|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 194 Records
-
1982 (9) TMI 74 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-B
Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... of interest ought to have been allowed as deduction under section 57(iii) of the Income-tax Act from other income. The contention before the Commissioner (Appeals) was that the borrowing from Swati and Taral was for maintaining and preserving the erstwhile income from other sources. If instead of borrowing from Taral and Swati the assets were sold to that extent, income would have been loss (sic). Reliance was placed on the decision in CIT v. H. H. Maharani Shri Vijaykuverba Saheb of Morvi 1975 100 ITR 67 (Bom.) approved by the Supreme Court in Seth R. Dalmia v. CIT 1977 110 ITR 644. However, the Gujarat High Court, in the case of Padmavati Jaykrishna v. CIT 1980 19 CTR 123, held that the interest paid on amounts for payment of income-tax is not allowable deduction under section 57 of the Act. In that case both the aforesaid decisions have been considered. Therefore, the assessee s alternative ground is rejected. 15. In the result, the appeals for the two years are rejected.
-
1982 (9) TMI 73 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Recovery of sums due to Government ... ... ... ... ..... le where the demand itself is barred by limitation. The respondent having taken objection to the adjustment of the amount, even of general principle, the appellants were not entitled to adjust. After the objection was raised by the respondent, there was no justification for the appellants to appropriate the amount towards a time-barred claim. No other point has been urged before us. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal. 10. After the judgment was delivered, Mr. K.N. Balasubramaniam, learned Counsel for the appellants, made an oral request for certificate under Article 133(1) of the Constitution to appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal having been decided by us on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court, we are not satisfied that the case involves any substantial question of law of general importance which in our opinion needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. The prayer for certificate is therefore rejected.
-
1982 (9) TMI 72 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Customs - Smuggled goods - Burden of proof for conscious possession - Acquittal ... ... ... ... ..... secution. It would seem to us that on the facts revealed in the present case, the view taken by the lower Appellate Court could not be said to be an unreasonable view and we feel this is not a case which would call for interference in an appeal against an acquittal merely on the ground that another view could possibly be taken. We are inclined to this view, more particularly because of the facts that the offence is alleged to have been taken place in the year 1969 and the respondent No. 1 was acquitted by the lower Appellate Court of the offence in the year 1976, and this is certainly not a case which would call for interference in an appeal against acquittal so many years after the offence was committed, now in the year 1982. In this view, we see no substance in this appeal. 7. The appeal fails and is dismissed. The bail bond of respondent No. 1 shall stand cancelled. No orders are necessary regarding respondent No. 2 since the appeal against him stands abated on his death.
-
1982 (9) TMI 71 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Custom House Agent ... ... ... ... ..... ding to Mr. Mitra inasmuch as the petitioner is in fact transacting business as a Customs House Clearing Agent as a partner of the Orient Transport Company he is not entitled to the grant of another licence in his personal capacity. 7. It appears from the averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent No. 2 and which has been quoted above that the petitioner was not holding a licence in his personal name but he was working as a Customs Clearing Agent in his capacity as a partner of the firm of Messrs Orient Transport Company. Under the circumstances the statement made by the Assistant Collector of Customs in her letter dated February 10, 1982, is not factually correct. As such, I allow this application and direct the respondent No. 2 not to give effect to the impugned letter, with liberty to the Customs Authorities to issue a fresh order in accordance with law. The Rule is, therefore, made absolute to the extent indicated above without any order as to costs.
-
1982 (9) TMI 70 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Writ jurisdiction - Revision of classification list due to mistake of law ... ... ... ... ..... dealing with the claims while in the present case there has been no such move by the petitioner nor is there any order of the Appellate Collector. Yet, the question being the same, we are of the view that a similar direction as made in the connected case should be given here. We accordingly direct that the Collector (opposite party No. 3) may either himself or through the Assistant Collector (opposite party No. 1) cause an investigation into the claim of the petitioner both in the matter of furnishing and acceptance of the revised classification list with effect from the date it has been given and for disposing of the claim for refund as and when made. We understand that there is no application for refund pending in this case. Therefore, the direction which will operate here is in regard to the acceptance of the revised classification list only. That matter should be disposed of within three months from the date of communication of the order. 3. We make no order as to costs.
-
1982 (9) TMI 69 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Demand - Limitation - Medicinal goods removed on payment of duty ... ... ... ... ..... h has not been made in the instant case. 32. We are not impressed with the contention of the learned Senior Standing Counsel that in any event, rule 12 will apply. Rule 12 is a residuary provision and it applies only when there is no other specific provision in the Rules. As we have found that rule 11 applies, there is no scope for invoking the residuary provision of rule 12. The learned Judge, therefore, was perfectly justified in holding that the demand of the appellants was barred by rule 11 of the Rules. 33. In view of our above finding, it is not necessary for us to consider the contention of the respondent that appellant No. 3 could not make a best judgment assessment though such an assessment is not provided for in the Act or in the Rules. 34. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 35. No order need be made on the application which shall be deemed to have been disposed of along with this judgment.
-
1982 (9) TMI 68 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
Classification disputes and classification lists - Refund - Duty paid under mistake ... ... ... ... ..... the question would be determined. 9. In these circumstances, instead of our deciding the matter finally, we are inclined to take the view that a writ of mandamus should be issued to the opposite party No. 4 either by himself or through the opposite party No. 3, Assistant Collector, to have both the aspects, namely, the acceptance of the revised classification list and the claim for refund, determined within three months from the date of communication of the writ. There has been sufficient delay in complying with the direction under annexure 10. Therefore, without applying for any further extension, our direction should be complied with peremptorily. Full opportunity should be given to the petitioner to be heard and to establish its claim. Since this writ application was necessitated on account of default in compliance of appellate directions, we are of the view that the petitioner is entitled to costs of the proceeding. The writ application is accordingly allowed with costs.
-
1982 (9) TMI 67 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
... ...
... ... ..... ched to the writ petitions, pay the drawback dues to the petitioner as expeditiously as possible. Inasmuch as the petitioner s claim for the drawback dues subject to the authorities verifying the correctness of the amount involved in it and the same coming within the period during which the concession is permitted is valid as per law, the respondents are directed to pay back the drawback dues to the petitioner in each of the writ petitions without any further delay. The rule nisi is made absolute in all the writ petitions except W. P. Nos. 2446 and 3070 of 1978. W. P. No. 3070 of 1978 is dismissed as superfluous. 16. As regards W. P. No. 2446 of 1978, which is for issue of a writ of certiorari, I do not think any separate order is needed since the claim made by the petitioner has been answered in favour of the petitioner in the above writ petitions. Hence, W. P. No. 2446 of 1978 is also dismissed as superfluous. There will be no order as to costs in all these writ petitions.
-
1982 (9) TMI 66 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Porcelain shells or porcelain housing used in lightning arresters are not porcelainware - `Goods' - Excise duty - Liability to duty
-
1982 (9) TMI 65 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Customs — Liability to pay Customs duty not dependent on liability to pay customs duty ... ... ... ... ..... ndents case is the incorrectness of the Sylvania and Synthetics Judgments. Mr. Dhanuka has fairly Conceded that in this court he is bound by the judgments. It is agreed that my conclusion covers these petitions. 14. I pass the following orders - In Misc. Petition No. 959 of 1979 the petition is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b), with costs. In Misc. Petition No. 1043 of 1979 the petition is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b), with no order as to costs. In Misc. Petition No. 1981 of 1979 the petition is made absolute in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c), with no order as to costs. In Misc. Petition No. 2157 of 1997 the petition is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b), with no order as to costs. In Misc. Petition No. 2169 of 1979 the petition is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b), with no order as to costs. In Misc. Petition No. 2117 of 1979 the petition is made absolute in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c), with no order as to costs.
-
1982 (9) TMI 64 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Customs Duty — Re-importation of goods — Liability to duty — Held ... ... ... ... ..... and acquired the character of imported goods and became liable to customs duty. The entry into Indian territorial waters on 6th March 1979 resulted in the discharge of the goods for home consumption. 11. The entry into Indian territorial waters on 6th March 1979 was, in my view, rightly taken into account by the Customs authorities for the purpose of determining the chargeability of the goods to customs duty. 12. I am informed by counsel that the facts in Misc. Petition No. 960 of 1979 are similar, that the contentions are identical and that the reasoning aforesaid will apply equally to it. 13. In the result, the two petitions are dismissed with costs. Rule discharged. 14. Mr. C.M. Mehta, on behalf of the Petitioners in the first petition (Misc. Petition No. 602 of 1979), applies for stay of this order for a period of 6 weeks from today. Such stay is granted upon the condition that the bank guarantee given at the interim stage of this Petition shall be kept alive till then.
-
1982 (9) TMI 63 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Writ jurisdiction - Customs - Words and Phrases - 'Entry Inwards' - Connotation of ... ... ... ... ..... f the entry inwards having been granted on a later date. The import general manifest was submitted on 16th June, 1977. The ship was granted entry inward on 20th June, 1977. What, therefore, is urged is that it was incumbent upon the Customs authorities to grant entry inwards within the period of 4 days, I am not inclined to read into the Act the obligation to grant entry inwards within this period. 6. It was submitted by Mr Chinoy that the impugned order in appeal assumed the date of entry inward to be that day on which the vessel came alongside and found a berthing place and prepared herself for discharge of cargo for home consumption. It was said that this was an arbitrary formula to adopt. I am not shown any alternative formula by reason of which I can say that the Customs authorities understanding of the phrase entry inward is incorrect. 7. Having regard to what is discussed above, the Petition is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Rule discharged.
-
1982 (9) TMI 62 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Ice-Cream from skimmed milk powder not exempt ... ... ... ... ..... is incidentally liquified on its way. A grievance was made above issuance of a Tariff advice. Learned Counsel has placed a Circular as per Annexure Q wherein Clause 6 reads as under - However, as already stated in the Board s letter dated 20-3-1970 quoted above, the quasi-judicial authorities are free to differ with the Tariff advice. We, therefore, see no merit in the contention that the Excise authorities will not consider the question with an open mind. What is more, since the matter has been argued on merits and we do not uphold the interpretation canvassed by the petitioners on merits, in any view of the matter the petition must fail. 3. Learned Standing Counsel has assured us that notwithstanding the outcome of the petition the order passed by us at the interim relief stage will be complied with and the said arrangement as regards the quantity covered by C.T. 2 certificate for the period upto December 31, 1982 will not be disturbed. In the result, petition is rejected.
-
1982 (9) TMI 61 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Tractors and tillers - Distinction between - Writ jurisdiction - Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... een remanded for a test or examination or for the removal of any other defect in the proceedings. Very detailed arguments were submitted to the authorities in writing. They considered them. It is true that no oral hearing was given to the petitioner. But their representation was considered at each stage. Oral hearing is not essential in every case. There need be no oral hearing. S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Ors. (1980) 4 SCC 379 (388) . All that the authorities have to do is to consider the representation made by the petitioner and to come to a conclusion of their own. 14. On the merits of the case I have to come to the conclusion, after hearing counsel for the petitioner at length, that there has been no injustice in this case. Nor has law been disregarded in any manner or form. 15. For these reasons the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. At the conclusion of the hearing on 16-9-1982 I announced the order. Now I have given my reasons for doing so.
-
1982 (9) TMI 60 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Pre-budget stock liable to duty - Excise duty - Nature and scope ... ... ... ... ..... r molasses now. 7. Sri Sudhir Chandra appearing for the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Limited contended that since molasses in question was produced at the time when it was exempt from excise duty and the Finance Act of 1980, under which molasses was introduced as a specific item in the Schedule, did not give retrospective operation, this stock could not be subjected to excise duty. Learned counsel, however, could not point out any provision in the Act or the Rules that excise duty was leviable with reference to the date of production. As pointed out earlier, although excise duty is on the production or manufacture of goods, it can be imposed at a stage subsequent to the manufacture or production as held in A.B. Abdul Kadir v. State of Kerala (A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 182). This dictum has been approved in the case of M/s. McDowell and Company Limited (supra). 8. In the result the petitioners are not entitled to any relief. The petitions are accordingly dismissed with costs.
-
1982 (9) TMI 59 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Stainless steel sheets - Valuation - Tariff entry - Constitutional validity - Taxation - Provisionary estoppel - Interpretation of statutes - Import and Export policy - Customs Tariff (Amendment) Act - Statute
-
1982 (9) TMI 58 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Price list - Proper officer failed to pass any order - Dereliction of duty - Refund of duty illegally recovered - Refund procedure not followed - Writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked
-
1982 (9) TMI 57 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Iron or steel products - Steel castings - Liability to duty - Castings - Short levy - Interpretation - Fiscal statute
-
1982 (9) TMI 56 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Proforma credit is not admissible only by adjustment - Refund - Statutory provision having two interpretations - Excise duty - Levy at different rates is not discriminatory. - Statute
-
1982 (9) TMI 55 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Valuation - Post-manufacturing expenses to be excluded ... ... ... ... ..... objected to by the petitioner. 3. In view of a large number of decisions of this court as well as of other High Courts and the Supreme Court, learned counsel for the respondents, as a matter of proposition, does not dispute that post-manufacturing expenses cannot be added to the assessable value. But as, to what would be those items of expenses is a question which has not been examined by the revenue authorities. In some of the reported decisions, some of the items have been examined but the authorities have not given their attention to any item themselves. I would refrain to discuss the details of those items although Mr. Chatterji has made some endeavour to give some observations in this regard. Therefore, when the matter goes back, it would be open to the petitioner to convince the authorities in this regard and if any dispute would arise thereafter, it would be open to the petitioner to come to this Court after exhausting the appellate remedy provided under the statute.
....
|
