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Showing 21 to 40 of 50 Records
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1958 (10) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... respect of commercial crops. If it is a deduction out of the price or commodity agreed to be paid or transferred, it would be a trade allowance. On the other hand, if the payment is de hors the terms of the transaction but made towards consideration for the use of the premises or services rendered, it would not be a deduction from the price or in any transaction. No material has been placed before us to arrive at a definite finding in the present case whether 'mahimai' is a deduction from the price or commodity within the meaning of s. 14 of the Act. The learned judges, having expressed the view that the question did not arise for consideration at that stage, did not also consider any material to support their finding. In the circumstances, the only reasonable course is to leave that question open so that it may be decided in appropriate proceedings. In the result, subject to the aforesaid observations, the appeals are dismissed but without costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1958 (10) TMI 44 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by arranging for a hierarchy of jurisdictions. Subjects must still overlap and where they do, the question must be asked what in pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint is made and in what list is its true nature and character to be found." Applying the above test, it will be seen that the pith and substance of the impugned Act is, as is apparent from its preamble and its provisions, the regulation of labour in factories and the ensuring of good working conditions. This matter fell down under item 27 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, and as such was within the legislative competence of the Central Legislature; and an establishment which answers the definition of a factory, would come within the purview of the Act notwithstanding the fact that it is an inn and the person who runs it is an inn-keeper. 9. In the result, the Writ Petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100/-.
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1958 (10) TMI 43 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ged before the Tribunal. Having draws our attention to this aspect of the matter and the conclusion of the Tribunal, Mr. Palkhivala stated that since the decision of the Tribunal on the second contention is in favour of the assessee our answering the first question would become academic. It that was the position, we should have expected learned counsel to draw our attention to the same at the outset of the hearing of this reference which has gone on before us for three hours. Moreover we do not see any reason why we should take into consideration on this reference the nature of the second contention of the assessee or examine the conclusion reached on it by the Tribunal. The only question we are called upon to answer is that which we have already set out in the earlier part of our judgment and we see no reason why we should refrain from answering the same. Our answer to the question will be in the affirmative. Assessee to pay the costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1958 (10) TMI 42 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... act the petitioner perfectly understood the contents of the notice. He attended to the further proceedings in relation to the accounting year ending 31st March, 1951, and assessment year 1951-52. He proceeded with these proceedings from April, 1957, till April, 1958, without raising any contention. The contention raised is frivolous and made for the purpose of only a technical argument which is not sustainable. The notice complied with provisions of section 22(2) of the Act and is valid. The only contentions urged before me were the contentions contained in the grounds (c), (d), (e) and (g) mentioned in paragraph 18 of the petition. The other contentions contained in the petition are not given up but no arguments have been advanced before me on those contentions as the petitioner's counsel was of the view that they were not substantial. Having regard to my findings as hereinbefore mentioned the petition is dismissed with costs. The rule is discharged. Petition dismissed.
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1958 (10) TMI 41 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he existing right cannot be effectively invoked by the respondent in the present case." We can equally use these remarks in connection with the exercise of the powers under section 34 of the Act and we can equally say that the order of assessment passed cannot be said to be final in the literal sense of the word. The order was and continued to be liable to be modified under section 34 of the Act. In view of this judgment of the Supreme Court, we must hold that the completion of the assessment for 1952-53 was no bar to the application of the amended provision of section 4(3)(i) of the Act with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1952, and that the assessment for assessment year 1952-53 was liable to be reopened under section 34(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions contained in the amended section 4(3)(i) of the Act. Our answer to the question is in the affirmative. Assessee to pay the costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1958 (10) TMI 40 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the question as formulated reference is only made to section 10(2)(xv) and what we have to decide is the question whether the deductions are permissible under section 10(2)(xv). It is not necessary to deal with this argument in detail. It is open to the assessee before us to rely also on any other provision in section 10. Moreover, there is nothing in the judgment of the Tribunal that its decision was under section 10(2)(xv). In view of what we have observed it is necessary to re-formulate the second question which should be as under "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the amounts of ₹ 24,706 and ₹ 4,360 are admissible deductions against the share of income falling to its lot from the firm of Messrs. Halar Salt and Chemical Works?" Our answer to the first question is in the affirmative. Our answer to the second question as reformulated is in the affirmative. Commissioner to pay the costs. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1958 (10) TMI 39 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dgment. Therefore, the finding and judgment of the trial Judge cannot be upheld. Consequently they are set aside and this appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs throughout. The case is remitted to the trial Court for a further trial on merits. Counsel's fee ₹ 100/- or as per certificate, whichever be less. 19. The suit was dismissed by judgment and decree dated 30-12-1953, after recording a separate finding of the same date holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to extension of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, their suit was barred by time. The suit had not been tried on merits. As such the dismissal was on a preliminary issue. This remand order being under Order 41, Rule 23 of the Civil Procedure Code, we further direct under Section 13 of the Court-Fees Act that the court fees of ₹ 20/- paid on the memorandum of appeal in this Court shall be refunded to the appellants and a certificate of refund shall br granted to them.
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1958 (10) TMI 38 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... artment. In the two assessment years to which this reference relates, there was admittedly no dividend income realised by the assessee company from the purchase of those shares. The only inference that is possible is that according to the Department the effect of section 24 read with section 12(2) is that though income from dividend in a case of the nature before us would be taxed under the head of other sources, if interest was paid on any loan incurred for the purpose of making the investment such interest would not be taken into computation. Of course, we are not concerned with any equitable consideration or any consideration of fairness while interpreting the provisions of the Act and if the language of section 12(2) compelled us to take the view urged on behalf of the Department, we would certainly take that view though not without some reluctance. Our answer to the question will be in the affirmative. Commissioner to pay the costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1958 (10) TMI 37 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... any event to be 2?%. All these considerations lead us, in the light of the legal position, to the conclusion that the tax which the Revenue seeks to levy on the assessee firm in respect of the commission relating to Malabar Steamship Co. was not an income of the assessee firm for the relevant accounting year. The position about the Dholera Steamship Co. as we have already mentioned is somewhat different. There was little scope here for any argument about the agreement or arrangement or understanding being subsequent to the closing of the accounting year. Of course what was stressed was that here also there was voluntary giving up of the commission by the assessee company after it had already accrued. We have already repelled that condition. In view of the conclusion reached by us on the first question it will be unnecessary to deal with the second question. Our answer to the first question is in the negative. Commissioner to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1958 (10) TMI 36 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ult, our answers to the questions referred are Question No. 1. Under the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act the petitioner (i.e., the company) is entitled to carry forward the loss for a period of six years notwithstanding the fact that during the period when the loss had occurred the law applicable was the Travancore Income-tax Act. Question No. 2. Out of the amount of ₹ 15,125-3-0 received by the petitioner (i.e., the company) from the lessees of the factory towards damages, a sum of ₹ 8,050-1-6 is not assessable to income-tax and the balance amount of ₹ 7,075-1-6 is assessable. The questions are answered accordingly, and the Department is directed to pay two-thirds of the costs of the petitioner (company). The advocate's fee for the reference is fixed at ₹ 150 and as per the above direction regarding costs the petitioner (company) will be entitled to get ₹ 100 as advocate's fee from the Department. Questions answered accordingly.
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1958 (10) TMI 35 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of capital which had been put into the business." Lord Tucker was of the same view "My Lords, I agree with those of your Lordships who consider that authority, as well as the legislative history of the words 'capital employed', point to the conclusion that in the present context they do not refer to the actual use made of a particular asset in the relevant accounting period once it is shown to have been a form of capital put into the business and still there." To us it does not appear that the decision relied on by Mr. Rama Rao Sahib is authority for the position that the assets must have been put into use. It seems to us to be sufficient if the assets have been acquired for the purpose of the business, and, whether used or not, are still there and available for the use of the business. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will get its costs. Question answered in the negative.
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1958 (10) TMI 34 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... benefit of the compounding, it would be idle for him to appeal to a higher authority and contend that he should have been allowed to pay less. If he had not paid the sum, there would have been no compounding. If he had paid the sum and compounding followed, he could not be aggrieved. The compounding contemplated by the section is to be the result of a voluntary payment made by the offending assessee which is accepted by the officer concerned. In the present case, the learned Subordinate Judge seems to have thought that there was an offer made by the assessee to pay a particular sum by way of compounding and as the offer was accepted by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, there was a contract. This view is in the teeth of the pronouncement of their Lordships in the above case. The result of the foregoing reasoning, it is not disputed, is that this appeal should be allowed and the suit of the plaintiff decreed with costs throughout. Leave asked for but refused. Appeal allowed.
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1958 (10) TMI 33 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ned by the Explanation to Article 286 of the Constitution for the reason that transport of goods is an integral part of the sale. We do not think we can give any weight to this argument. The Explanation is concerned only with the delivery to the buyer and not with the transport of the goods by his agent across the border and handing them over to his principal in another State. It is only in cases where the delivery is made by the seller himself to the buyer in another State that the Explanation is attracted and the right to levy tax thereon is vested in the State where delivery is effected. See Mohammed Ishok v. State of Madras(1). For these reasons, we hold that the petitioner cannot claim exemption in these cases also on the ground that they are saved by the Explanation. This revision case also fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 150. C.M.P. Nos. 7919 TO 7922 OF 1958. These petitions are not pressed and they are dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
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1958 (10) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the cases on the subject and the relevant provisions and come to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. Secondly, the learned advocate for the Government points out that it has not been brought to the notice of the courts below that by reason of the Sales Tax Continuance Order of 1950, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, page 670, dated 26th January, 1950, any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution of India shall continue to be levied, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provision contained in clause (2) of Article 286 of the Constitution. This undoubtedly is a complete answer to the findings of both the courts below that the assessment is bad. The net result is this appeal has got to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed and in the circumstances without costs. No leave. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (10) TMI 31 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e the Deputy Commissioner, and in effect, Mritasanjibani Sura increases strength, appetite, vigour and retentivity. It is invigorating and can be administered in various complaints. Therefore having regard to the essential ingredients of Mritasanjibani Sura, the method of its preparation and the effect it produces, there is no escape from the conclusion that it is a medicated wine and not a country liquor, as commonly understood. Accordingly, it is not exempt from sales tax. For these reasons I hold that in the circumstances of this case the assessment of sales tax upon the assessee for both the periods, namely, 1952-53 and 1953-54, is legally valid. Accordingly, the questions referred to by the Board of Revenue must be answered in favour of the State of Bihar and against the assessee. The opposite party is entitled to costs of the references. There will be a consolidated hearing fee of Rs. 200 in all the three cases. RAMASWAMI, C.J.-I agree. References answered accordingly.
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1958 (10) TMI 30 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ax from a customer in connection with a forward contract cannot be said to be an amount realised as tax on sale of any goods and therefore such an amount is not covered by the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 8-A of the Act. In view of our opinion about the applicability of sub-section (4) of section 8-A of the Act, we need not express any opinion on the question with respect to the competence of the U.P. Legislature to enact this sub-section. We therefore answer the re-formulated question No. 1(a), (b) and (c) in the affirmative to the effect that the tax deposited by a dealer on forward transaction is refundable. We give no answer to question No. 2 in view of what we have said above. Our answer to the first part of question No. 3 is that section 8-A (4) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act is not applicable in the circumstances of the case. We order the Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P., to pay the costs of the assessee which we assess at Rs. 500. References answered accordingly.
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1958 (10) TMI 29 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Scope of inquiry - Restricted only to question of merit. ... ... ... ... ..... ioner was beingdirected to deal with the entire appeal on its own merits. The order of the Tribunal must, however, be read and understood in the proper context and in the light ofall that is stated in the order itself and if we do so, as indeed we should do so,there is considerable force in the submission on behalf of the assessee that the ordermust be read as restricting the scope of the inquiry by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner only to the question of merits affecting the claim for relief from super-tax. We must, however, observe that there is in this case scope for the contention very strongly pressed before us by Mr. Joshi. On a consideration of thematter, we prefer to take the view that the order of the Tribunal required the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to inquire only into the matter of relief from super-tax on its merits. Our answer to the question will be in the negative. There will be no order for costs in this reference. Reference answered in the negative.
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1958 (10) TMI 27 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Court – Jurisdiction of ... ... ... ... ..... o have been made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted unless and until it is superseded by any appointment, notification hellip hellip hellip made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted. By virtue of this section the notification of the Government in G.O. No. Ms. 654 Development dated 20th February, 1947, must be deemed to continue in force even after the coming into force of the new Act of 1956. The District Court had therefore jurisdiction to entertain the petitioner s application. It is common ground that section 104 of the old Act which corresponds to section 75 of the new Act is not one of the excepted sections either under section 3 of the old Act or section 10 of the new Act of 1956 respectively. The civil revision petition is allowed and the order of the learned District Judge returning the petition to the petitioner is set aside. The application made by the petitioner will be restored to file and disposed of in accordance with law. No order as to costs.
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1958 (10) TMI 18 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Deductions - Profits and gains from new industrial undertakings,- "Reconstruction" as occurring in section 15C of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.
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1958 (10) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sum of ₹ 26,000 received by the appellant on April 22, 1950, is dividend as defined in section 2(6A)(c) of the Act?
Held that:- The sum of ₹ 26,000 received by the appellant on April 22, 1950, was dividend as defined in section 2(6A)(c) of the Act and is chargeable to tax. Appeal dismissed.
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