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Showing 241 to 260 of 267 Records
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1994 (1) TMI 27 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Income From Undisclosed Sources, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... f section 145(2) of the Act are attracted in the instant case or not would be of academic interest only and, therefore, the reference need not be called for. Without expressing any final opinion at this stage, lest it prejudice the issue involved, for the purpose of the present petition, it would suffice to say that prima facie, we are not quite satisfied that there was sufficient material before the Tribunal to come to the conclusion that the books of account of the assessee were reliable and could not be rejected. We are, therefore, of the opinion that a question of law does arise out of the order of the Tribunal. We would accordingly direct the Tribunal to state a case and refer the following question of law for the opinion of this court Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there was material before the Tribunal justifying the deletion of the addition of Rs. 6.50 lakhs made to the results declared by the assessee ? There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Accrual Of Income ... ... ... ... ..... s would be taxed only on the net dividend income and he would get double taxation relief, that is to say, the relief on the basis that the tax had been deducted at source. Indeed, the decision also suggested the interference of the Legislature. However, when a construction is possible which does not lead to an anomaly, we are of the view that that construction should be adopted in preference to the one which leads to an anomaly. We are, therefore, unable to accept and apply the principles laid down in the decision in CIT v. Oriental Co. Ltd. 1982 137 ITR 777 (Cal). In this view, it is unnecessary to go into the contents of the circular though the circular also reinforces the stand taken by the Revenue, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Clive Insurance Co. Ltd. 1978 113 ITR 636 referred to above. For the foregoing reasons, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. There will be, however, no order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
House Property, Interest On Borrowed Capital ... ... ... ... ..... estment and, therefore, since the borrowed fund was utilised only for capital outlay, the interest could not be allowed as a business expenditure. This argument is unsustainable in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in India Cements Ltd. v. CIT 1966 60 ITR 52 AIR 1966 SC 1053, that expenditure incurred for raising a loan is allowable as a business expenditure on revenue account irrespective of whether the funds are borrowed for capital outlay or for revenue disbursement. In the circumstances, we agree with the Appellate Tribunal that the capital borrowed was only for the purpose of business irrespective of the capital utilisation in the previous year and, particularly, in view of the intention of the assessee to use the property for the business which was established by the use in the subsequent year, the interest paid must be allowed as an expenditure laid out for the purpose of business. In the circumstances, we answer the question accordingly with costs of Rs. 500.
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1994 (1) TMI 24 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Account Books, Companies Profits Surtax, Company Surtax, Computation Of Capital Reserves, Depreciation Actually Allowed, General Reserve
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1994 (1) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Amnesty Scheme, Income Tax Authorities ... ... ... ... ..... f the said Act. The Assessing Officer while completing the assessment under the Amnesty Scheme had no option to enforce and apply only one part of the instructions for not initiating penalty proceedings and not to apply the other part of the instructions wherein he was instructed not to charge and/or to waive the whole of the interest technically leviable in law under sections 139(8), 215 and 217 of the said Act. Even otherwise, the law is well-settled that an executive instruction issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes in so far as it grants a benefit to the assessee is binding upon the tax authorities. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was fully justified in law in allowing the assessee s appeal by holding that no interest was chargeable in this case. We, therefore, answer the question referred by the Tribunal in this case in the negative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J.---I agree.
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1994 (1) TMI 22 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... y on the suit being decreed by the court. We are, therefore, satisfied that the finding of the Appellate Tribunal that the amount became payable only in this year is correct. Learned counsel for the Revenue pointed out that if the nature of the amount was rent, it has to be allowed only under section 30 of the Act. Even then, that section allows the deduction of rent paid, and the word paid has been defined in section 43(2) to mean actually paid or incurred according to the method of accounting on the basis of which the profits and gains of the business are computed. Since, admittedly, the assessee was following the mercantile method of accounting, and the liability to pay the additional amount accrued only on the basis of the order of the court, which was during the previous year relevant to this assessment year, the deduction of the amount in computing income for this year was correct. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Deemed Income, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... employed in the documents had also been taken into consideration by it, though that, by itself, may not be decisive. It would, therefore, be unnecessary for us to consider the question of the applicability of section 69D of the Act to hundis couched in English. We, therefore, answer the second question referred in the affirmative and against the Revenue. Regarding the first question, in view of the answer returned on the second question that the documents are not hundis, there is no question of deeming the amounts secured thereunder as income of the assessee applying section 69D of the Act. In addition the borrowings and repayments, as found by the Tribunal, are genuine and referable to the running account the assessee had with the two creditors and covered by cheque payments as well. In view of this undisputed conclusion of the Tribunal, we answer the first question referred to us also in the affirmative and against the Revenue. There will be, however, no order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Assessment Order, Estate Duty Act, High Court ... ... ... ... ..... e years as the decree itself came into existence after five years. In such circumstances, there have been instances where the Central Board of Direct Taxes itself has instructed the Income-tax Officer to waive the bar of limitation and allow the relief. Moreover, it can also be considered to be a rectification implicit in the direction of the High Court which is to be carried out by the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty and not a rectification to be carried out under the power under section 61 of the Act. In the interests of justice, I consider that the order of the Assistant Controller should be quashed and a mandamus be issued directing the Assistant Controller to consider the application of the assessee. Accordingly, the impugned order is quashed with a direction to the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty to consider the application of the assessee on the merits without raising the question of bar of limitation. The writ petition is ordered in the above terms. No costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 19 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Receipt, House Property, Revenue Receipt ... ... ... ... ..... ), where it had been pointed out that compensation paid for cancellation of a contract, not affecting the trading structure of the business or resulting in the deprivation of the source of income, leaving the person free to carry on his trade, is a revenue receipt and that where the cancellation of the agreement impaired the trading structure of the assessee or resulted in the deprivation of the source of income, such compensation in respect of the cancellation, is a capital receipt. As pointed out earlier, in this case, the assessee and the intending buyer, by reason of the acceptance of the terms of the sale by the intending buyer, had agreed that the sum of Rs. 21,000 would be in the nature of compensation for the loss of profits of the assessee, arising out of the non-performance of the agreement of sale by the intend ing buyer. Viewing the matter thus, we answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Addition To Income, High Denomination Notes, Income From Undisclosed Sources, Income Tax Act, Undisclosed Income
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1994 (1) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Acquisition Of Immovable Property, Appropriate Authority, Immovable Property By Central Government, Movable Property
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1994 (1) TMI 16 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Gift Tax, Provision For Gratuity ... ... ... ... ..... vered by a judgment of this court in CGT v. Venu Srinivasan 1985 156 ITR 679 according to which the balance-sheet, nearest to the date of gift, should be taken into account for valuing the assets gifted. As that has not been done by the Tribunal in this case, the matter has to be redone by the Tribunal in accordance with the abovesaid decision. Accordingly, we answer the first question in both the cases in the negative and against the assessee. So far as the second question in both the cases is concerned, it must be answered against the Revenue, in view of the decision in CWT v. S. Ram 1984 147 ITR 278 and, accordingly, we answer this question in the affirmative and against the Revenue. In view of our answer to the first question, no answer is necessary for questions Nos. 3, 4 and 5 as the answer to those questions would depend upon the decisions to be rendered by the Tribunal for the first question. Accordingly, we refrain from answering questions Nos. 3, 4 and 5. No costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 15 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... related to the existing legislation with the aid of emerging techniques of interpretation as was done in Ramsay s case 1982 AC 300 1981 2 WLR 449 (HL), Burmah Oil s case 1982 Simon s Tax Cases 30, and Dawson s case 1984 1 All ER 530 2 WLR 226 , (HL), to expose the devices for what they really are and to refuse to give judicial benediction. The observations of the Supreme Court in Mc Dowell s case 1985 154 ITR 148 do not amount to a direction on the court to ignore the provisions of law and to embark upon an enquiry without the regulating framework of the statute and to decide an issue of tax evasion according to the court s personal ideas of right and wrong. In view of my findings on the two issues, it is not necessary to consider the other points raised by the parties which are accordingly left open. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ application is allowed. The impugned order under section 281 and notice under section 226(3) are quashed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Expenditure Incurred, Local Authority ... ... ... ... ..... er the second question by saying that while the Tribunal was justified in upholding the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) to the effect that the unpaid amount under the Cement (Control) Order, 1967, was not hit by the provisions of section 43B of the said Act, the Tribunal was not justified in upholding the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), wherein he held that the sum of Rs. 2,87,245, which was payable under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977, was outside the mischief of section 43B. This sum of Rs. 2,87,245, in our view, was clearly hit by the provisions of section 43B. The second question is answered accordingly, in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee in respect of the unpaid amount under the Cement (Control) Order, 1967, and in the negative and against the assessee in respect of the unpaid cess under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977. There will be no order as to costs. NURE ALAM CHOWDHURY J.-- agree.
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1994 (1) TMI 13 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Attachment And Sale, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... x dues of the husband by attaching the house which stands in the name of the wife since 1959. The property has been sold with a tax clearance certificate granted by the Income-tax Officer and the purchaser purchased the property with full knowledge that the Income-tax Officer has no claim against the wife and the transfer was duly registered. After getting the clearance certificate, the transfer was duly registered. The registration cannot be cancelled once again at this stage. Therefore, in our view, the appeal should succeed. There will be an order as prayed for in terms of prayers (b) and (c) of the writ petition. The Special Officer will be entitled to retain ten per cent. of the amount collected and the balance will be handed over to the appellant. The Department is directed to hand over xerox copies of this order to the learned advocates for the parties and the learned advocate for the U. B. I., High Court branch, on the usual undertaking. ARUN KUMAR DUTTA J. --I agree.
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1994 (1) TMI 12 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
High Court, Income Tax Act, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... ugh the exercise of calling for a statement of facts, we will be only recording an answer in terms of the decision in CIT v. Meghalaya Plywood Ltd. 19931 202 ITR 343 (Gauhati) as we respectfully agree with the said decision. Under such circumstances, we consider that exercising such power would lead to a futile exercise of power for merely recording an answer following the said decision. On a plain reading of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 256, it is clear that the High Court may not require the Tribunal to state a case, if it satisfied with the correctness of the decision of the Appellate Tribunal particularly if the said decision is in terms with the settled law laid down by the High Court. Accordingly, we are satisfied that a case calling for a reference under section 256(2) has not been made out in the instant cases and as such all the five petitions filed by the Revenue under section 256(2) are liable to be rejected which we hereby do. No order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 11 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... dical Centre P. Ltd. V. CIT 1977 108 ITR 838 and Telster Advertising Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT 1979 116 ITR 610, respectively. The question referred to in that case was whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the loss determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act has to be carried forward and this question was answered in favour of the assessee holding that sub-sections (1) and (4) of section 139 are to be read together and, on being so read, the assessee is entitled to carry forward the loss if he has filed the return after the period prescribed under sub-section (1) by the time allowed within the sub-section (4). In the present reference, we find that the return was filed before the assessment was made. Therefore, the above ratio laid down squarely covers the present reference. In the result, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 10 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Income Of HUF, Individual Income, Question Of Law, Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... ge 489 to bring home his contention that the issue in hand is not squarely covered by the decision of the apex court in 1975 101 ITR 776. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and we are of the opinion that the asset involved in the case decided by the Supreme Court being self-acquired property of the assessee and the asset involved in the present case being acquired by the assessee on a partition of the family, the issue raised in the present proceeding cannot be said to be squarely covered by the decision of the apex court in 1975 101 ITR 776. Accordingly, in our opinion, it is a fit case where a reference can be called for under section 27(3) of the Wealth-tax Act (sic) on the question referred to in the petitions. Accordingly, we direct the learned Tribunal to draw up a statement of the case and refer the same to this court for its decision. We, therefore, allow these petitions, but we make no order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 9 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... perusal of the orders passed by the learned Tribunal and on hearing learned counsel, we are of the opinion that the questions of law proposed by the assessee are pure questions of law as they relate to the interpretation of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of section 115J of the Income-tax Act, 1961. However, in our opinion, the learned Tribunal was justified in holding that so far question No. 4 was concerned, it raises the question of vires and discrimination which cannot be gone into by the Tribunal. And so far question No. 5 is concerned, we do not think that it gives rise to any question of law and accordingly we do not propose to call for any reference in respect of questions Nos. 4 and 5. We, accordingly, direct the learned Tribunal to refer to this court a statement of the case on the aforesaid three questions, namely, questions Nos. 1, 2 and 3 for the opinion of this court. The application, therefore, stands partly allowed. We, however, make no order as to costs.
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1994 (1) TMI 8 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Development Allowance, Expenditure Incurred, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... It must, therefore, mean what is in law a house, although it is in fact a part of a house, viz., a legal house. Section 5(1)(iv) does not contemplate that every room or a single self-contained unit of a house occupied by one person, although not in itself a division, is a separate house in law, namely, a legal house. This being the position, merely because the assessee used the house partly for business purposes (godown) and partly as a residence it cannot be said that they are also separate legal houses or tenements, in the context of the fact-position. In that view of the matter, the Tribunal was justified in upholding the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that both the godown and the dwelling unit would be regarded as one house. Accordingly, the question is answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of court be sent to the Appellate Tribunal.
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