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Case Laws
Showing 281 to 300 of 308 Records
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1993 (9) TMI 29 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Business Expenditure, Development Allowance, Development Rebate Reserve, Income Tax Act, Special Deduction, Weighted Deduction
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1993 (9) TMI 28 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Business Loss, Capital Gains, Carry Forward And Set Off, Income Tax Act, Unabsorbed Depreciation
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1993 (9) TMI 27 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Computation Of Capital, Industrial Undertaking, Written Down Value ... ... ... ... ..... ken into account. In other words, question No. 1 in so far as it pertains to grant is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and as regards loan, the same is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Regarding question No. 2, admittedly, the Tribunal has not taken into account the provisions of section 80J. Learned counsel for the assessee submitted that in view of the retrospective operation of sub-section (1A) of section 80J from April 1, 1972, this question may not be decided at this stage. The Tribunal may be directed to decide it in accordance with the amended provisions. Admittedly, the amended provisions are not considered by the Tribunal. Hence, question No. 2 is not answered at this stage and it is for the Tribunal to decide it in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1A) of section 80J of the Income-tax Act. The reference is answered accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 26 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons, Charitable Purpose, Juristic Person, Trade Union ... ... ... ... ..... cial outlay under the agreement was for the better conduct and improvement of the existing business and was revenue in nature and was allowable as a deduction in computing the business profits of the assessee. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amounts of Rs. 48,000 and Rs. 22,000, respectively, paid to the German companies known in short as Aubema and Hoes are allowable as revenue expenditure. Therefore, the finding of the Appellate Tribunal that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amounts of Rs. 48,000 and Rs. 22,000 paid under the contracts respectively to Aubema and Hoes are allowable as revenue deduction, is correct in law and sustainable from the material on record. Both the questions referred to us are, therefore, answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference stands accordingly disposed of, with no order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 25 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
A Firm, Additions To Income, Cash System, Income From Undisclosed Sources, Income Tax Act, Question Of Law
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1993 (9) TMI 24 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Inclusions In Total Income, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... earned by the minor son of the deceased. The aforesaid decision is followed in the case of CIT v. Vallabhdas Manjibhai 1987 163 ITR 59 (Guj) wherein the court held that if one of the partners in a firm is a partner in a representative capacity for and on behalf of his joint family, the mere fact that his spouse is also a partner in the same firm or his minor children have been admitted to the benefits of that partnership firm would not attract section 64(1)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, making the income of such spouse or the children liable to be clubbed with the income of the person who is a partner in a representative capacity. One of the aforesaid decisions is also followed in the case of CIT v. Ramanlal Nagindas Shah 1992 195 ITR 9 (Guj). In view of the aforesaid legal position in this State, we answer the question in the affirmative i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In the result, the reference is answered accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 23 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons, Charitable Purpose, Juristic Person, Trade Union ... ... ... ... ..... n be challenged as erroneous if, for example, some provision was overlooked not only by the assessee but also by the Income-tax Officer. Even in such a case, the order of assessment can be challenged by filing a revision application before the Commissioner. Therefore, even this contention raised on behalf of the Revenue deserves to be rejected. As we are of the opinion that the revision application filed by the assessee was maintainable, the Commissioner ought to have entertained the same and decided the same on the merits. As he has failed to do so and as he has rejected the revision application on the ground that it was not maintainable, the said order passed by him deserves to be quashed. In the result, we allow this petition. The impugned order dated February 13, 1979, passed by the Commissioner is quashed and set aside and he is directed to hear the revision application on the merits and decide the same in accordance with law. Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 22 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Assessment Order, Revised Return ... ... ... ... ..... ile a revised return even after the Income-tax Officer makes a draft order under section 144B, that would lead to uncertainty and delay in finalising the assessment. Section 144B. is now omitted with effect from April 1, 1989. For all these reasons, we are of the view that once a draft order is made by the Income-tax Officer under section 144B of the Act, the assessee cannot, thereafter, file a revised return. We are coming to this conclusion without going into the question as to whether the Income-tax Officer can issue more than one order. We, therefore, do not think it fit to deal with the two decisions cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in this behalf. Learned counsel had relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Sudhir Sareen v. ITO 1981 128 ITR 445 and of the Madras High Court in the case of B. Nagi Reddy v. CIT 1993 199 ITR 451. In the result, this petition fails. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Interim relief stands vacated.
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1993 (9) TMI 21 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Financial Corporation, Guest House, Special Reserve ... ... ... ... ..... to the total income computed before deductions under section 36(1)(viii) and Chapter VI-A. As regards question No. 2, what is required to be emphasised is that the controversy between the Revenue and the assessee was whether the expenditure in question was entertainment expenditure or business expenditure. It has been found as a matter of fact that it was not an entertainment expenditure. Therefore, the point arising for our consideration stands concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. 1978 112 ITR 776. We, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the expenditure in question was wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business of the assessee and as Such, allowable under section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Both the questions are answered in the affirmative, that is, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. References are disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs in each one of them.
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1993 (9) TMI 20 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons, Charitable Purpose, Juristic Person, Trade Union ... ... ... ... ..... ) of section 171 was challenged and the Madras High Court has held that the said sub-section is invalid. At the time when the Tribunal decided the appeal, that was the only decision in the field and, therefore, in view of what the Bombay High Court has held in CIT v. Godavaridevi Saraf (Smt.) 1978 113 ITR 589 and CIT v. Smt. Nirmalabai K. Darekar 1990 186 ITR 242 (Bom), the Tribunal was bound to follow the said judgment of the Madras High Court. It, therefore, cannot be said that the Tribunal committed an error in following the said judgment of the Madras High Court. In view of the said decision of the Madras High Court, the only course which the Tribunal could have followed was to direct the Income-tax Officer to consider the partial partition on the merits and pass an order under section 171 first and then under section 143(3) of the Act. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative, that is, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 19 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Assessing Officer, Income Tax Act, Special Audit ... ... ... ... ..... t was contended that the assessee did not file any such application and, therefore, the Assessing Officer erred in extending the period for submission of the report of the special audit under section 142(2A) of the Act. There is no substance in this submission either. The proviso to sub-section (2C) of section 142 of the Act makes it clear that the Assessing Officer may, either on the application made by the assessee and/or for any good and sufficient reasons, extend the said period which cannot extend to more than 180 days from the date on which the direction under section 142(2A) is received by the assessee. It has been stated in paragraph 6 of the written statement that the petitioner did not co-operate with Shri V. P. Vij, Chartered Accountant, who has been appointed as the special auditor for completing the audit and, therefore, the period for submission of the report by the special auditor had to be extended. The petition being without any merit is dismissed. No costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 18 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Application For Reference, Assessment Year, Income Tax Act, Reference Application ... ... ... ... ..... principles of natural justice and was also not well-founded, because the Tribunal had not given any finding to the effect that the proposed question of law did not arise at all. Even assuming that one consolidated reference application was not maintainable in respect of the nine cases, it ought to have been treated as proper and valid in accordance with the prescribed form at least for one assessment year because there was no bar to treating the said reference application for a particular year and deciding the same on merits. Therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the reference application of the Department on a hypertechnical ground that the procedure was not legal. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal was wrong in rejecting the application to make a reference. It is, therefore, directed that the Tribunal shall decide the reference application filed under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act on the merits for referring the questions of law to this court.
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1993 (9) TMI 17 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... deals . Sub-clause (viii) refers to performance of services outside India in connection with the execution of contract for the supply outside India of such goods, etc. We do not find any nexus between the loss suffered by the assessee on account of fluctuations in the rate of exchange of dollars and any of the activities specified above. It is difficult to hold such a loss to be an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively on any of the above activities. We are, therefore, of the clear opinion that the Tribunal was justified in not allowing weighted deduction on the loss suffered by the assessee in the instant case on account of fluctuations in the rate of exchange of dollars purchased by it to avoid future loss due to exchange fluctuations. In view of the above discussion, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 16 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Appeal To AAC, Business Expenditure, Entertainment Expenditure, Expenditure Incurred, Interest On Borrowed Capital, Law Applicable To Assessment, Medical Expenses
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1993 (9) TMI 15 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
In Part, Partnership Deed ... ... ... ... ..... e instrument of partnership. In our opinion, therefore, the deed dated January 1, 1955, does not go beyond section 30 of the Partnership Act. In our opinion, the ratio of this decision does not assist learned counsel for the Revenue. In our opinion, all the authorities cited at the Bar assist the assessee and not the Revenue. In the light of the above discussion, we have reached the conclusion that the assessee was entitled to be assessed in the status of a registered firm and the Tribunal ought to have upheld the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner directing registration of the assessee under the Income-tax Act, 1961. In this view of the matter, we answer questions Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Having regard to our answer to questions Nos. 1 to 4, it is not necessary to answer question No. 5 as the said question has become academic. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 14 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Appeal To AAC, Foreign Company, Income Tax Act, Interest On Borrowed Capital ... ... ... ... ..... N. S. Malaysia . A similar claim has also been disallowed by the Income-tax Officer in the earlier years on the same ground. The Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal all were of the opinion that the above payment was referable to a loan used for capital investment in shares and the interest paid on such loan utilised for the purpose of purchasing shares in a foreign company cannot be allowed as a deduction in the computation of the business income of the assessee. We find that the Tribunal was justified in arriving at the above conclusion and rejecting the claim of the assessee for deduction of the amount of interest from the business income of the assessee. We, therefore, answer question No. 1 referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The other two questions have already been answered in paragraphs 3 and 5 above. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 13 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Deduction In Respect, Development Allowance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... find any material to show that the assortment charges can be said to be expenditure--falling in the above two clauses. There is no material on record to show that these payments were in the nature of commission as claimed by the assessee. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee is not entitled to weighted deduction on the assortment charges also. Having regard to the above discussion and following the ratio of the decision of this court in M. H. Daryani v. CIT 1993 202 ITR 731 and a number of other decisions of this court on this section, we hold that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the expenditure incurred by the assessee mentioned in the question set out hereinabove did not qualify for weighted deduction under section 35B of the Income-tax, 1961. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 12 - SUPREME COURT
Whether provision for gratuity is allowable as deduction - Held, yes
... ... ... ... ..... , the Tribunal ought to have held that no deduction by way of provision for gratuity should be allowed for the year 1972-73 ? The assessment year concerned is 1972-73. Sub-section (7) of section 40A is not applicable to the said assessment year. Sub-section (7) was introduced by the Finance Act, 1975, with retrospective effect from April 1, 1973. In other words, sub-section (7) applies on and from the assessment year 1973-74. The assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 36,831 on account of the provision made by it for payment of gratuity to its employees for the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1972-73. The deduction was allowed under section 37 of the Income-tax Act. This was objected to by the Revenue and the aforesaid questions were sought to be raised. We see no error in the order of the High Court refusing to direct the Tribunal to make a reference with respect to the admissibility of the said deduction. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed. No costs.
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1993 (9) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Tribunal was right in holding that no penalty could be imposed with reference to the cash deposits even after the amendment of section 271 in 1964
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1993 (9) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the land in question admeasuring 30,885 sq. yards excluding 2,607 sq. yards, which was admittedly non-agricultural land, was an agricultural land within the meaning of section 2(14) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and, therefore, on the sale thereof, tax on capital gains resulting therefrom was not leviable
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