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Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 553 Records
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1999 (9) TMI 872 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Adjudication - Ex parte dismissal of appeal as unsubstantiated ... ... ... ... ..... der of dismissal of the appeal as ldquo unsubstantiated rdquo . 3. emsp I find that it is without even examining the Order-in-Original or considering the grounds of appeal that the lower appellate authority has held that the appeal is unsubstantiated. On this sole ground, I find that the impugned order is not a speaking order, and is hence liable to be set aside. It is settled law that quasi-judicial authority is under a legal obligation to pass a speaking order on merits even in a case where the aggrieved party is not represented at the hearing. The lower appellate authority having failed to do so, has to be directed to dispose of the appeal on merits by way of a speaking order, after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard, to the appellants. I, therefore, set aside the impugned order and allow the present appeal by way of remand with a direction to the lower appellate authority to dispose of the appeal in accordance with law and the principles of natural justice.
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1999 (9) TMI 853 - CEGAT, CHENNAI
Classification of goods - Exemption - Washing machine parts - Classification - Demand - Limitation - Penalty - Confiscation - Plant and machinery
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1999 (9) TMI 852 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Crushed clay/Batch mixture - Marketability - Dutiability - SSI Exemption - Value of clearances
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1999 (9) TMI 838 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Winding up - Overriding preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... ld not convert trust money into the assets of the Mills Company. The intermingling of these two different properties can never be taken as the passing of the property in the trust money in the hands of a trustee, in favour of a trustee, or else the trustees in many such cases would also enjoy position of a creator of a trust and the only beneficiaries. This would militate against the very basics of the Doctrine of lsquo Trust rsquo not only implied but express also. The conclusion therefore is that, the prayer as prayed for in the Judge rsquo s summons requires to be granted. I order accordingly. In the result, therefore, the Liquidator is directed to pay the above said amount to the applicant Credit Society from the funds available with him, before he undertakes the exercise of distribution of the said proceeds realised by disposing of the assets of the mills company in question. This should be done as early as possible, but at any rate, within a period of four weeks hereof.
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1999 (9) TMI 837 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up - Circumstances in which a company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... n it was declared as defaulter and even thereafter when the notice under sections 433 and 434 was issued on behalf of the petitioning creditor. The learned Company Judge had admitted the company petition for the amount claimed in the notice dated 12-3-1997 which was issued under sections 433 and 434. In our opinion, in view of the above facts, the learned Company Judge rightly admitted the company petition and gave the directions as he did in the matter. 12. In the circumstances, we find no warrant to interfere with the order of the learned Company Judge. However, as the period for payment expired during the pendency of the appeal. We shall offer the appellant enlargement of time by one month from date to comply with the orders of the learned Company Judge and in default thereof, the respondent-petitioning creditor shall be at liberty to publish the advertisements as directed in the order under appeal in the newspapers specified therein. 13. Appeal is accordingly disposed of.
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1999 (9) TMI 836 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up - Suits stayed on winding up order ... ... ... ... ..... enewal clause will continue to operate. 34. Having considered the matter in the light of Order 26, Rule 9 and Order 39 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we are of the opinion that in a case of this nature the Court should allow the parties to adduce independent evidence including that of experts for the purpose of determining the amount which should be taken to be the fair rent in respect of the leases in question. 35. To the aforementioned extent this appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted to the learned company judge for passing an appropriate order in accordance with law. Meanwhile the appellant without prejudice to his rights and contention shall continue to deposit the sum Rs. 58,000 per month as has been directed by the learned trial judge but such deposit shall be subject to the ultimate result that may be passed by the learned company judge and all adjustments in this regard shall be made. 36. This appeal is, thus, disposed of without any order as to costs.
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1999 (9) TMI 834 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there has been any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the performance of the service by the bank?
Held that:- There has not been any deficiency in service provided by the bank and in our view National Commission and the State Commission were wrong in coming to the contrary conclusion. In the present case Dany Dairy & Food Engineers Ltd. approached the Saharanpur Branch of the bank to provide bank guarantee which it did. The Bank Guarantee was invoked at Saharanpur and payment was also made by the Saharanpur Branch of the Bank. Saharanpur Branch is situated within the State of U.P. No part of the cause of action has arisen in Delhi. It is difficult to agree with the view of the State Commission and also of the National Commission that the State Commission at Delhi had jurisdiction in the matter.
Therefore, uphold both the contentions of the appellant and set aside the order of the National Commission as well as of State Commission. The complaint filed by the first respondent is dismissed.
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1999 (9) TMI 833 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Winding up - Circumstances in which a company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... inclined to allow any of these company petitions, I do not consider it necessary to express my opinion whether or not the petitioner-Unions could have preferred these petitions on behalf of the workers represented by them. Suffices it to say that in paragraph 7 of both the petitioners, it has been stated that the General Secretary of the respective petitioner-Union had been authorized by all the members of the Unions to present the applications. In their counter-affidavit, opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 disputed the correctness of this assertion. The petitioner-Unions failed to produce any document to show that the members had authorised the General Secretary of their respective Unions either individually by executing power of attorney, or collectively by adopting any resolution in the meeting of the General Body, to present the petitions. 25. In the result, both the petitions failed and are hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the cases parties shall bear their own costs.
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1999 (9) TMI 832 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the statements of the occupants of the vessel recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act having formed the sole basis for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority for the order of detention and those very persons having retracted, non-consideration of the retraction, vitiates the order of detention itself?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The High Court in the case in hand did not accept the aforesaid contention on the ground that there was no material before the detaining authority that there has been retraction of the statements made by those persons who had earlier been examined under section 108. We need not go into this question in the case in hand, inasmuch as by the date of issuance of the order of detention, those persons have made a further statement indicating that the original statements made by them under section 108 of the Customs Act were correct and not the retracted statements they had made and this fact was before the detaining authority when he issued the order of detention under section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. This being the position, it is difficult for us to accept the contention of Mr. Kotwal that the satisfaction of the detaining authority gets vitiated for non-consideration of the relevant material. In our opinion, the aforesaid submission, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is devoid of any force and accordingly reject the same.
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1999 (9) TMI 831 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Penalty for wrongful with holding of property ... ... ... ... ..... ability is of civil nature and complaint under section 630 of the Companies Act is not maintainable. In support of the argument, learned counsel for the applicant has referred to the case of Jagdish Chcmdra Nijhawan v. S.K. Saraf 1999 95 Comp Cas 48 1999 SCC (Crl.) 20. I have carefully gone through the law laid down in that case. There was an agreement and the Hon ble Supreme Court observed that the appellant in that case joined the services mainly because he was offered a flat in Triveli Court. The employment was given for five years and there was a further agreement that in the case of termination of service at the instance of the company, the employee/his wife shall continue to enjoy rent free accommodation during their lifetime. In the light of this argument, it was held that the liability is of civil nature and a suit for eviction was also pending. This authority has, therefore, no help to the facts of the case. The petition is, therefore, without merit and is dismissed.
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1999 (9) TMI 830 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Disqualification of directors, Stock exchange, Grant of recognition to stock exchanges, Powers of stock exchange to make rules/bye-laws
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1999 (9) TMI 829 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Winding up - Inherent powers of court ... ... ... ... ..... ges is that there is nothing to indicate before me that a reference was pending in the true sense of the term as laid down by the Supreme Court as on 10-12-1998 and if that is the case the solitary ground on which this application has been filed fails. Furthermore, what I need to point out is that the order passed by the BIFR and the appellate authority have both been dismissed on the ground that no such reference was competent which really means that even assuming the company had gone to the BIFR that this Court cannot take any cognizance of that proceeding. Looked at from any angle therefore, it is not permissible for this Court to grant any relief on the present application. C.A. 515 of 1999 in Co. P. No. 63 of 1998 which is for recalling the order dated 10-12-1998 fails and stands dismissed. C.A. 516 of 1999 in Co. P. No. 63 of 1998 which is for stay also fails and stands dismissed. 4. I have also heard the learned counsel who represents the Official Liquidator on merits.
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1999 (9) TMI 828 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Winding up - Circumstances in which a company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... rcised and the order in question is recalled or set aside. It is for this reason that Company Application 684 of 1998 fails and stands dismissed. I need to add here that the Doctrine of finality applies to judicial proceedings but that maxim seems to have been long since forgotten by the legal profession, judging from the casualness with which applications for review and remand are addressed to the Court. This Judgment is a firm reminder that parties will have to function in a time-bound and professional manner. 8. The petitioners had been directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 5,000 with the Official Liquidator. The time period for depositing the amount both as far as the petitioners and the K.S.F.C. are concerned is extended by a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of this order. The petitioners to advertise the petition in the local edition of the Hindu within a period of two weeks from that date. Copies of the order to be furnished to the learned advocates forthwith.
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1999 (9) TMI 826 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Winding up proceedings - Initial expenses of Official Liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... editors, namely, the petitioners before the Court are relatively small whose capacity would be limited, this cannot act as a ground on which the office of the Official Liquidator will be cramped for funds and would find it difficult to carry out its functions. In this background, the financial institutions and banks whose bearability is much higher than that of individual creditors can certainly be requested to contribute towards the expenses as the overriding consideration is that they have much larger claims and much more money at stake. It is for these reasons that the order was passed in this case. Had there been any illegality in the order or irregularity in the order or unfairness in the order, I would have reconsidered it but in this background I am of the view that the order was perfectly justified, and consequently, that no relief is tenable on Company Application No. 683 of 1998. The company application accordingly fails and stands dismissed. Application dismissed.
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1999 (9) TMI 824 - SUPREME COURT
Whether time was the essence of the contract or not?
Whether High Court have authority in the matter of interference with an arbitral award under the Repealed Act of 1940 (The Arbitration Act, 1940)?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Needless to record that two arbitrators Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.N. Shankar, a retired Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court and Shri K.C. Diwan, Senior Advocate upon appraisal of evidence and have considered the matter in its entirety and in proper perspective. As such, the question of interference with the arbitral award does not and cannot arise. In that view of the matter, these appeals succeed. The order of the Appellate Bench of the High Court stand set aside and the order of the learned single judge of the Delhi High Court stands restored.
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1999 (9) TMI 821 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, INDORE BENCH
Stock exchange - Amenability to writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... se. There may be cases where the writ would certainly issue and cases where the writ jurisdiction would not be available. A dealing or a transaction within the Exchange may be private in nature but where its manner and method was covered by statutory Rules and Bye-laws and a breach alleged thereof even that would attract the writ jurisdiction on account of breach of statutory duty. As such Stock Exchange could be subject to the writ jurisdiction depending upon the nature of the action complained of and the obligation arising out of it, having its genesis in the Act, Rules and Bye-laws framed thereunder. 27. Therefore, while agreeing with the reasoning of the writ court partly these appeals are allowed to the limited extent indicated above. The dismissed writ petitions shall accordingly revive and be posted before appropriate Bench for examination of the nature of issues involved and for their determination in the light of the legal position enunciated. Appeal allowed in part.
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1999 (9) TMI 819 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... argo or bar to realise such arrears of rent and mesne profits and damages, for the landlord cannot be deprived of the amount which is legitimately due to him and such amount cannot be withheld indefinitely and unreasonably. As is held in Corromandal Pharmaceuticals case (supra) a reasonable construction should be given to the language of the provisions of the Act which is not unfair and also not unreasonable. The Additional District Judge has also considered the aforesaid aspect and has held that as the recovery of damages/mesne profits claimed by the plaintiff from the defendant in the present case are not included in the sanctioned scheme of the Board the suit cannot be stayed even for the recovery of such damages/mesne profits. The said conclusions are in consonance with the ratio of the decision laid down by the Supreme Court. 10. I, therefore, do not find any error in the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial Court. The petition has no merit and is dismissed accordingly.
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1999 (9) TMI 816 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Winding up - Circumstances in which a company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... High Court in Ofu Lynx Ltd. v. Simon Carves India Ltd. AIR 1970 Cal. 418 and submitted that this is a fit case to direct security to be furnished for the debt claimed by the appellant pending the suit to be filed. The circumstances in which the security was directed to be furnished by the High Court while dismissing the winding-up petition are not comparable to the circumstances obtaining in the present case. We are, therefore, not inclined to grant any such direction. However, we leave it open to the appellant to move the competent civil court for appropriate interim orders for securing the payment of the alleged debt. We further direct that every endeavour shall be made by the concerned civil court to dispose of the suit, if filed, expeditiously and without avoidable delay. The civil court will decide the suit uninfluenced by the observations made by the learned Single Judge on a prima facie consideration. The O.S.A. is dismissed subject to the above observations. No costs.
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1999 (9) TMI 815 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the arbitrator has acted beyond the terms of the contract or has travelled beyond his jurisdiction?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. From the facts of present case it is apparent that claim before the arbitrator in November-December 1985 was apparently barred by period of limitation. Letter dated 3-9-1983 written by the appellant repudiating the respondent’s claim on account of damages or losses sustained by him would not give fresh cause of action. On that date cause of action for recovering the said amount was barred by the period of three years prescribed under article 137. Under section 3, it was the duty of the arbitrator to reject the claim as it was on the face of it, barred by the period of limitation.
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1999 (9) TMI 784 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondents who purchased goods from persons other than registered dealers fall within the scope of section 6-A of the Act?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Once the goods are utilised in the construction of buildings the goods cease to exist or cease to be available in that form for sale or purchase so as to attract the tax and, therefore, the correct meaning to be attributed to the said provision would be that tax will be attracted when such goods are consumed in the manufacture of other goods or are consumed otherwise. Therefore, while agreeing with the view in Ganesh Prasad Dixit [1969 (2) TMI 128 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] on this aspect, we overrule to this extent the view expressed in Pio Food Packers [1980 (5) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA]
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