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Case Laws
Showing 261 to 280 of 355 Records
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1995 (11) TMI 96 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Writ Jurisdiction - Existence of alternative remedy ... ... ... ... ..... period of thirty (30) days from today, in accordance with the provisions contained in the Central Excises and Salt Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall decide the appeal on merits and in accordance with law, without going into the question of limitation. We also further direct the Collector (Appeals) in the event the appellant files an appeal against the order passed by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Madurai, dated 26-6-1992 in C. No. V/59/30/14/91 within a period of thirty (30) days from today, in accordance with the provisions contained in the Central Excises and Salt Act, to decide the appeal on merits and in accordance with law, without going into the question of limitation. We also further make it clear that our direction to consider the appeals on merits and in accordance with law shall not be construed as exempting the appellant from complying with the provisions contained in Section 35-F of the Central Excises and Salt Act. There will be no order as to costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
Demand - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... is question. 2.The further contention of the learned counsel for the assessee was that when the tribunal was remitting the entire matter, it ought not to have foreclosed its contention based on the proviso to Section 11A of the Act. We do not propose to go into this contention. Since we are remitting the matter to the tribunal on the question whether the Collector was right in concluding that the assessee was guilty of suppression and wilful mis-statement, the further order that the Tribunal may have to pass would be dependent upon the conclusion that it may reach on this issue. 3.We allow this appeal and remit the matter to the tribunal on the aforementioned short question. Since the issue is short, we hope the tribunal will be able to give priority to the matter and dispose it of at an early date so that the matter which is remitted to the Collector may not get delayed. 4.We were not called upon and do not interfere with any other part of the order. 5.No order as to costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 93 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit - Speaking order ... ... ... ... ..... aid to have adverted to such aspects. As noticed earlier, consideration at this stage cannot be expected to be of a more detailed nature than the one that has been undertaken by the Tribunal. In my view, the consideration by the Tribunal cannot be said to be vitiated for any of the grounds urged by the learned counsel before me. 9.At the same time, keeping in view the difficulties expressed and the over all aspects of the matter, I am of the view that interest of justice will be better served if instead of the deposit of Rs. 1,75,00,000/- the quantum is reduced to Rs. 1,00,00,000/- (Rs. One Crore) and the petitioner is directed to furnish a Bank Guarantee for the balance of the duty within four weeks from this date and the Tribunal shall, on complying with the conditions as above, proceed to consider and dispose of the appeal. To the extent indicated above, the order of the Tribunal shall stand modified and in other respects, the writ petition shall stand dismissed. No costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 92 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Addition To Income, High Denomination Notes, Income From Undisclosed Sources, Legal Representative, Question Of Law, Reference Application
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1995 (11) TMI 91 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Finding Of Fact, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... orily or not is essentially a question of fact. The Wealth-tax Commissioner was satisfied on the facts explained by the assessee and there was no question of concealment and the same was confirmed by the Tribunal. This court has held in order in M. C. C. No. 205 of 1985 that no question of law arises and adopting the same reasoning, we hold that no question of law arises in the present cases. The Division Bench of this court in M. C. C. No. 205 of 1985 observed as under We think the Tribunal has rightly held that it had essentially recorded a finding of fact on the basis of which the provisions of section 18(1)(c) of the Act could not be said to have been attracted. No question of law, therefore, can be said to arise out of the appellate order of the Tribunal. We are, therefore, constrained to reject this application. Hence, all these reference applications for calling reference from the Revenue are rejected in terms of the aforesaid order passed in M. C. C. No. 205 of 1985.
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1995 (11) TMI 90 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction Of High Court, Tribunal's Order, Writ Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... fair play, the supervisory and superintending jurisdiction conferred on courts by the said article remains always available. (Vide Trimbak Gangadhar Telang v. Ramchandra Ganesh Bhide, AIR 1977 SC 1222 also followed in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, AIR 1987 SC 117). There cannot possibly be an instance of more glaring injustice or flagrant violation of procedure as in the present case where the existence of the admission may expose the assessee to large amount by way of taxation. For the reasons aforesaid, we allow the revisional application, set aside the impugned order, remand the miscellaneous applications to the Tribunal for reconsideration in the light of the observations made by us hereinabove. We keep it on record that the Tribunal would record its findings with regard to the alleged admission keeping all other points open according to law for being agitated before the appropriate forum. There will be no order as to costs. B. M. MITRA J.-- I agree.
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1995 (11) TMI 89 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Income, Question Of Law, Sales Tax Refund ... ... ... ... ..... in the income for the assessment year 1983-84. Even this attempt failed. The Tribunal was, therefore, requested to refer the questions. The questions are as to the attractability of section 41(1) of the Act and as to the question of limitation during which the MPEB was required to receive the amount from the assessee. We are of the opinion that the questions as proposed are questions of law which are required to be referred. We are thus not satisfied that the refusal was justified. We, therefore, require the Tribunal to state the case and refer the questions as noted above for the opinion of this court in terms of section 256(2) of the Act. A copy of this order shall be transmitted to the Tribunal under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar for compliance within six months from the receipt of the copy of the order. This reference application is accordingly allowed, but without any orders as to costs. Counsel fee on each side shall be Rs. 700, if certified.
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1995 (11) TMI 88 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Firm Registration ... ... ... ... ..... t none the less he cannot decide the matter without affording proper opportunity to the affected parties. It may be possible that the Commissioner might have been impressed by the order of the Income-tax Officer but when it is suspected that the signatures are forged and the report of the expert was sought, then at least a copy of the report should have been given to the assessee. Although the expert s report is not conclusive evidence of the forgery but it is a rebuttable assumption and the assessee has a right to justify that the report is not correct and still it can lead evidence to prove to the contrary. The way the Commissioner has proceeded in revising the order shows that the act of the Commissioner was in total derogation of the principles of natural justice and such an act cannot be countenanced. We, therefore, answer the reference against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee and hold that the order passed by the Tribunal in the present case is fully justified.
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1995 (11) TMI 87 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... essee was required to be given the benefit of such payments made in exceptional circumstances. Law lives on logic and as such illogicality, resting on technical view, is to be spurned. This finding of fact, not shown to be perverse or perishable, reached by the Tribunal did not, as held in CIT v. Ashoka Marketing Ltd. 1976 103 ITR 543 (SC) and in CIT v. Kotrika Venkataswamy and Sons 1971 79 ITR 499 (SC), give any rise to the question of law and as such the Tribunal rightly rejected the reference application. Recourse to section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act is thus not justified and is acarpous. In the circumstances, we find that the finding of the Tribunal is based on an appreciation of facts and does not give any rise to the question of law. We are, thus, satisfied with the correctness of the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal. We thus find that this application deserves to be rejected summarily. Accordingly, we reject this application, but without any orders as to costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 86 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Interest On Refund ... ... ... ... ..... ion is not now open on the principle of finality to a given situation. Looking to the nature of payment as discussed above, it is seen that the amount was kept in deposit for appropriation and in that sense could not be said to have been the amount liable to be considered for interest, because the amount continued to be in deposit till February 17, 1989, as seen above. The reasoning that till February 17, 1989, although the amount was deposited earlier, the Revenue had no control and as such the amount could not be said to be the amount of the Revenue earlier. It was an amount deposited by the petitioner lying in his personal account. Taking into consideration, the above facts, in my judgment there is no error in the matter of award of interest from February 17, 1989, and not from July 6, 1987. On facts therefore, it is not possible to exercise jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petition stands dismissed leaving the parties to suffer their costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 85 - KERALA HIGH COURT
House Property ... ... ... ... ..... erwise of the criminal proceedings pending against them. Liberty is granted to them to raise all their contentions before the trial court. They may even file an application before the trial court inviting a decision on the points raised by them. The decision in K. M. Mathew v. State of Kerala 1992 1 KLT 1 (SC) can also be pressed into service by the petitioners if they want a consideration of the points raised by them for dropping the criminal proceedings. If the petitioners file application with a prayer for their discharge on the various grounds mentioned by them in the criminal miscellaneous cases, the trial court will consider the same and pass orders thereon as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within two months from the date of filing such application. The trial court may not proceed further in the complaints without taking a decision on the application to be filed by the petitioners for the above purpose. The criminal miscellaneous cases are disposed of as above.
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1995 (11) TMI 84 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Change In Constitution Of Firm ... ... ... ... ..... tion raised by the Revenue on the basis of sub-section (3A) of section 176 of the Income-tax Act. Sub-section (3A) provides that Where any business is discontinued in any year, any sum received after the discontinuance shall be deemed to be the income of the recipient and charged to tax accordingly in the year of receipt, if such sum would have been included in the total income of the person who carried on the business had such sum been received before such discontinuance . Since we are not concerned with the assessment of the former firm in this case, sub-section (3A) of section 176 has no application here. In view of the above, we answer questions Nos. 1, 3 and 4 in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, question No. 2 is answered in the negative in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this judgment under seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar to be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1995 (11) TMI 83 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Alternate Remedy, Depreciation At Higher Rate, Grant Of Depreciation, Income Tax Authorities, Motor Vehicles, Question Of Fact, Rate Of Depreciation, Transport Business
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1995 (11) TMI 82 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Assessed Income ... ... ... ... ..... o have not filed the return within the time allowed under section 139(1) to furnish the return of income. It is thus obvious that section 142(1) envisages two types of notices. When section 234A refers to the notice under section 142(1) it obviously means notice to file the return of income in cases of non-filing. The object underlying section 234A is to create additional liability to pay interest for the default in furnishing the return of income, the object is not to penalise an assessee, who has already filed the return under section 139 for not producing accounts or documents and so on under clause (ii) or (iii) of section 142(1). In my considered opinion, therefore, the necessary conditions as required under section 234A are not made out in the instant case and, therefore, the levy of interest is not justified. In the result, this application is allowed. The notice of demand of interest of Rs. 78,322 as mentioned in annexure-3 is quashed. PRAMOD KUMAR SARIN J. --I agree.
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1995 (11) TMI 81 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Debt Owed, Net Wealth, Tax Liability, Voluntary Disclosure ... ... ... ... ..... ses of this sub-section, record (shall include and shall be deemed always to have included) all records relating to any proceeding under this Act available at the time of examination by the Commissioner. As we have come to the conclusion that the revised return for 1975-76 filed on July 12, 1979, and the valuation report for the property in question estimating its value as on December 31, 1974, were not at all part of the record of proceedings for the assessment year 1974-75, wherein the assessment order sought to be revised had been passed by the Wealth-tax Officer. Further, the question of applicability of the Explanation giving an extended meaning to the word record to include the record existing on the date of passing of the order by the Commissioner, does not remain relevant. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the question referred to us in affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 80 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... in respect of insurance amount paid to the Export Credit Guarantee Corporation is not correct. In fact, on this issue, a special leave petition had been filed in the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Orient Co. (P.) Ltd. (F. No. 270/155/80-ITJ). The case of the assessee was decided by the Tribunal on the basis of the judgment of the Special Bench of the Tribunal, Bombay, in the case of J. Ramchandra and Co. (J. Hemchand and Co. (?)). The Central Board of Direct Taxes, looking to the conflicting views taken by the various High Courts, issued the abovenoted instructions clarifying the earlier circulars. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the case of the assessee requires reconsideration by the Tribunal in the light of Instruction No. 1441 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes. The reference is, therefore, returned unanswered to the Tribunal with the direction that the Tribunal should decide the matter afresh as per the aforesaid Instruction No. 1441.
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1995 (11) TMI 79 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
House Property ... ... ... ... ..... it cannot be said that the compounding fee was paid to cover the risk of damage or destruction. A statutory provision, particularly, a provision of the Income-tax Act should be read as far as possible confining to the plain language without importing any foreign words and subtracting any word therefrom. On a strict interpretation as it should be section 24(1)(ii) simply allows deduction of an amount of any premium paid to insure property against risk of damage or destruction. Payment of compounding fee is surely not in the nature of the deductions permissible by section 24(1)(ii) of the Act. For the reasons, we do not agree with the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal that the amount is deductible under section 24(1)(ii). The above question is, therefore, answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The records of this case be sent to the Appellate Tribunal within fifteen days to enable it to pass an order conformably to our decision.
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1995 (11) TMI 78 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Banking Company, Fluctuation In Rate, Foreign Exchange, Revenue Loss, Trade Loss ... ... ... ... ..... account of devaluation shall be a revenue loss and not a capital loss. (vii) The way in which the entries are made by an assessee in the books of account is not determinative of the question whether the assessee has earned any profit or suffered any loss. What is necessary to be considered is the true nature of the transaction and whether in fact it has resulted in profit or loss to the assessee. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, we are of the clear opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that the exchange loss claimed by the assessee as a result of fluctuations in the rates of exchange of foreign currencies held by it as balance in its foreign branches was an allowable deduction because the foreign currencies were its stock-in-trade. Accordingly, both the questions referred to us are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 77 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
In Part, Partnership Deed ... ... ... ... ..... stipulation that the firm will continue, notwithstanding the death of one of its partners. This being so, the Revenue failed to establish, either in fact or in law, that the old firm continued to exist notwithstanding the death of one of its partners. A clear finding being recorded by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that no business was continued by the firm which existed up to August 14, 1975, on three days, the Appellate Tribunal was right in drawing the inference that the old firm came to an end upon the death of one of its partners on August 14, 1975, continued the business for the subsequent period (sic) and the contention of the Revenue that it is a case of change in the constitution of the firm within the meaning of section 187 of the Act cannot be accepted. For the reasons, we answer the above question in the affirmative. The records of this case be sent down to the Appellate Tribunal within fifteen days to enable it to pass an order conformably to our decision.
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1995 (11) TMI 76 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Cash System, Deduction Of Interest, Mercantile System, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... of the Tribunal is based on appreciation of facts and does not give rise to any question of law. He placed reliance on CIT v. Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. 1993 204 ITR 154 (Cal). In our view, it is a pure question of finding of fact. This finding of fact, not shown to be perverse or perishable, reached by the Tribunal did not give, as held in CIT v. Ashoka Marketing Ltd. 1976 103 ITR 543 (SC) and in CIT v. Kotrika Venkataswamy and Sons 1971 79 ITR 499 (SC), rise to any question of law and as such the Tribunal rightly rejected the reference application. Recourse to section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act is thus, not justified and is acarpous. We, therefore, hold that the order of the Tribunal is based on proper application of facts and it does not give rise to any question of law as proposed. Accordingly, we find that this reference is without merit and deserves fate of dismissal. Accordingly, we dismiss this reference application but without any orders as to costs.
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