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Case Laws
Showing 261 to 280 of 284 Records
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1991 (8) TMI 24 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... on cannot be restricted by the application of section 2 of the earlier Amendment Act 14 of 1983. Full effect will have to be given to the words used in the Explanation. Sri Ramabhadran further contended that, in all these cases, the notices issued by the joint Commissioner were beyond the period of four years and, therefore, the bar provided under section ( operates. The petitioners have approached this court against the notices. The plea of limitation can be raised before the authority concerned. Basically, the question involves investigation of facts. It is open to the petitioners to show cause to the notices received by them within six weeks from today and the question of limitation also may be raised before the joint Commissioner. The respondent shall consider all such questions as may be raised by the petitioners and decide the same in accordance with law subject to the observations made in these writ petitions. Consequently, these writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.
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1991 (8) TMI 23 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Deduction, Income From House Property, Levy ... ... ... ... ..... ed out that the property tax is not an automatic levy so as to require the property owner to go and pay tax voluntarily therefore, having regard to the language of the proviso to section 23(1) of the Act, it was held therein that the assessee would be eligible for the allowance during the year when there was levy and the tax was paid by the owner of the property. A demand for the tax has to be equated to its levy. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Madras High Court. The said decision was followed by the same High Court in CIT v. East India Industries (M.) Pvt. Ltd. 1983 139 ITR 1059. Learned counsel also brought to our notice that the Calcutta High Court has also expressed the same view in the decision in CIT v. Parekh Kothi Ltd. 1986 160 ITR 864. There seems to be no contrary decision so far on this question. In the view we have taken as above, the question is answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. Reference is answered accordingly.
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1991 (8) TMI 22 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Revision ... ... ... ... ..... tion is in the affirmative then, whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was legally justified in not taking into consideration the subsequent facts ascertained on the basis of enquiries made subsequent to the date of the order under section 263 which establish that the ladies had not earned any income at all and that the income belonged only to the assessee ? (3) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in not upholding the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? Having heard learned counsel for the applicant and after going through the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, we find merit in the present applications. The present applications are, accordingly, allowed and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is directed to draw tip a statement of the case with regard to the aforesaid questions of law and submit the same to this court for its decision.
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1991 (8) TMI 21 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... essment year for the co-sharer, i.e., the present assessee, at a higher value. Mr. Saraf has drawn our attention to the decision of this court in Gulabrai Hanumanbux v. WTO 1989 2 GLR 418 1989 178 ITR 519 to show that the valuation of the property in respect of the co-sharer, Keshoram Radheshyam, as stated above was also upheld by this court in the above decision. We have perused the decision and accept the contention of learned counsel for the assessee. Our attention has been drawn to the decision of the apex court in Juggilal Kamlapat Bankers v. WTO 1984 145 ITR 485 AIR 1984 SC 564 1984 Tax L. R. 164. We have perused the judgment and we find that the apex court dealt with sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 7 of the Act and rules 2, 2A and 2B of the relevant Rules and we are of the opinion that this ratio is not relevant for our present purpose. For what has been stated above, we answer all the four questions referred to us in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1991 (8) TMI 20 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Interest On Refund, Law Applicable To Assessment, Refund ... ... ... ... ..... t of 1961. Several cases have been referred to by both sides. From the ratio of the decision cited from the Bar, it is clear that the claim of refund of the petitioner cannot be defeated after promulgation of the Act of 1961. Procedural matters are nothing but handmaids of justice. The substantive claim cannot be defeated by reason of technical defects and/or procedural irregularities. Such an argument for the Revenue authorities is not appreciated by this court. Since the refund has to be made by the Revenue authorities, the same has got to be issued in accordance with law and they will have to pay 12 per cent. interest in the manner as observed by the subsequent Act. For the foregoing reasons, this court does not find any bar and/or impediment to allowing the writ petition and to issue a writ commanding the respondents to take effective steps to refund the dues with interest at 12 per cent. within six months from the date of communication of the order. No order as to costs.
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1991 (8) TMI 19 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Interest Payable By Assessee ... ... ... ... ..... stimates of advance tax can be furnished on or before the date on which the last instalment of advance tax is payable by the taxpayer. Thus, sub-section (4) will only be attracted if an assessee is liable to pay advance tax under section (1), but as we have already indicated in the instant case, on the basis of the facts prevailing in the financial year relevant to the assessment year of the assessee, the assessee had no obligation to furnish a statement of advance tax under section 209A(1)(a) and as such sub-section (4) of section 209A cannot be pressed into service. That apart, the question referred to us does not cover the point raised by Mr. Bagchi. We have already set out the question which only deals with the obligation of the assessee to furnish a statement in terms of section 209A(1)(a). For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question, in this reference, in the negative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J. -I agree.
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1991 (8) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business, Electricity Charges, Lease, Other Sources, Property ... ... ... ... ..... fore the lower appellate authority. We do not find any substance in the ground raised on behalf of the Department. Ground No. 5 is, accordingly, rejected. It appears that the Tribunal has not given any reason whatsoever for holding that electricity charges should be assessed under the head Business and not under the head Other sources . No materials have been brought on record which could justify the conclusion of the Tribunal. For the reasons aforesaid, it is difficult for us to answer the second question in this reference. We, therefore, decline to answer this question and remand the matter to the Tribunal. The Tribunal shall decide the question afresh as to whether the electricity charges are assessable as business income or not. The Tribunal shall determine the nature and content of the receipt and, after giving the parties opportunity to adduce evidence, if any, shall dispose of the appeal on this issue. There will be no order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J. - I agree.
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1991 (8) TMI 17 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... f the Supreme Court in CIT v. Dalmia Investment Co. Ltd. 1964 52 ITR 567 and CIT v. Gold Co. Ltd. 1970 78 ITR 16. We, therefore, do not consider it necessary to set out the facts involved in this reference. Respectfully following the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court and for the reasons recorded in our judgment in Income-tax Reference No. 35 of 1980, we answer the question which has been referred to us for our opinion, in the affirmative and against the assessee. Reference answered, accordingly, with no order as to costs. At this stage, Mr. K. H. Kaji, learned counsel for the assessee, prays that this may be certified to be a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court under section 261 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Since, in our opinion, the question which has been referred to us is directly covered by a decision of the Supreme Court, as referred to above, we do not consider this case to be fit for appeal to the Supreme Court. We, therefore, reject the prayer of Mr. Kaji.
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1991 (8) TMI 16 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... nge in the constitution of the firm or the shares of the partners, and if there is a change in the constitution of the firm, then in such a case, the registration will not be continued for subsequent years but will have to be applied for afresh. It was also held that it is settled law that dissolution does not take place by death if there is a contract to the contrary. In that case, the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of registration up to June 4, 1964, i.e., the date on which one of the partners died. This view was accepted by the apex court. Situated thus, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was justified in holding that registration could be granted for a part of the accounting year and on the death of one of the partners, the firm is entitled to get the benefit of registration up to the date of death of the said partner. In the result, the reference is answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1991 (8) TMI 15 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Loss, Return ... ... ... ... ..... ficient reasons, it might be deemed that the petitioner was granted time by the Income-tax Officer till September 30, 1986, and thus its case comes within the ambit of subsection (3) of section 139 and, for that reason, sub-section (10) of section 139 in so far as it gives effect to the said, provision retrospectively with effect from April 1, 1986, may be held illegal and arbitrary. Inasmuch as the correctness of the order passed by the Income-tax Officer rejecting the application of the petitioner for granting extension of time till September 30, 1986, is not questioned in this writ petition, we decline to consider the validity of the said order. Even if the order is said to be bad, the petitioner does not get automatic extension till September 30, 1986, as prayed for by him. This contention is, therefore, rejected. For the above reasons, the writ petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed but having regard to the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1991 (8) TMI 14 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
Notice, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ithout the storage of chemical fertilizers in the godowns of the assessee. In view of the interpretation that we have placed on section 80P (or section 81) of the Income-tax Act, it is clear that the assessee was entitled to the exemption from payment of income-tax on the income derived by it from storage of the fertilizers in its godowns. It is up to the assessee, however, to indicate before the concerned income-tax authorities the manner in which this exemption is to be claimed by it and the extent of the exemption, in the light of the break-up of the figures for the relevant assessment years. The references are accordingly answered, but without any order as to costs to either party. After this judgment was pronounced, Mr, H. L. Bhagotra made art oral prayer for grant of a certificate in terms of section 261 of the Incometax Act for filing an appeal against this judgment before the Supreme Court. He may file an application in this regard which will be considered on merits.
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1991 (8) TMI 13 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y penalty. Instead, we find that the reasons assigned by the Tribunal have no basis under the law. We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the Appellate Tribunal took an absolutely incorrect view of law by exonerating the assessee from penalty. As we have stated earlier, the assessee did conceal his income and furnished inaccurate particulars and, therefore, was rightly subjected to penalty. In these circumstances, we hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not at all justified in cancelling the penalty levied under the Explanation to section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act. In view of the above finding, question No. 2 need not be answered. In the result, we answer the first question in favour of the Department and against the assessee that the Tribunal was not justified in cancelling the penalty levied under the Explanation to section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act. The reference is answered accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1991 (8) TMI 12 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
"Remuneration" In S. 40(c), Business Expenditure, Ceiling Fixed In S. 40(c)(i)(a), Company ... ... ... ... ..... r of the director, it was held that the remuneration was paid in respect of the liability which was undertaken as a guarantor and could not be described as a benefit within the meaning of section 40(c) of the said Act, The Said decision also, therefore, stands on a different footing and cannot help the assessee. Since there were two reference applications mentioned above in which a common question has been referred to this court, we direct that the reference be split into two and Income-tax Reference No. 162 of 1979 be treated as a reference in respect of the matter arising from Reference Application No. 70 of 1979 for the assessment year 1972-73 and the reference in respect of assessment year 1973-74 which arises from Reference Application No. 72 of 1979 be numbered as Income-Tax Reference No. 162A of For the reasons indicated herein before, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee, Both these references stand disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (8) TMI 11 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Offences And Prosecution, Wealth Tax, Wilful Failure To File Returns ... ... ... ... ..... less than Rs. 10,000, prosecution should not be launched. The submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner does not find support from the language of the instructions. In all the six cases the amount involved exceeded Rs. 10,000. Hence, the petitioner cannot at all take advantage of these instructions. Regarding the last contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the assessment was reopened and returns were filed, it is clear that on the due dates there turns of wealth were riot filed. The allegations to that effect are clearly made in the last two cases also. While so, whether it was wilful or not is a question which can be considered only during trial. I make it clear that EO. C. C. Nos. 75 and 76 of 1989 cannot be quashed at the threshold.The grounds urged by learned counsel for the petitioner do not find acceptance with me. There is no legal infirmity in the maintainability of the complaints. In view of the above, all the above petitions are dismissed.
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1991 (8) TMI 10 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment, Sanction U/S 151 For Issuing Notice, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... w, the reasons recorded in the present case are good reasons and are relevant and germane to the exercise of the powers. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Narayanappa 1967 63 ITR 219, we are not concerned with the sufficiency of the said reasons. We are satisfied that good and valid reasons exist for the exercise of the power. As far as the petitioner s challenge to the circular at exhibit A , dated March 24, 1981, issued by the Under Secretary, Central Board of Direct Taxes, is concerned, suffice it to say that, the impugned notices are not based on the said circular, but have been issued in exercise of the powers under section 148 read with section 147(a) of the 1961 Act. Hence, it is not necessary for us to consider the validity of the said circular, exhibit A , dated March 24, 1981. In our opinion, therefore, there is no merit in any of the contentions raised by Shri Dastur. The writ petition, thus, fails and the rule is discharged with costs.
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1991 (8) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT
Land requisitioned by the Central Government - Whether the interpretation given by the Tribunal based upon the definition of 'capital asset' in section 2 (14)(iii)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is correct - Whether the profits or gains arising from the transfer of 'capital asset' can be chargeable to income-tax if the transfer is effected in the previous year and if no amount is received
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1991 (8) TMI 8 - SUPREME COURT
Section 40(a)(v) - respondent assessee-company paid seven of its employees, in addition to what was described as their salary, certain amounts of bonus, commission and house rent allowance - whether such amount could be treated as perquisites - Section 40(a)(v) has since been replaced by another section 40A(5) which has also been substituted in 1989 - matter is covered by a circular of the Board dated March 4, 1972 - reference rejected
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1991 (8) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT
It is now well-settled law that the jurisdiction of the High Court in a reference under the Income-tax Act is in the nature of advisory jurisdiction and only such issues can be and are answered as arise properly on the facts and the questions referred to the High Court. In the circumstances, we are unable to permit the assessee to raise the question before us.
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1991 (8) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Date of commencement of business - immovable properties let out on lease - Tribunal was of the opinion that the business of the assessee could not be said to have commenced during the year which ended on March 31, 1965. The High Court has, however, taken a contrary view - business can be said to have commenced when assessee puts the property into proper shape and ready to be let out
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1991 (8) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Payments in cash exceeding a sum of ₹ 2,500 for some of the purchases of stock-in-trade. - the payments are not allowed as deductions in the computation of income under the head "Profits and gains of business". The payments are held to be in contravention of the terms of section 40A (3) - validity of section 40A(3) - applicability of Section 40A(3) to payments made for acquiring stock-in-trade
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