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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 44 Records
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1960 (10) TMI 88 - ANDHRA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fresh on the same grounds is not substantial. It is consequently rejected. 14. It is lastly urged that if the matter is sent back to the same Assistant Collector, the appellant is not likely to obtain justice at his hands. We are not persuaded that there is any force in this contention. It is nowhere suggested that this officer was in any way biased against the appellant. No such imputation was made at any time. If the appellant is able to satisfy him that his action was justified, not being a violation of any of the rules, the officer would not penalise the appellant. Further, the same officer may not he there now, he might have been transferred to some Other place. Even otherwise, if there is any foundation for the complaint of bias, he could move the Collector to send the matter to some other officer if the provisions of law permit such a course. 15. In the result, the order under appeal is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100/-.
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1960 (10) TMI 87 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... clear whether the opportunity to be heard which is provided for by s. 4(2) would include an opportunity to the person concerned to lead evidence. Such an opportunity has, however, been provided by s. 59(1) of the Bombay Act of 1951. As we have already mentioned there can be no doubt that the purpose and object of the Act are above reproach and that it is the duty of the State Legislature to ensure that public peace and tranquillity is not disturbed by the prejudicial activities of criminals and undesirable characters in society. That, however, cannot help the appellants’ case because, as we have indicated, the infirmities in the operative sections of the Act are so serious that it would be impossible to hold that the Act is saved under Art. 19(5) of the Constitution. There is no doubt that if the operative sections are invalid the whole Act must fall. In the result the order passed by the High Court is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (10) TMI 86 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ny relation to him, 'that would meet the presumption', as Lord Eldon expressed it. It comes really to this a purchase by one in the name of another with no other circumstances at all proved. Therefore, in my opinion, although the legal personal representative of the lady in this case would be the person entitled to receive the money at law and to give a receipt for it, in equity the money belongs to the legal personal representatives of Mr. Sanderson, who took out the policy." 10. There is no contention in this case--either before the lower court or before us--based on the relationship between the 1st respondent and the deceased Vasudevan Pillai or the possession of the policy by him. In these circumstances it is unnecessary to consider the impact of those factors, if any, on this case. 11. In the light of what is stated above the appeal has to be allowed, and we do so. The appellants, will receive their costs from the 1st respondent here and in the court below.
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1960 (10) TMI 85 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat a suit for a refund would have been permissible, constituted only obiter dicta. Even as obiter dicta we are unable to accept the correct principle was laid down there. As we pointed out the Supreme Court certainly did not differ from the Privy Council, which explained the position with reference to section 67 of the Indian Income-tax Act in its decision already cited. The principle laid down in Raleigh Investment and Co. v. Governor-General in Council 1947 15 I.T.R. 332 A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 78. applies in enforcing the ban enacted by section 18-A of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. In view of what we have said above, that the plaintiffs suit was barred by section 18-A of the Act, it is not necessary for us to pronounce any concluded opinion of ours on the question raised by learned counsel for the appellants, that it is not Article 62, but Article 96 of the Limitation Act that should govern the plaintiffs case. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (10) TMI 84 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rder must show the authority having discharged it, and, in the cases before us, we are satisfied that the two orders do not show that to have been done. They are vitiated because they do not give the basis for the best judgment assessments, and appear to be arbitrary. It may be that the officer has his reasons, but then the order does not disclose any reason. Therefore, there is error apparent on the face of the record to justify our interfering in these two petitions by vacating the assessments and directing the officer to make fresh assessments according to law. The writ petitioners can submit their accounts for the relevant years, which, we are informed, have now been returned from Maharashtra State, and could not be furnished earlier because they had been sent there for some litigation. The petitions are accordingly allowed with direction for fresh assessments with reasons for the orders, but the petitioners must bear their costs because of failure to submit the returns.
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1960 (10) TMI 83 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f those contracts. The assessment has been arbitrarily made without any material to support it. From the order of the Commissioner (Ex. P-3) it seems that the figure for the volume of business was arrived at after considering all the eight contracts. The return and the orders Ex. P-1, Ex. P-2 and Ex. P-3 do not disclose that there was any justification for this assumption. 10.. Accordingly, the assessment proceedings were held contrary to the fundamental principles laid down in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills case 1954 26 I.T.R. 775 A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 65. and the assessment is, therefore, liable to be set aside. We order that a writ of certiorari shall issue quashing the assessment made by the Sales Tax Authorities in this case. It shall be open to them to proceed again to assess the petitioner in accordance with law. Under the circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.
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1960 (10) TMI 82 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... State where the goods be situate and under a covenant of the sale, or should such a movement be incidental to the bargain, nevertheless the sale would be liable to tax under the statute. The majority pronouncement of the Supreme Court on section 3(a) is clear, and the taxing authorities must proceed to assess afresh in the light of the aforesaid observations. Accordingly we allow all these writ petitions, vacate the assessment orders and direct the taxing authorities to proceed afresh in view of the legal position clarified above. Costs will abide the final result. This order will cover all the O.Ps. The collection of the tax as per the provisional assessments has been stayed subject to furnishing of security which has been done. As the provisional assessments have been vacated, it is clear that there is no tax, whose collection can be stayed. Therefore, the stay order becomes unnecessary and the security furnished to get the stay order should be released. Petitions allowed.
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1960 (10) TMI 81 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oard of Ghazipur v. Deokinandan Prasad 1914 I.L.R. 36 All. 555 A.I.R. 1914 All. 338. , it was held that a suit for refund of excess amount paid as octroi duty was governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act. We hold that the present case was governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act and as the suit was brought within six years from the date of the cause of action for refund, the claim was within time. The appellant has also claimed interest on the amount of refund. We do not allow any interest for the period before suit. However, we direct that the amount of refund shall carry interest from the date of suit until realisation at 3 per cent. per annum. In the result, the decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit is set aside. Instead, the claim of the appellant is decreed for Rs. 1,836-15-0. This amount shall carry interest at 3 per cent. per annum from the date of suit until realisation. The respondent shall pay the costs of the appellant throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (10) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sales involved in the case fell "within the purview of the Explanation to section 2, sub-section (12) of Assam Sales Tax Act XVII of 1947?
Held that:- The appeal must therefore be allowed and the order passed by the High Court set aside. In the present case, no direction has been given by an authority competent for reopening the assessment and the Superintendent had no power to reassess the income under section 19 assuming that the section applied to a case where the assessee though registered had failed to include his sales in a particular commodity in his turnover, because the period of limitation prescribed in that behalf had expired.
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1960 (10) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on a proper interpretation of the relevant Articles of the Constitution, sales under which goods were delivered outside Bihar but for consumption not in the State of first delivery, were exempt from tax under the Bihar Sales Tax Act?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. If there is a sale falling within the terms of the Explanation, it is "inside" the State of delivery-cum-consumption and that State alone can levy the tax. Such a sale is outside all other States, which are prohibited from taxing such a sale by reason of any territorial nexus however close or cogent. The passage extracted, however, does not deal with cases where the sale in question does not satisfy the requirements of the Explanation leading to the fixation of the fictional situs of the sale determining the State by which the tax might be levied.
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1960 (10) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessee, who is a manufacturer and a dealer of non- edible oils and who elected the previous year as the basis of his assessment in the assessment year 1948-49, is liable to be assessed at the flat rate of 3 pies per rupee on the whole of the turnover of the previous year, or whether he is liable to be assessed at the rate of 3 pies per rupee and 6 pies per rupee on the turnover of the previous year in pro portion to the two periods from 1st April to 8th June, 1948, and from 9th June, 1948, to the 31st March, 1949?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The turn over of the previous year is fictionally made the turnover of the year of assessment: it is not the actual or the real turnover of the year of assessment. By the imposition of a different tariff in the course of the year, the incidence of tax liability may competently be altered by the Legislature, but for effectuating that alteration, the Legislature must devise machinery for enforcing it against the taxpayer and if the Legislature has failed to do so, the Court cannot resort to a fiction which is not prescribed by the Legislature and seek to effectuate that alteration by devising machinery not found in the statute. We are therefore of the view that the conclusion of the High Court is correct.
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1960 (10) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
As the respondent-company's transactions in question clearly fall within the notification by the State Government dated February 5, 1954, exempting such sales from tax by reason of their nature as well as the assessment years concerned, the respondent- company would be entitled to the benefit of the tax exemption conferred by the notification - Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (10) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
Whether hardened or hydrogenated groundnut oil (commonly called Vanaspati) is "groundnut oil" within the meaning of rule of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939?
Held that:- Appeal allowed in part and the order of the High Court in so far as it denied to the appellant the benefit of the deduction in the turnover provided by rule 18(2) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules is set aside. From the contents of this invoice it would be seen that the appellant has charged a price inclusive of the railway freight and would therefore be outside the terms of rule 5(1)(g) which requires that in order to enable a dealer to claim the deduction it should be charged for separately and not included in the price of goods sold. The conditions of the rule not having been complied with, the appellant was not entitled to the deduction in respect of freight.
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1960 (10) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called and Restriction on exercise of voting rights of members who have not paid calls, Etc.
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1960 (10) TMI 39 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Oppression of mismanagement – Application of sections 539 to 544 to proceedings under sections 397 & 398
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1960 (10) TMI 38 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Winding up - Prosecution of delinquent officers and members of company ... ... ... ... ..... nt liquidator, states that cases have been actually launched only in respect of offences mentioned in clauses (b), (c), (f), (g ) and (h) of paragraph 3 of the application and that prosecutions in respect of the remaining offences are awaiting the disposal of this appeal. It is difficult to say that a good citizen would consider it his duty to pursue so many prosecutions for similar and petty of offences in a criminal court after a lapse of over ten years. The sounder view is that it is sufficient if smaller number such as five or six are selected for being pursued. As the approach of the learned District Judge was erroneous, the order is set aside and the petition is remanded for fresh disposal in the light of the observations in this judgment. The validity of the pending prosecutions already launched will not, of course, be affected because the sanction by the company court is not a condition precedent for their validity. The parties will bear their own costs in this court.
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1960 (10) TMI 20 - IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Winding up - Meetings to ascertain wishes of creditors or contributors ... ... ... ... ..... in an affidavit. Neither the opposing creditors nor the company chose to file any evidence at all, and in my view it is not the law, and never has been, that under those circumstances a judgment creditor is not entitled to his remedy. I observe that in the passage in Buckley, which alone gives some colour to the respondents case, the creditors are spoken of as creditors of like degree. I am not sure I understand what that means. Of the three creditors here one has a judgment on which it has tried to effect execution, the second has a judgment and the third none, and it may be that has Something to do with what the textbook says. It does seem to me that a creditor who has pursued his remedy to judgment and has proceeded to execution and finds no assets at the company s place of business other than assets claimed by some third party is at least entitled to put the opposition upon their oath as to why they oppose his otherwise just demands. I would, therefore, allow the appeal.
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1960 (10) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up - Power of High Court to retain winding up proceedings in district Court ... ... ... ... ..... edure Code seem to be based on this principle. Therefore, if what the legislature meant by section 437 of the Companies Act, 1956, was that a proceeding could be validly retained and continued in a court lacking inherent jurisdiction if the High Court makes a direction in that behalf, one would have expected it to state so in clear and unambiguous terms. The actual language of section 437, as I have already shown, seems to indicate the contrary. It would be strange if, after having conferred jurisdiction primarily on the High Court, and having empowered only the Central Government to confer jurisdiction on district courts, the Legislature thought that a person should be allowed to institute proceedings in a court on which the Central Government did not think it fit to confer jurisdiction and then come to the High Court and have the proceedings validated. I dismiss the petition. I am grateful for the able assistance rendered to me by Mr. V. Balakrishna Eradi as amicus curiae.
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1960 (10) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the circumstances of the case the assessment of a sum of ₹ 28,000 to income-tax in the hands of the assessee is legally valid under section 34 of the Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- Learned counsel for the appellant has made a futile attempt to show that the appellant contested the quantum of assessment also and in the High Court the validity of assessment even with regard to its quantum was challenged. The record of the High Court settles the question conclusively ; and neither in the application for leave to appeal to this court, nor in the statement of the case filed here on behalf of the appellant, was it stated that learned counsel did not make the concession as recorded in the judgment of the High Court or that he disputed the quantum of assessment for any of the three years in question. Appeals dismissed.
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1960 (10) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the amount received by the appellant from the trust, property in his character as a shebait was exempt from liability to pay income-tax?
Held that:- In the present case, the appellant has no beneficial interest in the trust property. The appellant so far as his remuneration is concerned is again not the direct recipient of the income of the trust : the source and the character of the income are both altered when agricultural income is appropriated under the covenant in the deed of trust as remuneration for services rendered. Appeal dismissed.
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