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Showing 21 to 40 of 647 Records
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2005 (9) TMI 678 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es. Since the RBI had rejected the Petitioner's application for being granted permission to operate as an NBFC, maintenance of status quo for a period of one year would mean that this situation would continue. In that case there would have been no need to pass the impugned Orders. This would, however, obviously not meet the expectations of the Respondent Company. It is also not in dispute that the Appeal stands disposed of and is no longer on the Board of the Appellate Authority. Therefore, it cannot be understood how the matter could be reviewed after one year, and in any event that one year has already elapsed since the Order of the Appellate Authority is dated 26.4.2004 8. In this analysis the impugned Order dated 26.4.2004 of the Appellate Authority is not sustainable and is set-aside. the order dated 13.1.2004 is restored. The effect, inter alia, is that the interim Orders passed by Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J. are made absolute. 9. Parties to bear their respective costs.
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2005 (9) TMI 677 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... venience of parties, et cetera. Clearly whether the cause of action has arisen within the normal territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Seat or the Bench is a matter which would be required to be decided on the facts of each case, as observed by the Supreme Court in Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association's case (supra) - "It has to be left to be determined in each individual case as to where the cause of action arises." 17. As far as the present case is concerned, the objection has no merit whatsoever since the impugned order is passed at Pune which is within the ordinary territorial limits of the Appellate Side of the Principal Seat at Bombay. 18. In this view of the matter, I see no merit in this preliminary objection. Civil Application nos.2045 of 2005 and 2046 of 2005 are hereby dismissed. 19. Mr. Anturkar, the learned counsel for the applicants, submits that the petitions be deferred by a period of four weeks for admission. S.O. for four weeks.
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2005 (9) TMI 676 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 2002. He did not consider the question as to whether validity or otherwise of the notification dated 15.09.1949 issued under Regulation 6 of the Hyderabad Administration of Evacuee Property Regulation could have been questioned in a collateral proceeding. He further did not consider the fact that the question of title could not be determined in a writ proceeding; nor the identity of a person could conclusively be found out therein. The learned Single Judge furthermore did not advert to the limited scope of judicial review, namely, that an administrative order passed by the State can be questioned only on limited grounds and while entertaining a writ petition, the writ court does not act as an appellate authority. For the reasons aforementioned, both the judgments of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench are set aside. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned observations. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2005 (9) TMI 675 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... him to the specific relief. The provision imposes a personal bar. The Court is to grant relief on the basis of the conduct of the person seeking relief. If the pleadings manifest that the conduct of the plaintiff entitles him to get the relief on perusal of the plaint he should not be denied the relief. Section 16(c) of the Act mandates the plaintiff to aver in the plaint and establish as the fact by evidence aliunde that he has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. On considering almost identical fact situation it was held by this Court in Surya Narain Upadhyaya v. Ram Roop Pandey and Ors., AIR (1994) SC 105 that the plaintiff had substantiated his plea. When the factual background is considered in the light of principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the judgments of the learned Single Judge and the Full Bench do not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. The appeal is dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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2005 (9) TMI 674 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ground that the company during the illness of the lady carried out its regular activities. Ld. Counsel has produced a copy of the order which shows that this very ground was accepted by the Commissioner (Appeals) for setting aside the penalties against the appellants for the earlier period which was initially imposed by the adjudicating authority. That order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was also upheld by the Tribunal vide Final Order No. A/621/05/-NB(SM), dated 28-4-2005. In the face of that earlier order, it is difficult to conclude that non-payment of service tax in time by the appellants, was not for a sufficient cause, so as to deprive them the benefit of the provisions of section 80 of the Finance Act which empowers the dropping of the penalty against the assessee if sufficient cause is made out by him for non-payment of the service tax in time. 3. In the light of the discussions made above, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal of the appellants is allowed.
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2005 (9) TMI 673 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, CHENNAI
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... ... ..... Jayesh H. Pandya (supra), having arisen in the context of the provisions of Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, in my considered view, have no application to the case on hand. 1, therefore, do not hesitate to conclude that the acts of mismanagement and statutory violations set out in the company petition could be bifurcated and dealt with separately and accordingly jurisdiction could be exercised by the Bench to adjudicate the disputed issues in regard to the alleged acts of mismanagement and statutory violations. Towards this end, the respondents will file counter to the main petition by 07.11.2005 and rejoinder, if any, by 30.11.2005. The Company petition will be heard on the alleged acts of mismanagement and statutory violations in the affairs of the Company on 07.12.2005 at 2.30 p.m. The parties are at liberty to agitate the grievances in relation to the impugned allotment of shares before AAIFR. With these directions, the application stands disposed of.
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2005 (9) TMI 672 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rds, we do not find any 'debt' prevailing at the time of presentation of the winding up petition by the petitioning creditor and, therefore, the said petition ought to have been held as premature winding up petition. We further hold that for non-service of the notice under Section 20 of the said Act the claim of the petitioning creditor is also premature and therefore, in our opinion the winding up petition must fail on that ground also. Further we place it on record that there is a bar under Section 44 of the said Act of the Civil Court to fix the fair rent in respect of a tenancy. Hence, we have to hold that the Hon'ble First Court had no jurisdiction even to pass such order, as the fixation of fair rent was not determined by the Controller. 13. Accordingly, on the said reasoning we set aside the order so passed by the Hon'ble First Court as well as dismiss the winding up petition. 14. The appeal is thus allowed on the above terms. N.C. Sil, J. 15. I agree.
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2005 (9) TMI 671 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... paras would mean the expiry of notice period contemplated under Section 138 comes into effect only on the day when the Court took cognizance. 12. Under these circumstances it would be just and proper to allow the parties to go before the trial Court once again for disposal on merits in this case as the trial Court proceeded on the footing that legally the complaint itself was defective. So far as the question of limitation, taking cognizance, premature presentation of the complaint and the dispute of civil nature, the trial Court shall not indulge itself again on those issues. It shall proceed on merits of the case only. Based on the facts both the parties are at liberty to lead further evidence, if any. The trial Court shall dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible but not later than six months. 13. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part. The matter is remitted back to the trial Court for fresh disposal of the case on merits in the light of above observations.
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2005 (9) TMI 670 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ants jointly/severally restraining defendants from themselves, their servants, agents, dealers, partners, proprietors, stockiest, representatives and all other persons acting on their behalf from using the trademark 'DAVAT' or any other trademark which may be identical or deceptively similar to the trademark 'DAAWAT' of the plaintiff or from infringing the copyright of the plaintiff in their artistic work 'DAAWAT'. The decree of permanent injunction is also passed in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant jointly/severally from passing off their goods (rice) as that of the plaintiff. 14. The plaintiff is also entitled to decree for recovery of damages in the sum of ₹ 3 lakhs. 15. The plaintiff shall be entitled to costs. 16. The decree sheet be drawn up accordingly. IA Nos. 12456/1999, 1500/2000 and 1501/2000No further directions are called for in these applications in view of the suit being decreed. The applications stand disposed of.
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2005 (9) TMI 669 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sed in a notice of motion No.2611/2001 in Suit No. 3752/2001 dated 17th June, 2005, there is nothing survive in this notice of motion. The learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff, in view of the order dated 17/6/2005 not pressing the notice of motion. Notice of motion is accordingly disposed of as not pressed.
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2005 (9) TMI 668 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s to ensure that the procedure in complaints under Section 138 should not be cumbersome and there should be expeditious conclusion of trials. Section 145 which merely affects the procedure will have to be presumed to be retrospective in its operation and will apply to all complaints pending on 6th February, 2003. Hence, the order passed by the Sessions Court deserves to be quashed and set aside. The learned Magistrate will now proceed to decide the complaint by applying Section 145 of the said Act of 1881. 9. Hence, I pass the following order ORDER i) The impugned Order dated 12th April, 2005 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge quashed and set aside. ii) The learned Trial Judge will proceed with the complaint in accordance with law. iii) It is clarified that the provision of Section 145 of the said Act of 1881 will apply to the complaints which were pending on 6th February, 2003. iv) Parties and the concerned Court to act upon an authenticated copy of this order.
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2005 (9) TMI 667 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... struments Act. For continuation of such proceedings, the Company Court's permission may not be necessary. But, if some one from the Ex-Management of the Company has initiated criminal proceedings against others, the same criteria or parameters may not apply. The said decision is, therefore, distinguishable on facts. 27. In view of the above discussion and in light of the decisions relied on by Mr. Gandhi, the Court hereby allows all these four applications and direct the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 5, Ahmedabad to transfer the records and proceedings of Criminal Case Nos. 1698 to 1701 of 2000 forthwith to this Court and further directs the Registry to renumber the same, if so required, after they are transferred to this Court and the Official Liquidator to examine the said complaints and proceed with the same before this Court in accordance with law. 28. With the aforesaid directions and observations, all the four applications are accordingly disposed off.
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2005 (9) TMI 666 - SUPREME COURT
Challenged the Judgment and Order passed by the High Court - Suit for specific performance of an oral agreement to sale - Arrears of rent - Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit for eviction - denial of relationship of landlord and tenant - Counter-claim under Order VII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure - mesne profits - HELD THAT:- In the counter-claim although the Respondents have claimed mesne profits at the rate of ₹ 1500 per month from 10.11.1992 till 9.11.1995, i.e., for a period of only 3 years only and also in future, the Trial Judge did not discuss the evidence which might have been adduced by the parties in that behalf. The Division Bench of the High Court, as noticed hereinbefore, on the other hand, examined the question on the premise that the Appellants were in arrears of rent for the period from January, 1977 to June, 1996 and thus, became a defaulter. The contention of the Appellant that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction was repelled by the High Court, as noticed hereinbefore without going into the aforementioned aspect of the matter.
We have noticed hereinbefore that the Respondents in the counterclaim did not advance a plea for forfeiture of tenancy nor did they raise any contention that the landlord has issued a notice conveying his intention to determine the lease
It is now well-settled that a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction is a nullity. The Civil Court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction only on the basis that the tenant has denied their title. The matter might have been different if the civil court has otherwise jurisdiction to entertain a suit. The legislature has created new rights and liabilities for both the landlord and tenant in terms of the provisions of the said Act and provided a forum therefore. The jurisdiction of the civil court having been barred except in a situation where the proviso appended to Sub-section (1) of Section 10 would be attracted, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for eviction on a ground envisaged u/s 10(2)(vi) of the A.P. Building (Lease. Rent & Eviction) Control Act. The Civil Court, thus, had no jurisdiction to entertain the counter-claim.
The impugned judgment to the aforementioned extent, therefore, cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed in part so far as it relates to the counter-claim made by the Respondents herein However, that part of the judgment whereby and whereunder the Appellant's suit for specific performance of contract has been dismissed is upheld.
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2005 (9) TMI 665 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... The submission must be rejected in view of the provisions of Section 530 of the Companies Act which puts the mat ter beyond controversy. Section 530 of the Companies Act in clear terms provides that in a winding up, in priority to all other debts all revenues taxes, cesses etc. shall be paid but this is made expressly subject to the provisions of Section 529A. The Act, therefore, does not treat the revenue taxes as liquidation expenses. Reading Sections 529A and 530 together, there is no escape from the conclusion that t he liability towards workmen’s dues and debts due to secured creditors as provided under clause (b) of Section 529A, has to be paid in priority to all other debts, including tax dues to the revenue. In view of the clear language of Sections 529A and 530, there is no escape from this conclusion, and we must therefore, hold that the High Court was right in its decision. We, therefore, find no merit in these appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed.
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2005 (9) TMI 664 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... exemption under section 4-A of the Act has been availed, the dealer was entitled for moratorium in view of Rule 43 (8). It is true that the provision should be interpreted in a purposive manner to achieve the object of the Section. Perusal of Section 8 (2-A) of the Act shows that the grant of moratorium is in lieu of exemption under section 4-A of the Act. Therefore, it is open to the unit either to opt for exemption under section 4-A of the Act or for moratorium. Under Rule 43 (8) it has been specifically provided that in case if the exemption under section 4-A of the Act has been availed, dealer is not entitled for the grant of moratorium. The language of Rule 43 (8) is clear and unambiguous. For the reasons stated above, we are of the considered view that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Commissioner of Trade Tax, which is accordingly upheld. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2005 (9) TMI 663 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, CHENNAI
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... ... ..... order. (b)The Company will register the transfer of shares in favour of the petitioners within 30 days of due lodgment of the share certificates and the instruments of transfer by the petitioners. (c)Prasad Media Corporation Ltd. shall be arrayed as the respondent No. 6 in the company petition and shall answer the charges levelled in relation to it by 14-10-2005 and rejoinder be filed by 31-10-2005. (d)The Company shall file additional reply on its investments in Prasad Film Labs (Mumbai) Private Limited by 14-10-2005 and rejoinder if any, to be filed by 31-10-2005. With the above directions, both the company petition and the company application (CA No. 20/2005) stand disposed of, however, reserving the right to issue appropriate directions on the charges made against the respondents in the matter of (a) Prasad Media Corporation Ltd. and (b) Prasad Film Labs (Mumbai) Private Limited. Towards this end, the matter will be called on 7-11-2005 at 2.30 p.m. No order as to costs.
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2005 (9) TMI 662 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Donations received by trust - Assessing Officer treating the donations received as income under section 68 - Held that:- The fact that the complete list of donors was not filed or that the donors were not produced, does not necessarily lead to the inference that the assessee was trying to introduce unaccounted money by way of donation receipts – There was, therefore, full disclosure of income by the assessee and also application of the donations for charitable purposes. It is not in dispute that the objects and activities of the assessee were charitable in nature - Held that Section 68 has no application. See Director of Income-Tax (Exemption) Versus Keshav Social And Charitable Foundation [2005 (2) TMI 84 - DELHI High Court].
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2005 (9) TMI 661 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... inctive feature which the High Court unfortunately failed to properly appreciate. The employer accepted to choose the unqualified apology given and regrets expressed by Chunnu and Vakil. It cannot be said that the employer had discriminated so far as the respondent-workman is concerned because as noted above he had tried to justify his action for which departmental proceedings were initiated. It is not that Chunnu and Vakil were totally exonerated. On the contrary, letter of warning dated 11.4.1984 was issued to them. In Union of India v. Parma Nanda, 1989 2 SCC 177 the Administrative Tribunal had modified the punishment on the ground that two other persons were let out with minor punishment. This Court held that when all the persons did not stand on the same footing, same yardstick cannot be applied. Similar is the position in the present case. Therefore, the High Court’s order is clearly unsustainable and is set aside. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
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2005 (9) TMI 660 - CESTAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... d the appeal for non-compliance. Hence this appeal before the Tribunal. 3. We find on hearing both sides prima facie erection, installation and commissioning are not covered under the category of Consulting Engineering service in the light of Circular No. 79/9/2004-S.T., dated 13-5-2004 and in view of the decision in the case of Yokogawa Blue Star Ltd. v. CCE 2006 (3) S.T.R. 580 (Tri.)/2005 (186) E.L.T. 601 (Tri.) holding that prior to 1- 7-2003, erection, commissioning and installation charges were not covered under the category of Consulting Engineering Services and hence Service Tax was not liable to be paid during the period of dispute i.e. prior to 1-7-2003. In the present case we note that the period of demand is prior to 1-7-2003. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the lower appellate authority to decide on merits de novo after extending reasonable opportunity of hearing to the appellants. 4. The appeal is thus allowed by way of remand.
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2005 (9) TMI 659 - SUPREME COURT
Challenged the Order passed by High Court in granting bail - Blind Murder - Conspiracy - seriousness and gravity of the crime - No Prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence - HELD THAT:- In the present case, we find that the High Court has granted bail being of the opinion that the extra judicial confession given by Rohit Chaturvedi one of the co-accused may not stand the test of scrutiny by a judicial mind but that by itself was not sufficient to grant the bail. There is voluminous evidence collected by the CBI to show the involvement of Amarmani Tripathi, and his effort to interfere with the investigation of the case before the grant of bail and also after the grant of bail. He tried to change the course of investigation by creating false evidence of the marriage of Madhumita with Anuj Mishra with the help of Yagya Narain Dixit, a police officer, the 6th accused who died in an accident during the course of investigation. There are written complaints with the investigating agency showing that after his release on bail Amarmani Tripathi tried to threaten as well as win over Nidhi Shukla, sister of the deceased, and her mother by offering bribe. In our opinion, the High Court gravely erred in granting bail to Amarmani Tripathi in such circumstances. The High Court practically failed to consider/take into consideration the voluminous evidence which had been collected by the investigation agency and have been referred to by them in their statement of objections to the application for grant of bail.
It is true that the position of Madhumani is somewhat different from the case of her husband. While her husband is a politician and ex-Minister, she is no doubt a house wife. While her husband has several criminal cases against him, she has no such record. While there is material to show attempts by her husband to tamper with the evidence and threaten witnesses, there is nothing to show that she made any attempt to tamper with the evidence. But there is material to show that she had absconded for several months and surrendered only when bail was refused to her husband on the ground that she was absconding. Further when the matter is considered in entirety, with reference to the murder of Madhumita and the propensity of the husband and wife to pressurize and persuade others to act according to their wishes there is reasonable ground for apprehension that if her husband alone is taken into custody, leaving her to remain outside, she may take over the task of tampering the evidence and manipulating/threatening witnesses. Therefore, interference is called for even in regard to the bail granted to Madhumani.
We are conscious of the fact that evidence in this case has yet not been led in the Court. Wherever we have referred to the word "evidence" in this order the same may be read as material collected by the prosecution. Reference to the material collected and the findings recorded herein are for the purposes of these appeals only. This may not be taken as an expression of opinion. The Court would be at liberty to decide the matter in the light of evidence which shall come on record after it is led de hors any finding recorded in this order.
Thus, the orders dated 29th April, 2004 and 8th July, 2004 passed by the High Court are set aside. The bail bonds of the respondents in each of these cases are cancelled. Respondents are directed to surrender forthwith and in case they fail to do so, the State should take effective steps to take the respondents in custody.
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