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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 64 Records
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1969 (8) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Government was entitled in the circumstances of the case to forfeit under cl. 8 the terms of the contracts the deposits made for securing due performance of the contracts?
Held that:- The High Court was in error in disallowing the plaintiff’s case. The High Court has held that the plaintiff is not entitled to any interest prior to the date of the suit. No argument has been advanced before us challenging that view. Since interest was not recoverable under any contract or usage or under the provisions of the Interest Act, 1838 the High Court allowed interest at the rate of 3% per annum on ₹ 416.25 from the date of the suit, the rate of interest allowed on the claim decreed also should not exceed 3 per cent per annum.
We set aside the decree passed by the High Court and substitute the following decree - "The Union of India do pay to the plaintiff ₹ 18,500/- with interest at the rate of 3% per annum from the date of the suit till payment." The plaintiff was guilty of breach of the contracts. Considerable inconvenience was caused to the Military authorities because of the failure on the part of the plaintiff to supply the food-stuff contracted to be supplied.
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1969 (8) TMI 77 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Tax by rule 81(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules. In my opinion rule 81(1) is not ultra vires on the ground raised by the assessee. These are all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner before us. In view of my opinion that the notification dated 1st August, 1958, in respect of oil-seeds is invalid, there can be no assessment proceeding in respect of the turnover of oil-seeds when the Sales Tax Officer commences reassessment proceedings consequent upon the order of remand. In the result the petitions are partly allowed. The order of the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) Sales Tax, remanding the case for fresh assessment is quashed to the extent that it directs the reassessment of the turnover of oil-seeds. Similarly the order of the Additional Judge (Revisions) is quashed to the extent that it affects the turnover of oilseeds. The remaining reliefs are refused. In the circumstances the parties shall bear their own costs. GULATI, J.-I agree. Petitions partly allowed.
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1969 (8) TMI 76 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Court that an order by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner holding that there was no sufficient reason for excusing delay under section 30(2) of the Income-tax Act and rejecting the appeal as time-barred is an order passed under section 31 and an appeal lies from that order to the Appellate Tribunal. In my opinion, therefore, M/s. Sukhan Lal Amar Nath v. Commissioner, Sales TaxS.T.R. No. 556 of 1961 decided on 18th February, 1963. does not lay down correct law. I answer the question referred to us by saying that the question whether a revision application under section 10(3) of the Act was rightly dismissed as barred by limitation is a question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal passed under section 10(3)(i) of the Act and for that reason a reference can be made by the revising authority to this court under section 11 of the Act. I would direct the parties to bear their own costs. SATISH CHANDRA, J.-I agree. GULATI, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (8) TMI 75 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng as leaving the notice inside the business premises. Moreover, if the reasoning of the judge (Revisions) is accepted, clause (b) would become redundant. We see no reason why such an interpretation should be accepted. The opinion that we have expressed on the two questions is obvious from the language of rule 77 itself and requires no authority. However, there are two direct authorities of this court in which the same view has been taken on both the questions involved in this reference. The two authorities are Luxa Upbhogta Co-operative Society v. Sales Tax Officer, Varanasi 1964 A.L.J. 93. and C. Maharaj and Sons v. Sales Tax Officer IV, Agra 1964 15 S.T.C. 879. For the reasons stated above we answer both the questions in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. The fee of the learned counsel for the department is also assessed at the same figure. Reference answered in the negative.
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1969 (8) TMI 74 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y the dealer. This would be a matter completely within the discretion of the authorities, but as this aspect of the matter was not considered, so these two questions can be answered only in this way that the increase of the G.T.O., in the circumstances, was quite justified by the authorities, but they failed to take into consideration the findings about the non-receipt of these two consignments and this was, therefore, not considered, whether in such circumstances there should be proportionate scaling down of the G.T.O. The question as to what should be the percentage of scaling down and what should be the quantum is a matter which has to be decided by the authorities concerned. 10.. Having regard to all the facts and circumstances, these two questions are thus decided and this reference is disposed of. In the circumstances of the case, no order for costs is made, but the dealer will be entitled to a refund of the deposit. MISRA, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1969 (8) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
Levy and collection of tax and penalties - Held that:- Appeal allowed. The High Court held that because under the general sales tax law of the State eggs were not taxable except at the last point of purchase in the State, they were not taxable in the course of inter-State sale. But that view cannot now be sustained in view of the provisions of section 6 of the principal Act as amended by the Ordinance. Since the assessment has not been made in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance which retrospectively amends the provisions of sections 6, 8 and 9 of the principal Act it is necessary to set aside the order passed by the sales tax authorities, the Tribunal and the High Court, and to direct that assessment of tax be made in the manner provided by the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, as amended by the Ordinance.
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1969 (8) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the "trade discount" was a permissible deduction in assessments under the Central Sales Tax Act?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Use of the expression "in the same manner" in section 8(2) of the Central Act has not the effect of assimilating the procedural and the substantive provisions relating to the imposition, levy and collection of tax as are provided by the State law in the matter of collection of tax under the Central Act. Under sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 9 of the Central Act the power conferred upon the authority competent to assess the tax in the same manner as the tax on the sale or purchase of goods under the general sales tax law does not include the power to admit to exemptions provided by the State law inter-State sales taxable under the Central Act. The legal position has, however, been changed as a result of the issue of the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Ordinance, 1969 (No. 4 of 1969) which was promulgated on June 9, 1969.
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1969 (8) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on a proper interpretation of sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 11 of the Punjab Act the period of limitation was three years for making the assessment from the last date on which the return was to be filed?
Whether the order of assessment was valid even after it was made after a period of three years provided the necessary notice had been issued within that period?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. It is undoubtedly open to the Legislature or the rule-making authority to make its intention quite clear that on the expiry of a specified period no final order of assessment can be made. Then the taxing authorities would certainly be debarred from completing the assessment beyond the period prescribed as was the case in Sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922; but such is not the case here and we would hold that the assessment proceedings relating to the year 1962-63 were within time.
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1969 (8) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the goods in question were delivered for consumption within the delivery States?
Whether the assessment order of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer for the year 1949-50 is illegal in its entirety notwithstanding the fact that the State Government had a right to levy sales tax on outside sales which were effected prior to January 26, 1950?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. There is a single order of assessment for the period from April 1, 1949, to March 31, 1950, the assessment could be split up and dissected and the items of sale separated and taxed for different periods. It is quite easy in this case to ascertain the turnover of the appellant for the pre-Constitution and post- Constitution periods for these figures are furnished in the plaint by the appellant himself. It is open to the court in these circumstances to sever the illegal part of the assessment and give a declaration with regard to that part alone instead of declaring the entire assessment void. For these reasons we hold that the appellant should be granted a declaration that the order of assessment made by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer for the year 1949-50 is invalid to the extent that the levy of sales tax is made on sales relating to goods which were delivered for the purpose of consumption outside the State for the period from January 26, 1950, to March 31, 1950.
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1969 (8) TMI 42 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up - Power of registrar to strike defunct company off register ... ... ... ... ..... ion of the notice of striking off and the court can do it, if it is just to do so. This sub-section does not refer to the dissolution of the company consequent on the publication of the notice and it cannot be contended that an application under this sub-section is not maintainable, as the company is not existent consequent on the dissolution. If that were so, such a contention is not available for the same reason against the exercise of the power of the court, expressly saved by clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (5) for the winding up of a company whose name has been struck off the register. On reading sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 560, it appears to me clear that the court s power to wind up a company whose name has been struck off the register is not affected by the publication of the notice of striking off by the Registrar. In the result I order that Morning Star Private Ltd. (the company concerned in this case) be wound up. Parties will bear their own costs.
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1969 (8) TMI 34 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Rate of duty (Customs) ... ... ... ... ..... in this case the order for entry inwards was given on the 15th December 1966. On that date the ship was nowhere near Madras. It was somewhere on the high seas between Singapore and Cochin. Whatever might be the considerations which were applicable for cases under the old Act, the new Act leaves no room for any doubt. The new Act makes a difference between the date when the bill of entry is presented and the entry of the vessel and such entry can only be into the harbour. I am, therefore of opinion that the entry inwards of the ship for purposes of this case was 23-12-1966 and, therefore, though in respect of two consignments carried by it the bill of entry might have been presented earlier than that date it makes no difference to the duty payable because the entry inwards for purposes of section 15 is the actual date of entry inwards of the vessel and not the notional date on which the bill of entry is presented. 8.The Writ Petition, therefore, dismissed as devoid of merits.
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1969 (8) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
Validity and legality of the levy of cess by way of excise duty on the rubber used by manufacturers of chappals under the provisions of the Rubber Act, 1947, (Act XXIV of 1947) challenged
Held that:- We find it difficult to endorse the reading of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 12 in isolation. Not only the statute but also the section have to be read as a whole and together, and in our judgment whatever be the nature of duty, Parliament would undoubtedly have legislative competence under Entry 97 of List I in the Seventh Schedule read with Article 248 of the Constitution.
The substantive provisions of sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 12 also contemplate assessment being made with regard to the returns to be furnished by owners and manufacturers. Any person aggrieved by an assessment has been given the right of appeal to the District Judge. But as pointed out before, there is no provision either in the statute or in the rules for a demand to be made and a coercive process to be employed in the event of failure to make the payment. That is done by Rule 33D alone from which it would be reasonable to conclude that under the rules it is only the manufacturers who are liable to pay the amount of duty. The rules can, therefore, be said to make a definite provision with regard to the category of persons from whom the collection of the duty is to be made, namely, the manufacturers. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (8) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
Evidence — Enquiry before Customs officer is not a judicial proceeding — `Deemed' — Connotation of — Evidence Act — Statement of the accused
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1969 (8) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the company sold building material to the contractors during the quarters in question ?
Whether the company was a dealer in respect of building material within the meaning of the Orissa Sales Tax Act ?
Whether imposition of penalties for failure to register as a dealer was justified ?
Held that:- It is common ground that the rate mentioned against cement and structural steel is the price at which the goods were purchased by the company. If the company was charging a fixed percentage on the price paid by it for procuring such goods for storage and other incidental charges, it would be difficult to resist the conclusion that the company was not carrying on the business of selling cement and structural steel. There is, of course, no statement in the schedule that the price charged by the company in excess of the price paid by the company to its contractors for bricks was in respect of storage charges.
But neither the Tribunal nor the High Court has referred to this important piece of evidence and we are unable to decide these appeals unless we have an additional statement of facts in the light of the relevant evidence as to whether the excess charged over and above the price which the company paid for procuring cement and steel (expressly called storage charge) and bricks was intended to be profit. To enable us to answer the questions referred, it is necessary that the Tribunal should be called upon to submit a supplementary statement of the case on the questions whether the company charged any profit apart from storage charges for supplying cement and structural steel, and whether the difference between the price charged to the contractors and the price paid by the company to its suppliers for bricks was not in respect of storage and other incidental charges.
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1969 (8) TMI 30 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Assesse's revisions application against the orders imposing penalty under section 46(1) were disposed of under section 33A (2) without hearing the assessee - assessee is entitled to a hearing in revision - writ of mandamus is issued commanding the Commissioner of Income-tax, to hear the assessee in the revisions
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1969 (8) TMI 29 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Notice under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, proposing to rectify the petiotiner asseesmment for 1959-60 which was made under 1922 Act - validity of proceedings
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1969 (8) TMI 28 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Deductibility of expenditure incurred on maintenance of club house and kiosks against profits of racing
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1969 (8) TMI 27 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the penalty imposed under section 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, could validly be reduced from Rs. 4,380 to Rs. 200 - penalty to be imposed is to be calculated in accordance with the provisions of section 271(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961
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1969 (8) TMI 26 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Registration of the firm ... ... ... ... ..... ers as evidenced by the instrument of partnership on the basis of which the registration was granted. The undisputed facts are that the assessee-firm did not file its return of income within the time allowed by the Income-tax Officer. There is no discretion vested in the Income-tax Officer to grant the benefit of registration to the firm when the assessee-firm does not satisfy the two conditions laid down by the proviso to sub-section (7) of section 184 of the Act. In our opinion, the Tribunal was right in holding that the registration granted to the firm for the assessment year 1962-63 does not ensure for the subsequent assessment year since the assessee-firm has not filed its return of income. Accordingly, we answer the question that the registration granted to the assessee-firm for the assessment year 1962-63 shall not have effect for the assessment year 1963-64. The assessee shall pay to the department the costs of this reference. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.Order accordingly
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1969 (8) TMI 25 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Whether on a proper interpretation of section 271(1)(iii) and section 274(2) the Tribunal was right in reducing the penalty imposed on the assessee below the minimum prescribed u/s 271(1)(iii) - Held, no - Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the penalty proceedings were properly initiated and that the penalty orders passed by the IAC were valid in law - Held, yes
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