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Showing 121 to 140 of 158 Records
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1980 (12) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he show-cause notice. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of the learned judge is set aside and the rule is made absolute. The impugned show-cause notice is quashed and all subsequent proceedings taken under the impugned notice are set aside. The respondents are directed not to give any effect to the said impugned show-cause notice or any order that might have been passed by them on the basis of the said notice. Let appropriate writs in that regard issue. The security that has been furnished by the appellant with the Registrar, original side of this court, is discharged and be released. The appeal is allowed, but there will be no order for costs. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue prays for certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court under art. 134A of the Constitution. In our opinion, no substantial question of law of general importance is involved in this case. In the circumstances, the prayer for a certificate is disallowed. A. N. SEN C.J.-I agree.
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1980 (12) TMI 37 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Exemption Of Residential House, Rate Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... s. 33(1)(n). The same view has been taken by the Allahabad and Madras High Courts See ITAT v. Madan Mohan 1979 119 ITR 781 (All) and CED v. Estate of late R. Krishnamachari 1978 113 ITR 200 (Mad) . We respectfully agree with the view taken in these cases. The learned counsel for the accountable person relied upon a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in CED v. Estate of late Durga Prasad Beharilal 1979 116 ITR 692 (,AP). This case does, to some extent, support the learned counsel but as explained by the Karnataka High Court in K. Nataraja s case 1979 119 ITR 769 (Kar), the reasoning is not clear as to why the valuation of the interest of the lineal descendants in the residential house can be excluded. With great respect, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. For the reasons given above, our answer to the question is in the negative, in favour of the department and against the accountable person. There will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (12) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Foreign Income ... ... ... ... ..... hether on a future occasion when he repatriates that money from Ceylon to India, the assessee would be entitled to a deduction as a loss in respect of such discount and if so, on what amount, does not arise for consideration in this case. Nor are we concerned with the staying of collection under s. 220(7) on any ground of prohibition or restriction on such remittances. Suffice it to state that the contention of the learned counsel that the discount under the certificate scheme will have to be taken into account in ascertaining the real income, cannot be accepted. For the same reason, the rate of exchange for conversion into rupees as provided under r. 115 had to be applied only in respect of the entire income accrued in Ceylon and not in respect of any amount that would have been discounted if it had to be remitted into India. In the result, the question is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee, Rs. 500.
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1980 (12) TMI 35 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... herefore, we cannot say that the Tribunal went wrong in holding that the penalty is not impossible on the first ground mentioned earlier. Since on this ground the order of the Tribunal could be sustained, it becomes unnecessary for us to decide as to whether the finding of the Tribunal that the purchase consideration was not proved to have come out of the funds of the assessee which were of an income or revenue nature is correct or not. That finding will have to follow only if the facts otherwise show that there was a deliberate suppression or a concealment of the particulars within the meaning of s. 271 (1)(c). We are satisfied, therefore, that the order of the Tribunal cancelling the penalty is correct and does not call for any interference. The first and the third questions referred to us are, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the revenue. It is not necessary to answer the second question. The assessee would be entitled to its costs counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1980 (12) TMI 34 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dras High Court in CIT v. J. K. A. Subramania Chettiar 1977 110 ITR 602 with which we are in respectful agreement. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the view taken by the ITO that the assessee was guilty of concealment of income under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act and was, therefore, liable to be subjected to penalty under the said provision was perfectly correct in law and that the interference with the order of the ITO by the AAC and by the Tribunal was illegal and unwarranted. Accordingly, we answer question No. 1 in the negative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the department. In the light of the conclusion recorded by us on question No. 1, it is unnecessary for us to consider questions Nos. 2 and 4 and, accordingly, we decline to answer those questions. The parties will bear their retrospective costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Tribunal, as required by law.
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1980 (12) TMI 33 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... e land formed part of the cost of acquiring the land. The land by itself may have no value except for its usefulness in extracting clay. Therefore, the value of the right to excavate clay in the land in terms of money must have formed part of the price paid by the assessee for the land. Whatever difficulty there may be in assessing its value, it may not be correct to assume that there was no cost for the value of the right to excavate the land in terms of money. The AAC had considered these aspects and held that the entire sum of Rs. 27,260 may be allowed as a cost of acquisition for the purpose of determining the capital gains. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no basis for the contention that the right to possession and enjoyment transferred to the company was not paid, for by the assessee when it acquired the property itself. We, accordingly, answer the two questions referred in the affirmative. The revenue will been titled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs.500.
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1980 (12) TMI 32 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Income From House Property, Obiter Dicta, Precedents ... ... ... ... ..... ng provisions regarding the business and professional income, no such provision relating to the income from property has been incorporated in the new Act. The scheme of the relevant provisions in the new Act remains the same only an exception is carved out by incorporating the deeming provisions of s. 176(3A) and sub-s. (4) so far as business or professional income is concerned. But for these deeming provisions, the ratio in N. A. Mody s case 1966 61 ITR 428 (SC) would have been applicable to business or professional income even under the Act of 1961. In the view that we have taken, even for the assessment years 1962-63 and 1963-64 governed by the new Act, the assessee s income from property, of which she was not the owner, was not chargeable to tax in her hands as an income under the head Income from other sources under s. 56 of the new Act. We, therefore, answer the question refferred to us in the negative. The applicant to pay the costs of the reference to the respondent.
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1980 (12) TMI 31 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Company, Words And Phrases ... ... ... ... ..... im as the principal officer is to be treated as the principal officer of the company for the purpose of the Act. We do not, therefore, find it possible to agree with the view expressed by the Tribunal that the order passed by the assessing authority was one made under s. 2(p)(ii) of the Act. But that is really of no consequence because unless the assessee is able to show that the order, not being an assessment order, is one made under one of the provisions enumerated in s. 31, namely, s. 19, 20, 21, 25, 29 or 41 of the Act, the provision for appeal contained in s. 31 will not be attracted and no appeal can be maintained before the AAC. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we answer the questions referred in the affirmative, that, is, against the assessee and in favour of the department. The parties will bear their respective costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Tribunal as required by law.
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1980 (12) TMI 30 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Company, Employee, Limits, Remuneration ... ... ... ... ..... for the services rendered by an employee is determined at a fixed percentage of the turnover achieved by him, then such remuneration or recompense will partake of the character of salary, the percentage basis being the measure of the salary. The same is the legal position when, under the terms of the contract of employment, the employee is to receive remuneration at a fixed percentage of the net profits of the company. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the two managing directors were employees of the company and hence the company is entitled to claim a deduction in respect of the remuneration paid to them only subject to the provisions of s. 40A(5). Accordingly, we answer the question referred in the negative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the department. The parties will bear their respective costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Tribunal as required by law.
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1980 (12) TMI 29 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Employed, New Industrial Undertaking, Words And Phrases ... ... ... ... ..... borrow capital to finance their undertakings. This may be the reason for not including borrowed moneys in computing the relief under s. 80J. It is well settled that Parliament has a very wide discretion of making classifications in matters of taxation. It is not possible to argue, nor it is argued, that the construction adopted by us will make s. 80J invalid being violative of art. 14. As explained by us, there are weighty reasons to hold that r. 19A(3) is consistent with the intention of Parliament and does not go beyond the rule-making power conferred by s. 80J. For the reasons given above, we answer the questions as follows (1) The Tribunal was not justified in ignoring r. 19A(3). (2) The Tribunal was not justified in holding that borrowed capital has not (sic) to be included in the computation of capital employed. (3) The Tribunal was not justified in enhancing the deduction under s. 80J from Rs. 13,975 to Rs. 67,548. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1980 (12) TMI 28 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Joint Investment ... ... ... ... ..... e duty under s. 13 of the E.D. Act. In State Bank of India v. CED 1968 69 ITR 270, the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that a current account which was originally in the name of the deceased alone, but had been converted into a joint account in the name of the deceased and his wife, came fairly and squarely within s. 13. In Smt. Bimla Devi Sud v. CED 1969 72 ITR 630, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that National Savings Certificates which continued to stand in the joint names of the deceased and his wife even after the date of the alleged gift to her would be includible in the estate of the deceased by reason of s. 13 of the Act as the beneficial interest in them arose to the wife by survivorship. In view of the fact, as above noticed, that all the requirements of s. 13 of the Act have been fulfiled, the question referred to us has to be answered in the affirmative and against the accountable persons. The department will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1980 (12) TMI 27 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... educed to Rs. 24 lakhs by the Tribunal. This huge profit, according to the assessee, had arisen from a valuation of the closing stock only and its audited books of account became available only on 7th May, 1971. In the above facts and circumstances it can be reasonably said that the assessee had no idea as to the actual profits at a time when it had paid the advance tax on the basis of the profit earned in the immediately preceding year. Thus, it could not be said that there was a failure on the assessee s part to file an estimate of such tax in terms of s. 212(3A). Moreover, the failure, if any, could not have been said to have occurred without a reasonable cause. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was not justified in sustaining the order of penalty under s. 273(c) of the I.T. Act, The question, accordingly, is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Each party will pay and bear its own costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1980 (12) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1977 108 ITR 431, the decision in the case of CIT v. Indian Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. 1973 92 ITR 78 (Mad) at p. 86 and the decision in the case of CIT v. Braithwaite, Burn and Jessop Construction Co. Ltd. 1978 113 ITR 577 (Cal) at p. 579 and at p. 583. In the view we have taken, we will answer the second aspect of the question dealing with additional taxation reserve by saying that any excess provision over and above Rs. 8 1/2 lakhs out of Rs. 13 lakhs should be treated as reserve. The question is, therefore, answered by saying that the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of Rs. 8,30,716 should be treated as reserve and the Tribunal was right in holding that the excess provision for taxation liability should be treated as reserve, but the excess provision should be the difference between Rs. 8 1/2 lakhs and Rs. 13 lakhs which works out to be Rs. 4,50,000. The question is answered accordingly. Each party will pay and bear its own costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1980 (12) TMI 25 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Gift, Gift Tax ... ... ... ... ..... nsideration was not adequate. No material at all was brought on record to justify any such conclusion. The Tribunal did not also accept the submission for the assessee that the partners who were inducted were to render service and, therefore, there was adequate consideration. Its reasoning was that D. C. Shah was to be the managing partner and, there overall guidance one was nominated as the managing partner that does not mean that the service to be rendered by the other partners was either negligible or in any way diminished and could be left out of account. The view taken by the Tribunal that there was no adequate consideration is clearly opposed to the material on record. In our opinion, the view taken by the Tribunal is contrary to law and not warranted on the facts and circumstances of the case. We, therefore, answer the questions referred in each of these cases in the negative, viz., that the Tribunal was not right in holding that there was taxable gift by the assessee.
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1980 (12) TMI 24 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Exemptions, New Industrial Undertaking, Transfer ... ... ... ... ..... reframed by us will have to be answered in favour of the department and, accordingly, we answer the question in the affirmative. Even though the lease amounts to a transfer, the respondent-company would still be entitled to the relief under the said s. 84 if it had complied with the other part of the condition laid down in the said cl. (ii) of s. 84(2). Further, even if this was a portion of the building which was previously used by the Structural Engineering Works Ltd., if the Explanation to the said s. 84 applied to the case of the respondent-company, the respondent company would still be entitled to relief under the said s. 84, there being no dispute that all other conditions have been complied with by the respondent company. These points, as mentioned earlier, have not been determined by the Tribunal and the Tribunal will now proceed to dispose of the case conformably with what we have stated earlier in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1980 (12) TMI 23 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income, Business Expenditure, Income Tax, Wholly And Exclusively ... ... ... ... ..... rket and transporting charges, etc., will legitimately fall within the scope of s. 5(j). The expenditure incurred by the assessee by way of fees paid to the auditors for the preparation of the return of agricultural income-tax cannot be regarded as expenditure of the assessee laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the deriving of agricultural income. The observations of the Supreme Court in the decision aforesaid relied on by the counsel for the assessee are not, therefore, attracted to the present case. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of this court in Commr. of Agrl. LT. v. Nilambur Rubber Co. 1969 71 ITR 686 and, accordingly, we hold that the Tribunal was right in disallowing the assessee s claim for deduction of the aforesaid item of expenditure. In the result, we answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the department. The parties will bear their respective costs.
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1980 (12) TMI 22 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Capital Or Revenue Expenditure, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... the arrangement of transfer which in substance was to the effect that while allotting the Kuttampuzha Estate to the assessee, the assessee was also to take over the liability for payment of the gratuity due to the workmen employed therein under the transferor. The transfer of the Kuttampuzha Estate to the assessee was not as a running concern.. In such circumstances, the liability for the payment of gratuity accepted by the assessee as a part of the arrangement of transfer can be regarded only as a capital charge and no deduction could be claimed in respect thereof under s. 5(j) of the Act. The contrary view taken by the Tribunal cannot, therefore, be sustained in law. Accordingly, we answer the question referred in the negative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the department. The parties will bear their respective costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Tribunal as required by law.
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1980 (12) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Gift Tax, Gift To Spouse ... ... ... ... ..... the tenor of the document the assessee had purported to do. This was accepted by the court. Even in T.C. No. 198 of 1976 CGT v. K. B. Manickam Gupta 1981 128 ITR 598 (Mad) the assessee was the HUF but ultimately it was found that the gift was by the karta in favour of his wife in his individual capacity and that the gift was made from and out of his self-acquired property. The remanded case in T.C. Nos. 508 and 509 of 1976 CGT v. Ranganathan Chettiar 1982 133 ITR 890 (Mad) was also case of an HUF. All these cases have taken note of the fact that for the applicability of s. 5(1)(viii), it is the nature of the gift that is relevant and not the status in which the return was submitted by the assessee. Therefore, the assessee will be entitled to, a deduction under s. 5 (1)(viii) in respect of the gift in question. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1980 (12) TMI 20 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance, Entertainment Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... AAC and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal, the revenue submitted an application for making a reference And it is at the instance of the revenue that the aforesaid question of law has been referred to this court for its opinion. Recently, a Division Bench of this court had occasion to consider the question of law referred to in this case in CIT v. Lakhmichand Muchhal MCC No. 15 of 1977 decided on 12th September, 1980-since reported in 1982 134 ITR 234 (MP) . In that case it was held that hospitality shown on account of obligation of business arising as a result of an express or implied contract or arising on account of long-standing custom of a trade cannot amount to entertainment. In view of the decision in CIT v. Lahkmichand Muchhal 1982 134 ITR 234 (MP) our answer to the question referred to this court is in the affirmative and against the revenue. The reference is answered accordingly. Parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1980 (12) TMI 19 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Law Applicable To Penalty Proceedings, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... contrasted with the tax avoided which was relevant before the amendment. The penalty order in this case was passed on March 15, 1972, and the provision fixing the minimum of 20 was not in force. The penalty levied in this case is thus based on a provision which was not in existence on the date of levy. It would have been necessary to consider the legality of the penalty order, if such a question had been raised by the department. The assessee would be prejudiced or put in a worse position than he is as a result of the Tribunal s order, if we were to hold that the minimum penalty leviable is equal to the income concealed. We would, therefore, leave the anomaly there. We thought it necessary to refer to this aspect only because we do not want it to be understood as if we are in any way affirming the correctness of the order of penalty in so far as aspects other than those dealt with earlier are concerned. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 one set.
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