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Showing 221 to 240 of 274 Records
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1989 (1) TMI 54 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ndered in Amar Singh Modi Lal s case, AIR 1972 P and H 356 FB , but when the same was obtained during the three respective years. If allowance or deduction had been allowed earlier on the decision of Amar Singh Modi Lal s case, AIR 1972 P and H 356 FB , the amount could be added in the income ofthe assessee in the accounting year in which judgment was given. There is no method of allowing allowance or deduction in an indirect way as is suggested by counsel for the Revenue, nor has any judgment been cited. Since no allowance or deduction was allowed while making the assessments relating to the three years in which the royalty was collected, section 41(1) of the Act would not be attracted. Therefore, in the year in which the judgment was rendered in Amar Singh Modi Lal s case, AIR 1972 P and H 356 FB , the total royalty amount could not be added in the income of the assessee. On these premises, the referred question is answered in favour of the assessee and in the affirmative.
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1989 (1) TMI 53 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Property Passing On Death ... ... ... ... ..... f the view that the Tribunal was quite right in holding that the partnership firm had goodwill. On the second question, we are of the view that the Tribunal was quite in order in holding that the goodwill has to be considered as a whole and should not be cut up and attributed to the money-lending business in part and also partly to the textile business of the firm. It may be that the business activities of the firm were in different fields and commodities. Even so, the acquisition of goodwill is in respect of the entire range of business activities of the firm taken as a whole and cannot be regarded as having been acquired with respect to only one of the several lines of business activities carried on by the firm. We are, therefore, of the view that the Tribunal was justified in reaching the conclusion it did. We answer the questions referred to us in the affirmative and against the accountable person. The Revenue will have the costs of this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1989 (1) TMI 52 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ner. The Tribunal, in our view, on the facts and circumstances of this case, ought to have adopted a justice-oriented approach and ought to have allowed the application of the petitioner otherwise also, without rejecting the plea of illness, the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the application of the petitioner made for condonation of delay. For the reasons, we accept the contention of the petitioner and allow this petition. The order dated April 29, 1988 (annexure I to the writ petition), is quashed and the Tribunal is directed to entertain the application made under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and dispose of the same on merits according to law.
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1989 (1) TMI 51 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Quick Succession Relief ... ... ... ... ..... rty, the relief as contemplated under section 31 of the Estate Duty Act cannot be denied in view of the meaning to be given to the term property as per section 2(15) of the Estate Duty Act and other authorities cited supra. In view of the above said finding that the term property includes both movable or immovable and the sale proceeds thereof, we consider that the respondents are not correct in restricting the relief as claimed by the accountable person under section 31 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. In such circumstances, we direct the respondents to grant the relief of quick succession in entirety towards the sale proceeds of the above said immovable properties to the accountable person as prayed for. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Though the relief of certiorarified mandamus is asked for, it is enough if a mandamus as indicated above is granted. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed with costs to the limited extent indicated above. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1989 (1) TMI 50 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... om April 1, 1976? The matter here arises in the context of the deletion of section 274(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, which came into effect from April 1, 1976. In the present case, the Income-tax Officer completed the assessment on March 5, 1975, and thereafter made a reference to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner on November 25, 1975. As the conclusion of the Income-tax Officer regarding concealment of income had been made before the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, came into force, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner cannot but be held to have been vested with the requisite jurisdiction at the relevant time. This position in law has also been laid down by this court in ITR No. 55 of 1981 (CIT v. Prem Singh Deviditta Mal 1989 177 ITR 236), decided on December 2, 1988. The reference is accordingly answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1989 (1) TMI 49 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as his shares due to a misconception of the law. The matter requires more detailed analysis. Similarly, we were not invited to any definite or positive material which would go to show that the assessee was only benamidar between the date of purchase arid the date of transfer of the shares, and the assessee is only an apparent owner of the shares, but the real owners of the shares were the assessee s father, mother arid brother. This question depends as to how far, and to what extent the admission made by the assessee in his wealth-tax return for the assessment year 1977-78 is disproved, or explained, or offset by any material available on record. In view of the above, we direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to refer questions Nos. 1 and 3 (extracted hereinabove) for the decision of this court along with the statement of the case. This shall be, so done within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The original petition is disposed of as above.
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1989 (1) TMI 48 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... tructions. It will suffice for the purpose of this case to give a direction to the respondents to return the hundis which belongs to the petitioner, seized at the time of the search of the petitioner s advocate at premises No. 2 Pudupet Garden Street, Royapettah, Madras-14, after taking xerox copies at the petitioner s cost. However, the petitioner is directed to produce the original hundis as and when the Department needs them for further investigation. The original hundis will be handed over in the presence of the advocate from whose residence the hundis were seized. This petition is ordered accordingly. No costs.
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1989 (1) TMI 47 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains Tax, HUF ... ... ... ... ..... rs and if necessary by asking the parties to make payments of money to equalize the shares. Such apportionment, it was said, was also a kind of physical division of the properties contemplated in the Explanation to section 171 of the Act. Counsel sought to construe these observations to mean that there could be a partition otherwise than by a physical division and, therefore, in the present case, the partition be deemed to relate back to October or November 1970. This again is a contention devoid of merit. A reading of the judgment would show that these observations came to be made in the context of the partition of 18 separate and distinct immovable properties amongst 10 members of the Hindu undivided family, a situation which, on facts, bears no resemblence to the case here. In the result, the reference, namely, question No. (1) as it now stands, is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1989 (1) TMI 46 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er may have been different if a finding had been recorded that there was no firm or partnership concern in existence and in fact no payment was made but payment was shown in the account books of the company. On those facts, the entire amount could be disallowed as not having been expended but not by virtue of section 40(c) of the Act. On the facts of the case, the existence of the sole selling agent firm has been accepted because only part of the commission has been disallowed in exercise of the discretion contained in section 40(c) and the remaining part has been accepted as good payment. For the reasons recorded above, we answer the first question in favour of the assessee, i.e., in the affirmative, and opine that the case is not covered by section 40(c) of the Act and no part of the commission could be disallowed for the two assessment years in question. In view of our decision on question No. 1, question No. 2 does not arise and the same is returned unanswered. No costs.
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1989 (1) TMI 45 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Cash Credits ... ... ... ... ..... r examination before the authorities. In the absence of any proof regarding the genuineness of both the receipt of money and sale of tea to the parties, the additions sustained by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) should be sustained. This is a finding on a pure question of fact. On a reading of the order of the Appellate Tribunal as a whole, we are satisfied that no referable question of law, as formulated in para 7 of the original petition, arises for consideration in this original petition. The entire case centered round an appreciation of facts and circumstances as to whether the petitioner/assessee was able to prove the genuineness of the various cash credits appearing in its account books. The Appellate Tribunal found that the assessee totally failed to prove the genuineness of both the receipt of money and sale of tea to the parties. This is a pure, finding of fact. No question of law arises in this case. The original petition is without merit. It is dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 44 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ction 41(1) of the Income tax Act. In that case also, the payment to the sales tax department was not debited to the profit and loss account. The sales tax amount collected by the assessee from the customers was credited to a separate account as in this case. Even so, a Bench of this court held that the refund of sales tax received in the accounting year is income of the year in which it was received. Section 41 (1) of the Income-tax Act was held to be applicable. In the light of the Bench decision of this court in Marikar (Motors) Ltd. s case 1981 129 ITR 1, we are of the view that no referable question of law, as formulated in para 5 of the original petition, arises for consideration. We are further of the view that the decision of this court in Marikar (Motors) Ltd. s case 1981 129 ITR 1, is substantially in accord with the earlier Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Motilal Ambaidas v. CIT 1977 108 ITR 136. The original petition is without merit. It is dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 43 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Gratuity, Remuneration ... ... ... ... ..... in foreign currency. But the assessee has to provide funds for the purchase of foreign currency in terms of the Indian rupee and that will not remain the same as it was at the time of the agreement of purchase. Such extra amount that has to be paid by the assessee has to be considered to be capital expenditure. The Tribunal also held that the expenditure of Rs. 15,369 had been rightly treated as capital expenditure by the lower authorities. There is no case that the original expenditure for the machinery is not capital expenditure. If that is so, the accretion to it or the enhanced payment represented by the difference due to the fluctuation in exchange rate also should be of capital nature. In the light of the above, we answer the question in the affirmative,i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1989 (1) TMI 42 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Unexplained Investments ... ... ... ... ..... h Court, the aforesaid view was taken and the matter was decided against the assessee. The Supreme court also held that the expression income as used in section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short the Act ), had a wide meaning which meant anything which came in or resulted in gain and on this basis, concluded that the assessee had income which he had invested in purchasing wrist watches which were seized from his bedroom and he could be held to be the owner of the wrist watches and their value could be deemed to be his income by virtue of section 69A of the Act. For the reasons recorded above, we answer both the questions in favour of the Revenue, that is, in the negative, to the effect that the Tribunal erred in holding that the onus of proving ownership of the gold lay on the Department and also that the Tribunal erred in holding that the addition of Rs. 44,000 representing the value of 220 tolas of gold could not be sustained under section 69A of the Act. No costs.
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1989 (1) TMI 41 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... see s claim for development rebate. It is, in these circumstances, that the following question of law has been referred to this court for its opinion Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in finding that the assessee was entitled to development rebate ? Keeping in view the settled position in law as laid down in CIT v. Haryana State Minor Irrigation and Tubewell Corporation Ltd. 1983 140 ITR 437 (P and H), that it is open to an assessee to make entries regarding development rebate reserve at any time before the assessment is completed, the question posed has clearly to be answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. A similar view was also taken in CIT v. Sardar Singh Sachdeva 1972 86 ITR 387 (P and H), CIT v. Rita Mechanical Works 1977 108 ITR 552 (P and H) and Acropolymers (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1985 151 ITR 158 (P and H). This reference is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1989 (1) TMI 40 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Depreciation At Higher Rate, Developement Rebate, New Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... . 281 (Coch) of 1981 for the assessment year 1975-76 and question No. 2 in R. A. No. 282(Coch) of 1981 for the assessment year 1975-76 and questions Nos. 1 and 2 in R. A. No. 283(Coch) of 1981 for the assessment year 1976-77 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Department and we decline to answer question No. 1 in R. A. No. 282(Coch) of 1981 and question No. 3 in R. A. No. 283 (Coch) of 1981. The Tribunal shall hear the parties after affording an opportunity to produce further evidence relating to question No. 1 in R. A. No. 281 (Coch) of 1981 for the assessment year 1975-76 and question No. 3 in R. A. No. 283(Coch) of 1981 for the assessment year 1976-77 regarding the eligibility to depreciation on roads and fences. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in these cases. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1989 (1) TMI 39 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... ) clearly go to show that the business of the tent house was carried on wholly and solely for purposes of the trust and the main purpose of the trust was to provide education to the public in general without any distinction of caste, creed and colour and to provide assistance, aid and financial aid to orphans, widows, destitutes and other poor and deserving persons including the running and managing of orphanages, widows homes and other institutions of like nature. To achieve the object of the aforesaid purpose, if any business is done, the matter would still be covered by section 11 ( 1) (a) of the Act. Since the business was carried on solely for applying the receipts for charitable purposes for education and bringing up of poor by giving financial help and opening orphanages, widows homes and such like institutions, the Tribunal was right in allowing the exemption and we answer the question in favour of the assessee, that is, in the affirmative, with no order as to costs.
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1989 (1) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Amortisation, Film Business ... ... ... ... ..... nor could be allowed under section 37 of the Act, the payment was allowable under section 28 of the Act. On a reference, it was held that the nature of payment being one described in section 36(1)(iv) of the Act and as it could not be deducted under that section, it cannot be held to be deductible under section 28 of the Act on general principles in arriving at the true profits and gains of the business in a commercial sense. In the view we have taken that the expenditure incurred in connection with the obtaining of positive prints is really in the nature of post-production expenditure and that there is no provision in the Act or the rules obliging the authorities to disallow such expenditure, the claim of the assessee that such expenditure would fall under section 37 of the Act is, in our view, well-founded. We, therefore, answer the second question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Revenue. We, however, do not make any order as to costs in these references.
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1989 (1) TMI 37 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Carry Forward And Set Off, Limitation, Loss ... ... ... ... ..... igh Court of Madras in Tyresoles (India) v. CIT 1963 49 ITR 515, where it was held that where losses sustained are not set off against the profits of the immediately succeeding year or years, they cannot be set off against profits at a later date. The assessee thus not having sought to set off the unabsorbed loss in the succeeding assessment years after 1971-72 could not seek to claim it later, subsequently in the year 1976-77. Question No. (1) has thus to be answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. As regards the time limit, the Tribunal clearly fell into an error in agreeing with the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who had taken it to be four years. The law is, in fact, well-settled that the time limit for this purpose is really eight years. Question No. (2) has thus to be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference is answered accordingly. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1989 (1) TMI 36 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Company ... ... ... ... ..... e unreasonable or excessive amount under section 40A(2) and on another set of facts it might consider including 15 per cent. to be disallowed under sec tion 40A(8) in the disallowance to be made under section 40A(2). There fore, in spite of our opinion that both the provisions can stand together, there may be a little overlapping to a limited extent when, on peculiar facts, it may be concluded that 15 per cent. amount disallowable under sec tion 40A(8) should be included in the disallowance to be made under sec tion 40A(2). Accordingly, we answer the question in favour of the Revenue, i.e., in the negative, but the matter is left open to be considered by the Tribunal under section 40A(2) as to how much amount is unreasonable or excessive under section 40A(2). There is no dispute that 15 per cent. has to be disallowed under section 40A(8) of the Act even if nothing is found excessive or unreasonable under section 40A(2) of the Act. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1989 (1) TMI 35 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... y rule is applicable in cases where applications for condonation of the delay are required to be filed before civil and criminal courts. There also, a duty is cast on the applicants to furnish the cause for the delay and it is not the duty of the court to call upon the applicant to furnish the explanation. Accordingly, we agree with the view taken by the Madras, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh High Courts, and disagree with the view of the Allahabad High Court in Hazi Mohd. Khalil Mohd. Farooq s case 1962 46 ITR 458. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we answer question No. 1 in favour of the Revenue, that is, in the negative. As a result of our decision on question No. 1, question No. 2 is necessarily to be decided in favour of the Revenue, in the negative, that is, the Tribunal was, not right in law in setting aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and restoring the matter to the file of the Income tax Officer for consideration of the matter afresh. No costs.
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