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Showing 121 to 140 of 177 Records
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1978 (4) TMI 57 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appellate Authority, Business Income, From Other Sources, Income Tax Act, Penalty Proceedings
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1978 (4) TMI 56 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... writ petition. Moreover, mere issuance of any notices by the ITO to the respondent-Corporation under this sub-section or the failure of the latter to file an objection under cl. (vi) of that sub-section cannot in any manner prejudice the petitioner s claim. Under cl. (viii) of this sub-section, any payment made to the ITO of any amount in compliance with the notices can discharge the payer, namely, the Corporation, from its liability for rent only to the assessees in respect of whom the notices were issued. If the amount of rent for these godowns was really owed not to those assessee, but in reality to the petitioner and the payment is wrongly made to the ITO on account of those assessees then the petitioner will still be able to recover the rent from the Corporation. There is thus no justification for interference by this court by way of a writ with the proceedings under s. 226(3). Thus, in any view of the matter, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 55 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... decided subsequent to the appellate order of the Tribunal, it cannot be said that it must be left out of our consideration in determining this issue. Further, the case of General Electric Co. of India Ltd. 1978 112 ITR 246 (Cal) was decided on its special and peculiar facts and in our opinion the principles stated therein are not of universal application and do not apply to the instant case before us. The case of Sir Shadilal Sugar and General Mills 1972 85 ITR 363 (All) was not followed in the Chloride case 1977 106 ITR 38 (Cal), which on its turn, was not followed in Lala Laxmipat Singhania s case 1977 110 ITR 289 (All). Therefore, it cannot be said that there was a mistake apparent from the record. In the premises, we answer question No. 1 in the negative and in favour of the assessee and decline to answer question No. 2 which has become purely academic in view of our aforesaid answer to question No. 1. There will be no order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.--I agree.
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1978 (4) TMI 54 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Law Applicable, Notice Of Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... is the only validly existing return which could be seen for purposes of imposing penalty. Since the revised return has supplanted the original return, the original return becomes redundant in so far as the imposition of penalty is concerned. No such situation has arisen in the present case. The assessee did not file a revised return on the basis that he had subsequently discovered an error in the original return. He had to file a revised return because he was asked to do so by a notice. The present case is directly covered by the two earlier decisions mentioned above. We answer the first question by holding that the provisions as they stood prior to their amendments with effect from April 1, 1968, were applicable and the second question by holding that the Tribunal was justified in reducing the amount of penalty. We, therefore, answer both the questions in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (4) TMI 53 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Delay In Filing Return, Law Applicable, Wealth Tax Act, Wealth Tax Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... oil April 1, 1969. It may be mentioned that on April 1, 1969, the provisions of s. 18(1)(a) were amended. In CWT v. Ram Narain Agrawal 1977 106 ITR 965 (All), it was held that the law as it stood on the date of the default, namely, on the last date when the return was due, is the law which is applicable. The return was due on or before June 30, 1968. Therefore, the law as it stood on that date would be applicable. Though we agree with the ultimate conclusion of the Tribunal, yet we dissent from the view that the law as it stood on April 1of that year was applicable. The date of the beginning of the assesment year is, in our opinion, irrelevant because the taxable event is the date when the return was, in law, due. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us by holding that the provisions of s. 18(1)(a) as they stood on June 30, 1968, would govern the question of imposition of penalty and its quantum. The assessee will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (4) TMI 52 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Debt Owed, Income Tax, Net Wealth, Voluntary Disclosure Of Income, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... he I.T. Act, 1961, or that s. 68 of the Finance Act, 1965, creates a new charge to tax, on an ad hoc basis, on disclosed income irrespective of the assessment year in which it was earned. As already stated, the same view was taken by Issac J. in C. K. Babu Naidu v. WTO 1971 82 ITR 410 (Ker), but that view has been reversed by P. Govindan Nair, Actg. C.J., and George Vadakkal J. in C. K. Babu Naidu v. WTO 1978 112 ITR 341 (Ker). In that state of law, we have no hesitation in answering the common question referred in all the eight references against the CWT and in favour of the assessee. It must accordingly be held that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the tax at the rate of 60 prescribed under s. 68(3) of the Finance Act, 1965, was not deductible in arriving at the net wealth of the assessees under s. 2(m) of the W.T. Act, 1957, during the assessment years 1957-58 to 1965-66. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 51 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Annual Value, House Property, Municipal Taxes ... ... ... ... ..... t stood at the relevant time, that only where a deduction was claimed by the owner for the tenant s liability to such taxes that the question of the same being borne by the owner would arise. In the instant case, there was no controversy that the liability to pay the taxes was that of the assessee and not that of its tenants. Therefore, it appears to us that arguments of Mr. Pal proceeded on an entirely erroneous basis. Surprisingly, throughout the entire hearing our attention was not drawn to s. 23 as it stood at the relevant time. In any event, we do not accept that where it is laid down that the owner shall bear a certain liability, it means that the owner has already paid the same. This is entirely contrary to the plain meaning of the words. For the reasons stated above, we reject the contentions of the revenue and answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. C. K. BANERJI J.- I agree.
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1978 (4) TMI 50 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Act Of 1922, Act Of 1961, High Court, Rule Against Retrospectivity, Taxing Statutes ... ... ... ... ..... determining the true answer to a question referred under s. 66 (of the 1922 Act), this court is confined only to those sections to which the Tribunal or the High Court referred. Indeed, there are many cases which say the contrary. We can, therefore, look to sub-s. (4) for finding out the correct answer to the question referred. The application made by the department in this court for directing the Tribunal to refer a separate question as to the applicability of sub-s. (4) appears to have been made as a matter of abundant caution. The making of this application does not preclude us from proceeding with this reference and considering sub-s. (4). For the reasons given above, we answer the question referred to us in favour of the department and against the assessee. In our opinion, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the action of the ITO in reopening the assessment under s. 147(a) read with s. 148 was bad in law. There shall be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1978 (4) TMI 49 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Application For Reference, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... ar as the first question is concerned it stands decided by a Bench of this court in U.P. Hardware Store v. CIT 1976 104 ITR 664 (All). It was held that there was no justification for accepting the plea that the word expenditure used in s. 40A(3) should be restricted to overhead expenses enumerated in ss. 30 to 43A. The word expenditure was of wide import. It would cover the expenses to be taken into account while determining the gross profit. The gross profit is determined by the difference between the opening stock and the purchases on the one hand and the closing stock and the sales on the other. The payments made for purchases would also be covered by the word expenditure and such payments could be disallowed if they are made in cash in sums exceeding Rs. 2,500. In view of this decision, we answer the first question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (4) TMI 48 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Disclosure Petition, Income From Other Sources, Levy Of Penalty, Revised Returns, Voluntary Disclosure Of Income
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1978 (4) TMI 47 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Business Income, Provident Fund ... ... ... ... ..... see. According to Mr. Bagchi, it has not been found by the Tribunal that Rs. 24,000 was paid to Mr. Hallen in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the business of the assessee and, therefore, the payment of this gratuity to him is not an allowable deduction. But the findings of the Tribunal are as follows We consider that the payment of gratuity to Mr. Hallen was made for the purpose of the business and on account of commercial expediency. We would in this connection emphasise the absence of a provident fund scheme covering him. This is thus a kind of terminal benefit to which he could reasonably have looked forward to. The company has derived considerable benefit during the two decades of his service. We have underlined the relevant portion only to show that there is no merit in the aforesaid contention of Mr. Bagchi. In the premises, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. We, however, make no order as to costs. DEB J.-I agree.
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1978 (4) TMI 46 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Mercantile System, Sales Tax ... ... ... ... ..... e the Tribunal that the said amount should be allowed as a deduction because the same was genuinely estimated to be a liability. The only contention was that this amount had been offered for taxation and assessed in the assessment year 1965-66 and, therefore, it should not be again assessed in the year 1962-63. This contention is erroneous and we do not accept the same. The amount in dispute, that is, Rs. 7,692, having been collected in the assessment year 1962-63 by the assessee as part of its trading receipt ought to have been taxed as such in the said assessment year, if at all. For the reasons as aforesaid we answer the question No. 2 in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. In the facts and circumstances there will be no order as to costs. We make it clear that our answer is given without prejudice to the assessee s rights, if any, to agitate in appropriate proceedings for relief against double taxation in respect of the said sum of Rs. 7,692. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1978 (4) TMI 45 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax Act, Clubbing Of Income, Family Property, Individual Property, Minor Child
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1978 (4) TMI 44 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof ... ... ... ... ..... e department will have to prove that the assessee was guilty of concealment of income or has furnished inaccurate particulars of income. In our opinion the Tribunal was entirely wrong in its understanding of the Explanation. The entire approach of the Tribunal is also erroneous, because a confirmatory letter does not prove the creditworthiness of a creditor which must be proved as a fact by an assessee. The Tribunal has further failed to appreciate the relevant facts found by the authorities below. In these circumstances and as submitted by the learned advocates for both the parties, we send back this matter to the Tribunal without answering the question with a direction that after giving a reasonable opportunity to both the parties of being heard, the Tribunal shall decide afresh whether any penalty was imposable on the assessee. This reference is accordingly disposed of without answering the question and without making any order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1978 (4) TMI 43 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return ... ... ... ... ..... ved on him and after the expiry of the statutory period of notice the assessee has not filed a return, as in the present case. Then, could it be said that from the date after the statutory period in the notice expires, the assessee is guilty of two defaults simultaneously ? If he could not be held guilty for two defaults for the same period simultaneously, as he is not expected to file two returns, one under s. 139(1) and another under s. 139(2), then after the expiry of the period of notice he could only be held responsible for one default and that default could only be for non-compliance with the provisions contained in s. 139(2). The necessary corollary, therefore, that follows is that the period of default under s. 139(1) comes to an end as soon as notice under section 139(2) is served on the assessee. In this view of the matter, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 42 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Female Member ... ... ... ... ..... bai 1973 89 ITR 251 and it was contended on behalf of the accountable person that s. 12(1) would not be attracted at all. We consider that the facts of the case decided by the Supreme Court are different from the facts of the present case. In that case, it was held that no interest in the properties settled was reserved to the deceased during his lifetime or for any period after the properties were settled, nor was there any provision in the deeds enabling the deceased to reclaim the property or its possession under any circumstances, and, in such circumstances, the Supreme Court held that s. 12 was wholly inapplicable to the facts of that case. This decision, we consider, may not be applicable to the facts of the present case. In the light of the above discussion, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the accountable person. The revenue will have its costs of this reference including counsel s fee of Rs. 250.
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1978 (4) TMI 41 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Trading Receipt ... ... ... ... ..... d, the question referred has to be answered in favour of the assessee. The amounts collected by way of under-charges have been found to have been received by the assessee as an agent and, therefore, in a fiduciary capacity vis-a-vis the consignees. It appears to us that the facts of this case are substantially similar to the facts in the Tattersall s case 1938 22 TC 51 1939 7 ITR 316 (CA) as also to those in Sandersons and Morgans case 1970 75 ITR 433 (Cal). The facts in Prices Tailors Ltd. 1963 1 All ER 231 (Ch D) appear to us to be different. In that case, the deposits were claimed and received by the assessee in its own right and the money was received as property of the assessee though subject to certain contingencies. There is no similar finding in the instant case. For the reasons as stated above, we answer the question referred in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.-I agree.
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1978 (4) TMI 40 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ge rate represented the real exchange value. They came to this conclusion not on any factual basis but as a principle of law. We have seen that the official exchange rate need not necessarily represent the real exchange value of the currency and that it is necessary to adopt the real exchange value for the purpose of computation of net wealth. In the view we take that it would be open to the assessee to prove that the official exchange rate was not the real exchange value and since the Tribunal did not proceed on factual basis we think it desirable now to direct the Tribunal to give an opportunity to the assessee to prove the real exchange value. We cannot, therefore, answer the reference. Accordingly, we return the same to the Tribunal with a direction to re-hear the appeal after giving an opportunity to the assessee to adduce such evidence as he may choose to prove the real exchange value of the Ceylon currency in terms of Indian rupees. There will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (4) TMI 39 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Investment Company, Net Wealth, Unquoted Shares, Wealth Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... said two companies. These findings are not challenged. The Tribunal has nowhere referred to the chart printed in the paper book relied on by Mr. Pal. It is not known who has prepared this chart or if the figures therein are correct, ex facie, the percentage of yielding capacity has been calculated in the chart on the basis of average annual net profit and not on actual profits. For the said reasons, the purported chart is of little significance in this reference. We find that in arriving at the value of the shares, the Tribunal has taken into account all relevant factors as specified by the Supreme Court, viz., the yield, the assets, the potentiality and also the quoted value of shares in similar companies. Such valuation, in our opinion, is not in any way erroneous. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J.--I agree.
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1978 (4) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Income From House Property, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... 11 (Mad) was also referred to. It was held by the Madras High Court that in the case of a person occupying the property the income arising therefrom is notional but none the less real and is liable to tax. According to the Madras High Court the use of the expression indirectly in section 16(3) is broad enough to include an income which is not received in specie but represents such advantages as the enjoyment of property might secure, which enjoyment could be translated in terms of money. This is a clear answer to the argument of the learned counsel for the assessee that the notional income could not be included in the income of the assessee. There is great force in the arguments of Mr. Sengupta and in our opinion also the Tribunal has rightly applied s. 64(v) of the I.T. Act, 1961, in view of the aforesaid clause of the trust deed, and accordingly, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. Each party to pay and bear its own costs. DEB J.-I agree.
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