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Showing 161 to 180 of 194 Records
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1982 (9) TMI 34 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... and, lastly, no evidence of general practice could have been given because the celebration of golden jubilee is not a normal event. It was ultimately held that the disputed payment was for the assessee s business and was allowable under s. 37 of the Act. It is thus obvious that the Tribunal upheld the claim of the assessee under s. 36(1)(ii) also. The question referred to us is exactly in the same language as suggested by the Revenue and it does not call for any opinion by this court whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the claim was allowable under s. 36(1)(ii) of the Act. Since the claim had been upheld even under s. 36(1)(ii) of the Act, it is not necessary to answer the question referred as it would serve no useful purpose in the present case. Our answer to questions Nos. (i) and (ii) is in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Question No. (iii) is returned unanswered. The assessee is entitled to costs, which we assess at Rs. 250.
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1982 (9) TMI 33 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Closely Held Company, Rule Against Double Taxation ... ... ... ... ..... simple reason that the only ground upon which the registration can be cancelled is the non-existence of a genuine firm. The language of s. 186(1) is similar to that of r. 6B referred to above. Admittedly, during the relevant previous year, one of the partners admitted to the benefits of the partnership became a major. Even assuming that a change in the constitution took place, the genuineness of the firm was not at all affected. The mere fact that a fresh instrument of partnership was not brought into existence could not mean that a firm which was genuine ceased to be so. Since the registration could be cancelled only if there was during the previous year no genuine firm in existence, which was not the situation in the present case, the order of the I was rightly held to be erroneous and unsustainable. Our answer to the question referred is in the negative, against the Department and in favour of the assessee. The assessee is entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 250.
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1982 (9) TMI 32 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Partition In HUF, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... fore the AAC as well as the Tribunal was the order levying penalty on the disrupted HUF in respect of the period up to the date of partition and the same question was raised in the reference application. It is true that the provision contained in s. 171(8) was referred to for the first time in the application for reference but that provision was referred to only in support of the stand taken by the Revenue. No fresh question of law cropped up for consideration because of the reference to the provision of the Act, which, it was claimed, provided the authority to levy the penalty. The Department was justified in law in raising the question of applicability of s. 171(8) at the stage of the reference application. Our answer to question No. 1 is in the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue and the answer to question No. 2 is in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The. Revenue is entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 250.
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1982 (9) TMI 31 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... arned counsel for the petitioner, urged another point in support of this application, namely, that the sanction accorded by the CBDT, respondent No. 1, ought to be held to be merely mechanical without an application of its mind. Mr. Rajgarhia, however, contends that the stamped answer to the question as to whether the Board had accorded sanction or not, namely, Yes was merely signed by the Deputy Secretary on behalf of the CBDT. The original sanction order of the Board must, presumably, be lying in the office of the CBDT itself. We are inclined to take the view that Mr. Rajgarhia is contending for. It is, therefore, not possible for us on the materials before us to hold that the sanction accorded by respondent No. 1 was merely mechanical. In the result, this application is allowed, the impugned notice dated February 22, 1982, as contained in annex, 7 is quashed and the respondents are restrained from taking any action in pursuance thereof. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1982 (9) TMI 30 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Income Escaped Assessment, Income From Property, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... nal for a fresh decision in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs. The answers that we have given in the Taxation Cases Nos. 87 to 89 of 1971, also answer the question which has been referred in Taxation Case No. 43 of 1971, as to whether the bona fide letting value of the properties, Nos. 548A and 571 A, was rightly taken at Rs. 28,728 in the hands of the assessee/lessor, being the rent realisable by the lessees from the tenants. Mr. B. P. Rajgarhia, learned senior standing counsel for the Department, urged that in any event, the money really received by way of rent by the assessee/lessor in excess of the fair rent determinable under the Rent Control Act may fall under the heading Income from other sources if owned under s. 56 of the Act read with s. 14 in Chapter IV, Caption C. This question was never previously raised and, therefore, we are not applying our mind to it. If it is raised before the Tribunal, it shall decide the point in accordance with law.
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1982 (9) TMI 29 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Capital Asset, Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... by any public or local authority . The word authority was qualified by the words public or local which were restrictive in nature. In s. 43(1), the restrictive words have been omitted and only the word authority has been used. It appears that Parliament omitted the word Government from s. 43(1) because it felt that the wide connotation of the word authority would take within its purview Government as well, besides other kinds of authorities. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the term authority in s. 43(1) includes the Govt. of Uttar Pradesh to the assessee. The second submission of the learned counsel for, the assessee also fails. In view of the above, our answer to question No. 1 is in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Our answer to the first part of question No. 2 is in the affirmative and to the second part of the question is in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The assessee shall pay Rs. 250 as costs.
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1982 (9) TMI 28 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... u/s. 22(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Tribunal in this case has come to the conclusion on a review of the facts and also of the agreement that the assessee was the owner of the five new buses and as such was entitled to claim depreciation allowance on these buses. The Tribunal has not committed any error of law in coming to this conclusion. The requirement of s. 32 of the I.T. Act is that the vehicles must be owned by the assessee . This section does not require that the assessee must be a registered owner of the vehicles in order to claim depreciation allowance in respect of them. We are of the view that, in the facts of this case, the new buses were owned by the assessee within the meaning of s. 32 of the I.T. Act and the assessee was entitled to claim depreciation allowance on these vehicles. In the premises, both the questions are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The parties will pay and bear their own costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1982 (9) TMI 27 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
HUF, Partition ... ... ... ... ..... ) of s. 171 was not attracted, liability could well be fixed under the substantive provision contained in s. 25A of the 1922 Act. If the argument put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioners is accepted, the result would be that the petitioners would escape assessment altogether. Such an unreasonable interpretation cannot be accepted. We may also mention that petitioner No. 1, Balchand, had earlier come to this court seeking to quash the notice under s. 148 of the 1961 Act which has ultimately resulted in a fresh assessment and apportionment which are the subject-matter of this petition. It was held that the notice issued and proceedings initiated pursuant thereto were valid and the petition was dismissed. See Balchand v. ITO 1966 61 ITR 656 (MP) . This dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Balchand v. ITO 1969 72 ITR 197. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition is dismissed but without any order as to costs. Security amount be refunded to the petitioners.
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1982 (9) TMI 26 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... Mohd. Haneef s case 1955 27 ITR 447 (All), certainly is not an authority for the proposition that any vagueness in the notice can be got cured with reference to any subsequent communication made by the ITO. We are, therefore, of opinion that the notice under s. 34 issued to Sri Madan Lal Agarwal on 29th September, 1962, was vague and as such invalid. The vagueness of the said notice did not stand cured because the ITO at a later stage informed the assessee that he was to file his return in the status of HUF. The proceedings following such a vague and invalid notice also stand vitiated. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to go into the various other grounds raised by the learned counsel for the assessee for questioning the validity of the proceedings under s. 147(a) of the I.T. Act, 1961. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee shall be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 250.
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1982 (9) TMI 25 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... shares of a company such as this can be validly done under the provisions of s. 6(1). It ruled out the applicability of any other method, including the break-up method. What the Supreme Court said in regard to s. 6(3) and r. 10(2) was that it had not been argued before the Tribunal that the break-up method was the primary method to be applied. No question based upon this argument could, therefore, be referred. It is crystal clear that the valuation of the shares of the two companies concerned here can only be arrived at under the provisions of s. 6(1) upon the profit-earning method. This finding of the Supreme Court is binding on the first respondent. It was not open to him to seek to adopt for the purposes of the gift-tax assessments of the petitioner any method of valuation other than that method. Having regard to this conclusion, it is unnecessary to go into the alternative submissions of Mr. Kolah. The petition is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b), with costs.
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1982 (9) TMI 24 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Enduring Benefit ... ... ... ... ..... rns which cries aloud for being construed on its own terms. Earlier decisions of courts, even though rendered on agreements in this genre, can only come in our way and clutter up our decision. They are neither precedents to be followed, nor aids to construction to be adopted. The Ciba case 1968 69 ITR 692 (SC) and the Fenner Woodroffe case 1976 102 ITR 665 (Mad), whether considered separately or in juxtaposition, do not lay down any rule of construction which regards the presence or absence of a provision for return of the know-how literature to the foreign collaborator as a crucial factor in the construction of collaboration agreements. We, therefore, desist from further consideration not only of these two decisions, but of other reported cases cited before us during argument. In the result, our answer to the question of law is in the affirmative and in the assessee s favour. The Department will pay the cost of this reference to the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (one set).
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1982 (9) TMI 23 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Revision, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... r sub-s. (11) of s. 132. We are not prepared to accept that since the Commissioner issued the notice under s. 263, he would be prejudiced or biased against the petitioner and, therefore, is not competent to hear the objection under s. 132(11) of the Act. It was next contended that if s. 263 is interpreted to vest the Commissioner with the power of revision against an order passed under s. 132(5) of the Act, that would lead to multiplicity of proceedings-one proceeding arising out of the order passed under s. 263 and the other arising out of the regular assessment proceeding-both proceedings leading up to appeal before the Tribunal and reference applications. That can hardly be a relevant factor in interpreting the scope of s. 263. In our opinion, the action taken by the Commissioner of Income-tax by issuing notice under s. 263 of the Act is not without jurisdiction and no case has been made out for interference by this court. The petition is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1982 (9) TMI 22 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Cash Credits, Failure To Disclose Material Facts, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... on to the questions referred is as follows Question No. 1 On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the assessee had not fully and truly disclosed the material facts, that the Tribunal was legally justified in invoking the provisions of s. 34(1)(a) of the Act and the proceedings started under s. 34 after the expiry of four years, were not barred by time. Question No. 2 On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was legally right in holding the amounts of Rs. 47,000 and Rs. 35,860 as the income of the assessee liable to tax under the Act. Question No 3 That by reason of the omission to summon and examine the evidence offered by the assessee the finding of the Tribunal with regard to the nature and source of Rs. 47,000 and Rs. 35,860, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, is not legally vitiated. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. SURINDER SINGH J.-I agree.
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1982 (9) TMI 21 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Material Facts, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ately after his arrival in India. Before the assessee came to India himself, his sons had already reached India and one of them Shri Bhupal Singh had already set up business known as Chheharta Button Factory in partnership with his cousins. The assessee had liquidated the bulk of his investments in Africa and brought cash with him. All these facts clearly indicated that after arriving in India in January, 1946, the assessee had no intention to return and in fact he did not go back to Africa. Thus, the Income-tax Officer has given detailed reasons for coming to the conclusion that the residential status of the assessee was resident but not ordinarily resident in the reassessment proceedings even on the basis of the facts as existed at the close of the accounting period. In view of the aforesaid discussion, both the questions are answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. SURINDER SINGH J.-I agree.
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1982 (9) TMI 20 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... nsiderations for imposition of penalty are different from the considerations which are provided in s. 18(2A) for the Commissioner to waive the penalty and in this view of the matter, therefore, it is clear that merely because the Commissioner has chosen not to waive the penalty u/s. 18(2A) it could not be a ground for holding that the appeals are not competent. The same view has been taken by the Division Bench of this court in Misc. Civil Case No. 430/78 (Jagdish Agarwal v. CWT 1983 143 ITR 941 (MP) ), placing reliance on the decisions of the Karnataka, Madras and Delhi High Courts. In our opinion, therefore, the AAC was not right in holding that the appeals are not competent. Oar answer to the question, therefore, is in the affirmative. The Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding the appeals before the AAC as maintainable against the WTO s order imposing penalty u/s. 18(1)(a) of the W.T. Act. In the circumstances of the case parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1982 (9) TMI 19 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Mistake Apparent From Record, Rectification ... ... ... ... ..... word business has a wider connotation than the words manufacture or production is itself not obviously apparent. There is in my mind no doubt that it cannot be established without debate that the income purported to be excluded by the impugned orders, which relates to miscellaneous receipts, rents, interest other than interest on securities, and surplus on sale of assets under s. 41(2), is not income attributable to the manufacture or production of the articles mentioned in the First Schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. It cannot, therefore, be held that the inclusion of the income which the ITO has now purported to exclude was a mistake apparent from the record and that the 1st respondent was entitled to rectify it under the provisions of para. 8 of the Scheme. It must be recorded that the vires of para. 8 of the Scheme has not been attacked before me. The petition must, therefore, succeed and is made absolute in terms of prayer (b) with costs.
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1982 (9) TMI 18 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... the word retransfer in the last paragraph of Ex. P-1 postulates only a reversal of a completed process. On the terms of Ex. P-1, therefore, it is impossible to assume that the transfers effected by the petitioners on March 31, 1977, were conditional and had not taken effect at any time. The agreement was not for conditional transfer of shares, but for full legal transfer in lots, with a condition added that the lots sold were to be bought back under certain circumstances. The theory that there was no completed transfer and that there was no taxable point giving rise to capital gains is also belied by the circumstance that the petitioners themselves had included the long-term capital gains in the returns filed by them. They themselves were then of the view that the transfers had become effective, and in proceedings under art. 226 of the Constitution, this court cannot also now permit them to take up a different stand. The original petitions are, therefore, dismissed. No costs.
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1982 (9) TMI 17 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and against the assessee and as follows On the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the assessment of the assessee-firm for the year 1974-75 could be made only in accordance with section 188 and that a single assessment for the whole year was not valid even if, as between the old firm and the new firm, one or more partners thereof were common. ORDER CHIEF JUSTICE In accordance with the opinion of the majority of judges, the question referred to this court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and as follows On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the assessment of the assessee-firm for the year 1974-75 could be made only in accordance with section 188 and that a single assessment for the whole year was not valid even if, as between the old firm and the new firm, one or more partners thereof were common.
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1982 (9) TMI 16 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Recovery Proceedings Against HUF, Writ Against Recovery Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... nd collusive transfer of his share in the house property with a view to defeat the recovery. In our opinion, this conduct of the petitioner, therefore, clearly disentitles him to certiorari. We do not propose to enter into the merits of the contention urged by Sri Katju that the petitioner cannot be granted any relief also for the reason that he stated false facts in the writ petition. That is, in regard to petitioner s allegations in para. 3 of the writ petition that no notice of demand in respect of income-tax dues was ever served on the assessee HUF. The respondents in their counter-affidavit have asserted that such notice was in fact served. Since it becomes a disputed question of fact, we cannot go into it and, therefore, we leave this aspect without expressing any opinion on it. To conclude, therefore, for reasons discussed above, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The stay order dated January 18, 1980, confirmed by Order dated July 24, 1980, is discharged.
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1982 (9) TMI 15 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and others engaged in the incessant task of statutory interpretation. It has only led to more and more litigation between the taxpayers and the Revenue, with the ever present risk that first principles of fiscal accounting might get lost or distorted in the process. We fear that the litigation of the kind which this case and other cases in the books have witnessed will continue to rage as long as the provisions retain their existing format. Be that as it may, for the reasons we have earlier stated, we answer the second question of law in the negative and against the assessee. We hold that the unabsorbed depreciation and development rebate of past years must be deducted from the profits of the assessee s tyre factory for the year concerned and then only the relief at 8 per cent. will have to be worked out for determining the tax relief under s. 80-1 available to the assessee for the assessment year. In view of the mixed results of this reference, we make no order as to costs.
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