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Case Laws
Showing 201 to 220 of 266 Records
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1983 (11) TMI 66 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Confiscation of the ship carrying smuggled goods - Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... requires to be set aside. 6. Accordingly, both the petitions succeed and the order passed by the Additional Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay on August 31, 1979 confiscating the vessel m.v. Rishi Vishwamitra is set aside. The personal penalty imposed on the Master and the owner of the ship under Section 112 of the Customs Act is also set aside. The order of imposition of personal penalty on the 4th Engineer is confirmed. The rest of the order is not disturbed. The rule in both the petitions is made absolute accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. The amount deposited by the owners of the vehicle in this Court, in accordance with the interim order passed at the stage of admission, should be refunded. The Bank guarantees furnished by the owners and the Master of the vessel stands discharged. The Department can proceed to enforce the Bank guarantee furnished by the 4th Engineer for the purpose of recovering the penalty amount.
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1983 (11) TMI 65 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Remand with direction - Duty of the lower authorities to record finding according to the test laid down in the directions of the remanding authorities
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1983 (11) TMI 64 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Valuation - Contract entered for import of goods - Refund admissible if the excess duty charged was erroneous
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1983 (11) TMI 63 - SC ORDER
HUF, Partition ... ... ... ... ..... l the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the smallness of the amount involved, we do not think that this court should interfere with the impugned order of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1983 (11) TMI 62 - SC ORDER
Jurisdiction, Notice, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... f the High Court dated 6th September, 1979, should have been referred to the High Court for its opinion. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and direct that these four questions will be referred by the Tribunal to the High Court together with a statement of case under s. 256(2) of the I.T. Act, 1961. Appeal allowed.
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1983 (11) TMI 61 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Clubbing Of Income Of Spouse, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... ssessee has a substantial interest. There is, in this case, no dispute regarding the clubbing of the income of the wife with the assessee s income. The dispute is only as to whether the income of the wife should be the gross income for the purpose of clubbing or the net income after allowing the expenses and standard deductions. It seems to us that this question should not detain us longer. If the wife herself had been the assessee, there would not have been any doubt as to her right to compute her net income. She is entitled to the standard deductions and other expenses. If that is so, we fail to see any good reason why gross income should be clubbed with the income of her husband under s. 64. It would be contrary to the scheme of the Act itself not to allow deductions before clubbing the income. We find no justification to take a view different from the one reasonably reached by the Tribunal. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
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1983 (11) TMI 60 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... . CIT 1959 35 ITR 48, the Supreme Court observed that the teaching of Vedanta could be considered as a vocation. This decision has not been relied upon by the Tribunal, but we see no reason why the ratio cannot be applied to the present case. The preaching of sermons in the church by the representative of the church cannot be different from the teaching of Vedanta or any other teaching . The teaching or preaching may be done by a representative or an employee of the church. No matter who does it, so long as it is considered to be an integral part of the church. The disciples go to the church and not to the person who teaches or preaches. The activities of the church must, therefore, be considered as vocation. The assessee is, therefore, entitled to depreciation in respect of the church building while computing the taxable income. In the result, we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 59 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Firm, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... a question of law has been raised then all aspects arising out of it can be examined. The question being wide enough the assessee cannot be precluded from urging that the reconstituted firm was not the same which concealed the income. In fact the frame of the question presupposes it. For reasons stated above the question referred is answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs. BY THE COURT SATISH CHANDRA C. J.-In view of the majority opinion our answer to the following question of law referred by the Tribunal for the opinion of this court is in the affirmative in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Whether the Tribunal is right in confirming the penalty levied on the reconstituted firm when the concealment was by the previous firm? The Commissioner shall be entitled to his costs, which are assessed at Rs. 1,000. The fee of the learned counsel for the Department is certified at Rs. 200.
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1983 (11) TMI 58 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Business Income ... ... ... ... ..... ao s case 1961 42 ITR 179. The assessees did not sell any land in the condition in which they bought it. They made convenient building sites and sold the same. They did not even dispose of all the sites in one year. They went on selling the sites year after year realising more and more profits. The fact that all the assessees started converting their lands into building sites almost simultaneously in 1967 itself is an indication of their intention to trade in the lands as a venture. They made it commercially more attractive by converting and dividing into plots. The inevitable inference is that they had no intention to hold the lands as an investment. They dealt with the lands as their stock-in-trade. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the view taken by the Tribunal. In the result, and for the reasons stated above record our answer as follows The surplus income arising out of the, sale of sites is assessable as income from business and not as a realisation of capital gains.
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1983 (11) TMI 57 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Income From House Property ... ... ... ... ..... ons, no doubt, relate to the property belonging to the firm, but the principles enunciated therein are, in our opinion, clearly applicable even to a case where a property owned by an assessee is used for the business of a firm in which he is a partner. The conclusion of law that follows from the above discussion is If the property or a portion of it, owned by an assessee, is occupied by him for the purpose of his own business or profession, or a property owned by a firm is used for its business, such assessee is entitled to exemption under section 22. In the view that we have taken, the contention urged for the Revenue should prevail, and the Tribunal s finding that the assessee is entitled to exemption under s. 22 should be rejected. The question of law is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the assessee, and the answer is that the annual letting value of the property in question is liable to be included in the assessment of the assessee for the year 1971-72.
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1983 (11) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Approved Gratuity Fund ... ... ... ... ..... press, it should be taken to come within the definition of immovable property . Therefore, the mortgage should be taken to be of only immovable property. As already stated, the intention of the borrower as well as the lender at the time of the execution of the mortgage is to treat the machinery which is embedded in the earth as a permanent fixture and as such immovable property. Since the main question on which the application for approval was rejected for the period in question was on the ground that the mortgage was of movable property and as we have held that the mortgage is of immovable property, r. 101 cannot be taken to have been violated. It is , therefore, unnecessary to go into the other questions raised before us. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and a mandamus will issue directing the respondents to accord approval for gratuity fund to the petitioner in accordance with the application dated October 27, 1975. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 55 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Depreciation, Interest On Borrowed Capital ... ... ... ... ..... lief of depreciation for the other years. Section 35(2)(iv) has been amended by Finance (No. 2) Act of 1980, with retrospective effect from April 1, 1962, which states that where a deduction is allowed for any previous year under s. 35 in respect of expenditure represented wholly or partly by an asset, no deduction shall be allowed under s. 32 of the Act for the same or other previous years in respect of that asset. In view of this retrospective amendment, the reasoning of the Tribunal that the assessee is entitled to allowance of depreciation on the capital assets used for scientific research, even though the full value of the assets was allowed as a deduction under s. 35(2) in the earlier year, cannot hold good and since the amendment has been brought into effect from April 1, 1962, it would apply to the assessment year in question. We, therefore, answer the second question referred to us in the negative and against the assessee. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 54 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Exemptions, Precedents, Res Judicata ... ... ... ... ..... institution or not. On that question the statutory provisions in the 1961 Act are substantially the same as in the 1922 Act. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court holding that the Agastyar Trust is not exclusively a charitable institution should be taken to apply to the assessments arising under the 1961 Act as well. Since we have taken the view that we are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, it is not necessary to go into the other questions referred to and canvassed before us in T.Cs. Nos. 1610 to 1613 of 1977. The result is that the common question referred in T.Cs. Nos. 1610 to 1613 of 1977 and 64 to 76 of 1978 and T.C. No. 592 of 1978 is answered in the negative and against the assessee. The other questions referred in T.Cs. Nos. 1610 to 1613 of 1977 are returned unanswered as they have become unnecessary in view of the answer which we have given on the main question. The Revenue will have its costs from the assessee, Rs. 500 (one set).
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1983 (11) TMI 53 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Cash Credits ... ... ... ... ..... as necessary that an explanation was then given by the assessee regarding the nature of the source of the cash credit. The explanation could not have been by mere legal argument advanced before the AAC. The assessee had not given any statement on affidavit that this sum was out of the intangible additions of 1961-62. The assessee had not placed on record any material showing that the stocks were converted into cash. The assessee had failed to explain that the amounts, namely, the cash credits, came out of the intangible additions made to the assessee s income in the earlier assessment year. Apart from it, the Tribunal went into the accounts itself and found that only a part of the amount was available out of the intangible additions. The questions of fact are for the Tribunal to decide and this court cannot go behind the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal. Accordingly, we answer the reference against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue with no order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return ... ... ... ... ..... essee s case cannot be taken to be the subject-matter of the decision of the Supreme Court either in an appeal or otherwise so as to attract s. 22 of the Amending Act referred to above. In fact, s. 22 refers to an appeal in respect of an order imposing penalty under cl. (i) of sub-s. (1) of s. 271 of the I.T. Act for any particular assessment year. Here, the levy of penalty on the assessee for any particular year was not the subject-matter of proceeding before the Supreme Court. Therefore, the assessee will not clearly come within the scope of s. 22 and the fact that it appeared as an intervener in CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd. 1973 88 ITR 192 (SC), is of no consequence. Therefore, we have to disagree with the Tribunal and hold that the assessee is not entitled to the benefit of s. 22 of the Amending Act, 1974. In this view, we answer the questions referred to us in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the Revenue. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1983 (11) TMI 51 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Interest Payable For Delay In Filing Return ... ... ... ... ..... It may here be mentioned that there are three assessment orders, none of which have mentioned about waiving or not waiving the interest or reducing the same. So, probably, the ITO was not aware of the applications filed before the IAC regarding the waiver or reduction of the interest. As we have observed above, if an order had been passed by the ITO regarding the interest, then the assessee would know whether he had to file an appeal or a revision. But, there being no mention of the same, we have preferred to answer this reference by holding that the appeal does not lie to the AAC. At the same time, as there is no order, no revision lies to the Commissioner. So, the only possible direction that can be given is that this is a case in which the ITO has yet to pass an order waiving or reducing the interest or refusing to waive or reduce the interest and only after the order is passed can it be determined whether an appeal or revision lies. The reference is answered accordingly.
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1983 (11) TMI 50 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Change Of Law, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... the income concealed was less than Rs. 25,000. On February 8, 1973, the ITO could have made a valid reference to the IAC only if the concealed income of which inaccurate particulars had been furnished exceeded Rs. 25,000. This not being the case, no valid reference could be made. As held by the Division Bench of this court in Kundan Lal s case 1983 144 ITR 547, the source of the IAC s jurisdiction is reference validly made, it is the condition precedent for the assumption of jurisdiction by the IAC and that if the ITO fails to make a reference to the IAC, he cannot proceed. Similarly, if the ITO makes an invalid reference, the IAC is not conferred with any jurisdiction. With great respect to the learned judges of the Punjab and Haryana High Court who decided Mela Ram s case 1981 132 ITR 897 (P and H), we record our note of dissent. For the above reasons, we answer the question in the reference against the Department and in favour of the assessee. We make no order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 49 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Cash Credits ... ... ... ... ..... win M. Patel 1983 144 ITR 566, considered the question of the shares thrown in the hotchpot by the karta. It was held that when shares were thrown by the karta of the HUF into the family hotchpot, the acquisition of shares to the HUF for purposes of computing capital gains arising from the sale of shares would be the market value of the shares, as on the date on which it acquired them, namely, the date on which they were thrown into the common hotchpot by the karta. The Gujarat High Court in our opinion, with due respect to the learned judges, have gone a little too far. But it is, however, not necessary to express any considered opinion in this case. The cost of acquisition within the meaning of s. 48 would be the cost of acquisition to Shri Deena Nath Nanda and his wife, Smt. Rattan Devi Nanda, which has been calculated by the ITO at Rs. 76,748. Accordingly, we answer the two questions in favour of the assessee and against the Department. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 48 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Accrual, Income ... ... ... ... ..... company stood satisfied and adjusted. This satisfaction and adjustment of the claim of the assessee was partly towards the amount of Rs. 55,000 claimed as due to the assessee on the date of institution of the suit, partly for the profits or gains accruing or arising after the date of institution of the suit up to the date of the compromise, and partly for the loss of profits which the assessee would have earned had the agreement run its full term. The amount paid for profits likely to arise to the assessee if the contract had run its normal course has certainly accrued to the assessee on the recording of the compromise and in the relevant previous year. The other payment is towards adjudication of rights of the amount accrued due in the earlier years. The directions, as reproduced above, were thus rightly given by the Tribunal in the facts and circumstances of this case. The reference is answered against the Department and in favour of the assessee with no order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 47 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust, Precedents, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... about by a decree of a civil court or by recognition of the same in a decree of a civil court, to our mind, does not make any difference and the same principle would apply in considering whether, in such a case, the High Court in a reference can or cannot remand the case to the Appellate Tribunal for allowing a party to a case to urge a subsequent event and to adduce evidence in support of the same. Shri G. C. Sharma cited some other judgments also. It will suffice to say that none of these cases is in point and none of them is of any help to the case of the assessee. Some of these cases simply dealt with the question as to whether certain purposes can be said to be charitable purposes. In conclusion, we repel the said contention of the assessee s learned counsel and answer the questions in the negative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. In the circumstances of the cases, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Questions answered in the negative.
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