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Showing 241 to 260 of 268 Records
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1989 (8) TMI 28 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Assessment, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... not considered by the Income-tax Officer and, therefore, we should reframe question No. 1 so that reference is called on the question whether the Tribunal was right in setting aside the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax. In our opinion, question No. 1 is limited to the question of validity of the partnership which had come into existence. There is no question which has been proposed by the Revenue dealing only with the question whether the order passed by the Income-tax Officer was prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue irrespective of the fact whether the firm was genuine or not. It was open to the Revenue to have framed the question that even assuming that the firm was genuine, whether on merits, the Income-tax Officer had passed an assessment order which was prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue or not. No such question having, been framed, we are unable to reword question No. 1 and direct reference of the question which has not been sought for. No costs.
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1989 (8) TMI 27 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... alue of the yielding rubber trees as on January 1, 1954. Since the above conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal is valid and justified in law, we answer the common question, referred at the instance of the Revenue, for the four assessment years (1975-76 to 1978-79) in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. In the light of the conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal that no capital gains arose out of the sale of the old and unyielding rubber trees for the four years aforesaid, it is unnecessary and academic to consider questions Nos. 2 to 5, referred to by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for the decision of this court. Questions Nos. 2 to 5 referred to this court, at the instance of the assessee, do not really arise for consideration. We decline to answer the said questions. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as required by law.
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1989 (8) TMI 26 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
"Purchase Price" In Ss. 44AC And 206C, 7th Schedule Of The Constitution Of India ... ... ... ... ..... the interim orders passed by this court, the distilleries in the two States of Punjab and Haryana and the Union Territory of Chandigarh had been restrained from charging and collecting income-tax under sections 44AC and 206C though they were required by law to do so. Even uptill today, they have not been charging income-tax at source. Since the distilleries were restrained by this court from performing their statutory duties, they cannot be held liable civilly or criminally for not following the legislative command in sections 44AC and 206C and no action should be taken and can be taken against them on this score. The petitioners, country liquor contractors, shall be liable to pay income-tax on the purchases made by them from the distilleries during this interregnum and the same shall ultimately be set off or taken into account while framing the final assessment by the authorities. We, accordingly, dispose of these writ petitions in the above terms with no order as to costs.
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1989 (8) TMI 25 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Assessment, Revision ... ... ... ... ..... this court in this behalf is to be found in the case of CIT v. Pushpa Devi 1987 164 ITR 639, CIT v. Rambha Devi 1987 164 ITR 658 and CIT v. Smt. Pushpa Devi 1988 173 ITR 445. In circumstances similar to those of the present case, we have held that the Commissioner Income-tax was fully justified in acting in terms of section 263(1) of the Act. The present case also stands on the same footing. We, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the Commissioner of Income-tax, acting under section 263(1) of the Act, could not interfere in the matter of assessment passed by the Income-tax Officer. In that view of the matter, both the questions referred to us are answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee, and the reference is answered accordingly. However, there will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order be transmitted to the Assistant Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna, in terms of section 260 of the Act.
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1989 (8) TMI 24 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Treating Person As Agent, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... re where the court has declined to interfere at that stage, holding that the more appropriate method of ventilating the grievance is by directing the aggrieved party to fight it out along the hierarchy of the statutory authorities. That approach is readily preferred when controversies on factual aspects predominate. In the present case, as noted earlier, a determination and assumption relating to the agency has been already come to. Even the counter-affidavit is indicative of a firm attitude of the respondents on that aspect. This is evident from the sentence reading From a reading of sub-section (1) along with sub-section (3) of section 22, it is clear that an opportunity of being heard has to be afforded to the agent before treating him as an assessee in respect of the tax. (emphasis supplied) For the reasons discussed above, I reject that interpretation of the section. Exhibit P-1 is, accordingly, quashed. The original petition is allowed but without any order as to costs.
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1989 (8) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Interpretation Of Statute - Applicability of Sec 44C - Head Office Expenditure - Non-resident - HELD THAT:- On a combined reading of the Explanatory Memorandum as well as the circular issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes for enactment of section 44C, it is clear that this section is intended to be made applicable only in the cases of those non-residents who carry on businesses in India through their branches. It has been made very clear that the said section was introduced with a view to getting over difficulties in scrutinising and verifying claims in respect of general administrative expenses incurred by the foreign head offices in so far as such expenses can be related to their business or profession in India having regard to the fact that foreign companies operating through branches in India sometimes try to reduce the incidence of tax in India by inflating their claims in respect of head office expenses. The objective behind the aforesaid legislation is also clear from a bare persual of the earlier portion of the said section which provides, inter alia, the manner in which the disallowable amount is to be computed. The expenditure to be disallowed is the difference between the expenditure in the nature of head office expenditure and the least of the following three computations :
(a) an amount equal to 5 per cent. of the adjusted total income;
(b) an amount equal to the average head office expenditure;
(c) the amount of so much of the expenditure in the nature of head office expenditure incurred by the assessee as is attributable to the business or profession of the assessee in India.
The language of clause (c) clearly postulates that the expenditure in question should be incurred not only in connection with the business in India, but also business outside India.
In view of the observations of the Supreme Court in CIT v. B. C. Srinivasa Setty [1981 (2) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT], we are inclined to hold that if any one or more of the base figures forming part of computations under clauses (a), (b) or (c) of section 44C are not conceivable in a particular case, it must be held that the non obstante provisions contemplating disallowance of "head office expenditure" u/s 44C would not apply.
On a fair reading of clause (c), it appears that the expression "so much of the expenditure as is attributable to business in India" contemplated that at least part of the expenditure is referable to a business outside India. In the case before us, it is an admitted position that the assessee-company did not have any business operations outside India and the entire expenditure incurred at its London head office was wholly attributable to its business activities in this country. If that be so, it is clear that clause (c) cannot have any application in this case and, therefore, no disallowance can be made u/s 44C in the facts and circumstances of this case.
That section 44C applies only when a foreign company operates through its branches in India is made clear even in the explanatory note appended to the Finance Bill, 1976. In this context, it may not be out of place to refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of K. P. Varghese v. ITO [1981 (9) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT].
The difficulties of the nature as stated in the said memorandum as well as in the said circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxes cannot exist in a case where the entire head office expenditure is for the purpose of business in India. It is, therefore, clear that the provisions of section 44C have been introduced to cover cases where a non-resident assessee was incurring expenditure abroad and the business activities of such non-resident assessee were not only confined to India but were also being carried on overseas.
Thus, we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee.
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1989 (8) TMI 22 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... and to decide independently whether or not they were prepared to execute the agreement with the Government of West Bengal in respect of rent and cess from the date of vesting and accept the new lease. In this particular case, the agreement between the assessee-company and the Government of West Bengal in respect of rent and cess from the date of vesting at the enhanced rate was executed on March 13, 1975, that is during the previous year under reference. It was under this agreement that the liability to pay rent and cess at the enhanced rate from the date of vesting was fastened on the assessee and made enforceable for the first time. Therefore, the liability accrued and arose and became real and enforceable in the previous year under reference when the Agreement was executed. For the foregoing reasons, the question raised in this reference is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1989 (8) TMI 21 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has been shown that the assessee invested the said amount in National Savings Certificates in various names and, therefore, the certificates as well as the accretions thereto were impressed with the character of ancestral property. The fact that the assessee treated the same as his individual property is immaterial and is not sufficient in the eye of law to change the nature and character of the property from ancestral to individual property. In this state of affairs, the question of applying the principle laid own in section 227(2) of Mulla s Hindu Law need not be considered. We, therefore, are of the view that so much of the investment made in the house property in question as is attributable to the said sum of Rs. 23,137 must be regarded as Hindu undivided family property and so much of the income from the said house as bears proportion to the above investment is liable to exemption from income-tax in the assessee s hands. The questions referred are answered accordingly.
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1989 (8) TMI 20 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e of the record in not following the decision of this court in CIT v. Deora Pu Canbeon Mfg. Co. P. Ltd. 1985 156 ITR 831. The Tribunal, however, rejected that application. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal, the assessee sought reference but as the application submitted by the assessee in that behalf was rejected, the assessee has filed this application. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we have come to the conclusion that the following question of law does arise out of the order passed by the Tribunal Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in refusing to rectify the order dated June 6, 1985, passed by the Tribunal dismissing the appeal preferred by the assessee ? The application is, therefore, allowed. The Tribunal is directed to state the case and to refer the aforesaid question of law to this court for its opinion. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this application.
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1989 (8) TMI 19 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... ee would be entitled to accumulate 25 of the total income of the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1978-79 inclusive of the deemed income under section 11 (3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Mr. Moitra, appearing on behalf of the Revenue, has failed to show any infirmity in the order of the Tribunal. In fact, he has prayed merely for remand of the case as was done by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CIT v. Hyderabad Secunderabad Foodgrains Association Ltd. 1989 175 ITR 574. The facts in that case were quite different and it was felt by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that it was necessary to remand the case. But, in the instant case, no argument at all has been advanced to show any infirmity in the order of the Tribunal. Since Mr. Moitra has failed to show us any infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1989 (8) TMI 18 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Central Excise, Exemptions, Manufacture ... ... ... ... ..... evasion. The stipulation of audit by chartered accountants has a legitimate affinity to the object sought to be achieved. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that by diverting their clientele to the corridors of chartered accountants for the purpose of audit, the petitioners lose their grip over them and there is a remote possibility of such assessees unfolding themselves from the nest of chartered accountants. This contention is far-fetched and not founded upon proximity to a realistic approach. It may be noticed that the two decisions to which we have made reference had been cited with approval. Therefore, with respect, adopting the reasoning in these decisions, we find absolutely no difficulty in upholding the validity of section 44AB. All these writ petitions will, accordingly, stand dismissed with costs, counsel s fee Rs. 500 in each petition. Soon after we delivered judgment, an oral application was made for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Leave granted.
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1989 (8) TMI 17 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Income Received By Receiver ... ... ... ... ..... and a disputed question which could not be decided without oral evidence arose as to valuation. There is some misconception as to the controversy before me. The controversy is not in regard to what the valuation should be. It is in regard to whether the threshold requirements stipulated by section 269C were met when the Competent Authority issued the said notice on November 14, 1977. Mr. Dwarkadas, learned counsel for the petitioners, referred to the delays that had occurred in the acquisition proceedings. In his submission, such delays which remained unexplained had to be taken into account in considering whether or not acquisition proceedings under Chapter XXA should be struck down. I find it unnecessary, having regard to what I have already held, to go into this aspect. In the result, the notice dated November 14, 1977, exhibit F to the petition, and the letter dated February 15, 1983, exhibit H, issued consequent thereupon are quashed and set aside. No order as to costs.
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1989 (8) TMI 16 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Bonus, Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ntroversy involved, here. We may add that by section 11 of the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, two provisos to section 36(1)(ii) laying down ceilings on the bonus to be allowed as deduction have been deleted with effect from April 1, 1989. Simultaneously, bonus payments have been covered by the provisions of section 43B, so that these are allowed on actual payment basis. This amendment only indicates that the Legislature did never intend that the payment of bonus in whatever name it is called in excess of the amount of bonus prescribed under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, would not be allowable even if such payment is reasonable and has been made having regard to the commercial and business expediency and to maintain the target of production through sustained industrial peace. For the foregoing reasons, the question in this reference is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1989 (8) TMI 15 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hearing, learned counsel for the parties conceded that the answer to the question referred to this court under the Wealth-tax Act should be the same as given in judgments disposing of references under the Income-tax Act. Under the circumstances, our answer to the question referred to this court by the Tribunal is that though the Tribunal was right in holding that the amount alleged to have been given to Smt. Badamibai continued to belong to the assessee-Hindu undivided family and was liable to be assessed under the Act in the hands of the assessee-Hindu undivided family the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the gifts made to the grandchildren of Smt. Badamibai and the income accrued thereon continued to belong to the assessee-Hindu undivided family and was liable to be assessed under the Act in the hands of the assessee-Hindu undivided family. Reference answered accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1989 (8) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assets, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... the transferor had no right to eject the transferee by virtue of the protection given by the aforesaid provisions. In this particular case, after taking possession pursuant to the agreement in question, the assessee had sublet the property and was deriving income from the lease property. This aspect of the matter as to whether, in the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the assessee had a right to the property in view of section 53A and whether the property in the hands of the assessee could be regarded as an asset within the meaning and in the light of the provisions of section 53A or not, has not been considered by the Tribunal. In our view, the Tribunal has failed to consider this aspect of the matter. The matter is thus remanded to the Tribunal for fresh consideration of the case on the basis of the facts read with the provisions of section 53A. The reference is thus disposed of finally as above. There will be no order as to costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J. -I agree.
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1989 (8) TMI 13 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Wealth Tax, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... s to the refund and will manage its distribution amongst themselves. In regard to the deduction of wealth-tax in the estate duty assessment, it will be open to the Revenue to take such proceedings as are, in law, available to it. That other assessees similarly placed, if there be any, may not secure refunds is no reason to deny it in this petition. I do not think that Rs. 53,000 is so trifling an amount that I should not order its refund. Lastly, whether or not the law has been laid down in the petitioner s case, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of it. In the result, the assessment order dated November 6, 1965 (exhibit-A to the petition) is quashed and set aside. The Union of India shall repay to the petitioner the amount of Rs. 53,322 (subject to verification) collected pursuant to the said assessment order, with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per annum from April 24, 1983 (when this writ petition was admitted) until payment or realisation. No order as to costs.
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1989 (8) TMI 12 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Search And Seizure, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... not be said to be right. The Department had not replied to the petitioner at the earliest point of time so that she could have taken any other steps for getting the jewels for the marriage of her daughter. I think that it is high time that the officials of the respondent-Department understood that they are also bound by the rule of law. They are also expected to reply to any representation at the earliest point of time. Here is a hard case where a lady who wants her jewels which are of course under litigation and a prohibitory order under section 132(3) is not able to get back her jewels even after 71/2 years have passed. The Department should take expeditious action to finalise the matter or to pass an order at least on the representation made by the petitioner immediately. It is unfortunate that it has not been done in this case. I do hope that the Department will not repeat the same in future in such cases. With these observations, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
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1989 (8) TMI 11 - KERALA HIGH COURT
"Purchase Price" In Ss. 44AC And 206C, 7th Schedule Of The Constitution Of India ... ... ... ... ..... e the Income-tax Officer, Commissioner of Incometax (Appeals) or even before the Tribunal. Relevant partnership deed also has not been made part of the records. Therefore, we are not in a position to appreciate this argument. The assessee s case always had been that it continued to carry on abkari business. In the circumstances, we answer question No. 1 raised in the reference at the instance of the assessee in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Question No. 1 raised in the reference at the instance of the Revenue is answered in the negative against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. In view of our answer to question No. 1, we feel that our answer to question No. 2 raised at the instance of Revenue can have only academic interest. Therefore, we refuse to answer the question. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1989 (8) TMI 10 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is cumbersome, instructions are being issued to simplify the calculation of extra shift allowance. It is for the tax authorities to follow this instruction as the intention is to simplify the calculation of the extra shift allowance. This instruction was issued only on February 26, 1985, long after the decision of the Tribunal in the instant case. It also appears that this instruction will be effective prospectively. For the reason aforesaid, we answer the second question in the reference made under section 256(1) of the Act by saying that the assessee Was not entitled to the extra shift allowance as claimed, in view of the provisions of the rule and, accordingly, the disallowance of the said claim was justified in law. This will not, however, prevent the assessee from making a representation before the Board for such relief in the light of the said instruction dated February 26, 1985, as the assessee may be advised. There will be no order as to costs. J. N. HORE J. -I agree.
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1989 (8) TMI 9 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Tea Estate, Year In Which Expenditure Allowable ... ... ... ... ..... ned and quantified and the assessee-company was asked to execute the agreement. The assessee-company accepted such liability, executed the agreement with the Government of West Bengal and made provision in its books of account in respect of this additional liability in the year under reference. It was on this basis that the liability to pay rent and cess at the enhanced rate from the date of vesting was fastened on the assessee-company during the relevant previous year and the assessee-company made provision for such liability in its books and claimed the deduction. Therefore, the liability accrued and arose in the real sense in the previous year under reference. For the reasons aforesaid and in view of the decision in Teesta Valley Co. Ltd. 1991 187 ITR 657 (Cal), where judgment has been delivered today, the question raised in this reference is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J.-I agree.
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