, as the information declared at the time of application that they were not engaged in IA activities, was false. Thus, the DA has found the Noticees to be in violation of Regulation 13(b) of the IA Regulations.

  Noticee No. 1 has not provided sufficient evidence or justification in response to the above mentioned observation made by the DA. In absence of such material or justification, the material available on record clearly suggests that Noticees were involved in providing unregistered investment advisory activities prior to obtaining SEBI registration, which they continued to do, even after obtaining the registration.

  Thus, no doubt in agreeing with the observations made by the DA that the Noticees have violated Regulation 13(b) of the IA Regulations and Clause 1 of Code of Conduct for Investment Advisers read with Regulation 15 (9) of IA Regulations. Further, the Noticees have also not acted with honesty, fairness and in the interest of maintaining integrity of the securities market.

  Whether the recommendation made by the DA is appropriate? - As stated earlier, the DA has recommended that the Noticees shall be refrained from taking up any new assignment or contract for a period of 3 (Three) years.

  Although Noticees 1 and 2 are registered with SEBI, they have not conducted the IA activities in their individual capacities but rather carried out IA work through the six partnership firms who were not registered with SEBI”. Accordingly, vide the said Order dated November 28, 2023, Noticees (amongst others) were debarred from accessing the securities market, directly or indirectly and were prohibited from buying, selling or otherwise dealing in the securities market, directly or indirectly in any manner whatsoever, for a period of two years from the date of the order or till the expiry of two years from the date of completion of refunds to complainants/ investors as directed whichever is later. The said direction effectively acts as a restraint from taking any new clients. Further, SEBI vide the same Order had also imposed a penalty of ₹ 18,00,000 on the Noticees along with 7 other entities to be paid jointly and severally, and also directed them to refund the amount/fees/consideration received from investors/clients.

  Noticee No. 1 has submitted that he has challenged the said Order of SEBI before the Hon’ble Securities Appellate Tribunal. We note that no stay has been obtained by the Noticee No. 1 against the said Order.

  Noticee No. 2 did not challenge the said Order and thus, it has attained finality against him. Noticee No. 2 in his submissions (before the DA) had desired to surrender his IA Registration since he was neither using the IA registration and nor maintaining any clients. On perusing the registered intermediary database of SEBI, also note that his (Noticee No. 2’s) name is not appearing in the list of SEBI registered intermediary since his registration is not in force owing to non- payment of registration fees. However, in terms of the IA Regulations, the certificate of registration granted by SEBI remains valid until it is suspended or cancelled.

  Considering that the Noticees have already been debarred from the securities market and penalized for their conduct, I am of the view that restraining the Noticees from taking up any new assignment or contract for a period of 3 (Three) years as recommended by the DA would be disproportionate, and instead, a restraint of six months would be commensurate and would meet the ends of justice.

  In exercise of the powers conferred upon me under Section 19 of the SEBI Act, 1992 read with Regulation 27(5) of the Intermediaries regulations, restrain the Noticees from taking up any new assignment or contract for a period of six months.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 159
  

  Condonation of delay of 280 days in refiling the present Appeal - Delay on the ground of ill-health of the father of Appellant as well as ill-health of the father of the Counsel - sufficient cause for delay or not - HELD THAT:- The present Appeal was filed on 06.04.2024 by the Appellant - Mr. Sandeep Kasare who is the Power of Attorney holder of Ms. Anupma Agarwal (Ms. Anupma) the Erstwhile Director of Somerset Estate Private Limited (Corporate Debtor). The registry of this Appellate Tribunal marked the defects on 12.04.2024. As per Rule 26(2) of NCLAT Rules, 2016, seven days are prescribed for refiling of the Appeal from the date when the registry intimates the defects to the Appellant.

  The explanation is not found to be sufficient and justifiable for condonation of delay in refiling the Appeal. The Appellant has been very casual and not pursued it for very long period and the defects remained pending. If the Appellant was serious, he could have pursued the matter with the registry in curing the defects and in case they were not getting cured, the appellant could have mentioned it before this Tribunal. It is found that none of this was done. The Appellant places its reliance on various judgments. None of them are applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case.

  Appellant has failed to establish any sufficient or justifiable cause for the inordinate delay of 280 days in refiling the Appeal. The explanation offered that Ms Anupama, a shareholder of the Corporate Debtor was unable to provide the relevant documents as the records were managed by her father-in-law is vague, unsubstantiated and lacks any evidentiary support. Such a contention is devoid of merit and cannot be accepted as a valid ground for condonation of delay. Furthermore, Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process is a time-bound mechanism under the IBC and an inordinate delay of 280 days without any justifiable cause undermines the objective of expeditious resolution and serves only as an impediment to the statutory timelines prescribed under the Code.

  There is no sufficient cause to condone the delay in refiling for 280 days. Insolvency Resolution is a time bound process and such laxity in pursuing the Appeal is not understandable. Therefore, the Application for condonation of delay is dismissed.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 158
  

  Money Laundering - direction to Respondents to substitute the provisionally attached property with that of any of the unencumbered marketable assets - HELD THAT:- The petitioners, namely, M/s. M3M India Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. M3M India Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. have filed an affidavit agreeing to the conditions.

  The substitution of the property as indicated in paragraphs 10(a), 10(b) and 10(c) in the additional affidavit allowed, the same shall be subject to the conditions as specified in paragraphs 10(d)(i) to 10(d)(ix).

  SLP disposed off.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 157
  

  Seeking grant of anticipatory bail under Section 482 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Money Laundering - predicate offence - import of photosensitive semiconductor devices - failure to take proper steps for service through the Ministry of Home Affairs and failed to attach requisite documents for service in Hong Kong, as per protocol - failre to rebut presumption - HELD THAT:- It is not disputed that the predicate FIR registered by the Economic Offences Wing, Delhi Police, discloses the commission of cognizable and scheduled offences under the PMLA, involving the use of forged Form 15CBs to remit sums exceeding Rs. 300 Crores abroad. Though the applicant is not named in the predicate FIR, the Directorate of Enforcement, in exercise of its powers under Section 3 read with Section 70 of the PMLA, has attributed a portion of the said proceeds to the applicant’s company. In terms of Section 24 of the PMLA, a statutory presumption arises once it is shown that a person is in possession of property linked with a scheduled offence. It is for the applicant to rebut the presumption by demonstrating that such proceeds are untainted. At this stage, no material has been placed on record to displace the statutory presumption.

  The reliance placed by the applicant on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, [2022 (7) TMI 1316 - SUPREME COURT (LB)], is misplaced, as the decision does not exempt foreign recipients from scrutiny merely by asserting contractual legitimacy in the face of strong allegations of layered money laundering.

  The applicant’s conduct during the investigation is materially relevant to the exercise of discretion under Section 438 Cr. PC. It is on record that the applicant was intercepted at the Amritsar International Airport on 27.01.2025 and served with a summons under Section 50 of the PMLA to appear the following day. He failed to appear, and continued to ignore subsequent summons dated 06.02.2025, 25.02.2025, and 03.04.2025, on vague grounds relating to his father’s illness, without substantiating such claims or offering any concrete mechanism for cooperation. In Virbhadra Singh v. ED [2017 (7) TMI 109 - DELHI HIGH COURT], this Court held that failure to comply with Section 50 summons is a serious breach and may warrant coercive steps.

  Law laid down in Tarsem Lal’s case is applicable to an accused named in prosecution complaint. Here, by contrast, the present applicant has not been arrayed as an accused and investigation qua him is still stated to be pending, the applicant has failed to appear despite multiple statutory summons and is now seeking anticipatory bail to evade arrest. In State v. Anil Sharma, [1997 (9) TMI 626 - SUPREME COURT], the Supreme Court underscored the necessity of custodial interrogation in white-collar crimes, noting that anticipatory bail at an early stage can frustrate meaningful investigation.

  The apprehension expressed by the Enforcement Directorate that the applicant poses a flight risk is not without merit. The applicant is a permanent resident of Hong Kong and has no known fixed assets or ties in India. His interception at the airport was not a voluntary surrender but an incidental occurrence. In Directorate of Enforcement v. M. Gopal Reddy [2023 (2) TMI 1045 - SUPREME COURT], the Court held that anticipatory bail ought not be granted where the accused is residing abroad, evading investigation, and lacks a demonstrable intention to submit to jurisdiction. The applicant’s conduct fits this description.

  This Court is of the considered view that custodial interrogation may be warranted to ascertain the applicant’s role in facilitating or benefiting from the alleged money laundering operation. Premature grant of bail would impede investigation and compromise the statutory objectives of the PMLA.

  In the present case, the applicant has failed to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 24 of the PMLA or discharge the burden mandated under Section 45. His non-appearance in response to summons and evasion of investigation reflect a lack of bona fides and do not inspire confidence in his willingness to cooperate with the authorities - The record shows that the applicant had earlier approached the Sessions Court under Section 482 of the BNSS, 2023, and the same was dismissed on 27.03.2025, inter alia, on the ground that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that he was not guilty of the offence of money laundering. Notably, there is no denial on the applicant’s part regarding the receipt of summons, yet he consistently failed to appear and evaded the process of law on untenable pretexts.

  Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, including the applicant’s evasive conduct, the material on record indicating receipt of laundered funds by entity controlled by him, the failure to meet the statutory threshold under Section 45 of the PMLA, and the need for custodial interrogation, this Court finds no justifiable reason to exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant. Further, the criminal proceedings against the applicant’s company are still at an initial stage and any pre-arrest protection at this juncture would risk impeding the investigation qua the applicant.

  The application for anticipatory bail is dismissed.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 156
  

  Seeking grant of bail - Money Laundering - predicate offence - collection of huge money from various candidates for their illegal selection to the post of teaching and non-teaching staff under the West Bengal Government and also extorttion of an amount of Rs. 2.4 crores @ Rs. 20,000 per student from 1200 candidates for facilitating them to fight Court cases for appointment as teachers - right to speedy trial - HELD THAT:- Since the present complaint is the fallout of the predicate offence, prima facie involvement of the petitioner in the alleged offence cannot be ruled out. The extent of his involvement is required to be adjudicated by the learned Trial Court at the appropriate stage of the proceedings upon recording evidence of the witnesses.

  In view of the incriminating material which transpired against the petitioner during investigation and the observation made by the Hon’ble Division Bench as stated earlier, prima facie involvement of the petitioner in the offence cannot be ruled out. The material collected against the petitioner satisfies the presumption under section 22 and 23 of the Act of 2002 and it cannot be held at this stage that the petitioner is “not guilty of such offence”.

  In the judgment in Manish Sisodia [2024 (8) TMI 614 - SUPREME COURT], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the right to bail in cases of delay coupled with incarceration for a long period should be read into section 439 of The Code of Criminal Procedure and section 45 of the 2002 Act.

  The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again held that prolonged incarceration before being pronounced guilty of an offence should not be permitted to become punishment without trial and in such a case Article 21 applies irrespective of the seriousness of the crime. The right to life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution is overarching and sacrosanct.

  In view of the circumstances as stated hereinabove and the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court with regard to the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution as well as prolonged incarceration, this Court is inclined to release the petitioner on bail subject to stringent conditions to secure his attendance as well as deter him from influencing the witnesses of the case.

  The application for bail allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 155
  

  Money Laundering - provisional attachment order - coonection with the proceeds of crime - attachment made without the compliance/ existence of the conditions as stated under the second proviso of Section 5(1) - requirements of Section 5(1)(a) & (b) are not fulfilled independent of and in conjunction before attaching the properties - failure to prove legal source of income for acquiring the properties - Respondent ED has not conducted any independent investigation.

  Whether the immovable properties cannot be attached, being acquired prior to the enforcement of PMLA, as well as prior to the alleged commission of the scheduled offence? - Whether the properties attached in the PAO needs to be set-aside for want of any connection with the alleged ‘proceeds of crime’? - HELD THAT:- PMLA, 2002 came into force w.e.f. 01.07.2005. The period of commission of the schedule offence is from 1997 to 2013. The contention of the Ld. Counsel for the appellants that investments/ acquisitions made by the appellants prior to the alleged period of offence is also not covered within the definition of proceeds of crime is devoid of any merits - The perusal of the definition reveals three limbs of the definition out of which first part refers to the property acquired or derived directly or indirectly by a person relating to the criminal activity to a scheduled offence. The second part includes “the value of any such property”. The second part is generally mixed with third part for giving interpretation.

  Further, this Tribunal has also given an elaborate judgment on the issue in the case of Sadananda Nayak v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Bhubaneswar [2024 (10) TMI 1619 - APPELLATE TRIBUNAL UNDER SAFEMA AT NEW DELHI], where all the judgments on the issue have been considered and thereby this issue was decided in favour of Respondent ED.

  Accordingly, when any property is attached as value thereof, in absence of direct proceeds of crime, then question of proving its connection with the proceeds of crime has no relevance. Thus, issue no. i) & ii) are decided against the appellants.

  Whether the attachment was made without the compliance/existence of the conditions as stated under the second proviso of Section 5(1)? - Whether requirements of Section 5(1)(a) & (b) are not fulfilled independent of and in conjunction before attaching the properties? - HELD THAT:- In the present matter, there is ample material on record to prove that these properties were acquired illegally by Sh. Farouq Irani and further statements recorded under Section 50 of PMLA also support the stance. Moreover, the appellant’s father even transferred the properties to his daughters via a settlement deed and thereby tried to divert the properties and bring them into the legal pool, and hence, tried to frustrate the proceedings of the Act. These settlement deeds were executed after the commission of fraud came into the light of RBI - the Second Proviso is rightly applicable in the present case, seeing the fact that an attempt to divest the properties has already been made, thus, an apprehension is pertinent in this case regarding frustration of proceedings of PMLA and immediate attachment is justified. Further, the issue that the requirements of Section 5(1) (a) & (b) were not fulfilled in the instant case also does not hold good, as the appellant is in possession of proceeds of crime and the same has a likelihood of being concealed, transferred or diverted as an attempt for the same has already been made by transferring these properties to her via the settlement deed. Thus, as a precautionary measure, these properties are liable to be attached and rightly attached - the issues are decided against the appellant.

  Whether the appellant was able to prove her legal source of income for acquiring the properties? - Whether the attachment of the two immovable properties and term deposits need to be set-aside, in view of Settlement Deed No. 3133 of 2013 and 91 of 2014 executed by her parents in favour of appellant and her sister? - HELD THAT:- The appellant has not been able to prove any documentary evidence via which the legal source of income could be proved for acquiring the term deposits or share in the property at S. No.2. She has not filed her bank statements reflecting any regular income and accumulated balance for acquiring these properties. On the other hand, the documentary evidence reveals that the income of FLCIL was regularly inflated to get more loans year after year from the consortium of banks and thereafter, fraudulently diverted the same. In fact, these properties were apparently purchased by Sh. Farouq Irani as discussed in detail in para 6 of the impugned order. The only stand taken by the appellant is that these properties were transferred to her via a settlement deed and on perusal of the records, it is evident that these deeds were merely a cover-up to paint the illegally acquired properties, as legal and to shelter it from attachment - these issues are also decided against the appellant.

  Whether the attachment needs to be set-aside, as Respondent ED has not conducted any independent investigation? - HELD THAT:- ED is not required to conduct any investigation for the predicate offence. ED can only point out any glaring mistake or lacunae in the said investigation conducted by police/ CBI which may come to its knowledge while conducting the investigation under PMLA. However, ED cannot arrive at different conclusion qua the predicate offence, while conducting investigation for PMLA. Thus, this contention is decided against the appellants and in favour of ED, as no independent investigation is required to be made by the ED.

  Appeal dismissed.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 154
  

  Rejection of the Petitioner’s applications for benefits under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 (SVLDR Scheme) - declarations have been rejected by the Respondents on the ground that the Petitioner is a manufacturer of cigarettes and is hence ineligible to avail any benefits under the Scheme given the provisions of Section 125(1)(h) of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 read with the Fourth Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 - HELD THAT:- The impugned orders, to the extent they reject wholesale the Petitioner’s applications under the Scheme, warrant interference.

  The Respondents may be justified in contending that the benefit of the Scheme cannot be extended to tobacco products and other goods falling under the Fourth Schedule. However, nothing was shown to us based on which it could be said that the Petitioner’s applications under the Scheme in respect of goods or credit other than those falling under the Fourth Schedule could have been straightaway rejected without examination on merits - there are no good reason why the Petitioner’s applications under the Scheme, which concern goods or input credits for goods and services other than those falling under the Fourth Schedule, should not be considered on their merits and in accordance with law. Undoubtedly, all contentions of the parties regarding the merits of the matter or any limitation issue can be kept open for decision by the relevant authorities in the first instance.

  The concerned authorities are directed to consider the Petitioner’s applications for benefits under the Scheme afresh - the impugned order set aside - petition allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 153
  

  Rejection of petitioner’s appeal on the ground of bar of limitation - HELD THAT:- The record shows that the Order-in-Original dated 29 December 2022 was served upon the petitioner only on 9 March 2023. The appeal was filed on 29 March 2023. Thus, from the date of service of the order and the date of knowledge of the contents of the order, the appeal was well within the prescribed period of limitation.

  The Commissioner (Appeals) was therefore not justified in rejecting the appeal by invoking the bar of limitation. On this short ground, the impugned order dated 29 January 2024 set aside and the matter remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) for disposal of the petitioner’s appeal in accordance with law and on its own merits as expeditiously as possible.

  Petition allowed by way of remand.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 152
  

  Levy of service tax - construction of godown & office for storing of electronic voting machine, construction & repair of Tourist Avas Grih, construction of fire fighting& fire alarm system in District Court, Agra and repair of Court Room building and Commissioner Agra premises for which work entrusted by PWD Department and construction & repair of strong room in Naveen Galla Mandi - Construction & repair of strong room in Naveen Galla Mandi where work order given by Executive Engineer, CD-1 (TTZ), PWD Agra - levy of penalty u/s 78 of FA.

  Levy of service tax - construction of godown & office for storing of electronic voting machine, construction & repair of Tourist Avas Grih, construction of fire fighting& fire alarm system in District Court, Agra and repair of Court Room building and Commissioner Agra premises for which work entrusted by PWD Department and construction & repair of strong room in Naveen Galla Mandi - HELD THAT:- It is found from the records that SCN dated 28.04.2021 has been issued on information for the F/Y 2016-17 received from Income Tax Department/26AS under third party data exchange. Since, the Appellant has not taken ST Registration and returns not filed, the SCN has been issued on the basis of figures in ITR/26AS. On going through the work order given by PWD Department regarding construction service with material of godown & office for storing of electronic voting machine, construction & repair of Tourist Avas Grih, construction of fire fighting& fire alarm system in District Court, Agra and repair of Court Room building and Commissioner Agra premises shows there are different work assigned and mainly are addition/alternation and new construction were carried-out, thus there is force in Appellant’s argument that construction work at above mentioned places falls under definition of ‘original work’ under Rule 2(A) of Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 which means all new constructions, all type of additions & alterations to abandoned or damaged structure on land that are required to make them workable, hence the Adjudicating Authority is directed to re-quantify the demand of service tax on above work orders on 40% of value under ‘original work’ under Rule 2A of Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 and also by giving benefit of cum-tax value.

  Construction & repair of strong room in Naveen Galla Mandi where work order given by Executive Engineer, CD-1 (TTZ), PWD Agra - HELD THAT:- On going through the work order of construction & repair of strong room in Naveen Galla Mandi where brick work with coarse sand mortar & cement and other work was there which falls under definition for ‘original work’ under Rule 2(A) of Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 which means all new constructions, all type of additions & alterations to abandoned or damaged structure on land that are required to make them workable. The Adjudicating Authority is directed tore-quantify the demand of service tax by taking construction & addition/alteration of strong room at Naveen Galla Mandi under ‘original work’ under Rule 2A of Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 and demand of tax has to be worked-out on 40% of value and also by giving benefit of cum-tax value.

  Penalty u/s 78 - HELD THAT:- In the matter at hand, construction work was done for Government and no service tax was mentioned in work orders, therefore, there are no ingredient of suppression of facts, wilful mis-statement etc; with an intent to evade payment of Service Tax. The penalty imposed under Section 78 is therefore set-aside.

  Appeal allowed in part.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 151
  

  Levy of service tax - difference in the taxable value shown in ST-3 returns from the income booked in the statutory record like balance sheet vis-à-vis job work receipt for the said period - demand based on the income tax returns/any third party data - invocation of extended period of limitation.

  Whether the appropriate amount of service tax has been paid by the appellant at the relevant time in terms of the statutory provisions of Point of Taxation Rules, 2011? - HELD THAT:- There is no denial with respect to the issuance of invoices, however there is no evidence on record as to whether it got issued within 14 days. The burden was upon the department. The same remains undischarged.

  It is also observed that vide reply to Show Cause Notice dated 16.07.2021 it was conveyed that the appellants did not receive the payment of the amount of invoices due to some dispute in relation to billing. Department has failed to produce any evidence to falsify the said contention. Resultantly, the situation remains is that there is no amount of consideration received. Hence the activity of appellant fails to fall under the scope of definition of service given under Section 66B of the Finance Act, 1994, rendering of activity has to be quid pro quo of considering for it to be called as taxable service defined under Section 66B(44) of the Finance Act. In absence thereof, question of leviability of service tax does not arise.

  It is observed that the only document based whereupon the demand has been confirmed is from 26AS from Income Tax Department. But the law is settled that Revenue cannot raise the demand on the basis of difference in the figures reflected in the ST-3 returns and those reflected in Form 26AS without examining the reasons for said difference and without establishing that the entire amount received by the appellant as reflected in the Form 26AS is the consideration for services provided and without examining whether the difference was because of any exemption or abatement.

  Invocation of Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The department came to know about the affairs of the appellant, i.e. providing of taxable service in view of the admitted facts that appellant is a registered assessee under the Service Tax provision, and have been filing their returns and paying tax. It is also not denied by the Revenue that the appellant was maintaining proper financial records, register and vouchers for their transaction. Thus it is held that the appellant is wrongly alleged to have suppressed the material facts from the department regarding the failure to discharge service tax liability on the taxable receipts - it is held that extended period is wrongly invoked by the department while issuing the show cause notice. Since the entire period of demand is beyond the period of limitation, the show cause notice is, therefore, held to be barred by time.

  The department has failed to prove its case against the appellant. The reliance of 26AS as the basis of demand is not permissible. There is no corroborative evidence on record to prove the allegations. The Show Cause Notice is already held to be barred by time. Hence the impugned order is held to have wrongly confirmed the demand - appeal allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 150
  

  CENVAT Credit - duty paying documents - no documents prescribed under Rule 9(2) were produced before audit - Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The details missing in the disputed invoices were – (a) service tax registration; (b) service tax paid; and (c) name of the appellant as the service recipient. The first of these two are essential and their absence cannot be condoned to consider the invoice a valid document for availing CENVAT credit as per the proviso to Rule 9(2). In their absence, the invoices cannot be said to be valid duty paying documents to avail CENVAT credit. The third viz., the name of the service recipient is not indicated in the proviso to Rule 9(2).

  If the invoice lacks the essential details indicated in the proviso to Rule 9(2), then such a document is not a valid document for availing CENVAT credit. Just as a cheque without the account number cannot be taken as a valid cheque even if the person who signed it has, indeed, a bank account, even if the person who issued the invoice had a service tax registration, the invoice will not become a valid one in the absence of this essential details in it.

  With respect to the invoices where the details of the service tax paid was missing, it is the submission of the learned counsel that challans showing payment of service tax have been enclosed. It is found in the first place that the invoice itself must contain the details of service tax paid as per the proviso to Rule 9(2). The reason is evident - there is no correlation between the challans evidencing payment of service tax and the invoices. The service provider may have paid some amount as service tax through the challan but whether it pertains to the same invoice is the question - Clearly, the appellant was not entitled to CENVAT credit on invoices where the service tax amount is missing as per the proviso to Rule 9(2).

  The CCR apply to the appellant as they apply to any other assessee. It is not open to the assessee to take CENVAT credit on the basis of note sheets or sanction orders or invoices which do not have the essential details. The appellant could take CENVAT credit only on the strength of proper and valid documents. It cannot take CENVAT credit on any document which it pleases and then expect the officers to examine its invoices with its agreements, covering letters sent by the service providers, challans which do not indicate the challan number and hence which have no correlation.

  Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- This can be invoked only in case of fraud or collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression of facts or violation of the provisions of the Act or Rules with an intent to evade. The appellant was registered and has been filing ST-3 Returns. All the discrepancies were discovered during audit from the appellant’s records itself. Had the Range officer done his job and scrutinized the returns in time calling for details as required, the wrongful availment of CENVAT credit would have come to notice. There are no grounds to invoke extended period of limitation. The essential ingredients to impose penalty under section 78 of the Act are the same as the ones for invoking extended period of limitation. Thus, the penalty under section 78 of the Act cannot be sustained.

  The appeal is partly allowed and the demand for extended period of limitation and the entire penalty under section 78 are set aside. Rest of the impugned order is upheld. The matter is remanded to the Principal Commissioner for the limited purpose of re-computing the demand of service tax and interest.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 149
  

  Short payment of service tax - allowing reimbursable expenses at a standard rate instead of actual expenses and dropping the demand - tax liability of the respondent under consulting engineer service for FY 2011-12 - amount paid under protest when the letter of protest was given after more than two months.

  Allowing reimbursable expenses at a standard rate instead of actual expenses and dropping the demand - HELD THAT:- If a service provider had not paid service tax at all and it emerged during investigation that it had rendered taxable services, service tax can be charged only if there is evidence that a taxable service was rendered and the value of the service so rendered is available. If Revenue cannot get hold of each and every invoice but is able to obtain aggregate values in the books of accounts or balance sheets, demand can only be raised based on the available figures and the best judgment of the officer. If every tax invoice is insisted upon, service tax cannot be confirmed if the invoices were not available. As it is with the tax, so is it with the deductions on account of reimbursable expenses. If there is no doubt that reimbursable expenses were incurred and amounts on that account were collected but the exact figures are not available, the officer has to use his best judgment. It is evident that the exact figures were not available as otherwise Revenue would have provided the figures and proof - There are no reason to interfere with the best judgment of the Commissioner with respect to the value of the reimbursable expenses incurred by the respondent.

  For the year 2011-2012, SCNs were issued on the basis of best judgment assessment - HELD THAT:- The service tax return would not show any tax as having been paid on reimbursable expenses but would show it as tax paid on a service. The service rendered by the respondent was classified as ‘consulting engineering service’ and the service tax was paid accordingly. The amounts collected for providing this service was taxable while any reimbursable expenses collected were not in view of Intercontinental Consultants. Therefore, the entire amount paid by the respondent as service tax should be reckoned towards the taxable service. There are no error in the Commissioner doing so.

  Respondent had paid certain amounts during the course of investigation but had given a letter of protest after two months after such payment - HELD THAT:- According to the Revenue, the Commissioner erred in considering the amounts so paid as deposits and adjusting them towards the confirmed demand. There are no force in this submission of the Revenue. Any amounts paid during investigation do not become service tax by themselves. They need to be appropriated towards confirmed demands in the adjudication order and if any amount paid is more than what is finally confirmed the assessee will be entitled to refund of the amount and vice versa. If no SCN is issued at all after investigation, then the assessee can claim refund of the amounts so paid. It is immaterial if the letter of protest was given before or while depositing the amounts or not at all given.

  The impugned order is correct and proper and calls for no interference - Appeal dismissed.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 148
  

  Classification of services - Manpower Recruitment and Supply Agency Services or not - place of provision rules - reverse charge mechanism - extended period of limitation.

  Whether Daimler AG is providing Manpower Recruitment and Supply Agency Services to the Appellant under Section 65(105)K of the Finance Act, 1994 prior to 01-07-2012 and is providing taxable services under Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 post 01-07-2012 and consequently the Appellant is liable to pay service tax under Section 66A of the Act ibid read with applicable provisions of Service Tax Rules and Place of Provision Rules? - HELD THAT:- The issue whether the overseas group company or companies, with whom the assessee has entered into agreements, provide it manpower services, for the discharge of its functions through seconded employees has come up for analysis by the Honourable Supreme Court in its decision in C.C, CE & S.T., Bangalore (Adjudication) v. Northern Operating Systems Pvt Ltd, [2022 (5) TMI 967 - SUPREME COURT], wherein the Apex Court has after noticing the relevant provisions of the Finance Act, 1994 with amendments as they were prior to 01-07-2012 and post the amendments in 2012, with effect from 01-07-2012, upon extensive deliberations, concluded, for the reasons given therein that the respondent therein, i.e., the assessee, was the service recipient of manpower recruitment and supply services provided by the overseas entity, in regard to the employees it seconded to the assessee, for the duration of their deputation or secondment.

  In the instant case, the Appellant has contended that the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the appellant’s case, whereas the Revenue has contended that the appellant’s case would be covered by the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in Northern Operating Systems (NOS Judgement) and thus the demand is sustainable.

  As regards the contention that “in Northern Operating Systems, the foreign Company had created a pool of employees who are deployed to various affiliate companies to perform tasks in relation to business of the foreign group entity, and that there is no such pool of employees created in the present case and employees are engaged in relation to business of the Appellant and not the foreign Company”, again the same remains an averment sans any evidence given the absence of the going global policy or the global mobility policies as well as the detailed appointment letter of the employee. In any event, in our view, irrespective of whether a pool is created or not, the fact remains that it is the Home Company, who upon receiving the specification of the employee desired by the Appellant, determines the transferee who is to be made available by indicating the current salary and family status of the transferee. Thus, this distinction sought to be pointed out is rather rendered immaterial as the factum remains that who would be the transferees who are offered to be supplied, are only chosen as decided by the Home Company.

  When the entitlement to availment of credit or entitlement to refund etc., would arise only subsequent to the discharge of such revenue liability in the first instance; such availment of cenvat credit or entitlement to refund also being subjected to further checks and balances in terms of the statutory requirements that has to be fulfilled to qualify for the same, the Honourable Apex Court, has decided not to entertain the plea of revenue neutrality when holding that the liability has to be necessarily discharged. The appellant has also placed reliance on a number of decisions to contend that the entitlement to cenvat credit results in a revenue neutral situation and thus the demand need not be sustained. The crucial distinction that we note is that in all these decisions, the fact situation was not pertaining to the liability that arises consequent to the levy attracted under Section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994 for import of service. To countenance the plea of the appellant would be to render the discharge of liability consequent to levy under Section 66A, completely otiose, as no person who is liable thus need to pay service tax on service received from abroad for the reason that the tax so paid will be available as credit to them.

  The Appellant was the service recipient for service (of manpower recruitment and supply services) by the overseas entity, in regard to the transferees/employees it seconded to the appellant, for the duration of their deputation or secondment. Therefore, Daimler AG is providing Manpower Recruitment and Supply Agency Services to the Appellant under Section 65(105)K of the Finance Act, 1994 prior to 01-07-2012 and is providing taxable services under Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994 post 01-07-2012, and consequently the Appellant is liable to pay service tax under Section 66A of the Act ibid read with applicable provisions of Service Tax Rules and Place of Provision Rules.

  Whether extended period of limitation can be invoked in the facts and circumstances of the case? - HELD THAT:- There are no existence of “wilful suppression” of facts, or deliberate misstatement in these instances. For these reasons, the Revenue was not justified in invoking the extended period of limitation to fasten liability on the appellant.

  Therefore, respectfully following the said Judgement of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Northern Operating Systems, the impugned common Orders-in-Original upheld, except to the extent it seeks to recover amounts for the extended period of limitation and imposes penalties. The penalties imposed are set aside. The demands now stand modified excluding any liability for the extended period of limitation and the demands are confined only to the normal period, along with applicable interest thereon.

  Appeal disposed off.

  ---

• 2025 (7) TMI 147
  

  CENVAT Credit of Central Excise duty paid on the towers and shelters, which were procured in completely knockdown (CKD) condition - capital goods - HELD THAT:- The issue whether, the goods in question i.e., towers and shelters should be considered as ‘capital goods’, as per the definition provided in the CENVAT statue, it is found that the same is no more res integra, in view of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court, delivered in the case of Bharti Airtel Ltd. Vs Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune [2024 (11) TMI 1042 - SUPREME COURT] that 'We, therefore, agree with the conclusion arrived at by the Delhi High Court that towers and shelters (PFBs) support the BTS/antenna for effective transmission of mobile signals and thus enhance their efficiency and since these articles are components/accessories of BTS/antenna which are admittedly "capital goods" falling under Chapter 85 within sub-clause (i) of Rule 2(a) (A) of CENVAT Rules, these items consequently are covered by the definition of "capital goods" within the meaning of sub-clause (iii) read with sub-clause (i) of Rule 2(a)(A) of CENVAT Rules. Further, since these are used for providing output service, i.e., mobile telecommunication service, and since these are "capital goods" received in the premises of the provider of output service as contemplated under Rule 3(1)(i), the Assessees would be entitled to CENVAT credit on the excise duties paid on these goods.'

  The adjudged demands confirmed by the original authority cannot be sustained. Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the learned adjudicating authority are set aside - Appeal allowed in favour of the appellants.

  ---

1234567........ 21765