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Showing 181 to 200 of 228 Records
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1994 (8) TMI 49 - SC ORDER
Valuation (Customs) ... ... ... ... ..... der to pass because the Tribunal should have considered in its order the material that was placed on record in respect of the many individual imports made by the assessee from DAK Electronatics Corporation for these imports fell into different categories, as is shown by the order of the Collector of Customs which was impugned before the Tribunal (Para 12.3). The Tribunal should, in our view, have also applied its mind to the Rules under which the valuation of imported goods was required to be made and the applicable law. 3. The appeals of the assessee and the Collector of Customs are allowed. The order under appeal is set aside. The appeal No. CD(SB)(T)329/82-A is remanded to the Tribunal for being heard and decided afresh in the light of the observations made above. 4. The interim order dated 4th August, 1986 made by this Court shall operate until the final disposal of the appeal by the Tribunal and for a period of 8 weeks thereafter. 5. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 48 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT JODHPUR
Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit ... ... ... ... ..... ons are not being disposed of and the proceedings for the recovery of the excise duty imposed have been started vide Annexure 5. 2. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that in similar type of writ petitions, this Court has earlier directed the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi to decide similar applications within certain period and till then the proceedings for the recovery of the excise duty levied have been stayed. 3. This position is not disputed by learned Counsel for the respondents. 4. The Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi will decide the said applications of the petitioner within three months from the date of the receipt of a certified copy of this order. Till then, coercive steps will not be taken for the recovery of the amounts demanded in pursuance of the order of the Collector, Central Excise, Jaipur dated 22-2-1994. 5. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 47 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Modvat Scheme - Withdrawal of - Promissory estoppel ... ... ... ... ..... er 28, 1987 produced at Annexure-G to the petition. In our opinion the ends of justice would be met if the following direction is given with respect to the challenge to the letter Annexure-G, dated October 28, 1987. 11.In the result the petition is rejected as far as the prayer relating to the constitutional validity of Notification No. 203 of 1987, dated September 9, 1987 is concerned. As far as the challenge to the letter dated October 28, 1987 produced at Annexure-G to the petition is concerned, it is directed that if the petitioner files appeal to the appropriate appellate authority, i.e., Collector (Appeals), Allahabad, on or before September 15, 1994, the same shall be entertained by the appellate authority and will be decided without taking objection as to limitation. It is hoped that the appeal that may be filed will be decided by the appellate authority concerned as expeditiously as possible. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent only, with no order as to costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT
Revision/Review - Limitation for demand of duty ... ... ... ... ..... ght into force until 17th November, 1980, the time limit for the purposes of a short levy notice under Section 36(2) was not, until 17th November, 1980, that provided by Section 11A and that, therefore, the notice with which we are concerned in this appeal was not time-barred. 4. We find it difficult to accept the contention. The third proviso to Section 36(2) merely indicates how the time limit for a notice, inter alia in regard to short levy of excise duty, has to be reckoned it has to be reckoned as indicated in Section 11A. The notice under Section 36(2) is not required to be given under the provisions of Section 11A. That Section 11A was not brought into force until 17th November, 1980, is, therefore, of no relevance, particularly considering the fact that it was enacted in 1978 as was the third proviso to Section 36(2) itself. 5. In the result, the only point argued on behalf of the appellant must be decided against it. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 45 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Prosecution (Customs) - Jurisdiction - Double jeopardy ... ... ... ... ..... ting the driver s cabin from the rear body of the truck. The complaint was lodged before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi. He took cognizance of the offence. It was challenged on the ground that the court at Delhi had no jurisdiction to try the case. The important thing to be noted is that the place of interception was Kundli, which is a town admittedly situated within the State of Haryana. Ex facie, the court at Delhi had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. So, it was held that the Court at Delhi had no jurisdiction to try the case. But such are not the facts here. So this case would not apply to this case. Hence I am unable to accept this submission made by Mr. Abdul Nazeer. For the reasons already stated, the petition fails and shall stand dismissed. The petitioner is at liberty to urge all the points before the court below and the learned Magistrate shall not in any way be influenced by any of the observations made in this order.
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1994 (8) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Arrest - Bail ... ... ... ... ..... on of the Supreme Court in Deepak Mahajan s case (supra), wherein Their Lordships have stated in unambiguous terms that the provisions of the Code would be applicable to the extent in the absence of any contrary provision in the Special Act or any special provision excluding the jurisdiction or applicability of the Code. In such circumstances, we hold that Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in its entirety applies squarely with regard to the production and detention of a person arrested under Section 104 of the Customs Act and such a person is entitled to be released on bail after expiry of the period prescribed therein. 4. In the result, the petitioner who is in custody since the 16th May, 1994 has to be released on bail. We, accordingly direct that the petitioner be released on bail to the satisfaction of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barasat. The application under Section 439, Code of Criminal Procedure is thus allowed. Sidheswar Narayan, J. - I agree.
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1994 (8) TMI 43 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit - Financial hardship - Strictures against the CEGAT ... ... ... ... ..... at he has not been able to furnish the bank guarantee as aforesaid. 10.Though the petitioner s conduct is not free from laches yet in the circumstances mentioned above, I am of the view that the petitioner s right to appeal should not be allowed to be frustrated because of his financial constraints. This writ petition was filed in the year 1987 and the department should have been able to recover the duty and penalty because no stay was granted. If it has not been able to recover the amount, that further shows that the petitioner is really too poor to make any deposit in terms of Section 35F. 11.For the above reasons, this writ petition is partly allowed. The Tribunal s Order dated 29th January, 1987 dismissing the petitioner s Appeal No. 1639/84-B1 is quashed. The pre-deposit of the duty and penalty which is the subject matter of the said appeal is dispensed with and the Tribunal is directed to dispose of the said appeal on merits in accordance with law. No order as to costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 42 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit ... ... ... ... ..... under Section 35F of the Central Excises and Salt Act be waived and further that the department be restrained from effecting recovery of the same till the decision of the appeal. By the impugned order, the learned Tribunal has rejected only the application so far as it related to the stay of the demand and the impugned order dated 17-5-1994 does not make any mentioning whatsoever to the petitioner s prayer for waiver of pre-deposit. That means that part of the application is yet to be disposed of. 2So far as the stay of the demand is concerned,. the application has been dismissed for want of prosecution after rejecting an adjournment application. It is open to the petitioner to move a fresh application for stay of the demand. In my view, therefore, there is no cause for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is dismissed in limine. 3.A certifed copy of this order may be supplied to the learned counsel on payment of usual charges today.
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1994 (8) TMI 41 - SC ORDER
Classification of goods ... ... ... ... ..... of Entry, then it is for the department to establish that the goods are different. The CEGAT has found that there is no material to sustain the finding of the Assistant Collector that the goods imported were not wool waste. No reasons are brought to our notice to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal. The appeal is dismissed.
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1994 (8) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Demand - Jurisdiction and tenability - Classification list - Provisional assessment ... ... ... ... ..... ccept the stand of the revenue that it has for any reason short-levied duty or that the assessee has short-paid the duty. It is also not possible to accept the case of the revenue for the reasons as above that assessment for the payment of tax in the circumstances as above, are provisional under Rule 9B of the Rules. The reason is obvious. The role of Rule 9B has been limited by sub-rule (2A) of Rule 173B. In any event if any provision of the rules elsewhere and not in Chapter VII-A, appear to conflict with what is found in this Chapter, they are required to be ignored. 17For the reasons as above, I have found force in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner. I accordingly hold that the Notice No. 47/84, dated 26-6-1984 and the proceedings allegedly initiated against the petitioner under Sec. 11A of the Act are without jurisdiction. They are accordingly quashed. The writ petition is allowed. On the facts of this case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 39 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Stay/Pre-deposit of duty ... ... ... ... ..... t. In view of the aforesaid observations the Collector s order requiring the appellant petitioner to deposit about two-third of the demand cannot be justified. 6.The petitioner s right to appeal and the interest of revenue have to be harmonised and the condition of pre-deposit has to be imposed in a manner that it does not create a strong fetter to the right of appeal itself. In my view, therefore, it would have been just if the petitioner was required to pre-deposit a sum of Rs.50,000/- only. 7.The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed and it is directed that in case the petitioner deposits a sum of Rs. 50,000/- in cash towards the aforesaid dues within 15 days from today, the condition of pre-deposit of the dues under Section 35-F of the Act shall stand dispensed with. The writ petition, accordingly, stands allowed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. 8.A certified copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel on payment of usual charges within 24 hours.
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1994 (8) TMI 38 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Demand - Show cause notice ... ... ... ... ..... sively within the knowledge of the petitioner and it was his duty to disclose on what account those drafts were received, failing which the authorities concerned could legitimately assume, with reference to the evidence collected from the railways regarding the despatch of goods in the names of the petitioner, his brother and servant, that those drafts were in respect of the goods sold by the petitioner. 7. Admittedly, no excise duty had been paid in respect of the goods sent to Jagadhari/Yamuna Nagar. The plea that the petitioner required certain persons for cross-examination, seems to have been a mere ploy because in the circumstances, no cross-examination of the railway officials or the bank officials seemed necessary. As already stated, the petitioner has not filed any copy of any application to show which specific individuals he wanted to cross-examine. 8. For the above reasons, I find no force in this writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed in limine with costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 37 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Refund (Customs) ... ... ... ... ..... July, 1992 after giving them the benefit of proviso (b) of Section 27(2) of the amended Customs Act, within a period of three months from this date positively. 12.Although the claim for interest was made by the writ petitioners in the application for refund but it appears that such claim was not made by the writ petitioners at the time of passing the direction by the Appellate Tribunal on the Customs Authorities to pay the amount claimed by the writ petitioners in the application for refund. Before me also, the learned counsel for the writ petitioners did not press for payment of interest. Accordingly, the question of directing payment of interest in this matter shall not arise. 13.No other point was raised on behalf of the parties. 14.The writ petition is thus allowed in the manner indicated above. 15.There will be no order as to costs. 16.Let xerox copies of this order be made available to the learned Counsel, appearing for the respective parties on their usual undertaking.
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1994 (8) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
Manufacture - Dutiability ... ... ... ... ..... been assessed once and levied to duty, must pay that duty again if any process, incidental or ancillary, is carried out on it . This was a reference to the Assistant Collector s observation that the process of covering bare copper or aluminium wire amounted to an incidental or ancillary process of bringing into existence a new product. In this appeal before us the challenge is, in the main, to the observation of the Tribunal quoted above. We see no reason to go into this question in the facts of this case. The excise authorities did not lead any evidence to establish that the winding of cotton or fibre-glass yarn upon bare copper or aluminium electric wire constituted a process of manufacture or brought into existence a new commercially recognised article. The appellate authority s finding in this regard was justified and his order, as also the order of the Tribunal sustaining it, must be upheld. 6. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
Copper/Aluminium Strips ... ... ... ... ..... submission, the assessees liability to pay excise duty upon the insulated strips was in terms of tariff items 26A(2) for copper insulated strips and 27(b) for aluminium insulated strips. Mr. Ganguli, learned counsel for the Revenue, submitted, on the other hand, that insulated strips were not specified in Tariff Items 26B and 27 and, therefore, Tariff Item 68 was applicable thereto. 8.Copper and aluminium strips, even though insulated, remain copper and aluminium strips and fall within the manufactures of copper and alumi- nium respectively. Tariff Items 26A and 27 are, therefore, closely related to and identifiable with insulated copper and aluminium strips respectively. Tariff Item 68, which speaks of goods which are not elsewhere specified in the Sche- dule, is consequently, inapplicable. We are, therefore, of the view that the asses- sees must be assessed upon the insulated wire under Tariff Items 26A and 27. The appeals are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
Whether remand of case by Appellate Tribunal correct?
Held that:- It appears that the Tribunal has adopted an easy course in remitting the matter to the Collector. On the materials on record, being an appellate authority, the Tribunal itself should have analysed the evidence and given a factual conclusion. If this course had been adopted the decision could have been rendered in one way or the other. The remit was superfluous and the parties had argued at length. Therefore, we set aside the impugned order of the Tribunal and remit the matter to it. The Tribunal is directed to decide the issues involved on their merits.
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1994 (8) TMI 33 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Immovable Property, Income Tax Act, Movable Property, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... in this regard and if the proceedings are for provisional attachment, certainly immovable property can be attached. But, in the instant case, since admittedly the proceeding started under section 132 of the Act related only to movable property, the impugned seizure of immovable property is apparently without jurisdiction. Consequently, the impugned seizure pursuant to the warrants of authorisation dated September 3, 1993, and September 8, 1993, is liable to be quashed on this short ground alone. However, the Income-tax Department is not remedyless and we make it clear that if it is absolutely necessary to attach immovable property, the Department can proceed strictly according to law under section 281B of the Act. With this observation, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned seizure in pursuance of the warrants of authorisation dated September 3, 1993, and September 8, 1993, and the proceedings consequent thereto are quashed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 32 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Business Expenditure, Income Tax Act, Provision For Gratuity ... ... ... ... ..... ng in clause (7)(1)(a) of Part III of the Sixth Schedule to the Companies Act includes any expenditure contracted for and arising under a contingent liability but if the sum so appropriated is shown to be in excess of the sum required to meet the estimated liability (discounted present value on a scientific basis) it is only the excess that will have to be regarded as a reserve under clause 7(2) of Part III to the Sixth Schedule. Similar is the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in CIT v. Bally Jute Co. Ltd. 1990 182 ITR 428. Nowhere has the Revenue contended so far that the liability after formulating the scheme arose only during the accounting year ending June 30, 1971, of which the assessment year was 1972-73 and hence the claim for deduction during the assessment year 1971-72 is impermissible. Hence, we need not go into the said question, faintly suggested by Mr. Pandey. The question referred is accordingly answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 31 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Or Revenue, Enduring Benefit, Expenditure Incurred, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... the profits. The business of the assessee is of manufacture and sale of bidis. The jeep is used for the purpose of and in the course of business. The original petrol engine was replaced by a diesel engine. It is an undisputed fact that over the years, the cost of petrol has been increasing at a much higher rate than the cost of diesel. It was in these circumstances that the engine was replaced. The intention in replacing the engine was certainly to reduce the expenditure incurred in operating the jeep and thereby augment the profits of business. By incurring the expenditure, no new asset was brought into existence and no advantage for the enduring benefit of the business was derived. The expenditure was incurred for running the business with a view to produce profits. On these premises, the conclusion that the expenditure is of revenue expenditure is inevitable. We find no question of law arising for consideration. The application is accordingly dismissed, but without costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 30 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Undisclosed Income ... ... ... ... ..... ain was not accepted. it cannot automatically be concluded that the 150 sugar bags belonged to the assessee. This argument cannot be accepted as, admittedly, 150 bags of sugar were found in the godown of the assessee and the ownership of those sugar bags was within the exclusive knowledge of the assessee (partners of the firm), and that being the fact, it cannot be contended that there was no nexus in this case for connecting the ownership of the sugar bags in question with the assessee. We do not, therefore, think that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the above said judgment can be pressed into service. In the result, we answer the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative and, consequently, both the questions are answered against the assessee. Let a copy of this judgment be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna, under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar. B. P. SINGH J.--I agree.
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