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Showing 21 to 40 of 200 Records
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1979 (1) TMI 230 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... se Rules, 1944. In other words the said second proviso to Notification No. 14/76, dated 23-1-1976 would cover manufacturers who apply for the license for the first time on or after 1-1-1976 and to those who held a license for less than 12 months immediately proceeding the months in which they made the application for simplified procedure. Since the appellants do not fall in any of categories of manufacturers referred to above the second proviso to Notification No. 14/76 would not be attracted and, therefore, the Assistant Collector’s order depriving them of the benefit of exemption from duty under Notification issued under Rule 8(1) is not proper. I, therefore, set aside the order of the Assistant Collector and accept the appeals. As a result, the appellants during the relevant period prior to their opting for the simplified procedure and permitted to work under the same, can work under physical control and are eligible to avail of the relevant exemption notifications.
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1979 (1) TMI 229 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High Court was in error in not deciding the main issue whether the time was of the essence of the contract or not ?
Held that:- Having regard to the aforesaid material on record, particularly the clauses in the agreement pertaining to imposition of penalty and extension of time it seems to us clear that time (12 months period) was never intended by the parties to be of the essence of the contract. Further from the correspondence on the record, particularly, the letter (Ex. 78) by which the contract was rescinded it does appear that the stipulation of 12 months' period was waived, the contractor having been allowed to do some more work after the expiry of the period, albeit at his risk, by making the recision effective from August 16, 1956.
It would be difficult to accept the High Court's finding that the recision of the contract on the part of the respondent- defendant was proper and justified on the basis that the same was neither shown to be mala fide nor unreasonable. It will thus appear clear that though time was not of the essence of the contract, the respondent-defendant did not fix any further period making time the essence directing the appellant- plaintiff to complete the work within such period; instead it rescinded the contract straightaway by letter dated August 27, 1956. Such recision on the part of the respondent-defendant was clearly illegal and wrongful and thereby the respondent-defendant committed a breach of contract, with the result that there could be no forfeiture of the security deposit. In our view, therefore, the trial court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant-plaintiff was entitled to a refund of their full security deposit of ₹ 4,936/- as also to ₹ 5845/- being the balance of their Bill No. 1253 dated September 20, 1956 for work actually done by them and not paid for and nominal damages of ₹ 120/-. The appellant- plaintiff was also entitled to interest on the aforesaid sums and costs of suit as directed by the trial court.
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1979 (1) TMI 228 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... onfused with appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the Subordinate Court. In the present case both the grounds on which the review was allowed were hardly grounds for review. That two documents which were part of the record were not considered by the Court at the time of issue of a Writ under Article 226, cannot be a ground for review especially when the two documents were not even relied upon by the parties in the affidavits filed before the Court in the proceeding under Article 226. Again that several instead of one Writ Petition should have been filed is a mere question of procedure which certainly would not justify a review. We are therefore, of the view that the judicial Commissioner acted without jurisdiction in the allowing the review. The order of the judicial Commissioner dated 7th December, 1967 is accordingly set aside and the order dated 25th May, 1965, is restored. The appeal is allowed but without costs.
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1979 (1) TMI 227 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e bill or a cash receipt would contain. To a pointed question, the learned standing counsel s answer is that in the sale patti in hand, the commission agent s commission probably was reflected. At any rate, that would be an additional material and not that there was any deficiency in the sale patti which would not provide the adequate information contained in a sale bill or a cash receipt. In the circumstances, we find it difficult to accept the submission advanced by the learned standing counsel that the Tribunal acted contrary to law in accepting the sale patti and the declaration read together as compliance of rule 27(2) of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, so as to allow the deduction to the assessee as representing the sale to a registered dealer. In the circumstances, we are inclined to hold that no question of law arises and the finding of the Tribunal is essentially one that has borne out by fact. The application is accordingly rejected. Application for reference rejected.
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1979 (1) TMI 226 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ade within the time-limit indicated, there is no bar to fetter the further action or to allow it to run to its conclusion. Subsection (2) requires that the imposition of penalty must be in making the assessment under sub-section (1) . From the point of view of this requirement, if we examine the facts disclosed, we find that the assessment had been completed by the appellate order dated 26th April, 1974, and, certainly, by the revised order of the Sales Tax Officer in pursuance of the said order, on 19th September, 1974. The notice for imposition of the penalty was issued only on 14th November, 1974, after the termination of the assessment proceedings. It cannot be said, in the circumstances, that the proceedings for imposition of the penalty were in making an assessment as required by sub-section (2) of section 19 of the Act. In this view, the judgment of the learned Judge is right. We affirm the same and dismiss this writ appeal with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (1) TMI 225 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e dealings of a dissolved firm which was functioning when the 1939 Act was in force. We said extrinsically also because the order of the Tribunal is unassailable, for, the principle had been laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Jullundur Vegetables Syndicate 1966 17 S.T.C. 326 (S.C.). , where the court said that unless there is a statutory provision permitting the assessment of a dissolved firm, no assessment of a firm after its dissolution can be made under the quondam East Punjab General Sales Tax Act of 1948. A similar question is now the poser before us. Applying the principle and ratio of the Supreme Court in the above case and having regard to the provisions contained in section 61(1)(ii)(e), the authorities are not enabled to bring to tax the dealings of dealers, which functioned under the 1939 Act, which did not provide for a power to assess such dealings in so far as they relate to the dissolved firm. The tax cases are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1979 (1) TMI 224 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... an equation of a false representation. As a matter of fact, our Court in T.C. No. 264 of 1972 considered the scope of the word violation and observed that if there is a violation, it was only the violation of section 10(b) and, if section 10(b) has been violated, there was no question of that violation being either technical or otherwise. Having regard to the circumstances in this case, when in a situation where the assessees were conscious of overt purchases having been made by them in the teeth of the enumerated products in the registration certificate, the plea of bona fides set out by them as the main cause for the lenient view does not appear to be a justifiable contention. Anyway, a lenient view having been already taken by both the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal, we see no reason to interfere, as, in our view, there has been a violation within the meaning of section 10(b). In the result, these tax cases are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1979 (1) TMI 223 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t this reference must be answered in the negative and against the department. In United Excise v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1971 28 S.T.C. 16 1971 J.L.J. 489., a Division Bench of this Court considered the nature of the contract similar to the one under consideration before us in this reference and held that the process of bottling the liquor was undertaken on account of compulsion of law and was in the nature of a works contract and could not be said to be necessitated by the contract of sale between the distillery contractor and the retail vendor. In this view of the matter, the Division Bench held that bottling charges were not exigible to tax under the Act. We respectfully agree with the opinion expressed by the Division Bench in that case. 4.. Consequently, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative and against the department. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered in the negative.
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1979 (1) TMI 222 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ning redress against any illegal or incorrect assessments. The grant of the specific relief of injunction is discretionary and civil courts should not interfere with the functioning of the authorities constituted under the taxing statutes except in cases where it is very clearly brought out that there is an attempted abuse of their powers by such authorities or a colourable exercise of such powers for purposes not warranted by the statute. In the present case, there is absolutely no such circumstance brought out in the evidence. Such being the position, the lower court was clearly in error in granting the injunction prayed for by the plaintiff. 3.. The decree and judgment of the court below are therefore set aside and the suit O.S. No. 50 of 1969 will stand dismissed. The appellant will get its costs from the respondent in the appeal. The parties will bear their respective costs in the lower court. Declared in Open Court on this the 12th day of January, 1979. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (1) TMI 221 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fore, rightly in the affirmative. 6.. In the instant case, all the items are not identical as the items which were considered by the Supreme Court, but a similar notification of the Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, Government of India, has been relied on. The special items in the instant case are joan, chhote elachi, i.e., cardamom. It is common knowledge that aromatic substances are extracted from the item joan and oil is extracted from cardamom. Such extracts are normally available in the market. Therefore, this question, so far as the items mouri, dhania, postadana, jira and methi are concerned, has to be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the dealer concerned. On the same reasoning, the items joan and chhote elachi must also be held to be oil-seeds. Therefore, the question in its entirety is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the dealer. There will be no order as to costs. BANERJI, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1979 (1) TMI 220 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the following order (i) The common order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal dated 5th December, 1974, confirming the common order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), Dharwar, dated 31st March, 1973, and the five assessment orders made by the Commercial Tax Officer, Bagalkot, viz., (i) dated 17th September, 1970, for the assessment period 1st April, 1959, to 31st March, 1960 (ii) dated 28th June, 1969, for the assessment period 1st April, 1961, to 31st March, 1962 (iii) dated 17th September, 1970, for the assessment period 1st April, 1962, to 31st March, 1963 (iv) dated 18th/20th February, 1967, for the assessment period 1st April, 1963, to 31st March, 1964 and (v) dated 17th September, 1970, for the assessment period 1st April, 1964, to 31st March, 1965, are set aside. (ii) The matters are remanded to the Commercial Tax Officer, Bagalkot, with a direction to make fresh assessments in the light of this order. (iii) No costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1979 (1) TMI 219 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te notice could not have been given by the assessing authority. If the assessing authority for any reason thought that the turnover of the petitioner has escaped assessment, then he should give notice to the petitioner only in respect of the years which fall within the limitation prescribed in sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Act. In this view of the matter, the composite notice is bad in law and, therefore, the same is quashed. However, it is made clear that it will be open to the assessing authority if he so considers proper, and there are circumstances appearing, which may satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) of section 12, to give a fresh notice to the petitioners for such period which may fall within the limitation prescribed in sub-section (2) of section 12 of the Act. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The notice dated 29th October, 1977, is quashed subject to the observations made above. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1979 (1) TMI 218 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ment, it should be given effect to and an opportunity ought not to be given to the assessee to retract therefrom unless there is some suspicion, proved and circumstantial, available at the time when such a statement was made. No such significant circumstance is present in the instant case. Therefore, we are of the view that for the simple reason that it suited the assessee to retract from his statement before the income-tax authorities, that situation should not prevail and cause the assessing authorities under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act also to accept such retraction and the result thereof. We agree with the Board of Revenue that such an attempt to retract from the sworn statement was made possibly to avoid the inclusion of the aforesaid amounts in the assessable turnover under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act and the Board of Revenue was right in having included the amounts as the turnovers for the relevant years. The appeals are dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
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1979 (1) TMI 217 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is inevitable having regard to the secrecy which the printer has to maintain while despatching the question papers. This is a case in which the respondents are entitled to claim an exemption in regard to the cost of the packing materials for a greater reason because they charged such cost independently. This aspect we have already referred and found that the cost of such packing materials is eligible for deduction as per the express provision made under rule 6(cc) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Rules. For the reason that the packing materials used by the respondents in the course of their dealings should be treated as incidental to the packing work involved in the printing and despatching of such papers and also for the reason that they are eligible to claim the deduction of the cost of such packing materials under rule 6(cc), the Tribunal came to the correct conclusion. Hence, we are not inclined to interfere. The tax revision cases are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1979 (1) TMI 216 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ise articles in which the main ingredient is sugar, although, other articles may be added for enhancing its taste. It thus comprises essentially only those articles which are commonly called sweetmeats. The main ingredient in the icecandy is ice and not sugar and, in common parlance, is not treated as sweetmeats (mithai). In view of these considerations, ice-candy does not fall either in the category of cooked food or confectionery. As there is no other notification under which it is included, it has to be taxed as an unclassified item. The revision is accordingly allowed, and the order of the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, as regards the rate of tax, is set aside. The revision should be decided afresh on this point in accordance with law and the observations made in this judgment. A copy of this judgment will be sent to the revising authority under section 11(8) of the Act. As none has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1979 (1) TMI 215 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... under the Central Sales Tax Act at the relevant time and the sales were interState sales, it necessarily follows that no sales tax was payable on the sales of bamboos arising under the contract. Liability to pay sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act is only on sales by a dealer. As the appellant-State was not a dealer, no sales tax was payable under the Central Sales Tax Act. As regards the liability to pay sales tax under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, the State was no doubt a dealer but the sales, being inter-State sales, could not be taxed under this Act. The result, therefore, is that no sales tax was at all payable on the sales arising under the contract. It is not disputed before us that, if that be the legal position, the respondent paid the sales tax as part of price under the contract under a mistaken belief that the sales were exigible to sales tax. The appeal must, therefore, fail. 8.. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (1) TMI 214 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ge the said order dated 4th September, 1975. Therefore, by making an application for amendment in September, 1977, the appellant cannot contend that he should be granted coverage in respect of resale of cement with effect from the date of his original registration as a dealer (4th September, 1975). We accordingly hold that the writ petition filed by the appellant does not make out a prima facie case and the same was rightly summarily rejected by the learned single Judge. We, however, make it clear that the appellant did not challenge in the writ petition the order of the Commercial Tax Officer dated 4th September, 1975. Therefore, we refrain from determining whether or not the Commercial Tax Officer had acted in accordance with law by holding in the said order dated 4th September, 1975, that the appellant should not be given any coverage in respect of resale of cement. In the above view, we dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs. RAY, J.-I agree. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (1) TMI 213 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... o not propose to make any reference to them. These cases are (1) In re Haven Gold Mining Company 1882 20 Ch D 151 (CA) and (2) In re Thomas Edward Brinsmead and Sons 1897 1 Ch D 45 (affirmed on appeal mdash see 1897 1 Ch D 406 I think to dub the respondent-company as a bubble company is totally unjustified and uncalled for. This ground was not even alleged in the petition and seems to have been taken in desperation. To sum up, I have come to the conclusion that both the grounds taken under section 433(e) read with section 434(1)(a) and section 433(f) are not well founded and the petition presented ostensibly for a winding-up order is really to exercise pressure and deserves to be refused admission. It is proper to clarify that any observation made in this petition is only a prima facie view in the context of the provisions relating to a winding-up of a company and it will not affect the pending proceedings between the parties. The petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
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1979 (1) TMI 211 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Meetings and proceedings – Company Law Board’s power to call annual general meeting, Accounts – Annual accounts and balance sheet
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1979 (1) TMI 197 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up - Unpaid dividends and undistributed liquidation account ... ... ... ... ..... bsolutely no justification for holding that the order dated November 30, 1973, of the Regional Director was a nullity. In view of this, we allow O.S.A. No. 56/76 and set aside the order of the learned judge dated August 5, 1975, and dismiss Company Application No. 421/74. As pointed out already, once the income-tax department loses in Company Application No. 421/74 it has no case in Company Application No. 461/73 because admittedly the only amount available with the Regional Director was Rs. 20,542.50 and if the order of the Regional Director dated November 30, 1973, directing payment of that amount to the appellant stands, there will be no amount available with the Regional Director to pay the income-tax department. Consequently, the income-tax department will not be entitled to an order in its favour in Company Application No. 461/73. Therefore, O.S.A. No. 55/76 is also allowed and Company Application No. 461/73 also will stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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