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Case Laws
Showing 221 to 240 of 308 Records
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1993 (9) TMI 89 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... of the property as disclosed by the assessee in his returns for the earlier years were available to him. If the Wealth-tax Officer doubted the correctness of the valuation as given in the previous year, it was open to him to discard that value and determine the market value on his own enquiry and in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, therefore, it cannot be Said that the under estimate of the property is merely on account of the assessee s failure to file the return for the year. It is thus clear that the duty cast upon the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of all material facts does not absolve the Income-tax Officer from performing his duty to apply his mind and make proper inquiry, especially when the primary facts were before him on the basis of which he could have pursued the inquiry and found out the value of the property. In that view of the matter, the answer to the question referred to above is in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
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1993 (9) TMI 88 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Foreign Technician ... ... ... ... ..... s. We have carefully considered the facts of the case. We are of the clear opinion that the assessee being eligible to get the benefit of exemption under section 10(6)(viia)(I)(B) of the Act and the employer of the assessee having complied with all the requirements laid down in the Act for that purpose, the benefit cannot be denied to him because of delay on the part of the Central Government in according approval. In such cases the approval, once accorded, has to relate back to the date of the application. It is the only just and reasonable interpretation that can be given to such a provision. We are, therefore, of the clear opinion that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee was entitled to relief under section 10(6)(viia)(I)(B) of the Act for the assessment year 1975-76. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 87 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Export Market Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... e sale of such goods. Neither the inspection by the authorities have any nexus with technical information for promotion of sales nor does the certificate contain any such information. In that view of the matter, we are of the clear opinion that the Tribunal was justified in disallowing weighted deduction in respect of expenditure on export inspection charges. So far as the disallowance of the claim of the assessee for weighted deduction on expenses incurred on loading and unloading is concerned, we find that such expenditure is expenditure in India in connection with the despatch of goods out of India and in view of the specific prohibition contained in sub-clause (iii) of clause (b) on allowance of weighted deduction on such expenditure, the assessee is not entitled to weighted deduction in respect thereof. In view of the foregoing discussion, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 86 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Statutory Impost ... ... ... ... ..... s a complete answer to the controversy involved in the present case. The Supreme Court has clearly laid down that wherever an impost is found to be of a composite nature, i.e., partly of compensatory nature and partly of penal nature, the authorities are obligated to bifurcate the two components of the impost and give deduction to that component which is of compensatory nature. The Commissioner (Appeals) acted correctly in bifurcating the damages imposed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner into two parts and allowing deduction for that part of the amount which constituted interest. The Tribunal erred in reversing the order of the Commissioner which now stands fully supported by the above decision of the Supreme Court. In view of the foregoing, we find that the Tribunal was not justified in reversing the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. We make no order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 85 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Expenditure On Scientific Research, Gratuity ... ... ... ... ..... order as it deems fit (c) In the event of the appropriate authority deciding to pass an order of compulsory purchase under section 269UD(1) of the Act, interest at nine per cent. per annum shall also be paid on the balance amountof apparent consideration from the date of the impugned order to the date of payment (on account of escalation in value of the property, as part of price) (d) In the event of the appropriate authority not exercising the option to purchase the said property and the third respondent conveying the property to the petitioner, the petitioner shall pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 31 lakhs with interest at nine per cent. per annum from August 19, 1988 (the due date for payment under the agreement),which shall also form part of the price. With these observations, the petition and 1. A. II are partly allowed and the matter is remitted to the appropriate authority, Income-tax Department, for disposal in accordance with law and the above observations.
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1993 (9) TMI 84 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Tax Clearence Certificate, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... r in the instant case governing the second respondent. The Allahabad High Court had no occasion to consider the language of section 230A. In the circumstances of this case, the second respondent had no competence to reject the registration of the document only on the ground that the certificate under section 230A was not produced. The impugned order shall have to be set aside and it is so set aside. The respondent is directed to proceed according to law and register the document unless there is any other impediment against registration. It was contended that there is an alternative remedy available to the petitioner by way of an appeal. Exercise of writ jurisdiction is discretionary. The question raised by the petitioner in the instant case is of general importance and is likely to affect a large number of cases. Hence, I have considered it fit to exercise the writ jurisdiction and dispose of the writ petition on the merits. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. No costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 83 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... This view of ours gets full support from the decision of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Travancore v. CIT 1986 158 ITR 102, wherein Sabyasachi Mukharji J. (as he then was) dealing with the concept of real profits observed as under (at page 152) The concept of reality of the income and the actuality of the situation are relevant factors which go to the making up of the accrual of income but once accrual takes place and income accrues, the same cannot be defeated by any theory of real income. We are informed at the Bar that a similar view has been taken by the High Courts of Madras, Karnataka, Kerala and Punjab and Haryana. In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that in the instant case, for the purpose of determining capital gains , the cost of acquisition of the agricultural land belonging to the assessee has to be taken as on January 1, 1954, and not as on April 1, 1970. The question is answered accordingly, i. e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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1993 (9) TMI 82 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Search And Seizure, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... nsideration in the original petition is not prejudged and no party to the litigation should be permitted to steal a march over the other. As to who exactly is the owner of the gold is a matter yet to be determined. Till then, it is imprudent and improper to return the gold to any one of the parties. The very gold seized may be required for evidence in future litigation. It is after considering all these aspects that the learned single judge held that, at this stage, it is not safe to assume or act on the basis that the gold biscuits seized from the third respondent are the same as those brought into this country validly and properly by the petitioner. That is a matter for proof and adjudication. The learned single judge was justified in declining to grant the interim relief as prayed for. We are not satisfied that the interim order passed by the learned single judge is in any way perverse or unreasonable or grossly improper. The writ appeal is without merit. It is dismissed.
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1993 (9) TMI 81 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance, Entertainment Expenditure, Export Market Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction
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1993 (9) TMI 80 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Benefit To Person With Substantial Interest, Business Expenditure, Company ... ... ... ... ..... w. Factual controversies stand on a different footing. If the Tribunal proceeds upon an assumption of law which is erroneous in law and refers a question to the High Court, the High Court is not bound by the terms of the question referred. It can correct the erroneous assumption of law underlying the question. Even the fact that the Revenue or the assessee was also a party to such erroneous assumption before the Tribunal cannot stand in the way of such party resiling from an erroneous assumption of law. In such a case, the High Court cannot be called upon to act on the erroneous assumption of law because doing so would neither be in the interest of law or of justice. (See Salem Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. CIT 1993 201 ITR 697 (SC), 701). In the light of the above discussion, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Under the facts and in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 79 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons, Charitable Purpose, Juristic Person, Trade Union ... ... ... ... ..... enditure. We are of the view that the items claimed under Stores consumed and cost of pipes is similar to an earlier item considered by us under building repairs . Since the stores consumed and the cost of pipes were only for the purchase of materials for replacement and no new assets or additional assets came into existence, the claim is allowable in full. Questions Nos. (6) and (7) referred to this court are answered in the negative. Both the items are revenue expenditures. They have been dealt with in paragraph 11 of the common order of the Tribunal. We hold that the assessee is entitled to the deduction of those amounts in full. Question Nos. (6) and (7) are answered in the negative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. The references are disposed of as above. A copy of this judgment, under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar, shall be forwarded to the Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Additional Bench, Palakkad.
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1993 (9) TMI 78 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate, Legal Fiction ... ... ... ... ..... pees for the transfer of the business. Non-transfer of it cannot militate against the factum of succession. In view of the above discussion and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are fully satisfied that the conditions of section 33(4) are satisfied in the instant case and the provisions of section 155(5)(i) are, therefore, not attracted. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the Income-tax Officer was not correct in withdrawing the development rebate which had been allowed to the assessee-firm for the assessment years 1961-62 and 1962-63 by taking resort to section 155(5)(i) of the Act and refusing to allow development rebate for the assessment year 1963-64 on the very same ground. We, therefore, answer both the questions referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 77 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Company ... ... ... ... ..... ssessee-company in favour of the assessee-company are outside the scope of the said section. Turning to the facts of the present case, it is pertinent to note that in the case before us, there is no controversy in regard to the factum of genuineness of the payment or the reasonableness thereof having regard to the legitimate business needs of the assessee. The only dispute is in regard to the scope and ambit of section 40(c), which as stated by us, stands concluded by the above decision of the Supreme Court. We, therefore, hold that the payments in question did not fall within section 40(c) of the Act. In that view of the matter, we answer the first question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In view of the first question having been answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, the other two questions become academic and need not be answered. The reference is disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 76 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s have not been included by the plain language used in the section. The fiction which has been created cannot be extended beyond the clear wording which has been used therein. It would be creating another fiction to include the accrual from the transferred assets for inclusion in the net wealth of the assessee. It has not been contemplated by that section. The charge could be created by specific and unambiguous words and neither can there be any presumption in respect thereof nor can the meaning be extended beyond what has specifically been included. A strict interpretation has to be taken for the purpose and, accordingly, we are of the view that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the interest which has accrued to the minor son, Rajesh Kumar, cannot be included in the net wealth of the assessee under section 4(1)(a)(ii). The reference is accordingly answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 75 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Charitable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... 2 Act are identical with the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (4) of section 139 of the 1961 Act. On a careful comparison of the two sets of provisions, it is evident that there is no difference between the two. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kulu Valley s case 1970 77 ITR 518, therefore, squarely applies to the present case. Applying the ratio of the above decision, the option exercised by the assessee under the Explanation to section 11(1) of the Act before the time allowed under sub-section (4) of section 139 has to be held to have been exercised before the time allowed under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 139 of the Act and in that event, the assessee would be entitled to the benefit of deduction under section 11 of the Act. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 74 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment, Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... the said paper it is mentioned interest due from Messrs. Citric India Ltd. at the rate of 12 per cent The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has agreed with the conclusion arrived at by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). In the present matter, it has also taken into consideration that the debtor did not credit any interest in the books of account from the financial year 1968-69 onwards and declined to pay the interest. The finding which has been recorded being a finding of fact on the basis of which the presumption stands rebutted, and the matter being covered by the decision given by this court dated April 13, 1988 (see 1988 173 ITR 393 (Raj)), we are of the opinion that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in upholding the finding of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) that the reopening of the assessment under section 147(a) was not justified. Accordingly, the reference is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No orders as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 73 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Deduction, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... h the claim. As to what was the liability discharged in the instant case was on the assessee. It was his burden to have brought evidence to the satisfaction of the authorities establishing the same. The assessee did not discharge the same. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner was that, since the dispute was between the Income-tax Department and the assessee the burden was on the Department also. The burden required proving of a fact is positive and, therefore, if the assessee wanted benefit of a certain deduction or liability discharged, it is for him to bring evidence to prove the same. It is the rule of the law of evidence that the onus of proving a fact which must be exclusively within the knowledge of a party lies on him who asserts it. For the reasons given above, the question is answered against the assessee and in favour of the Department. The Department would be entitled to its costs which are assessed at Rs. 500 (rupees five hundred only) in each case.
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1993 (9) TMI 72 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Speculation Business, Speculative Transactions ... ... ... ... ..... lso in no way similar in character to trade. It cannot, therefore, be treated as in the nature of trade. That being so, we are of the clear opinion that the Tribunal was justified in affirming the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and holding that the Income-tax Officer was not justified in disallowing deduction of Rs. 5,85,093 by reference to section 43(5) of the Act. As already observed, no such disallowance can be made in the absence of clear findings that (i) the transactions in question were speculative transactions, and (ii) that those transactions were of such a nature as to constitute a business. There being no such finding, payment of the above amount cannot be treated as loss from speculation business. Explanation 2 to section 28 and section 73 of the Act are, therefore, not attracted. Having regard to our above opinion, we answer question No. 2 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. We make no order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 71 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... hri Nirmal Kumar in accordance with the new deed of partnership that the firm was held not to be a genuine firm. The registration for the assessment year 1978-79 had already been granted on the basis of the sale deed. The finding which has been recorded by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and not been challenged is that the profits of Shri Nirmal Kumar were inadvertently credited to the account of Smt. Devi Bai and this was an inadvertent technical mistake. A further finding has been given that the account of Smt. Devi Bai has already been transferred and merged with the account of Shri Nirmal Kumar and by this process the profits have ultimately been credited to the account of Shri Nirmal Kumar. Therefore, no defect remains even on this account. The reasoning which has been given by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is in accordance with law and, therefore, it is held that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in granting registration for the assessment year 1977-78.
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1993 (9) TMI 70 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... ng of fact recorded by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was that it was on account of an inadvertent mistake. If an honest mistake is committed in the division of profits, then on broad principles, it cannot affect the genuineness of the firm. The question as to whether the firm is genuine or not is a question of fact. The expression genuine firm means that the firm is really in existence and the partners are carrying on the business of the firm in accordance with the deed Of partnership. The finding of fact as stated above has already been recorded by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal that it was only a technical mistake which has since been corrected. In view of the above position, we are of the opinion that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in cancelling the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax made under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The reference is accordingly answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. No orders as to costs.
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