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Case Laws
Showing 281 to 300 of 408 Records
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1996 (8) TMI 128 - SUPREME COURT
Levy of demurrage by the International Airport Authority of India on unaccompanied baggage and baggage under transhipment
Held that:- The words of the 1980 Regulations are crystal clear. "Cargo" is expressly defined therein to mean property other than baggage. There is, therefore, no way by which "cargo" can be read to include baggage. The definition of "demurrage" in the 1980 Regulations restricts it to what is chargeable for non-removal of cargo within the time allowed. For the reason that baggage is not cargo, demurrage cannot be levied upon baggage. The High Court was, therefore, right in the view that it took in this behalf.
In so far as baggage in transhipment is concerned, the same principle applies and no demurrage is chargeable by the Authority thereon. Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (8) TMI 127 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD
Recovery of Government dues - Attachment of goods ... ... ... ... ..... dated 10-7-1992 passed by Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi. Sd./- N.K. Prasada Assistant Commissioner . 9. From a perusal of the order extracted above, it is manifest that none of the requirements of rule, has been satisfied. Indeed, there is not even a reference to transfer of business by M/s. G.T.C. Industries Limited to the petitioner. It is not even alleged that the petitioner is the successor of M/s. G.T.C. Industries Limited. There is no mention that the goods have been assessed to duty and the duty has not been paid. For want of fulfilment of requirements of Rule 230(2) of the Rules, the impugned order cannot be sustained. Indeed, the order is ex facie without jurisdiction and devoid of authority of law. 10. For the above reasons we declare the impugned order as without jurisdiction arbitrary and illegal direct the respondents to release the goods from the attachment. 11. The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed with costs. Advocate s fee is fixed at Rs. 1,000/-.
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1996 (8) TMI 126 - SUPREME COURT
`Ocean going vessel' - Meaning - Reconsideration of ... ... ... ... ..... applied to vessels which actually went out into the ocean. He submitted that, therefore, the test laid down in the two judgments cited above was met. 5. In our view, there is, prima facie, merit in the submissions on behalf of the owners that an ocean going vessel is a vessel equipped, crewed and licensed to go out into the ocean, regardless of whether or not it actually does, and that the transhippers, as shown by the record, are such vessels also, they do, in fact go out into the ocean on their day-to-day business to load ore and, in the monsoon, to carry cargo to or seek refuge in other Indian or foreign ports. The judgment in Chowgule and Co. Private Limited v. Union of India and Ors. (ibid) requires the consideration of a bench of three learned Judges both on the question of the relevance of end-use and on the question whether, in any event, the end-use requirement is satisfied. 6. The appeals shall be placed before the Hon ble Chief Justice for appropriate directions.
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1996 (8) TMI 125 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT CALCUTTA
Writ jurisdiction - Question of fact ... ... ... ... ..... f her claim for release of the confiscated goods and after the hearing it will be open to the adjudicating authorities to come to the conclusion in respect of the disputes as raised. (e) The final order in the Adjudicating Proceeding must be passed within 2 months from the date of communication of this order. Let it be kept on record that Mr. Mitra learned advocate appearing for the Customs Authorities submits that although enquiries were held to find out the address of the writ petitioner in Haryana but it was found that in the address given in the writ application the writ petitioner was not residing. Mr. Mitra also disputes as to the claim of ownership of Shri Dharam Pal, the deceased husband of the writ petitioner in respect of the confiscated goods. With these observations this writ application is disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. All parties including the Customs Authority are to act on a signed xerox-copy of this Dictated Order on the usual undertaking.
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1996 (8) TMI 124 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT CALCUTTA
Refund consequent upon appellate order ... ... ... ... ..... te the interest which is payable to the writ petitioner on the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1,64,963.33p. within a month from this date and such payment will be made along with the principal sum of Rs. 1,64,963.33p. within a month from the date of communication of this order to the petitioner positively. There will be no order as to costs. 4.Since no affidavit has been filed by the respondents it is recorded that the allegations made in the writ application are not admitted by the respondents. 5.A prayer has been made on instruction by Mr. Sarkar appearing on behalf of the Revenue Authorities to stay the operation of this order for a period of four weeks from this date. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case and considering the issues involved in this writ application I do not find any reason to accede to such prayer of Mr. Sarkar. Accordingly the prayer for stay is refused. 6.All parties concerned to act on a signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking.
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1996 (8) TMI 123 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT CALCUTTA
Writ Jurisdiction - Question of facts ... ... ... ... ..... so make it clear that I have not gone into the merits of the disputes raised by the writ petitioner on the question as to whether the writ petitioner has become the owner of the lots for which the delivery of the said lots would be given to him or on the question as to whether the writ petitioners are entitled to compensation and refund of the money from the Customs Authority under the law. All those questions are kept open to be decided by the Civil Court or by any other appropriate forum if the writ petitioners are advised to approach the Civil Court or any other appropriate forum for this purpose. 8.Subject to this observation the writ application is dismissed. The interim order, if any, stands vacated. 9.There will be no order as to costs. 10.In view of the order passed on the writ application itself the application for vacating the interim order is disposed of accordingly. 11.All parties concerned to act on the signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking.
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1996 (8) TMI 122 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Demurrage and Detention charges ... ... ... ... ..... y demurrage charges for periods covered by detention certificate. The aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court nowhere directs the Board of Trustees of the Bombay Port Trust to refund the demurrage charges or detention charges recovered by it. Further, the learned Counsel for the Respondents pointed out that in the case of Trustees of Port of Madras v. Nagavedu Lungi and Co. - 1995 (80) E.L.T. 241 (SC) the Court has decreed the suit filed by the Board of Trustees of the Port of Madras against the Defendants for recovery of demurrage charges and other incidental charges in respect of certain textile goods in the Customs area of the Port of Madras by holding that the importer of goods cannot avoid his liability to pay demurrage charges and incidental charges in respect of the goods illegally detained in Customs area. 6. Considering the aforesaid facts, in our view, there is no substance in this petition and is, therefore, dismissed. Rule discharged with no order as to costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 121 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Rate of duty - Customs ... ... ... ... ..... e, the Bill of Entry was presented on 6th October, 1988. On the said date the Notification No. 286/88 was operative as it was already published on 3rd October, 1988. Section 15(1)(a) of Customs Act, 1962 is as follows - 15. Date for determination of rate of duty and tariff valuation of imported goods. - (1) The rate of duty and tariff valuation, if any, applicable to any imported goods, shall be the rate and valuation in force, - (a) In the case of goods entered for home consumption under Section 46, on the date on which a bill of entry in respect of such goods is presented under that section. There is no dispute that the goods in this case have entered for home consumption and hence in this case presentation of Bill of Entry is the date for determining the rate of duty payable. Therefore, the Customs duty, which was charged according to the said Notification No. 286/88, was correct and it was correctly decided. 4. In the result, the Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 120 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Refund - Tribunal's order ... ... ... ... ..... t the all granted by Respondent No. 3 with interest. 5.In these peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and particularly in view of the order passed on 2-9-1991 by this court in this writ petition directing the Respondents to grant refund of amount to the Petitioners as per order dated 24-6-1991 within 8 weeks, in our opinion the Petitioners are entitled to get interest at least from the said date at the rate of 12 p.a. till date of payment. The Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, Panvel, Respondent No. 3 is directed to hear the Petitioners and to decide their claim for refund after taking into consideration provisions of Section 11B of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and further considering the order of Collector of Customs of Central Excise (Appeals) dated 25-5-1992. The Respondent No. 3 is further directed to decide and dispose of the said claim within a period of 3 months form this order. Petition disposed of accordingly. No costs. Certified copy expedited.
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1996 (8) TMI 119 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Writ - Jurisdiction - Cause of action - Territorial jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... sdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be invoked of that High Court alongwith whose territorial limits the cause of action wholly or in part arises. To a similar effect there is another decision of different Division Bench of this Court in Rakesh Dhar Tripathi v. Union of India and others - AIR 1988 All. 47. 2. In view of the rule laid in the aforesaid decisions of this Court, with which I am bound, this writ petition is clearly not maintainable before this Court. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed as not maintainable without entering into the merit of the case. However, it shall be open to the petitioners, if so advised, to file a fresh petition before the appropriate court and take such steps or proceedings as may be considered necessary before such court or authority available to the petitioner under law. 3. A certified copy of this order may be supplied to the learned counsel for the petitioners on payment of usual charges within 24 hours.
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1996 (8) TMI 118 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit ... ... ... ... ..... , 1996 i.e. after the budget. The goods in question therefore, will not be exigible. 4. It is, therefore, urged by the counsel for the petitioner that if the petitioner is required to make pre-deposit that would cause undue hardship, inasmuch as in view of the Supreme Court s decision the goods in question are not exigible. In Paragraph 2 of the demand-cum-show cause notice, it is undisputed that the goods in question are pre-deposit stock cleared on or after 1st of March, 1994. 5. On these facts and circumstances, it will suffice if the petitioner is asked to furnish an indemnity bond in respect of the impugned excise duty. 6. The petition is, therefore, disposed of finally with the observation that the appeal filed by the petitioner will be entertained on furnishing the indemnity bond with regard to the excise duty which will be executed by the petitioner within two weeks from today. We hope and trust that the appeal will be decided by the appellate tribunal expeditiously.
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1996 (8) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ants manufacture the items set out in the Exemption notification falling within the entries of the Tariff thereon stated. The appellants have, however, to satisfy the Assistant Collector of Central Excise that the oxygen gas had been used for the purpose set out in the Exemption notification. 5.It, therefore, becomes necessary to set aside the order under appeal and remand the matters to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise to determine what quantity of oxygen gas had been captively consumed, in respect of which the benefit of the Exemption notification shall be available to the appellants. To the extent, that it is available, no differential duty shall be payable. 6.Having regard to what has transpired, it becomes unnecessary to go into the question of the valuation at the rate of Rs. 325/- per hundred cubic meters. That question will remain open, should it be necessary to raise it. 7.The Civil Appeals are disposed of accordingly. 8.There shall be no order as to costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the proved facts and circumstances the courts below were justified in taking recourse to the statutory presumption under Section 138A of the Customs Act?
Held that:- The answer must be in the affirmative. The fact that accused was found to be inside the vehicle from which the silver ingots were recovered; the fact that the vehicle did not stop even though customs authorities [signalled] for stopping; the fact that the two courts below disbelieved the plea of accused-Devchand about the break down of his fiat car and he is taking [an] innocent lift by the ambassador car from the secret pocket of which the silver ingots were recovered; and that the place from where the recovery was made is undoubtedly a place within the notified area under Section 11K of the Act and further that there was no transport voucher as required under Section 11K of the Act, unhesitatingly point towards the complicity of the accused-Devchand in the commission of offence under Section 135(1) and the presumption under Section 138A having been rightly attracted. The burden lay on the accused-appellant to establish that either he did not know about the fact of silver ingots being transported in the vehicle or that he was in no way connected with the same. But the accused-Devehand has utterly failed to discharge the said burden. In our considered opinion the conviction must be held to be well founded and the sentence passed thereunder is wholly justified.
So far as Jayantilal is concerned no convincing argument has been advanced on his behalf to interfere with the findings and conclusions arrived at by the courts below and consequently we do not find any case warranting interference by this Court has been made out. Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (8) TMI 115 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Precedent - Principles of Judicial Discipline ... ... ... ... ..... require that the orders of the highest appellate authority should be followed unreservedly by the subordinate authorities. Further, the subject matter of the appeal can furnish no grounds for not following it, unless its operation has been suspended by the competent Court. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner has filed a caveat before the Supreme Court and so far no notice of stay has been received by the petitioner. In view of the above, the respondents are directed to implement the order of the Customs, Excise, and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, South Zonal Bench, Madras in Appeal NCC/V-129/96/Md and C/V-130/96/Md, dated 18-5-1996 in accordance with law, within one week from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. It is open to the respondents to direct the petitioner to execute necessary customs surety or security bond to safeguard the interest of revenue to cover the disputed amounts, in case the contention of the revenue is accepted in appeal.
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1996 (8) TMI 114 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Release of seized goods - Order ... ... ... ... ..... sly which were accepted by the Customs Authorities in the past, I do not find any reason to hold that the order that was passed by the learned Single Judge in the other writ application of similar nature should not be passed in this writ application. 17.Accordingly, the writ application is allowed. The Customs Authorities are directed to release the consigned goods comprising 18.75 Metric Tonnes presently lying at West Bengal State Warehousing Corporation, a bonded-warehouse situated at Hide Road, Calcutta, upon payment of the assessed Customs Duty and also in addition to that, the freight and other expenses in the assessable value of the imported goods for the purpose of assessment of the Customs Duty within one month from the date of communication of this order. 18.The writ application is, thus, allowed to the extent indicating above. 19.There will be no order as to costs. 20.All parties shall act on a xerox signed copy of this judgment and order upon the usual undertaking.
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1996 (8) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
Claim of refund
Held that:- The writ petition was not a run-of-the-mill case. It was a case where the respondent-State had not acted as this Court had expected a high constitutional authority to act, in furtherance of the order of this Court. That is something that this Court cannot accept. The respondent-State was obliged by this Court's order to refund to the writ petitioners, including the appellants, the amounts collected from them in the form of the levy that was held to be illegal. If there was good reason in law for rejecting the refund claim, it should have been stated. Not to have responded to the appellants' refund claim for 11 years and then to have turned it down without reason is to have acted disrespectfully to this Court. Even assuming, therefore, that this was a writ petition only for money, the writ petition fell outside the ordinary stream of writ petitions and, acting upon it, the High Court should have ordered the refund. Appeal allowed.
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1996 (8) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellants were also entitled to the exemption granted to the 3rd respondents [The State Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Corporation of India Ltd.]?
Held that:- In the first place, the interim order was passed upon the application for stay of recovery of the difference in duty made by the appellants. If the appellants found the conditions imposed by the order unacceptable, they could have sold the caustic soda at a price higher than ₹ 5132 per metric tonne and paid duty thereon at the rate of 92.5 per cent after applying to this Court to relieve them of their undertaking. The appellants acted upon the interim order knowing full well that if the appeal was decided against them they would be required to pay duty at the rate of 92.5 per cent. Acting upon the interim order created no equity in favour of the appellants, nor are these any special or peculiar circumstances.
In the second place, an undertaking given to Court is not an obligation imposed by the Court. It is a promise voluntarily made to the Court. Acting upon its own undertaking to court creates no equity in favour of the party giving it, nor is it a special or peculiar circumstance.
In the third place, the passage from the decision in Jhangir Bhatusha's case [1989 (5) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] does not assist the appellants.
In the fourth place, should a court come to the conclusion that an exemption is arbitrary or discriminatory or violative of Article 14, it may strike the exemption down but it cannot widen its scope so as to cover those it finds have been discriminated against. Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (8) TMI 111 - SC ORDER
Notification ... ... ... ... ..... s of operativeness and enforceability. This contention of Shri Ganesh is unacceptable. Para 18 2. We may also observe that rejection by the Tribunal of the appellant s case even on the admitted position that on the very date of issue of notification there was a radio announcement about the changes brought about by these notifications and also a Press Release is another ground to justify rejection of the appellant s claim. Accordingly, there is no ground to admit this appeal. 3. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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1996 (8) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
Ex party orders - Held that:- It is for CEGAT to consider in every such case whether the respondent who applies for recall of the ex parte order against him had sufficient cause for remaining absent when it was passed and, if it is established to the satisfaction of CEGAT that there was sufficient cause, CEGAT must set aside the ex parte order, restore the appeal to its file and hear it afresh on merits.
On the facts of the present case, we think it proper to allow the appellants' application to CEGAT for setting aside the ex parte order against it ourselves. Appeal allowed.
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1996 (8) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
What will be the rate at which Customs duty is to be levied on goods that remain in a bonded warehouse beyond the permitted period?
Held that:- The permitted period for warehousing the said bales came to an end on 15th September, 1984, but the said bales remained in the bonded warehouse thereafter. The said bales, by reason of the provisions of Section 72, were deemed to have been improperly removed from the bonded warehouse on that day and subject to duty at the rate then in force. The demand notice dated 8th May, 1985, called upon the appellants to pay such duty. The order dated 25th June, 1985, pertaining to the appellants' private bonded warehouse, rightly made it clear that the said bales had not been cleared therefrom on an ex-bond bill of entry under Section 68 but under Section 72. While the appellants may have filed an ex-bond bill of entry pertaining to the said bales on 30th May, 1985, there is nothing on record that suggests that clearance thereon under Section 68 was ordered. Section 15(1)(b) has, therefore, no application.
The consequence of non-removal of warehoused goods within the permitted period or the permitted extension is, by virtue of the terms of Section 72, certain. The date on which it comes to end is the date relevant for determining the rate of duty. When the duty is, in fact, demanded is not relevant. The alternative submission on behalf of the appellants must, therefore, also be rejected.
Appeal dismissed.
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