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Showing 201 to 220 of 267 Records
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1994 (1) TMI 67 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Appropriate Authority, Immovable Property By Central Government, Movable Property ... ... ... ... ..... as the other grievance sought to be made out by learned counsel for the petitioner about the taking into account of instances outside of the purview of the appropriate authority is concerned, I am of the view that if the petitioner so desires he could have them agitated before the very authority when submitting his explanation and it will be unnecessary as also inappropriate for this court to express any view in this matter at this stage of the proceedings. For all the reasons stated above, I do not see any merit in the objection raised against the charge memo at this stage. The writ petition, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs. The petitioner shall have four weeks time to make his representation to the charge memo. It is needless to point out that he will have all his rights and privileges as are permissible under the relevant rules, fully preserved including the right to raise any objections whatsoever except the one which has been rejected in this order.
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1994 (1) TMI 66 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Chargeable Profits, Computation Of Capital, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... served that any income falling under Chapter VI-A of the Income-tax Act, since that Chapter deals with deductions, is includible, that is, is capable of being included in the total income but by virtue of the special provisions relating to deductions in Chapter VI-A, is taken out and excluded from the total income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act. This court further observed that deductions allowed to the assessee under Chapter VI-A of the Income-tax Act are not income, profits and gains not includible in the total income as contemplated by rule 4 of Schedule II to the Surtax Act. Such deductions are not taken out for proportionate diminution of the capital of the company computed under rules 1 to 3 as provided under rule 4 of the Second Schedule to the Surtax Act. Hence, question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 65 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... , we have in mind also the principles stated by the Supreme Court in Director of Inspection of Income-tax (Investigation) v. Pooran Mall and Sons 1974 96 ITR 390, which are as follows It is not every provision of a taxing statute that will fall under the rule of strict interpretation. The question whether a certain provision of law is directory does not fall to be decided on different standards because it is found in a taxing statute. There is no rule that every provision in a taxing statute is mandatory. The strict construction that a citizen does not become liable to tax unless he comes within the specific words of a statute is a different proposition. That a person cannot be taxed on the principle of estoppel does not admit of much argument. We, therefore, agree with the view of the Tribunal that the provisions of section 80J(6A) of the Income-tax Act were not mandatory and we answer the questions in the affirmative and against the Revenue, with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 500.
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1994 (1) TMI 64 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Computation Of Capital, Cost Of Acquisition, Cost Of Improvement, Diversion Of Income, Income By Overriding Title
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1994 (1) TMI 63 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Borrowed Capital, Computation Of Capital, Industrial Company, Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction
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1994 (1) TMI 62 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Chargeable Profits, Company Surtax, Computation Of Capital, In The Nature, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... wo situations. The main purpose of Schedule I is to ascertain the business profits of the company as determined in the income-tax assessment and make certain adjustments with regard to certain amounts included therein which do not really form part of the business profit. It was for that reason that sub-rule (iv) excludes profit under section 41(2), because that profit which is brought to tax under the Income-tax Act is not really in the nature of business profit. But so far as the terminal benefit under section 32(1)(iii) is concerned, it is really in the nature of depreciation which is already allowed in the income-tax assessment for ascertaining the business profit. Since the terminal benefit continues to bear the same nature of depreciation, there is no reason for excluding the same in ascertaining the business profits for the purpose of surtax. In our opinion, therefore, the answer to the second question also has to be in the affirmative and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 61 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Assessed Tax, Registered Firm, Unregistered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... unregistered firm for the purpose of imposition of penalty as provided in sub-section (2) of section 271 of the said Act. However, the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable from those of Priya Gopal Bishoyee s case 1981 127 ITR 778 (Cal). Here, the assessee had admittedly paid by way of advance tax much more than what was determined on the basis of the total income assessed on regular assessment. Therefore, the assessed tax within the meaning of the Explanation to section 271(1)(a)(i)(b) is clearly a negative figure. In this situation, no penalty can at all be calculated. This is not a case where the tax determined on regular assessment is subsequently paid by the assessee, a registered firm, long after the completion of the regular assessment, as was the situation prevailing in Bishoyee s case. For the foregoing reasons, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. NURE ALAM CHOWDHURY J.-I agree.
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1994 (1) TMI 60 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Tax Deducted At Source ... ... ... ... ..... Rasiklal, son of Premchand Shah, Kirtibhai, son of Bhogilal Shah, Rajnikant, son of Kantilal Shah and Bharatkumar, son of Bhogilal Shah, is bad and the same deserves to be quashed and is hereby quashed. It is further observed that if during the hearing of the case the parties including the Income-tax Department cannot show that any other person or persons were in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business, cognizance against that person/persons can be taken under section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code in due course and this quashing would have no adverse effect against taking of the cognizance as per the provisions referred to above, if the offence is disclosed during the trial of the case. However, the prosecution against the company, and K. B. Shah, i.e., accused Nos. 1 and 4 shall continue. The parties, i.e. (accused Nos. 1 and 4 and prosecutor), are directed to appear before the Magistrate, Economic Offences, Indore, on February 10, 1994.
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1994 (1) TMI 59 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... 870 could be spread over a period of twenty years and allowance made at the rate of 1/20th each year. Learned counsel for the Commissioner has frankly admitted that he can find no provision in the Act for spreading out the expenditure over a period of twenty years. If the amount was laid out and expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business and was not in the nature of a capital expenditure, the whole of it was allowable under section 10(2)(xv) of the Act. Therefore, it is too late in the day to raise such an objection, especially in view of the decision of the Allahabad High Court referred to above. Accordingly, we answer questions Nos. 1 and 3 in the affirmative and against the Revenue. So far as question No. 2 is concerned, it is fairly stated that the decision in K. P. Varghese v. ITO 1981 131 ITR 597 (SC) is against the Revenue and, therefore, that question is answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue, with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 500 one set.
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1994 (1) TMI 58 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Failure To Disclose Material Facts, Original Assessment, Reassessment Proceedings
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1994 (1) TMI 57 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Income Tax, S. 10, The High Court, Total Income, Wilful Attempt To Evade Tax ... ... ... ... ..... d under the Act but it does not mean that the result of a proceeding under the Act would be binding on the criminal court and the criminal court has to judge the case independently on the evidence placed before it. In Ajantha Biscuit Co. v. Asst. Collector of Central Excise 1992 40 ECC 202 1993 LW (Crl.) 575 (Mad), I have taken a similar view. In view of the decision of the apex court, the ratio of which is clearly applicable to the facts of this case, the complaint cannot be quashed at the threshold. Regarding instructions or guidelines given to the Income-tax Department relating to the prosecution of persons above a certain age and above certain limits of penalties, Mr. K. Ramaswamy, learned standing counsel for the respondent, has rightly pointed out that those instructions and guidelines cannot override the specific provisions of the Income-tax Act. For the reasons stated above, the complaint cannot be quashed. In the result, this petition fails and shall stand dismissed.
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1994 (1) TMI 56 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax Act, Application For Reference, Dispose Of, Reference To High Court ... ... ... ... ..... intention to affect the rights and liabilities accrued under the 1950 Act. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the fiction created by the latter part of the proviso is clearly subject and subservient to the rights and obligations accrued or incurred under the 1950 Act. The remedy of the petitioner in relation to the order, exhibit P-10, was thus under section 60 of the 1950 Act, as rightly invoked by them. I have therefore, no hesitation in holding that the order of the Commissioner, exhibit P-14, is unsustainable in law and against the plain terms of section 99(1) of the 1991 Act. Accordingly, I quash exhibit P-14. The second respondent, Commissioner, is directed to consider and dispose of the reference application, exhibit P-11, afresh in accordance with the provisions of section 60 of the 1950 Act with all expedition and at any rate within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The original petition is allowed as above. No costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 55 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Carrying On Business, Dissolution Of Firm, Firm Consisting ... ... ... ... ..... is nothing to show that there was a determination of the rights and liabilities of the continuing partners. On the other hand, there are several clauses in the agreement which indicate that the continuing partners retained their rights and liabilities inter se and also carried on business with the assets which remained with them without disruption. The fact that no closing stock was left or that there were no trading transactions between December 6, 1973, and the execution of the partnership deed by the continuing partners, is insufficient to indicate any dissolution of the firm by conduct. Since the finding of the Tribunal that there was a dissolution cannot be upheld, it follows that the assessments made by the Income-tax Officer of the total income of the assessee-firm for the entire period under section 187 was correct. The first question is answered in the negative and against the assessee. The second question becomes academic and does not require any answer. No costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 54 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax Act, Natural Justice ... ... ... ... ..... a nullity. Exhibits P-4, P-7 and P-9 are therefore liable to be quashed on this sole ground. I do so. If the first respondent intends to proceed against the petitioner with the reassessment for the year 1983-84, which I feel is misconceived at this distance of time, he should summon the auctioneers in question who had made the tell-tale entries in their books pertaining to the petitioner and afford the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine them in relation to those books. If the authors of the entries at the relevant time are not available, the entries cannot be relied on for any purpose whatsoever in the absence of an opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine them. Whether those entries are still reliable as evidence against the petitioner is a matter which will have to be adjudicated upon after affording such opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the authors of those books. The original petition is, therefore, allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 53 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appropriate Authority, Central Government, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... bly long before the date of passing the order. The order having been set aside and struck down, the petitioner is entitled to the certificate of No objection under section 269UL(3). Respondent No, 3 is directed to grant the No objection certificate within two weeks hence. The respondents are further directed to issue a certificate under section 230A(1) on satisfaction of all legal requirements by the petitioner for that purpose. If the registration of the lease deed has already been completed by the registering authority on a provisional basis in terms of the order of this court dated May 20, 1988, the same shall be treated as valid and final upon production of the No objection certificate under section 269UL(3) and the certificate under section 230A(1). There will be no more any restraint on the lessor in the matter of delivery of possession of the leasehold property. The interim order thus stands vacated. In the result, the petition is allowed without any order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 52 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Gift Tax, Question Of Law, Shares In Private Company, Unquoted Shares ... ... ... ... ..... application was rejected by saying that the High Court should not be burdened with redundant questions of law as the matter was decided by it with reference to the decision of the Supreme Court just referred to above. We are afraid that we cannot share the view of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. It would be an oversimplification of the matter to say that the decision in appeal by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal rested on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kusumben D Mahadevia 1980 122 ITR 38, alone, whereas, in fact, it is not so. We are clearly of the opinion that the questions set out above do arise out of the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which requires a reference to this court. Accordingly, we direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to draw up a statement of the case and refer the aforesaid questions of law for the opinion of this court. In the result, the application succeeds and is allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... udgment and we apply the same reasoning in this case and hold that section 20A of the Wealth-tax Act is unconstitutional and invalid. Hence we allow these two writ petitions and direct the respondents to take appropriate proceedings recognising the partial partition effected by the members of the Hindu undivided families in these two cases. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed. The parties will, however, bear their respective costs. Counsel for the respondents orally prays for the grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. He brings to our notice that the Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal against the judgment of the Division Bench in Valliappan s case 1988 170 ITR 238 (Mad) by order dated April 25, 1988, and has also granted stay of operation of the judgment of this court. In our opinion, the question raised in these two cases is fit to be decided by the Supreme Court and we accordingly issue the certificate under article 133(1) of the Constitution of India.
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1994 (1) TMI 50 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Income From Undisclosed Sources, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... tatutory provision must be so construed which avoids absurdity and mischief and that a clarificatory and explanatory provision should normally in the context be interpreted to have retrospective effect. The respondent is not likely to suffer any loss by this interpretation. Hence with greatest respect, it is difficult for us to agree with the view taken by the Delhi High Court in the case of Escorts Limited 1991 189 ITR 81. In the result, it is held that the first proviso to section 43B of the Income-tax Act is remedial and curative in nature and the proviso was brought into force to remedy unintended hardship which was likely to be caused by section 43B. It is also declaratory in its nature. Hence, the said proviso relates back to the date when section 43B came into operation, i.e., April 1, 1984. Hence, the question is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 49 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Movable Property, Purchase Of Immovable Property By Central Government, Rent Control
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1994 (1) TMI 48 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
HUF Income, Income Tax Act, Interest On Deposit, Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... the income derived from the amount, as he will be holding it on behalf of the donor. That is the reason why the Appellate Tribunal has given a direction that the actual interest earned by the donee should be treated as income and should be assessed as accruing to the assessee. It follows that this is not an assessment on a notional income at all. Such a situation can arise only if the assessee is able to establish that the amount gifted had become irrecoverable. That issue, as stated by the Tribunal, was never raised before the Tribunal. In the circumstances, we answer the first question in the affirmative and against the assessee. The second and third questions do not arise from the order of the Tribunal. The fourth question challenges only the issue of interest which, as held by the Tribunal, was only alternative to the actual amount which was directed to be added. Therefore, the answer to this question also has to be in the affirmative and against the assessee. No costs.
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