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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 98 Records
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1978 (5) TMI 111 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ractor on deferred payment basis. It was held entitled to receive the amount of Rs. 35,173.45 as price of the bricks. On facts, it has been found that this amount was not awarded to the assessee by way of compensation for any misappropriation done by the contractor. If at all the contractor had tried to misappropriate, not the bricks but their price which he was liable to pay the assessee. The sum of Rs. 7,000 was held deductible by the arbitrator on account of expenditure incurred by the contractor in manufacturing the bricks. That is not liable to be deducted from the turnover of the assessee. The assessee was entitled to receive Rs. 35,173.45 as sale price. The assessee may be entitled to claim deduction of Rs. 7,000 on the income-tax side. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (5) TMI 110 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... urposes of section 18(2), we will have to refer to the definition of turnover in section 2(i), which is to the following effect (i) Turnover means the aggregate amount for which goods are supplied or distributed by way of sale or bought or sold by a dealer, either directly or through another, on his account or on account of others, whether for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration. It is apparent from the definition that the amount for which the goods are bought also comes within the sweep of the word turnover . This being so, as the assessee s purchases were to the tune of Rs. 5,360 between 20th December, 1968, and 31st March, 1969, the average monthly turnover was obviously in excess of Rs. 1,000, and he was liable to be taxed. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative in favour of the department and against the assessee. As none has appeared to oppose the reference, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (5) TMI 109 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e turnover. The estimate has undoubtedly to be made on some relevant material, but as a matter of necessity there is always an element of guesswork in an estimate. In the present case, as the suppressed sale of the assessee for one day alone amounted to Rs. 6,045.76, it cannot be said that the estimate made was not supported by any material on the record. In the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. H.M. Esufali H.M. Abdulali(1), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have taken the view that the suppressed sale of a particular period can form the basis for an estimate of turnover for the whole year. Thus, there was material on the record for making the estimate of the escaped turnover of the assessee. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to its cost, which is assessed at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (5) TMI 108 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd Standard motor cars. This observation shows, that the idea of taking the warranty into consideration in fixing the price of a car is well-known to the manufacturers and dealers of motor cars. The observation supports, in a way, the view taken by us that the consideration for the part or parts that might be replaced under the warranty was included in the price fixed and paid for the car at the time of its sale. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Financial Commissioner that the future replacement of the parts in pursuance of the warranty have to be regarded as sales , the price for which was already paid and on which sales tax was already levied and collected, and that they were not liable to the imposition of further sales tax, is correct. We, therefore, answer the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (5) TMI 107 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , such assessment, though made within six years of the date of the proposed revision, cannot be reopened or revised. The said notification by which clause (ii) of sub-rule (5) of rule 80 has been amended does not, in our opinion, either expressly or by necessary implication, confer any such power of revision of an assessment which stood barred on the date the notification was issued. In view of the principles of law laid down in the above Supreme Court decisions, this appeal must succeed. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned notices dated 7th November, 1974, and 7th December, 1974, of the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chowringhee Circle, are quashed. Let an appropriate writ issue in that regard. The rule nisi is made absolute. There will, however, be no order for costs. As prayed for by the learned Advocate for the respondents there will be a stay of operation of this order for a period of six weeks from date. CHAKRAVORTI, J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (5) TMI 106 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s not leave any discretion either with the assessee or with the assessing authority. The proviso places the matter beyond doubt. In the proviso, latitude has been given to the assessee. He may furnish the certificate in form E-I or E-II with his return in form I, or if he is unable to do, he may furnish them later up to the prescribed date. But no such latitude has been given in respect of declaration in form C. All these considerations lead us to the conclusion that the requirement to furnish declaration in form C along with the return in form I, is mandatory. If a dealer does not fulfil this requirement, he is not entitled to claim exemption. In the result, we answer the questions referred to us as follows (i) The provisions of rule 8-B(4) of the Central Sales Tax (U.P.) Rules are mandatory (ii) in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner will be entitled to costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (5) TMI 105 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e entry appears to be by way of clarification. By the use of the word include the legislature does not always intend to convey the intention that but for the inclusive language the matters referred to were not part of the earlier subjectmatter. It is on many occasions used by way of clarification see Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Chawla Stores 1977 40 S.T.C. 57 1976 U.P.T.C. 337. In the present case, as the ballies were obtained by cutting timber trees and as cut timber is also included in the notification, it is not possible to hold that ballies did not come within the category of timber, and came to be included in the category only after 1971 when the inclusive words were introduced in the notification. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to its costs, which is assessed at Rs. 200. The counsel s fee is also assessed at the same figure. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1978 (5) TMI 104 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... le to pay sales tax on the sale of goods to the consumers. The facts of that case were identical with the present case and the ratio therein will fully cover this case. Mr. D.N. Rampal, counsel for the State, wanted to create a distinction on facts between the two cases. No such dispute was, however, raised before the Tribunal. On the other hand, the Tribunal in its judgment said that the facts were not in dispute. It decided the matter by placing reliance on the single Bench decision in Mulkh Raj Nand Lal s case 1973 31 S.T.C. 173 1971 R.L.R. 539. This decision was, however, reversed in appeal as stated above. In the circumstances, I do not find any force in this submission of the learned counsel for the State. In my view, the judgments of the Assistant Excise and Taxation Commissioner and the Tribunal are liable to be quashed. For the reasons recorded above, I accept the writ petition and quash the impugned orders, annexures B and D. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1978 (5) TMI 103 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hattel as chattel or goods. From that point of view, we find it difficult to say or lay down as a proposition of law that charges separately shown in bills or items separately mentioned in the order form would be conclusive of the nature of the transaction. It seems to make little difference whether the order form or the bills are unilateral documents or bilateral ones to which both the parties had affixed their signatures. We are not satisfied that the signing of the documents was after a conscious study of, or advertence to, the legal nature and effect of the transaction. We cannot, in the circumstances, regard these documents as conclusive of the nature of the transaction, whether it was one of a contract for work and labour or sale of the materials concerned. In these circumstances and on the facts disclosed, we find little to interfere with the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. We dismiss this tax revision case without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (5) TMI 102 - ITAT GAUHATI
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... ... ..... rt held that when the assessee itself has accepted that there is a goodwill then the same has to be valued. In the instant case the assessee was carrying on a common type of business which could be carried on not only in a small place but also in a big place. But the nature of the business is such which does not attract the customers to purchase the goods only from that very shop. The goodwill is the good name or the reputation of a business whereby the customers are attracted to purchase the goods from such a businessman. Since there are no such distinguishing feature which could show that the assessee was carrying on really a reputable business, the question of assessing the goodwill does not arise. With these remarks we hold that the business carried on by the deceased in kirana had no goodwill. Since we have taken this view there is no necessity of computation of the goodwill according to the method adopted by the Asstt Controller. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1978 (5) TMI 101 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases ... ... ... ... ..... r who is removed as a liquidator of the company. The petitioner and the respondents Nos. 3 and 4, Jagat Bhusan Garg and Dinomoni Shah Deo, are hereby directed to make over possession of all books, papers and documents and information relating to the company to the official liquidator forthwith. The official liquidator to be paid a fixed remuneration of Rs. 1,500 to be paid by the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 in the first instance and to be repaid to them out of the assets of the company after the same is realised by the official liquidator. There will also be an order of injunction against the Registrar of Companies, the respondent No. 1, in terms of prayer (e) of the petition. The ad interim order of injunction in terms of prayer (d) is vacated. The petitioner, the said respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and the official liquidator and the Registrar of Companies to act en a signed copy of the minute on the undertaking of the petitioner s advocate on record, to complete and file this order.
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1978 (5) TMI 100 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Oppression and mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... case On the particular, facts of the present case, I find that the respondents did not put in appearance because there were negotiations taking place between them and the petitioner which led them not to appear in the court. Taking advantage of this, the petitioner represented to the court that Shrimati Promilla Gambhir was never appointed as a director and, acting on this, an order has been passed. That part of the order is based on the assumption that the statement before the court was correct. Actually, it is not and, therefore, justice demands that the case should be reheard. I accordingly think that this is a case in which there is sufficient cause for setting aside the ex parte order whether it strictly falls under order 9, rule 13 of the Code or not and certainly this is a case in which the order can be passed under section 151 of the Code. I, accordingly, accept the application and set aside the ex parte Order and direct the master to be reheard. No order as to costs.
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1978 (5) TMI 99 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases, Officer ... ... ... ... ..... the Registrar within the prescribed period. In view of the fact that no loss has been occasioned to the company by the irregularities alleged to have been committed by the petitioner and that the winding-up proceedings of the company have been brought to an end with satisfactory result, I accept the case of the petitioner that he did not commit the irregularities with a dishonest motive and that he acted honestly throughout. In these circumstances, there being no mala fide on the part of the petitioner I will have no hesitation in granting relief under sub-section (2) of section 633 of the Act to the petitioner in spite of his failure to comply with the requirement of section 497 of the Act. In the result, therefore, I allow the petition, make the rule absolute and condone the irregularities complained of against the petitioner. I, however, direct the petitioner to supply the omissions which are capable of being so supplied now forthwith. There will be no order for the costs.
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1978 (5) TMI 95 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... iven up by the landlord and future expense has been saved. But the petitioner is right in saying that a suspicion attaches to the transaction. I may here say that generally when a company is in compulsory liquidation, it is generally the practice to give up the premises of the company, because if the company has gone into winding up, the office is no longer required by the company. The only loss that might be said to have resulted to the company by the course followed by the first respondent is that in case an application for re-structuring of the company had come forward, it would have very much helped if an office was available. As no monetary loss as such can be established on this charge, I am unable to act under section 543 of the Act. These are all the points raised and having noted the points and the fact that the official liquidator may take action, if so advised, on better material being available, I have to reject the petition. I, however, make no order as to costs.
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1978 (5) TMI 94 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up – Statement of affairs to be made to official liquidator, Powers and duties of liquidator, Effect of supervision order
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1978 (5) TMI 70 - ITAT PATNA-B
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... ... ..... yed filing of the return. The Department has not challenged this finding of the AAC either by a cross objection or by a cross appeal. Under the circumstances, we have only to see whether penalty can be levied only for non-filing of petition for extension of time for filing the return. Under s. 271(1)(a) of the said Act, the penalty is to be imposed for delay in filing the return if there is no reasonable cause. There is no provision for levying penalty for non-filing of petition for time. The AAC has clearly held that there was reasonable cause for delayed filing of the return because the parents of Shri S.S. Bagaria were seriously ill and Sri S.S. Bagaria was not in a fit state of mind to look after the Income-tax matters. Under such circumstances, we hold that there was reasonable cause for delayed filing of the return and so the penalty even for 10 months cannot be levied. We, therefore, cancel the penalty order of the ITO. 10. In the result, the appeal is allowed in full.
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1978 (5) TMI 69 - ITAT PATNA-B
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... ... ..... . We, therefore, hold that the WTO was not justified in deducting the value of factory shed and factory office building from the total asset of the firm. Under such circumstances the asset of the assessee cannot be a negative figure. We, therefore, direct the WTO to allow necessary exemption after deleting the deductions of Rs. 2,49,021 and Rs. 31,032 relating to the value of factory shed and factory office building which he has shown in his order dt. 19th March, 1975. He will allow necessary exemption after making necessary re-calculation in view of our directions above and after hearing the assessee in the light of the directions of the AAC dt. 13th Aug., 1975. We, therefore, set aside the order of the AAC dt. 28th June, 1977 as well as the assessment order of the WTO dt. 12th March, 1976. He is directed to allow necessary exemption to the assessee under s. 5(1) (xxxii) of the said Act after making re-calculation as mentioned above. 14. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1978 (5) TMI 64 - ITAT MADRAS-D
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... ... ..... of the AAC under s.154 preferred the appeals now in question, we consider that the facts justify condonation of delay and admission of the appeals. We accordingly do so. 10. Having admitted the appeals, it is not necessary for us to dwell in extenso on the aspect in question. There was positive income from dividends and interest in both the years and merely because after the set off of deductions negative income as far as the income under Other Sources was concerned resulted relief could not be denied because still there was a large positive total income. Relief has to be allowed on the gross amount of dividends and interest from banks included in the assessment following the ratio of the judgment of the Madras High Court in Madras Auto Service vs. ITO (1) which decision is binding on us. We accordingly direct exclusion of Rs. 3,000 for the asst. yr. 1973-74 under s.80-L and an amount of Rs. 1,370 for the asst. yr. 1974-75. 11. The result is that both the appeals are allowed.
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1978 (5) TMI 62 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... ty to pay such interest on the ground that he is not liable to pay advance tax at all or that the amount of advance tax determined as payable by the ITO is not correct. 7. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that unless the assessee denies his liability to pay interest on the ground that he was not liable to pay advance tax at all or that the amount of advance tax determined by the ITO as payable ought to be reduced or that the return was not belated or that the penal provision was not attracted at all and his objection relates merely to the question of waiver or reduction of interest such objection does not amount to denial of liability to pay interest and, therefore, the assessee has no right of appeal to the AAC against such levy of interest under s. 246 (c). I, therefore, agree with the views expressed by the Judicial Member and answer the question referred to me in the negative. The appeals are remitted back to the regular bench for disposal accordingly.
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1978 (5) TMI 60 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... of the learned ITO will have to be cancelled. 12. Apart from it, as discussed above, the explanation given by the assessee in penalty-proceedings could not be called to be baseless. It is supported by documentary evidence, as discussed above. We may also point out that Shri Raj Kumar was minor and as, such, at the relevant time he could not enter into transaction himself. The partners of the assessee-firm include father of the minor also. If the partners of the assessee-firm entered into transactions on behalf of the assessee, there would be no illegality about it. In the ordinary course of the human conduct, the father is supposed to act on behalf of the minor son. 13. Looking to the aforesaid facts and hard facts of life, in our opinion, in the present case, no penalty under sec. 271(1)(c) of the Act is leviable. The learned AAC, wrongly sustained the order of penalty. So the order of the learned AAC imposing penalty, is cancelled. 14. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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