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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 68 Records
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1965 (10) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ourt by its order dated November 13, 1964. We, therefore, confirm- the order of the High Court, but for different reasons. We, however, desire to make it clear that our order does not affect the validity of the permit granted to the appellant by the Regional Transport Authority, Bilaspur in so far as it relates to the route within the limits of Bilaspur region. That is the ratio of the decision of this Court in M/s. Bundelkhand Motor Transport Company, Nowgaon v. Behari Lal Chaurasia and anr.( 1966 1 S.C.R. 485) in which it was pointed out that inter-regional permit when granted is valid for the region over which the authority granting the permit has jurisdiction even though it is not countersigned by the proper Regional Transport Authority with regard to the portion of the route outside that region. We accordingly dismiss this appeal. There will be no order as to costs. We desire to express our thanks to Mr. Iyengar who acted as amicus curiae in this case. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 68 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ies and that in his presence the seal of the Enforcement Directorate was removed by the Customs Officer and that it was then re-sealed by putting the seal of the Customs Department. According to the appellant himself, therefore the packet containing the diamond claimed by him had been seized by the Customs. The Collector of Customs has also stated that the packet had been seized by the proper customs officers on 4th September 1964. There, therefore, does not appear to be any substance in the argument of Mr. Poonawala, that the diamond claimed by the appellant in this appeal had not been seized by the proper Customs Officer. This appeal must, therefore, also be dismissed. (18) Since the goods originally appear to have been seized without authority of law by the officers of the Enforcement Directorate, we make no order as to costs of these appeals. The appellant's attorneys will be entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited by them in these appeals. (19) Appeals dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he property despite the decree, must pay mesne profits or damages for use and occupation of the said property until it is delivered to the plaintiff. A decree for ejectment in such a case must be accompanied by a direction for payment of the future mesne profits or damages. Then as to the rate at which future mesne profits can be awarded to the plaintiff, we see no reason to differ from the view taken by the trial Court that the reasonable amount in the present case would be ₹ 300 per month. 19. In the result, the plaintiff's appeal is partly allowed and a decree is passed in his favour directing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff future mesne profits at the rate of ₹ 300 p.m. from the date of the trial Court's decree, i.e., 16th October, 1958, until the date of delivery of possession of the property in suit to the plaintiff. In the circumstances of this case, we direct that parties should bear own costs in both the appeals. 20. Appeal allowed in part.
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1965 (10) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... allocated for utilisation for the purpose of business year after year. It was an account in which the net profits less the appropriations were added, and the account was intended for application in extending the business of the assessee company. The amounts entered in the account 'Earned Surplus" cannot therefore be regarded as mere unallocated profits at the end of the accounting year. The High Court was therefore right in holding that the "Earned Surplus" represented reserves. The method in which the accounts are maintained in the light of the accountancy practice clearly indicates that at the end of each year, there have been specific appropriations in the account, and the conditions which this Court regarded as essential in the Century Spinning & Manufacturing Company's case 1954 S.C.R. 203., for constituting the fund into reserve are fulfilled. The appeals fail and must be dismissed with costs. There will be one hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... namely, the order dated March 7, 1962, and that dated April 18, 1963, were not legally passed the former, because it was made without giving notice to the Panchayat Samithi, and the latter, because the Government had no power under s. 72 of the Act to review an order made under s. 62 of the Act and also because it did not give notice to the representatives of Dharmajigudem village. In those circumstances, was it a case for the High Court to interfere in its discretion and quash the order of the Government dated April 18, 1963 ? If the High Court had quashed the said order, it would have restored an illegal order-it would have given the Health Centre to a village contrary to the valid resolutions passed by the Panchayat Samithi. The High Court, therefore, in our view, rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power in the circumstances of the case. In the result, the appeal is dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, without costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... State, the matter was put up before The Chief Minister on December 5, 1963 or so and the Chief Minister after considering all aspects decided that it was necessary to take over the route in question. The matters were further considered by various officers and there was correspondence with the Government of India and eventually on July 30, 1964, it was finally decided by the Chief Minister to take over the route in question in the interest of security. It was thereafter that the order of August 17, 1964 was issued by the Transport department with the concurrence and approval of the Home Department. In view of this affidavit filed in this Court there can be no doubt that the necessary satisfaction of the State Government which is a condition precedent for the issue of an order under the rules was there before the impugned order was issued. The appeals therefore fail and are hereby dismissed. In the circumstances we order the parties to bear their own costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT
Whether s. 23 (1) (a), having, been substituted by the Amending Act XXXIX of 1957, would have retrospective operation in respect of the alleged offence, which took place in 1954?
Held that:- 23(1) (a) prescribes a minimum penalty while under the old s. 23(1) the Magistrate had an option of fixing a fine less than the minimum prescribed under s. 23 ( 1 ) (a). But we are unable to agree with him that the new section prescribes any minimum. What it does prescribe is a maximum. The words "not exceeding" cover not only the expression "three times the value of the foreign exchange" but also the words "five thousand rupees" Therefore, no greater penalty than might have-been levied under the old section has been prescribed by the new section 23 (1 ) (a), and consequently there is no breach of art. 20(1) of the Constitution.
the offence is alleged to have been committed in 1954 and notice of adjudication was sent in 1958 and now we axe in the year 1965. It would be expedient if the adjudication proceedings are disposed of as expeditiously as possible. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (10) TMI 62 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uance or dissolution a partner of such firm or Hindu undivided family or association, shall be jointly and severally liable to assessment under section 5, 5-A, 6 or 11 or any notification under section 9(1) and for payment of the tax assessed and/or penalty levied. The last contention on behalf of the petitioner was that the warrant of arrest should have been entrusted to a revenue official for execution, but inasmuch as in the present case it was entrusted to a police official, namely, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, the latter had no jurisdiction to arrest the petitioner, and hence the arrest and detention are illegal. There is no substance in this argument because section 49 of the Act does not impose any such restriction upon the choice of agency for the execution of an arrest warrant. It follows that the action taken by the District Collector under section 48 of the Act is lawful and proper, and consequently this petition fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 61 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... under the Act questioning the validity of the assessment. Since the petitioner had the right of appeal and other remedies open to him, it is quite unnecessary to consider in this case, the hypothetical instances of any hardship which may be caused to persons who were not assessed under the Act at the relevant time. Since a right of appeal is now provided under section 20 of the Act, not only to the assessee but also to any person objecting to an order affecting him passed under the provisions of the Act, the question loses its importance. As this point had not been raised in the grounds, and has no bearing in the instant case, it is unnecessary for me to decide a question which is purely academic in character and does not affect the rights of the petitioner in any way. I am therefore of opinion that there is no merit in any of the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner. In the result, this revision petition fails. The same is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 60 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s. In other words, under section 15, a limitation is prescribed for issuing the notice contemplated by that section and not for making the assessment. As mentioned earlier, a notice in Form 13 had been issued to the assessee within three years from the end of the assessment year. For the reasons mentioned above, we answer all the questions referred to us against the assessee. In other words, we hold that the assessments in question are not barred by limitation the failure on the part of the assessing authority to issue a notice as required by section 15 has not vitiated the assessment the assessments under section 14(5) were permissible and lastly that though the assessee s failure to furnish a return of his turnover brings his case within section 15, at the same time it also falls within section 14(5) and consequently the impugned assessments were validly made. The assessee to pay the costs of the department. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 (one set). Reference answered accordingly.
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1965 (10) TMI 59 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... must be held to be overruled by the Supreme Court decision. We considered the Supreme Court decision and pointed out that what we had stated in Ambica Mills case(3) was in no way different from what was held by the Supreme Court and the decision of the Supreme Court did not throw any doubt on the validity of the ratio in Ambica Mills case 1964 15 S.T.C. 367. There is nothing in the decision given by us in this case which would suggest that the test formulated by the Supreme Court should be limited only to purchases of raw materials and should not be held to extend to purchases of consumable stores. We are therefore of the view that the purchases of raw materials and consumable stores effected by the assessee were in the course of the assessee s business and were, therefore, liable to purchase tax under section 10 of the Act. Our answer to the last question is consequently in the affirmative. There will be no order as to costs of the reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1965 (10) TMI 58 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y making the hirers to apply for a loan, then making purchases of motor trucks, retaining ownership therein till the entire amounts together with interest thereupon were eventually paid up and then transferring property therein to the hirers on such hirers exercising their option. The transactions thus had features giving to them the distinctive character of a business and therefore they cannot be regarded as merely occasional sales. Nor would it be incorrect to say that the assessees were dealers in motor trucks in so far as these transactions were concerned. The third question, therefore, also has to be decided against the assessees. For the reasons set out above, our answers to the questions are as follows Question No. 1 The transactions were hire-purchase agreements and not financing agreements. Question No. 2 in the affirmative. Question No. 3 also in the affirmative. The assessees will pay to the State of Gujarat costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1965 (10) TMI 57 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aw, then the statutory machinery contains ample provision for redress of legitimate grievance from the departmental hierarchy. Resort to this Court on writ side is clearly misconceived for such a purpose, particularly at the present stage which is apparently calculated to obstruct and delay the assessment, which is already sufficiently belated. The averment in the written statement that the petitioner-firm is attempting to delay the assessment in order to take benefit of expiry of limitation provided by law, may legitimately be kept in view and it certainly cannot be ruled out of consideration in this connection. As a result of the foregoing discussion, there is neither any jurisdictional nor any other similar grave legal infirmity disclosed on the record nor is there any manifest injustice done to the petitioner in consequence thereof, which would justify interference by this Court on writ side. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 56 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing of a wrist watch as a wrist watch. The wrist watch would of course show the time even without the watch-case but it would not be possible to use it as a wrist watch unless the mechanism is fitted in the watch-case. Therefore, even if the condition suggested by Mr. Mody is a condition which must be fulfilled before a part can be said to be a spare part, we are satisfied that it is fulfilled in the present case since the watch-case is undoubtedly essential for the functioning of a wrist watch as a wrist watch. The watch-case must, therefore, be held to be a spare part of a wrist watch within the meaning of entry 10 of Schedule E. Our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, is that chromo-steel back watch-cases sold by the assessee under their bill dated 2nd May, 1963, are spare parts of a watch and are covered by entry 10 of Schedule E to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. The assessee will pay the costs of the reference to the State. Reference answered accordingly.
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1965 (10) TMI 55 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he applicant to specify the name of the proprietor or the names of the partners, and the registration certificate is granted, the Sales Tax Officer is precluded from subsequently examining, when taking assessment proceedings, what is the identity of the dealer. The decisions cited on behalf of the petitioner do not lead me to the conclusion to which he seeks to persuade me. It must be remembered that an unregistered dealer is as much liable to assessment as a registered dealer is. To accept the contention of the petitioner would be to imply that a dealer who has not applied for registration is not liable to assessment. As I am of opinion that the recovery proceedings are bad in law, it is not necessary to decide whether the order of the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, dismissing the petitioner s revision application is vitiated by any error of jurisdiction. The petition is allowed. The recovery proceedings are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to his costs. Petition allowed.
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1965 (10) TMI 54 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t Act, the Mysore High Court took the view that in the case of tax due according to the return filed by the assessee, the assessee could be said to have committed default in making payment of the amount of tax within the prescribed time only if the assessee failed to comply with the notice issued under the second proviso to rule 18 and non-payment of the amount of tax before filing of the return did not attract the applicability of the penal provision contained in section 13(2). Section 13(2) of the Mysore Act corresponds to our section 16(4) and the second proviso to rule 18 corresponds to our sub-section (5) of section 16. This decision based on an allied provision considerably supports the view which we are taking on a construction of the provisions of section 16. Our answers to the questions referred to us, therefore, are Question No. 1 in the affirmative. Question No. 2 in the negative. There will be no order as to costs of the reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1965 (10) TMI 53 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tax, to make over to the State Government the amounts so collected. He refers to section 9-A and also to rule 4-A(ii) of the Central Sales Tax (Madras) Rules, 1957. On the view we have expressed on the main contention for the assessees, it is not necessary for use to deal with this ground of the learned Special Government Pleader. He next argues that in the first batch of petitions it could not be said that the petitioners were under any mistake of law as they had been all along contending that they were not liable to tax under the Central Act. The further contention for the respondents is that even assuming that there was such a mistake of law, this Court in exercising its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution should take note of the law of limitation. Here again, it is unnecessary for us to express any opinion on these contentions as the assessees fail in any case. The petitions are dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250 for each batch. Petitions dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 52 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... contract before the High Court of Mysore therefore was in no way analogous to the contract before us and therefore Mr. Nanavati cannot find assistance in that decision. As already stated, the contract before us is similar to the one in the two decisions of the Supreme Court and as already observed, it is not possible to distinguish the case of McKenzies Ltd. 1965 16 S.T.C. 518. from the present case. The result, therefore, is that we must answer the questions against the applicants. Our answer to question No. 1 is that the contract was one and indivisible contract and that was for the sale of the body, that is to say, it was a contract for sale of goods and was not a contract of work and labour. In view of our answer to the first question, it does not become necessary to answer the second question, for in the view we take of the first question, the second question cannot arise. The applicants will pay to the State the costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1965 (10) TMI 51 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... relates to the vires of a statutory rule and, therefore, the proceedings by way of writ are more appropriate than the remedies provided by the statute. I should like at this stage to point out that merely because an aggrieved party has by his own conduct lost his remedy under the statute on account of time lapse, is by itself no ground for invoking this Court s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case, we have gone into the merits of the objection to the vires of the impugned rule as a special case, but I express no opinion on the question whether or not the assessee could have come to this Court by means of a reference and raised the question of the invalidity of the impugned assessment on the ground that the impugned rule is inconsistent with the Central Act and the Rules made by the Central Government thereunder. For the foregoing reasons, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed but without costs. PANDIT, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1965 (10) TMI 50 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... id that the amendment in 1964 added utensils by including them in steel articles . The amendment was made ex majore cautela to clarify and remove doubt, if any, that utensils would be covered by the entry as it stood originally. In our view, if the word articles has a comprehensive meaning so as to include utensils, it would not be possible to restrict its meaning by resorting to the words used in another entry in another Schedule, especially when those words in that Schedule have been used for the purpose of clarification. That being so, we are of the opinion that the Deputy Commissioner was right when he came to the conclusion that utensils made from stainless steel were included in entry 20 of Schedule E, and the contrary conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal was not correct. In the result, our answer to the question referred to us will he in the affirmative. The opponents will pay to the State of Gujarat the costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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