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Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 178 Records
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1980 (1) TMI 58 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Application For Registration, Reassessment Of Firm ... ... ... ... ..... n there is nothing to cast any doubt on the genuineness of the firm. We are, therefore, of the opinion that if it is stated in the application for registration that the profit/loss would be divided amongst the partners and if before the completion of the assessment such division is actually made, registration cannot be refused, if the other requirements stand duly satisfied. As for the mode of distribution of profit/ loss there is no particular provision made in the Act or the rules and, therefore, if it is made in a manner which may indicate that the division has been made in accordance with the shares specified in the partnership deed, we do not think that any fault can be found with such division. For these reasons, therefore, we agree with the view taken by the Tribunal. Our answers to the questions referred, therefore, are in the affirmative, against the department and in favour of the assessee. Since nobody appeared for the assessee, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1980 (1) TMI 57 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Development Rebate Reserve ... ... ... ... ..... ry and not mandatory. The provisions of s. 34(3)(a) read with s. 155(5) of the Act, in our view, are mandatory and the breach of these provisions cannot be overlooked by observing that the breach was technical or venial. We respectfully are not in agreement with the view taken by their Lordships of the Gujarat High Court in Vikram Mills case 1976 105 ITR 423 and in our view the moment the entries were made in the account books of the firm transferring the money lying in the development rebate reserve to the capital account of the partners of the firm, the development rebate reserve became non-existent, which is in violation of the condition imposed by s. 34(3)(a) read with s. 155(5) of the Act, and thus the assessee is not entitled to the benefit as has been rightly hold by the Tribunal. For the reasons recorded above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (1) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ds as if the evidence of the payment is disputed. Even the ITO had not questioned the genuineness of the payment. He allowed a part of it with reference to the first three years on the basis that it was entertainment expenditure and disallowed the rest in accordance with the law then in force. He did not allow any part of the expenditure for the later two years because s. 37(2A) contemplated disallowance of the entertainment expenditure. He did not dispute the factum of payment. Now, that the question of the expenditure being entertainment expenditure is out of the way, the only point to be examined is whether the payment was at any time disputed by the I.T. authorities. We do not find that the ITO disputed the genuineness of the payment and, therefore, the third question cannot be said to arise out of the Tribunal s order. The other two questions are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel fee is Rs. 500.
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1980 (1) TMI 55 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... rain Laxman Prasad 1972 84 ITR 233 (All), have been overruled in Badri Narain Kashi Prasad v. Addl. CIT 1978 115 ITR 858 (All) FB . We, accordingly, answer the question in the negative and against the revenue. We consider that the Tribunal shall act within its jurisdiction and limit its decision on two factors relevant for the purpose of granting registration u/s. 184 read with s. 185 of the Act, namely, (1) whether the application for registration was in conformity with the Rules framed under the Act, and (2) whether the firm shown in the document presented for registration was a bogus one or had no legal existence. Having decided the question of law aforesaid we direct that a copy of the judgment be sent under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar to the Appellate Tribunal which shall pass such orders as are necessary to dispose of the case conformably to the judgment. The assessee is entitled to costs, which are assessed at Rs. 300. D. PATHAK J.-I agree.
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1980 (1) TMI 54 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... wance in the manner enjoined upon him by the I.T. Act, the assessee cannot be sought to be held liable on the ground of failure on his part to disclose fully or truly all the relevant facts. On neither ground, therefore, on which reliance was placed in the letter of January 27, 1976, as grounds for reopening the assessment for the six years under consideration, was it open to the ITO to resort to the provisions of s. 147(a) and issue notices under s. 148. Since the condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction for reopening the assessment was not satisfied in respect of any of the years for which the notices were issued, this special civil application must be allowed and each of these notices, annex. E , collectively to the petition, must be quashed and set aside. This special civil, application is allowed accordingly. Notices, annex. E , are quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly. The respondents will pay the costs of this petition to the petitioner.
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1980 (1) TMI 53 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Charitable Or Religious Trust, Property Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ed from the trust houses, is not applied exclusively in religious purposes or charitable institutions, while it is specifically so stated by the petitioner in para. 8 of the petition. That being so, it could not be said that the rental income is not applied exclusively to the said purposes. In our opinion, the use of the expression, the rent derived from such buildings in the prov. (i) to cl. (f) of s. 6 of the Adhiniyam, would mean the amount which is actually received by the trust after meeting out the expenses legitimately made in the recovery and collection of the rent as well as other incidental expenses. In the result, the petition is allowed and the aforesaid impugned orders of the Asst. Commissioner, Property Tax, Sagar (annex. E), and the Deputy Commissioner, Property Tax, Gwalior (annex. F), could not be sustained in law and, therefore, the same are quashed. We, however, pass no orders as to costs of this petition. The security amount be refunded to the petitioner.
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1980 (1) TMI 52 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Cash Credits ... ... ... ... ..... did not lead to the conclusion that the income was not that of the assessee-firm derived from undisclosed sources. The learned Tribunal considered the capacities and capabilities of the depositors to lend money as well. It held that the entries were fictitious and the entries were not reflected in the names of the persons who claimed the amounts in the entries. We have just dealt with the question referred to us in Income-tax Reference No. 39/75. For the reasons alluded to in our judgment, we have no hesitation in answering the question in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. In the result, we hold that, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the credits standing in the names of the creditors were correctly included by the ITO in the total income of the assessee as income from undisclosed sources. The Commissioner will be entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 300. PATHAK J.-I agree.
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1980 (1) TMI 51 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... trust deed where the settlor had expressed a desire to give financial aid to the poor members of the family of the settlor and their descendants but as the dominant object of the trust was found to be of religious and charitable nature, it was held that the express desire of the trustees to give financial aid to the poor members of the family of the settlor and their descendants without any fetter on the powers of the trustees to utilize the income for charitable purpose would not be sufficient to hold that the trust was not a religious or a charitable one. The paramount object of the trust having been found to be of religious and charitable nature, mentioning of the said two objects would not, therefore, render the trust to be non-charitable. In the result, both the questions are answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The respondent shall also be entitled to its costs which are assessed at Rs. 250. BHOPINDER SINGH DHILLON J.-I agree.
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1980 (1) TMI 50 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Rectification ... ... ... ... ..... into the records and examined whether the 7 rate or the 10 rate would be applicable to the assessee. By not determining this question, the Tribunal acted erroneously, and has failed to exercise its jurisdiction. In the Tribunal s view, the assessee could ask for depreciation at 10 . If so, there was a clear error in the order of the ITO, in so far as he granted 9 as allowance. The assessee would then be eligible for refund and no technicality need have stood in the way of the assessee getting the benefit. The Tribunal will now go into the question as to what would be the proper rate of depreciation applicable to the assessee and adjudicate on the order under s. 154 accordingly. The result is, the second and third questions are answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. We do not consider it necessary to answer the first question as the relevant materials are not before us and the Tribunal has not given a finding on the matter. There will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (1) TMI 49 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... the department s appeal. The Tribunal agreed with the AAC that while the reserves for all these years was only pounds 45,222, there was in existence a reserve of pounds 55,064. The Tribunal was of the view that in every year there was an excess of development reserve and the excess had been syphoned off only in the accounting year which ended on March 31, 1967. It is not as if the assessee had utilised the excess of one year to compensate the deficiency for any subsequent year. As there was an excess of reserve created in all these years there was no question of such excess being utilised in subsequent years. In view of the clear finding of the Tribunal as above, we think nothing has been made out to show a contravention of s. 34(3) which would justify action under s. 155(5) of the Act. The view taken by the Tribunal was correct. We answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (1) TMI 48 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... utomobile ancillary and it was only the company, Messrs. Lakshmi Precision Screws Limited, which was registered as an automobile ancillary for obtaining IDA financing. The registration of the assessee-company as an automobile ancillary would not show that it is producing automobile ancillary. The finding of fact recorded by the AAC that the company was not producing any item which could be used only as automobile ancillary was neither challenged nor set aside by the Tribunal. The registration certificate simpliciter, in our view, was not sufficient to hold that the screws manufactured by the company were automobile ancillaries within the said item No. 20 or that the assessee was entitled to the development rebate at the rate of 25 per cent. The question referred to us is consequently answered in the negative, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The revenue is also allowed costs of this reference which are assessed at Rs. 250. BOPINDER SINGH DHILLON J.-I agree.
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1980 (1) TMI 47 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Assets, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... . Therefore, it could not be presumed that the said agreement was made with a view to evading any tax liability. There is no material on record to suggest or support this allegation of the revenue authorities. We are of the opinion that this is too short a view of the matter which the Tribunal has taken. It has not considered the factum of the agreement since that was under challenge. The competent authority has also not satisfied itself after giving adequate opportunity to the respondent transferee to lead evidence to establish the factum and/or genuineness of the agreement. In that view of the matter, therefore, we must set aside the order of the Tribunal and also the order of the competent authority and remand it to him for purposes of disposing the matter afresh according to the correct legal principles indicated in this judgment. Cross-objections are, therefore, disposed of accordingly. In the result, the appeal is allowed accordingly however, with no order as to costs.
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1980 (1) TMI 46 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Annual Value, House Property ... ... ... ... ..... ard rent did not apply where the claim was made as a defence in suit for ejectment under s. 14(1)(c) and that in any event he was entitled to the benefit of s. 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. These contentions were repelled and in that context to meet the arguments raised on behalf of the tenant it was held that the prohibition in ss. 4 and 5 operates only after the standard rent of the premises is determined and not till then. We fail to see how this judgment helps in interpreting the provisions of s. 23(1) and (2) of the Act. Mr. Awasthy has placed reliance on a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Sakarlal Balabhai v. ITO 1975 100 ITR 97 and of the Madras High Court in Addl. CIT v. Mrs. Leela Govindan 1978 113 ITR 136 (Mad). Both these decisions are of no help to us for determining the present controversy. For the reasons recorded above, the question of law referred to us is replied in the negative, against the revenue and in favour of the assessee with costs.
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1980 (1) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Interest ... ... ... ... ..... had to consider the meaning of the words regular assessment occurring in sub-s. (6) of s. 18A. It was held that it should bear the same meaning as it bore in sub-s. (5) of that section. We do not find that this case can be taken to throw any light on the point before us. So also is the decision in Lal a Laxmipat Singhania v. CIT 1977 110 ITR 289 (All). That was a case where the assessee claimed interest up to the date of the assessment made as a result of the appellate proceedings. It was contended that the final assessment that was made as a result of the appellate proceedings should be taken to be the regular assessment. The Allahabad High Court rejected this contention. This case also does not bear on the problem before us. Rectification of an assessment is not the same as its modification on appeal, etc. For the reasons given above, we answer the questions in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1980 (1) TMI 44 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, HUF, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ent persons, the assessment made against the respondent in his capacity as individual cannot be regarded in law as an assessment made against the HUF. Hence, no question of reassessment of the respondent s-HUF under s. 19 of the Act could legally arise in this case. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the Tribunal was fully right in holding that the assessing authority had acted illegally and without jurisdiction in proceeding to assess the income of the joint family in the hands of the respondent by assigning to him the status of the karta of an HUF in the reassessment proceedings taken under s. 19 of the Act. We, accordingly, answer question Nos.1 to 3 in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. These references are disposed of as above. There will be no direction regarding costs. A copy of this judgment, under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the court, will be communicated to the Tribunal, as required by law.
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1980 (1) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Informer, Reward To Informers ... ... ... ... ..... pect of the same. But the defendant did not come forward to prove this case. The defendant failed to discharge that onus. In the premises, there will be no order on the plaintiff s application for discovery. The issues are, therefore, answered as follows Issue No. 1(a) - Yes. Issue No. 1(b) - Yes. Issue No. 2 - Yes. Issue No. 3 - Yes. Issue No. 4 - Yes. Issue No. 5 - Yes. The plaintiff has already received Rs. 12,500 from the defendant. There will be a decree for a further sum of Rs. 2,00,000 in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant and this sum will carry interim interest at the rate of 6 per annum from the date of institution of the suit to the date of the decree. Interest on judgment at the rate of 6 per annum until realisation and costs. The defendant is given 3 months time from date for payment of the decretal dues. In default of payment by the defendant within the period aforesaid, the plaintiff will be entitled to execute the decree. Certified for two counsel.
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1980 (1) TMI 42 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
HUF, Res Judicata, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... to sign the same as a solemn document. Similarly, in Mohan Rao s case 1972 84 ITR 685 (AP), it was held that it was manifest from the conduct of the 1st defendant, in the absence of any explanation, that the statement in the return was deliberately made out of his own volition abandoning or giving up his interest in the self-acquired property and impressing it with the character of joint family property and the fact that the ITO did not accept his statement was of no consequence. It is true that in the present case the assessee had filed returns in the status of an individual up to the year 1957-58, but it is trite that the principle of res judicata cannot be pressed into service in a matter like this. In view of what we have observed above, we hold that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in determining the status of the assessee as an HUF. The question is thus answered in the affirmative. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1980 (1) TMI 41 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Acquisition Under Land Acquisition Act, Income When Accrues ... ... ... ... ..... 118 ITR 923, where a different view has been taken by a Division Bench of the said court. With respect we do not find it possible to agree with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court, since in reaching the said conclusion due notice does not appear to have been taken of the crucial aspect that the award of interest under s. 28 of the Land Acquisition Act (Central Act) is dependent on the exercise of the discretion by the court and it cannot, therefore, be said that a right to such interest had accrued to the assessee with effect from the date of dispossession itself. We, accordingly, answer question No. 1 in the negative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the department, and question No. 2 in the affirmative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the department. The parties will bear their respective costs. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the court will be communicated to the Tribunal, as required by law.
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1980 (1) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Interest Payable By Government ... ... ... ... ..... nnum on the amount of refund due from the date immediately following the expiry of the period of three months aforesaid to the date on which the refund was granted. These provisions do not deal with a situation where advance tax was paid in excess. They refer to cases where the assessee had paid the tax, as a result of the demand, and the appellate order resulted in a refund due to the assessee. These provisions are supplementary in nature and give, the assessee further right to interest whenever there has been a delay on the part of the ITO in giving the refund due to the assessee as a result of the orders referred to in s. 240 were passed. These two provisions do not in any way cut down the scope of s. 214(2). The result is that the assessee would be eligible for interest claimed up to 21st January, 1976, on the sum of Rs. 52,121 from the 1st day of April, 1973. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the assessee would be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1980 (1) TMI 39 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Loss ... ... ... ... ..... counsel for the assessee put forward the proposition that wherever there is a loss on remittances from a person who earned monies abroad, then the loss must be allowed as a deduction. We are unable to accept this wide proposition. As pointed out earlier, the loss must be incidental to the business before it is considered for the purpose of assessment. If it has nothing to do with a business, then it cannot feature in the computation of income. When once the decision is reached that the loss was incidental to the business, then the further circumstance of the loss being on capital or revenue account would arise for consideration. As, in the present case, the loss has arisen only because of the assessee s remitting the funds for his own purposes, the loss had to be taken only as personal loss and not as business loss. The result is that the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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